Foreign policy decisions are driven by conceptions of the national interest. It serves the national interest of the United States to pursue human rights goals because they advance our security interests; help establish a system of world order based on the aspirations of people and on the rule of law; are geopolitically advantageous by furthering peaceful evolutionary democratization of states; and command popular support, as they reflect fundamental values of the American people. Nonetheless, human rights had virtually no role in our foreign policy until the Carter administration. President Carter made human rights a key focus of U.S. foreign policy. When the Reagan administration began, it denigrated human rights policy, supporting many repressive authoritarian states. Gradually, the Reagan administration took a more positive stance toward human rights, largely accepting the Carter administration's human rights policies by the end of the Reagan years. Given the easing in East-West confrontation, the Bush administration now has a unique opportunity to strengthen and coordinate an international system of states that respect human rights. If the United States does this, our national interests will clearly be served.
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References
1.
1. Richard Schifter, “Building Firm Foundations: The Institutionalization of United States Human Rights Policy in the Reagan Years,”Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, 2:3-24 (1989). Schifter served as assistant secretary of state for human rights during the latter portion of the Reagan administration and proved to be a strong human rights advocate. His reappointment by Secretary of State Baker is to the credit of the Bush administration.
2.
2. Jerome J. Shestack and Roberta A. Cohen, “International Human Rights: A Rule for the United States,”Virginia Journal of International Law, 14:673, 678-680 (1984).
3.
See U.S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 238-240.
4.
4. The Preamble to the U.N. Charter affirms the dignity and worth and equal rights of each person. Article I states that the purpose of the Charter is to maintain peace and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. U.N. Charter, Art. I, paras. 1, 3.
5.
Henry Kissinger , American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 94.
6.
6. George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs, 64:205, 217 (Winter 1985-86).
7.
Richard H. Ullman , “The Realities of George F. Kennan,”Foreign Policy, 28:139 (1977).
8.
8. As James Chace put it, “In every case, there are elements of the `national interest' on both sides of any difficult decision; too often those who invoke the phrase are trying to load the dice in favor of the outcome they think most important.”James Chace, “Is a Foreign Policy Consensus Possible?”Foreign Affairs, 57:1, 15 (1978).
9.
Professor Hoffmann has observed that “what is prudent or expedient [in the national interest] is itself greatly determined by what the statesmen consider right.”Stanley Hoffmann, “Reaching for the Most Difficult: Human Rights as a Foreign Policy Goal,”Daedelus, 112:19, 35 (1983).
10.
For a summary of opposing views, see Conway Henderson, “Human Rights and Regimes: A Bibliographical Essay,”Human Rights Quarterly, 10:525, 527-528 (1988).
11.
11. See Sissela Bok, A Strategy for Peace (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 32-35.
12.
12. James Billington, “Realism and Vision in Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs, 65:630, 652 (1987).
13.
13. William Buckley, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs, 58:775, 784 (1980).
14.
14. William Bundy, “Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs, 54:51, 57 (1975).
15.
cf. Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen, “Making the Separation of Power Work,”Foreign Affairs, 57:17 (1978).
16.
16. Buckley, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,” p. 784.
17.
17. Jimmy Carter, Address delivered to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 23 June 1976.
18.
18. Elizabeth Drew, “A Reporter at Large: Human Rights,”New Yorker, 18 July 1977.
19.
19. Jimmy Carter, Speech on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 6 Dec. 1978, printed in Human Rights Reader, ed. Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin (New York: NAL, 1979), p. 325.
20.
20. Washington Post, 16 Apr. 1977.
21.
Hedley Bull, “A View from Abroad: Consistency under Pressure,” ibid., p. 442.
22.
22. During the Carter administration, a number of dictators fell - Idi Amin in Uganda, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Bokassa in the Central African Empire. Disappearances declined in Argentina, and in Peru, Portugal, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil, there were movements away from military regimes and toward constitutional governments. Annual emigration of Soviet Jews reached 51,000, the highest level ever. The Carter administration, of course, can hardly claim credit for all of these developments, but it did contribute to them.
23.
23. Stanley Hoffmann, “A View from Home: The Perils of Incoherence,”Foreign Affairs, 57:463, 479 (1979).
24.
idem , “Requiem,”Foreign Policy, 42:3 (1981).
25.
25. Schlesinger, “Human Rights and the American Tradition,” p. 521.
26.
26. Tamar Jacoby, “The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights,”Foreign Affairs, 64:1066, 1070 (1986).
27.
27. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Foreign Policy and the American Character,”Foreign Affairs, 62:1, 5 (1983).
28.
28. Jacoby, “Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights,” p. 1084.
29.
Charles Maynes, “Lost Opportunities,” ibid., 64:43 (1986).
30.
Jerome J. Shestack , “The Rise and Decline of Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy,”Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 15:19, 33-35 (1983).
31.
31. Hoffmann, “Reaching for the Most Difficult,” p. 19.
32.
32. The Kirkpatrick model included a worst-case scenario. In her view, traditional authoritarian governments were in danger of being replaced by Marxists, reactionaries, or other revolutionaries. Hence to support authoritarian governments was to choose the lesser of two evils. But this is an artificial choice, not a moral imperative. One can reject both lesser and greater evils. Moreover, Kirkpatrick misunderstood the nature of autocracies and the desire of their citizens for democratic government. As it turned out, the worst-case scenario did not materialize in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, the Philippines, South Korea, or Uruguay.
33.
33. Justice William T. Brennan, Jr., has pointed out that “the perceived threats to national security that have motivated the sacrifice of civil liberties during times of crises are often overblown and factually unfounded.” Brennan, “The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises” (Address delivered at the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, 22 Dec. 1987).
34.
34. For an excellent analysis of the case of the cold war and human rights programs, see Michael Mandelbaum, “Ending the Cold War,”Foreign Affairs, 68:16 (1989).
35.
Jerome J. Shestack , “An Untimely Focus: The Vulnerability of the Reagan Administration's Human Rights Policy,”Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, 2:25-53 (1989).
36.
36. James Baker, “Power for Good: American Foreign Policy in the New Era,”Current Policy, 14 Apr. 1989, no. 1162.
37.
Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, “Bipartisan Objectives for Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs, 66:899 (1988). Both articles instruct the new administration in policy goals and stratagems but do not see fit to emphasize human rights - a sobering reminder, perhaps, that human rights is still far from the recognition it requires in U.S. foreign policy.
38.
38. Quoted in Burns H. Weston, “Human Rights,”Human Rights Quarterly, 6:257, 281 (1984).
