Abstract
One of the peculiarities of the December 1998 votes in the House of Representatives to impeach Bill Clinton was that they took place during a lame-duck session. Roughly 10 percent of the voting population were in their final term and therefore no longer faced any risk of electoral retribution by the citizenry. While most of the relevant empirical literature suggests that the absence of electoral discipline does not matter, in theory, these departing legislators could ignore the preferences of their districts and vote according to their own personal preferences, the wishes of special interests, their new constituencies when relevant, or any other idiosyncratic factor. Because the votes on impeachment are so politically important, and since they offer an exceptional opportunity to examine the so-called last term problem, our analysis explores whether the factors influencing the votes of departing members of Congress were different than those influencing the votes of their continuing colleagues. We find that, contrary to past findings regarding political shirking, those leaving the House exhibited contrasting behavioral patterns relative to those who were continuing in the 106th Congress. In deciding their vote choices on the impeachment articles, reelected incumbents weighted district preferences far more heavily than departing members. Consequently, our results suggest that the severing of electoral ties is relevant for legislator behavior and that it is a matter of some importance whether or not a vote takes place during a lame-duck session.
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