Two poles of understanding define the hermeneutic circle: gestalt understanding, in which the experience of a text or piece of music is apprehended as a unity, and conceptual understanding, in which the work is broken down into more determinate parts. In our sensory-motor interaction with the world, the environment is composed of discrete objects, but there is also an omnipresent gestalt background of nonrepresentational practices that confer meaning on these objects. It is argued that neuroscience can provide an explanation of how a physical system instantiates these types of understanding. A naturalized version of temporality, that extended temporal horizon that frames the flux of sensible experience and confers meaning on it, is equated with the dynamical system concept of temporal hierarchical organization. With this naturalized concept of temporality, it is demonstrated how the two poles of understanding that define the hermeneutic circle can emerge in an evolutionary autonomous agent as those dynamics best suited to maintain optimal grip in that particular agent.
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