Though a general consensus exists regarding the significance of perceived performance in voters’ evaluations of incumbent governments, much of the research underlying this consensus has been carried out across political systems with little internal variance in the degree of democracy. We propose that in emerging regimes, where such uniformity in terms of the territorial diffusion of democracy is not a given, characteristics of subnational political regimes can prevent electoral linkages from forming. Specifically, we argue that in subnational contexts where some minimal level of political competition has taken hold, performance-based linkages such as those driving economic voting should surface. However, in subnational dominant-party systems, where clientelistic linkages between voters and political bosses tend to prevail, economic performance and other aspects of an incumbent’s governance record will be less consequential for the voting calculus of citizens, in both provincial and national elections. We find support for this theoretical framework in Argentina and Mexico, two democratic countries characterized by highly uneven subnational political contexts. By highlighting how subnational regime characteristics facilitate or undermine electoral accountability mechanisms, we cast light on the very real representational consequences of uneven democratization in emerging regimes.
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