We argue that support for parties of the radical right and left can usefully be understood as a problem of social integration—an approach that brings together economic and cultural explanations for populism. With comparative survey data, we assess whether support for parties of the radical right and left is associated with feelings of social marginalization. We find that people who feel more socially marginal—because they lack strong attachment to the normative order, social engagement, or a sense of social respect—are more likely to be alienated from mainstream politics and to support radical parties. We also find an association between indicators for recent economic and cultural developments often said to affect social status and feelings of social marginalization, especially among people with low incomes or educational attainment. We conclude that problems of social integration and subjective social status deserve more attention from scholars of comparative political behavior.
AlganY.GurievS.PapaioannouE.PassariE. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 309-382.
3.
AndersenR.CurtisJ. (2012). The polarizing effect of economic inequality on class identification: Evidence from 44 countries. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 30, 129-141.
4.
AndersenR.FetnerT. (2008). Economic inequality and intolerance: Attitudes toward homosexuality in 35 democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 52, 942-958.
5.
AntonucciL.HorvathL.KutiyskiY.KrouwellA. (2017). The malaise of the squeezed middle: Challenging the narrative of the “left behind” Brexiter. Competition & Change, 21, 211-229.
6.
ArzheimerK. (2017). Explaining electoral support for the radical right. In RydgrenJ. (Ed.), The oxford handbook of the radical right (pp. 143-165). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
AshcroftL. (2016). EU referendum: How did you vote poll. London, England: Lord Ashcroft Polls.
9.
AslanidisP. (2016). Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective. Political Studies, 64: 88-104.
10.
AutorD.DornD.HansonG.MajlesiK. (2016). Importing political polarization: The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure (NBER Working Papers No. 22637). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
BantingK.KymlickaW. (2013). Is there really a retreat from multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the multiculturalism policy index. Comparative European Politics, 11, 577-598.
13.
BellD. (Ed.). (1964). The radical right. New York, NY: Doubleday.
14.
BellahR. N.MadsenR.SullivanW. M.SwidlerA.TiptonS. M. (1996). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley: University of California Press.
15.
BergerS. (2017). Populism and the failures of representation. French Politics, Culture & Society, 35, 21-31.
16.
BerkmanL.GlassT.BrissetteI.SeemanT. E. (2000). From social integration to health: Durkheim in the new millennium. Social Science & Medicine, 51, 843-857.
17.
BlauP. M. (1960). A theory of social integration. American Journal of Sociology, 65, 545-556.
18.
BlauP. M.DuncanO. D. (1967). The American occupational structure. New York, NY: Wiley.
19.
BonikowskiB.GidronN. (2016). The populist style in American politics: Presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996. Social Forces, 94, 1593-1621.
20.
BornschierS. (2010). Cleavage politics and the populist right: The new cultural conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
21.
BouchardG. (2017). Social myths and collective imaginaries. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
22.
Brown-IannuzziJ. L.LundbergK. B.KayA. C.PayneK. (2015). Subjective status shapes political preferences. Psychological Science, 26, 15-26.
23.
BryanM. L.JenkinsS. P. (2015). Multilevel modelling of country effects: A cautionary tale. European Sociological Review, 32, 3-22.
24.
BullockJ. G.GreenD. P.HaS. E. (2010). Yes, but what’s the mechanism? (Don’t expect an easy answer). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 550-558.
25.
BurgoonB.van NoortS.RooduijnM.UnderhillG. (2019). Positional deprivation and support for radical right and radical left parties. Economic Policy, 34, 49-93.
26.
ColantoneI.StanigP. (2018). The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. American Journal of Political Science, 62, 936-953.
27.
CramerK. J. (2016). The politics of resentment: Rural consciousness in Wisconsin and the rise of Scott Walker. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
28.
De BottonA. (2004). Status anxiety. London, England: Hamish Hamilton.
29.
De VriesC.HoboltS. (2012). When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. European Union Politics, 13, 246-268.
30.
DurkheimE. (1984). The division of labour in society. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published 1892)
31.
EdelmanM. (1985). The symbolic uses of politics (2nd ed.). Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
32.
EhrenreichB. (1990). Fear of falling: The inner life of the middle class. New York, NY: Harper.
33.
ElchardusM.SpruytB. (2012). The contemporary contradictions of egalitarianism: An empirical analysis of the relationship between the old and new left/right alignments. European Political Science Review, 4, 217-239.
34.
ElchardusM.SpruytB. (2016). Populism, persistent republicanism and declinism: An empirical analysis of populism as a thin ideology. Government and Opposition, 51, 111-133.
EribonD. (2013). Returning to Reims. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
37.
EtzioniA. (1996). Positive aspects of community and the dangers of fragmentation. Development and Change, 27, 301-314.
38.
EvansM. D. R.KelleyJ. (2004). Subjective social location: Data from 21 nations. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 16, 3-38.
39.
FiskS. T. (Ed.). (2010). Handbook of social psychology. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
40.
GestJ. (2016). The new minority. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
41.
GestJ.RenyT.MayerJ. (2018). Roots of the radical right: Nostalgic deprivation in the United States and Britain. Comparative Political Studies, 51, 1694-1719.
42.
GidronN.HallP. A. (2017). The politics of social status: Economic and cultural roots of the populist right. The British Journal of Sociology, 68, S57-S84.
43.
GidronN.MijsJ. (2019). Do changes in material circumstances drive support for populist radical parties? Panel data evidence from The Netherlands during the great recession, 2007–2015. European Sociological Review, 2019, 1-14.
44.
GidronN.ZiblattD. (2019). Center-right political parties in advanced democracies. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 17-35.
45.
GomezR.MoralesL.RamiroL. (2016). Varieties of radicalism: Examining the diversity of radical left parties and voters in Western Europe. West European Politics, 39, 351-379.
46.
GoosM.ManningA.SalomonsA. (2014). Explaining job polarization: Routine-biased technological change and offshoring. American Economic Review, 104, 2509-2526.
HainmuellerJ.HiscoxM. J. (2007). Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe. International Organization, 61, 399-342.
49.
HallP. A.EvansG. (2019, August). Representation gaps: Changes in popular preferences and party positions over the long term in the developed democracies. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.
50.
HanK. J. (2016). Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties. Electoral Studies, 42, 54-64.
51.
HawkinsK.ReadM.PauwelsT. (2017). Populism and its causes. In KaltwasserC. R.TaggartP.EspejoP. O.OstiguyP. (Eds.), The oxford handbook of populism (pp. 267-288). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
HochschildA. R. (2016). Strangers in their own land. New York, NY: New Press.
54.
HoutM. (2008). How class works: Objective and subjective aspects of class since the 1970s. In LareauE.ConleyD. (Eds.), Social class: How does it work? (pp. 25-64). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
55.
ImZ. J.MayerN.PalierB.RovnyJ. (2019). The losers of digitalization: A reservoir of votes for the radical right?Research & Politics, 6, 1-7.
56.
InglehartR. F.NorrisP. (2017). Trump and the xenophobic populist parties: The silent revolution in reverse. Perspectives on Politics, 15, 443-454.
57.
InglehartR. F.WelzelC. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
58.
IvarsflatenE. (2008). What unites the populist right in Western Europe? Reexamining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. Comparative Political Studies, 41, 3-23.
59.
JackmanM. R.JackmanR. W. (1973). An interpretation of the relation between objective and subjective social status. American Sociological Review, 38, 569-582.
60.
KefalasM. (2003). Working-class heroes: Protecting home, community, and nation in a Chicago neighborhood. Berkeley: University of California Press.
61.
KitscheltH.McGannT. (1997). The radical right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
62.
KöppingP. (2018). Integriert doch erst mal uns! [But First Integrate Us!]. Berlin, Germany: Christoph Links Verlag GmbH.
63.
KüpperB.WolfC.ZickA. (2010). Social status and anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: An examination from the perspective of social dominance theory. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 4, 205-219.
64.
KurerT. (2018, April). The declining middle: Political reactions to occupational change. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Bloomington, IN.
65.
KuziemkoI.BuellR. W.ReichT.NortonM. I. (2014). Last place aversion: Evidence and redistributive implications. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129, 105-149.
66.
LayteR.WhelanC. T. (2014). Who feels inferior? A test of the status anxiety hypothesis of social inequalities in health. European Sociological Review, 30, 525-535.
67.
LindemannK.SaarE. (2014). Contextual effects on subjective social position: Evidence from European countries. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 55, 3-23.
68.
LipsetS. M. (1955). The radical right: A problem for American democracy. The British Journal of Sociology, 6, 176-209.
69.
LipsetS. M. (1959). Democracy and working-class authoritarianism. American Sociological Review, 24, 482-501.
70.
MarchL. (2011). Radical left parties in Europe. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
71.
MarmotM. (2004). The status syndrome: How social standing affects our health and longevity. London, England: Owl Books.
72.
McClendonG. (2018). Envy in politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
73.
MertonR. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
74.
MiyakawaM.Mangusson HansonL. L.TheorellT.WesterlundH. (2012). Subjective social status: Its determinants and association with health in the Swedish working population (the SLOSH study). European Journal of Public Health, 22, 593-597.
75.
MoffittB. (2016). The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
76.
MuddeC. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
77.
MuddeC.Rovira KaltwasserC. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
78.
MuddeC.Rovira KaltwasserC. (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. Comparative Political Studies, 51, 1667-1693.
79.
MüllerJ. W. (2016). What is populism?Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
80.
MutzD. (2018). Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111, E4330-E4339.
81.
OeschD. (2006). Redrawing the class map. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
82.
OeschD. (2008). Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. International Political Science Review, 29, 349-373.
83.
OeschD. (2013). Occupational change in Europe: How technology and education transform the job structure. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
84.
OeschD.RennwaldL. (2018). Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right. European Journal of Political Research, 57, 783-807.
85.
OperarioD.AdlerN. E.WilliamsD. R. (2004). Subjective social status: Reliability and predictive utility for global health. Psychology & Health, 19, 237-246.
86.
PassasN. (1997). Anomie, reference groups and relative deprivation. In PassasN.AgnewR. (Eds.), The future of anomie theory (pp. 62-94). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
87.
PatemanC. (1988). The gender contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
88.
PeugnyC. (2009). Le dèclassement [Downward Social Mobility]. Paris, France: Éditions Grasset.
89.
PoppitzP. (2016). Does self-perceptions and income inequality match? The case of subjective social status (IMK Working Paper No. 173). Düsseldorf, Germany: Hans-Boeckler Foundation.
90.
PutnamR. K. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, NY: Touchstone.
91.
RamiroL. (2016). Support for radical left parties in Western Europe: Social background, ideology and political orientations. European Political Science Review, 8, 1-23.
92.
RidgewayC. L. (2014). Why status matters for inequality. American Sociological Review, 79, 1-16.
93.
RidgewayC. L.WalkerH. (1995). Status structures. In CookK.FineG.HouseJ. (Eds.), Sociological perspectives on social psychology (pp. 281-310). New York, NY: Allyn & Bacon.
94.
RiekB. M.ManiaE. W.GaertnerS. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 336-353.
95.
RodrikD. (2018). Populism and the economics of globalization. Journal of International Business Policy, 1, 12-33.
96.
RooduijnM.AkkermanT. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe. Party Politics, 23, 193-204.
97.
RooduijnM.BurgoonB. (2018). The paradox of well-being: Do unfavorable socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts deepen or dampen radical left and radical right voting among the less well-off?Comparative Political Studies, 51, 1720-1753.
98.
RooduijnM.BurgoonB.van ElsasE. J.van de WerfhorstH. G. (2017). Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe. European Union Politics, 18, 536-559.
99.
RooduijnM.van der BrugW.de LangeS. L. (2016). Expressing or fueling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent. Electoral Studies, 43, 32-40.
100.
RovnyA. E.RovnyJ. (2017). Outsiders at the ballot box: Operationalizations and political consequences of the insider-outsider dualism. Socio-Economic Review, 15, 161-185.
101.
RuncimanW. G. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice. London, England: Routledge.
102.
RydgrenJ. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious: Explaining the emergence of a new party family. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 413-437.
103.
RydgrenJ. (2017). Radical right-wing parties in Europe. Journal of Language and Politics, 16, 485-496.
104.
SchneiderS. M. (2019). Why income inequality is dissatisfying? Perceptions of social status and the inequality-satisfaction link in Europe. European Sociological Review, 35, 409-430. doi:10.1093/esr/jcz003
105.
ShayoM. (2009). A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class and redistribution. American Political Science Review, 103, 147-174.
106.
Singh-ManouxA.AdlerN.MarmotM. (2003). Subjective social status: Its determinants and its association with measures of ill-health in the Whitehall II study. Social Science & Medicine, 56, 1321-1333.
107.
SosnaudB.BradyD.FrenkS. (2013). Class in name only: Subjective class identity, objective class position, and vote choice in American presidential elections. Social Problems, 60, 81-99.
108.
SpruytB.KeppensG.Van DroogenbroeckF. (2016). Who supports populism and what attracts people to it?Political Research Quarterly, 69, 335-346.
109.
SteenvoordenE.HarteveldE. (2018). The appeal of nostalgia: The influence of societal pessimism on support for populist right parties. West European Politics, 41, 28-52.
110.
StegmuellerD. (2013). How many countries for multilevel modeling? A comparison of frequentist and Bayesian approaches. American Journal of Political Science, 57, 748-761.
111.
TaggartP. (2000). Populism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
112.
TajfelH.TurnerJ. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In AustinW. G.WorchelS. (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
113.
TavitsM. (2007). Party systems in the making: The emergence and success of new parties in new democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 113-133.
114.
Van HauwaertS. M.Van KesselS. (2018). Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. European Journal of Political Research, 57, 68-92.
115.
Van KesselS. (2015). Populist parties in Europe: Agents of discontent?Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
116.
VisserM.LubbersM.KraaykampG.JaspersE. (2014). Support for radical left ideologies in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 53, 541-558.
117.
WalkerI.SmithH. J. (Eds.). (2002). Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
118.
WeakliemD. L. (2002). The effects of education on political opinions: An international study. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14, 141-157.
119.
WeberM. (1968). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published 1918)
120.
WelzelC. (2013). Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
121.
WuthnowR. (2018). The left behind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
