Why do some communities protest to demand change, while other seemingly similar communities do not? A large body of literature has found that elites play an important role in this regard, and documented the wide variety of mobilization tactics they use. While such arguments go some way toward explaining protest patterns, however, the literature has so far struggled to explain why some elites are able to employ these mobilization tactics so much more effectively than others. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these patterns. Specifically, I identify the critical role played by protest brokers—intermediaries who connect elites desiring mobilization with potential protesters. Without these brokers, I argue, many elites lack the local knowledge, connections, and trust necessary to mobilize collective action, significantly decreasing the likelihood of protest occurrence, and helping to explain where protests happen.
AlexanderP. (2010). Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests - a preliminary analysis. Review of African Political Economy, 37(123), 25-40.
3.
AndreoniJ.,SprengerC. (2012). Risk preferences Are not time preferences. American Economic Review, 102(7), 3357-3376.
4.
AuerbachA. M. (2020). Demanding development: The politics of public goods provision in India’s urban slums. Cambridge University Press.
5.
AuerbachA. M.,ThachilT. (2018). How clients select brokers: competition and choice in India’s slums. American Political Science Review, 112(4): 775-791.
6.
AuyeroJ.LapegnaP.PomaF. P. (2009). Patronage politics and contentious collective action: a recursive relationship. Latin American Politics and Society, 51(3), 1-31.
7.
BertauxD. (1981). Biography and society: The life history approach in the social sciences. Sage Publications.
8.
BrockettC. D. (1991). The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in central America. Comparative Politics, 23(3), 253-274.
9.
BurgwaldG. (1996). Struggles of the poor: neighbourhood organization and clientelist practice in a quito squatter settlement. CEDLA.
10.
CalvoE.,MurilloM. V. (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 742-757.
11.
CampR. A. (2002). Mexico’s mandarins: Crafting a power elite for the twenty-first century. University of California Press.
12.
CampE. (2015). Cultivating effective brokers: A party leader's dilemma. British Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 521-543.
13.
ColeA. L.,KnowlesJ. G. (Eds.), (2001). Lives in Context: The Art of Life History Research. AltaMira/Rowman and Littlefield.
14.
DawsonH. J. (2014). Patronage from below: Political unrest in an informal settlement in South Africa. African Affairs, 113(453), 518-539.
15.
De FigueiredoR. J. P.Jr.,WeingastB. R. (1999). The rationality of fear: political opportunism and ethnic conflict. In WalterB.SnyderJ. (Eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (pp. 261-302). Columbia University Press.
DiazF. A. (2017). Protests in Colombia and South Africa reveal link between inequality and popular uprisings. The Conversation.
18.
DollbaumJ. M. (2017). Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the 'for fair elections’ protests 2011-2012. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 8(2), 109-122.
19.
DuffyM. M.BinderA. J.SkrentnyJ. D. (2010). Elite status and social change: using field analysis to explain policy formation and implementation. Social Problems, 57(1), 49-73.
20.
EisingerP. K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. American Political Science Review, 67, 11-28.
21.
EkiertG.,KubikJ. (1998). Contentious politics in new democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93. World Politics, 50(4), 547-581.
22.
FlacksR. (2004). Knowledge for what? Thoughts on the state of social movement studies. In GoodwinJ.JasperJ. M. (Eds), Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion (pp. 135-154). Rowman & Littlefield.
23.
FrederickS.LoewensteinG.O’donoghueT. (2002). Time discounting and time preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351-401.
GagnonV. P. (1995). Ethnic conflict as an intra-group phenomenon: A preliminary framework. Revija Za Sociologiju, 26(1), 81-90.
26.
GamsonW. A.,MeyerD. S. (1996). Framing political opportunity. In McAdamD.McCarthyJ. D.ZaldM. N. (Eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (pp. 275-290). Cambridge University Press.
27.
GayR. (1999). The broker and the thief: A parable (reflections on popular politics in Brazil). Luso-Brazilian Review, 36(1), 49-70.
28.
GeigerS. (1986). Women's life histories: Method and content. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 11(2), 334-351.
29.
GerringJ. (2006). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University Press.
30.
GerringJ. (2008). Case selection for case‐study analysis: Qualitative and quantitative techniques. In Box-SteffensmeierJ. M.BradyH. E.CollierD. (Eds), The Oxford handbook of political methodology. Oxford University Press.
31.
GoodwinJ.,JasperJ. M. (Eds), (2003). The social movements reader: cases and concepts. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
32.
GrassoM. T.,GiugniM. (2016). Protest participation and economic crisis: the conditioning role of political opportunities. European Journal of Political Research, 55, 663-680.
33.
GurrT. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton University Press.
34.
HipsherP. L. (1996). Democratization and the decline of urban social movements in Chile and Spain. Comparative Politics, 28(3), 273-297.
HollandA. C.,Palmer-RubinB. (2015). Beyond the machine. Comparative Political Studies, 48(9), 1186-1223.
37.
IsaevG. (2014). Russia and Egypt: conflicts in the political elite and protest movements in 2011-2012. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5(1), 60-67. DOI: 10.1016/j.euras.2013.10.003.
38.
KenistonK. (1968). Young radicals. Harcourt, Brace & World.
39.
KitscheltH. P. (1986). Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 16(1), 57-85.
40.
KosterM.,de VriesP. A. (2012). Slum Politics. Focaal, 2012(62), 83-98.
41.
KoterD. (2013). King makers: local leaders and ethnic politics in Africa. World Politics, 65(2), 187-232.
42.
LaibsonD. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443-478.
43.
LakeD. A.,RothchildD. (1996). Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. International Security, 21(2), 41-75.
44.
LancasterL. (2018). Unpacking discontent: Where and why protest happens in South Africa. South African Crime Quarterly, 64, 29-44.
45.
LarreguyH.MarshallJ.QuerubínP. (2016). Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. American Political Science Review, 110(1), 160-179.
46.
LarreguyH.Montiel OleaC. E.QuerubínP. (2017). Political brokers: partisans or agents? Evidence from the Mexican teachers' union. American Journal of Political Science, 61(4), 877-891.
47.
LiebermanE. S. (2005). Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 435-452.
48.
LockwoodS. J. (2021). Replication data for: Protest brokers and the technology of mobilization: evidence from South Africa. DOI: 10.7910/DVN/SP1UVH. Harvard Dataverse
49.
MbaziraC. (2013). Service delivery protests, struggle for rights and the failure of local democracy in South Africa and Uganda: parallels and divergences. South African Journal on Human Rights, 29(2), 251-275.
50.
McAdamD. (1982). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970. University of Chicago Press.
51.
MillsC. W. (1956). The power elite. Oxford University Press.
52.
MtyalaQ.,HartleyA. (2010May 26). We’ll trash city, says ANCYL. Times.
53.
MuellerL. (2018). Political protest in contemporary Africa. Cambridge University Press.
54.
MullerE. N. (1985). Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence. American Sociological Review, 50(1), 47-61.
55.
MurrayC. (2002). Livelihoods research: transcending boundaries of time and space. Journal of Southern African Studies, 28(3), 489-509.
56.
NichterS. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 19-31.
OberschallA. (1978). Theories of social conflict. Annual Review of Sociology, 4, 291-315.
59.
OlsonM. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press.
60.
ParetM.,RuncimanC. (2016). The 2009+ South African protest wave. WorkingUSA, 19(3), 301-319.
61.
PerryE. J (2007). Popular protest in shanghai, 1919-1927. In DillonN.OiJ. C. (Eds), At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-Building in Republican Shanghai. Stanford University Press.
62.
PollettaF. (1998). “It was like a fever ...” narrative and identity in social protest. Social Problems, 45(2), 137-159.
63.
PutnamR. D. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Prentice-Hall.
64.
RobertsonG. B. (2011). The politics of protest in hybrid regimes: Managing dissent in post-communist Russia. Cambridge University Press.
65.
RobinsS (2010). The divide within is stalling change. Cape Times.
66.
RobinsonM.,WhiteG. (1997). The role of civic organizations in the provision of social services. World Institute for Development Economics Research.
67.
RobnettB. (1996). African-American women in the civil rights movement, 1954-1965: Gender, leadership, and micromobilization. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), 1661-1693.
68.
SapireH. (1992). Politics and protest in shack settlements of the Pretoria‐Witwatersrand‐Vereeniging region, South Africa, 1980-1990. Journal of Southern African Studies, 18(3), 670-697.
SeddonD.,ZeiligL. (2005). Class & protest in Africa: New waves. Review of African Political Economy, 32(103), 9-27.
71.
SnowD. A.,BenfordR. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. International Social Movements Research, 1, 197-218.
72.
SnowD. A.RochfordE. B.WordenS. K.BenfordR. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464-481.
73.
South African National Census (2011). Statistics South Africa.
74.
StokesS. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3), 315-325.
75.
StokesS. C.DunningT.NazarenoM.BruscoV. (2013). Brokers, votes and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics. Cambridge University Press.
76.
SzwarcbergM. (2012). Uncertainty, political clientelism, and voter turnout in Latin America: Why parties conduct rallies in Argentina. Comparative Politics, 45(1), 88-106.
77.
SzwarcbergM. (2015). Mobilizing poor voters: Machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina. Cambridge University Press.
78.
TarrowS. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. Cambridge University Press.
79.
TarrowS. (1996). States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements. In McAdamD.McCarthyJ. D.ZaldM. N. (Eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (pp. 41-61). Cambridge University Press.
80.
TezcürG. M. (2016). Ordinary people, extraordinary risks: participation in an ethnic rebellion. American Political Science Review, 110(2), 247-264.
81.
ThalerR. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics Letters, 8, 201-207.
VarshneyA (2002). Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and muslims in India. Yale University Press.
84.
WassermanH.BoschT.ChumaW. (2016). Voices of the poor are missing from South Africa’s media. The Conversation.
85.
WilkinsonS. (2004). Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India. Cambridge University Press.
86.
YueL. Q. (2015). Community constraints on the efficacy of elite mobilization: the issuance of currency substitutes during the panic of 1907. American Journal of Sociology, 120(6), 1-46.
87.
ZarazagaR. (2014). Brokers beyond clientelism: A new perspective through the Argentine case. Latin American Politics and Society, 56(3), 23-45.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
