Abstract
Theological ethics 1 in the Catholic tradition has undergone profound change in the post-Vatican II era. The classicism that dominated Neo-Scholasticism has been replaced by a theology attuned to historical consciousness, while the essentialist theological anthropology that characterised the manualist tradition has been superseded by a dynamic concept of the moral subject and of moral reasoning. Moreover, Catholic theological ethics has become more determinedly ecumenical, humanistic, and pluralistic in its approach to foundational issues as well as in relation to the resources from which it draws. 2 Analyses of the impact and significance of these developments are many. However, while the transformation wrought by the generation which catalysed the theological agenda of Vatical II is well rehearsed, the significance of the conceptual and methodological developments instituted by the next generation is less well appreciated. This essay adds to the small number of existing assessments of this post-Vatican II generation of Catholic theological ethicists 3 by considering the contribution that James F. Keenan SJ has made to the field. 4
Keenan’s teaching and writing spans four decades and is extensive in its ambition, remit and volume. Canisius Professor at Boston College where he has spent much of his academic career to date, Keenan has written foundational theological works on conscience, agency, moral reasoning, and casuistry as well as in applied theological ethics, especially in the fields of bioethics, sexual ethics, institutional church ethics and university ethics. His historical and textual work, on Thomas Aquinas,
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on casuistry,
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and on St Alphonsus di Liguori
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has been ground-breaking, and through the decades he has developed noteworthy and often challenging analyses of the theological works and encyclicals of Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis.
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Additionally, his time at the helm of the iconic “Moral Notes” series, published annually in
Historian John O’Malley has argued that Vatican II was most fundamentally “about style, about the ‘how’ of the church.” 10 Recognising the likely resistance to such a seemingly superficial evaluation, O’Malley asks “Style? Is that really important?” answering “Indeed it is. The style of our nation is democratic. Without that style, there is no United States. What made Michelangelo a great painter was not what he painted but how he painted, his style.” 11 Regarding the style of Vatican II O’Malley argues “no other aspect of Vatican II sets it off so impressively from all previous councils and thereby suggests its break with ‘business as usual.’ No other aspect so impressively indicates that a new mode of interpretation is required if we are to understand it and get at its ‘spirit.’” 12 O’Malley argued that “content and mode of expression are inextricably intertwined,” and that “in dealing with style we are at the same time dealing with content.” 13 Keenan has often adapted O’Malley’s reflection on style 14 affirming with O’Malley that style is “not something over against substance” but rather “more like a way of proceeding” 15 that conveys “a resonance with a particular type of culture.” 16
When one examines Keenan’s corpus through the lens of style, one sees a body of work that is distinctive. Part I of this essay discusses what I regard to be the foundational elements of Keenan’s distinctive style and aims to demonstrate with O’Malley, that in Keenan’s style we find the ultimate expression of his values, and his sense of the mission and purpose of theology. In naming Keenan’s style performative, I adapt Judith Butler’s definition to suggest that his ethics “is a discursive practice that enacts that which it names,” 17 which in Keenan’s case is the enactment of a culture of connection, empathy and solidarity. Part II considers some of the key themes and concerns with which Keenan has engaged, affirming with O’Malley that substance and style are inextricably intertwined. The focus of this section is Keenan’s work on the moral life, paying particular attention to his retrieval of virtue as well as his more recent work on theological anthropology rooted in vulnerability and recognition. In each case his performative style enacts and displays the relationality that, for Keenan, is at the heart of Christian ethics. This performativity is also in view in his work on church ethics and university ethics, fields that are close to home, but still under-examined, as Keenan has so forcefully argued. In this context one sees time and again that Keenan uncovers neglected dimensions of the church’s moral tradition, names complicity in institutional failures and attends to the systemic erasure of certain voices in theology and society. He is both advocate and activist, concerned not only with retrieving and reinventing the theological tradition but also with engaging and serving the church community. Part III focuses on Keenan’s practices of solidarity within the academy that flow from his ethic of connection, and that illustrate further its performativity. The essay ends with a brief reflection on continuing the agenda which he has set.
Narrativity and Connection
In his keynote address to the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA) in 2009, Keenan departed from the conventional style of the academy and began his lecture with a detailed account of his cancer diagnosis and the fear it engendered in him. Entitled “Impasse and Solidarity in Theological Ethics,” 18 Keenan moved from this personal narrative to create a compelling ethical discourse on suffering and solidarity. From this starting-point he developed a searing critique of the detached, rationalist style of theology that is prized in academia, and made the case for a change in the way moral theological reflection proceeds. Indeed, this can be regarded as one of Keenan’s most important essays, not only because of the personal narrative mode through which he theologises, but also because the essay does important theological work on the relationality that anchors the moral life, and on the moral practice of solidarity. Additionally, he introduces the themes of vulnerability and recognition, and the concerns of university and academic ethics which would later become central to his theological ethics.
Theology had already taken a narrative turn, so that was not particularly distinctive. Especially from the 1970s, scholarly analysis of the religious ideas embedded in narrative emerged as a key mode of theological reflection. 19 The narratives of interest were primarily the biblical narratives, the classics of (mostly) Western culture and the newly articulated narratives, often in fiction, poetry and theatre, of traditionally silenced groups, including women. Paul Ricoeur, Hans Frei and Stanley Hauerwas, as well as feminist theologians Sallie McFague and Carol Christ, turned to narrative as a venue for theological insight. Yet for many, the focus was on narrative at a remove, as for example with the theologising of literary classics. A small number of theologians and ethicists did engage the narratives of their own lives as a source of theological insight. For example, Stanley Hauerwas has used personal narrative in his theological reflection 20 and it has also been an important dimension of the theological work of Emile Townes, 21 M. Shawn Copeland 22 and others who have drawn on their personal narratives to highlight the exclusions and violence of gender and white privilege that have been threaded through Christian history, with the purpose of revisioning theological ethics in ways that address these systemic failures. Keenan’s theological ethics sits within this narrative turn, although there are also other contexts, including the post-Vatican II renewal, in which his work is appropriately located. However, particularly in the context of Catholic theological ethics, Keenan’s work is unique in theologising explicitly, consistently, and unapologetically, from his own personal, often threshold experiences. Moreover narrativity is not simply a technique, but is performative. It is a pathway to connection, empathy, and solidarity. It is fundamental to Keenan’s theological method because as a genre it is unsurpassed in its capacity to enunciate our shared humanity.
For Christians the formative narrative is of Jesus’s redemptive love and engaging this narrative,
Keenan’s prioritisation of narrative and impetus for affective connection is evident also in his historical and textual studies. Although rarely noted, Keenan’s historical and textual work is never just about the texts, their meaning and significance. Rather, alongside Keenan’s textual and historical analysis is an invitation to enter the lives, writings, and worlds of St Thomas Aquinas, St Ignatius, St Alphonsus de Liguori, and the casuists, as well as the worlds of the monks and laypersons of the Middle Ages who were dedicated to the corporal works of mercy. He attends to the materiality as well as to the intellectual and spiritual dimensions of these worlds. Moreover, he gives readers an insight, not only into the worlds of the authors of these great works, but also into the worlds of the readers and hearers; that is, to the worlds of the communities for whom this writing and preaching was intended. This approach not only serves to retrieve those aspects of the tradition that have been obscured or lost, but it also serves as a path of connection between the communities of Christians past and present, and thereby as a way of engaging the tradition in the constructive task of contemporary theological ethics. We see this approach in embryonic form in
Vulnerability and Recognition
This relationality also animates Keenan’s virtue-based theology. His retrieval of the language of virtue has been a vital resource for the person-centred ethics that has characterised much of the post-Vatican II moral theology. Not only has his
This relational structuring of the virtues has been extraordinarily generative, not only for Keenan’s own theological ethics, but also for the development of virtue ethics. While highly conversant with the different analytical frameworks adopted in the tradition through the centuries, and while recognising the value that each has brought to the moral tradition, seen for example in his work on casuistry, nonetheless one can conclude that for Keenan, Christian ethics is best understood as an ethic centred around virtue. For Keenan, analytical reflection on the moral life is best pursued through the lens of virtue. Yet his centring of virtue is never strident or exclusionary. Rather, he recognises the value of alternative discourses, for example of rights, and engages these discourses through the prism of virtue, thus opening them for further elaboration. His reading of the tradition moreover often brings to light its fundamental virtue-orientation, an orientation that has often been obscured, or that has fossilised through centuries of decontextualised interpretation.
Indeed, one could argue that his most recent, magisterial history
In his centring virtue Keenan has also analysed the dynamics of moral development by considering what “growth in virtue” entails. He challenged the tendency towards perfectionist ethics, arguing that the cardinal virtues, of justice, fidelity, self-care and prudence “do not purport to offer a picture of the ideal person,” nor are they “the last word on virtue,” but rather they are among the first, providing the bare essentials for right human living.”
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He has developed this reflection to high acclaim, and with significant impact for the community in his pastorally oriented
For Keenan, our growth in virtue is a response to the divine initiative. This dynamic of divine invitation and human response is influenced by the work of Keenan’s
It was noted earlier that Keenan centres his D’Arcy Lectures around the foundational stories of grief, vulnerability and recognition that are at the heart of the Christian narrative and he invites readers to imaginatively inhabit these narratives in order to understand the moral life to which Christians are called. Through his D’Arcy Lectures he develops his theological anthropology in new directions, echoing the insights of philosopher Gillian Rose whose meditation at the end of her life spoke of accepting “the boundaries of oneself and others, while remaining vulnerable, woundable, around the bounds.” 46 Keenan’s theological anthropology highlights the vulnerability that is at the heart of our humanness, and which animates his ethics of connection. Grief, vulnerability and recognition are in fact the cornerstones of the “ontologically social anthropology” 47 developed in these lectures.
Explaining the frame-altering significance of an ontologically social anthropology, he says “in this project of preparing for the moral life I am interested in a theological anthropology that takes seriously not that we are social before we are personal, or personal before we are social, but that we are in our natures, or as the philosophers would say we are, ‘ontologically’ (that is, in our being) connected before we are either and therefore the act of recognition will always somehow refract to this underlying prior state of us as connected.” 48 This underlying prior state of persons as connected is reflected in our pre-personal (ontological) vulnerability, is what constitutes us as human and created in God’s image, and is what grounds our capacity for moral responsiveness. 49 The first movement in the moral life, Keenan argues, is to be vulnerably disposed to the other, and he engages the works of Emmanuel Levinas, Judith Butler, Roger Burggraeve, and Enda McDonagh to define vulnerability as our capacity to be capaciously responsive. The moral life begins with our vulnerable disposition, from which recognition is made possible, and with Axel Honeth he notes that each person needs recognition to flourish, and that mutual recognition is the constitutive foundation of both the personal and social realisation of the good life. 50 Vulnerability engenders recognition, which leads then to what Keenan calls the “conscience question, namely, ‘now what do I do’.” 51 Moreover as Judith Butler insists this “most individual question of morality—how do I live this life that is mine? [i.e. Keenan’s now what do I do] is bound up with biopolitical questions distilled in forms such as these: Whose lives matter? (Whose lives do not matter as lives, are not recognisable as living, or count only ambiguously as alive) . . . Whose lives are grievable and whose are not.” 52
Grief, as Keenan reminds us, provides an epiphany of our human connectedness, and he engages Butler’s searing critique of the ideologies and institutions that render certain lives ungrievable 53 to explore the social construction of recognition and its implications for the moral life. His recent work on the structures of domination through which pervasive racism is constructed, draws on the work of M. Shawn Copeland, Bryan Massingale, and Andre Prevot, to argue for a radical decentring of the dominant caste of whiteness that has rendered so many lives ungrievable. 54 Similarly, his work on clericalism and hierarchicalism interrogates the structures of domination premised on white male privilege that have rendered the lives of women and children unseen and ungrievable. 55 This uncompromising gaze on cultural, societal, and institutional infrastructures of domination provides the clarion call for the development of an ethics of connection, an ethic that at its core engages our shared vulnerability and that can pave pathways to virtue within cultures, societies and institutions. In his most recent work, he turns his focus to organised collectives in order to examine their role in either constructing and amplifying, or resisting and interrupting the infrastructure of domination, 56 and in his prescient work on university ethics 57 and church ethics 58 he not only denounces the cultural and structural infrastructures that enable the logic of domination, but he also builds a moral vision based on our shared vulnerability, which animates an ethic of connection in which individuals can flourish and in which the common good can be secured.
The Practices of Solidarity
Embedded in Keenan’s style are other important features of his way of doing theological ethics, in which we see its performativity at work. These include his collaborative spirit, his global-orientation and his allyship. Each is anchored in the central role that connection, empathy, and solidarity play in his work, and each is fundamental to the impact that his practice as well as his writing has had on the field. His collaborators include former student Joseph J. Kotva, Jr. with whom he edited one of the first moral theological collections to analyse the crisis of ethics in the Church—the 1999 work
His global orientation and commitment to giving voice to theologians beyond the USA and Europe is also performative and has certainly transformed Catholic ethics in the twenty-first century. His vision for
Finally in the context of Keenan’s performative style which, with O’Malley and Keenan I suggest “conveys a resonance with a particular type of culture,” it is important to note Keenan’s solidarity and allyship. While the adequacy of the term allyship is debated, 70 it is used here to reference Keenan’s consistent practice of interrogating and taking responsibility for his own privilege as he engages with issues of identity formation and social justice. 71 We see this in his determinedly self-critical work to investigate his male privilege and its implications for his commitment to feminism, 72 his landmark work on university ethics and contingent faculty, 73 and his analysis of how white self-sufficient masculinity 74 has shaped both the structures of institutional Catholicism and his own experience therein. Keenan is clear-sighted about his own positionality, acknowledging the challenge inherent in Timothy McGee’s insight that “white efforts at solidarity—asking how to help, seeking to be a good ally or destroying their own whiteness—often become subtle quests to regain control over white identity.” 75 He engages the work of Cone, Massingale and Copeland who uncover the racialising logic at the core of white supremacy 76 and its pernicious outworkings that have deformed the Christian tradition, and he insists that radical work of self-interrogation must be done at both the personal and institutional levels. Keenan also brings this critical lens to his landmark work on clericalism, and on what he perceptively describes as clericalism’s father, hierarchicalism, 77 where, in a series of uncompromising articles, lectures, and pastorally oriented engagements, Keenan continues his solidarity with laity and clergy who suffer at the hands of the Church’s unaccountable power, challenging “the specific vice that infects our leadership, (that is) hierarchicalism,” 78 and working for a change in culture and structure that would reflect the servant leadership that ought to embody the vulnerable grace of episcopal ordination. 79
There is no doubt that Keenan’s theological ethics has been shaped by the classic post-Vatican II renewal of moral theology represented by Curran, Farley, Häring, and McDonagh, and he has contributed to that renewal in profound ways, often
Continuing the Agenda of Renewal
Through his writing, teaching, mentoring, and connecting, Keenan has embodied a dynamic mode of theological engagement in Catholic ethics, adopting a performative style based in imaginative identification, connection and solidarity. His has been a formative presence in the field of Catholic theological ethics for more than four decades and he has developed the moral tradition in innovative and unique ways. Nor has his impact on the field been limited to his research and teaching. Rather in his many leadership roles he has intentionally sought to reform the practices of the profession, to make them more inclusive, collaborative and engaged.
Keenan’s work has engaged many fields in its agenda of renewal, so an analysis of how scholars have built and can build on his contribution is a task for another day. However, one example, namely his retrieval and renewal of virtue ethics, can usefully serve as a context to note how scholars have developed this work. There was already an interest in virtue ethics from the 1980s in Catholic moral theology, influenced in part by the renewed philosophical interest in the virtues, as seen in the works of Frederick S. Carney,
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William Frankena
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and Alisdair MacIntyre.
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In the Catholic tradition the interest was also driven by the return to the sources, and particularly to Aquinas. Among post-Vatican II moral theologians there was a determination to read Aquinas in his context and not through the received lens of Neo-Scholasticism. This approach is evident in Jean Porter’s influential works,
With this restoration of virtue ethics have come developments in significant new directions. Catholic ethicists including Patricia Bettie Jung
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and Christopher Vogt
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have elaborated virtue ethics in a feminist key,
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while James Bretzke,
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Yiu Sing Lúcás,
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David Clairmont,
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and Daniel Scheid
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have each engaged with inter-religious and comparative discourses on virtue to reshape theological ethics. Arguably of most significance in the evolution of virtue ethics has been its recasting as social ethics.
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As noted earlier, Keenan was alive to this perspective, especially through the work of Enda McDonagh, and it has become more pronounced in his later work. Indeed, some of Keenan’s former students have played a major role in this evolution of virtue ethics. Works including Daniel Daly’s
In terms of continuing and expanding the agenda of reform, Keenan’s recent work on vulnerability and recognition holds much promise as social ethicists engage the polycrisis 102 that is a feature of this time. This polycrisis is composed of a host of interrelated, transnational and global challenges (ecological, technological, socio-economic, and political) that, if not addressed, threaten to destroy our planetary home and bequeath to future generations a world of turbulence, conflict, and endemic inequality. However, notwithstanding the inflated rhetoric about the value of democracy, there is no way to restore faith in democracy without acknowledging and addressing the systemic failures of our current politics. The task of ethics is to interrogate the values that frame our politics, to illuminate how these shape our practice, and to consider what a renewed politics might look like. From the perspective of theological ethics, a renewed politics will need to address the systemic inequalities and the interrelated ecological breakdown that are the consequence of a tenacious political economy, much of it the outworking of the persistent legacy of empire. It will need to build a public realm grounded in shared intelligibility, and in that context distinguish between commitments that aim to build up and those that seek to tear down the democratic commons. It will need to create spaces for those many voices that remain silent and silenced. Ultimately, it will need to have the capacity to engender and propel a politics of human flourishing and planetary well-being.
An ethic that takes human vulnerability seriously, and not as something simply to be ignored or mastered, has the potential to shape a different kind of politics that can address these systemic failures. Currently the existential experience of vulnerability is deployed in the service of a politics that unites rather than divides. However the recognition of our shared vulnerability has the capacity to generate “a new kind of conversation: about how we act in the world; about our ethical obligations towards each other; about how to oppose the conditions under which some lives are more vulnerable than others; and about how to forge new alliances that are lived in ‘the horizon of a counter-imperialist egalitarianism.’” 103 Keenan’s work is vital in seeding such conversations. Kristin Heyer’s recent work on moral agency, particularly her powerful 2024 Catholic Theological Society of America Presidential Address “Heart(s) of Flesh: Structural Sin and Social Salvation” 104 also advances this possibility in important ways, as does the social ethics of William O’Neill 105 and David Hollenbach. 106 In its reflection, and in its social and political engagement, one hopes that theological ethics can propel a politics that is grounded in our shared vulnerability, that can cultivate an expansive sense of equal dignity, and that can ground our hope for a shared, equal and dignified future.
