Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2020-1
Diamonds,Rebel’s and Farmer’s Best Friend: Impact of Variation in the Price of a Lootable,Labor-intensive Natural Resource on the Intensity of Violent Conflict
This article investigates the impact of the world price of a “lootable,” labor-intensive natural resource on intensity of violent conflict. Results suggest that a price increase can have opposite effects at different geographical levels of analysis: a decrease in conflict intensity overall in resource-rich countries, but an increase in conflict intensity in resource-rich subnational regions. The article argues that intensity of violence decreases overall due to rising opportunity costs of rebellion but that violence concentrates in resource-rich areas as returns to looting rise. The article introduces a new measure of diamond propensity based on geological characteristics, which is arguably exogenous to conflict and can capture small-scale labor-intensive production better than existing measures. The stated effects are found for secondary diamonds, which are lootable and related to opportunity costs of fighting, but not for primary diamonds, which are neither.
AddisonTonyLe BillonPhilippeMansoob MurshedS.. 2002. “Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour.” Journal of African Economics11 (3): 365–86. doi: 10.1093/jae/11.3.365.
2.
ArezkiRabahBhattacharyyaSambitMamoNemera. 2015. “Resource Discovery and Conflict in Africa: What Do the Data Show?” CSAE Working Paper WPS, vol. 14. Accessed May 17, 2019. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/63531/.
BazziSamuelBlattmanChristopher. 2014. “Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics6:1–38. doi: 10.1257/mac.6.4.1.
8.
BellCurtisWolfordScott. 2015. “Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly59 (3): 517–30. doi: 10.1111/isqu.12150.
9.
BergenstockDonna J.2004. An Analysis of the International Diamond Market. New York: Edwin Mellen.
10.
BermanNicolasCouttenierMathieuRohnerDominicThoenigMathias. 2017. “This Mine Is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa.” American Economic Review107 (6): 1564–610. doi: 10.1257/aer.20150774.
11.
BesleyTimothyPerssonTorsten. 2009. “Repression or Civil War?” American Economic Review99 (2): 292–97. doi: 10.1257/aer.99.2.292.
12.
BockstaelSteven VanVlassenrootKoen. 2012. A Farmer’s Best Friend?Ghent, Belgium: Academia Press.
13.
BrennerDavid. 2015. “Ashes of co-optation: From armed group fragmentation to the rebuilding of popular insurgency in Myanmar.” Conflict, Security & Development15 (4): 337–58.
14.
BrücknerMarkusCicconeAntonio. 2010. “International Commodity Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Economic Journal120 (544): 519–34. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02353.x.
15.
BrunnschweilerChrista N.BulteErwin H.. 2009. “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence, and the Onset of Civil Wars.” Oxford Economic Papers61 (4): 651–74. doi: 10.1093/oep/gpp024.
16.
CaselliFrancescoColemanWilbur John. 2013. “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict.” Journal of the European Economic Association11 (suppl. 1): 161–92.
17.
ChorltonL. B.2007. “Generalized Geology of the World. Bedrock Domains and Major Faults in GIS Formate.” Open File 5529.1.
18.
CicconeAntonio. 2011. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: A Comment.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics3 (4): 215–27.
CliffordT. N.1966. “Tectono-matallogenic Units and Matellogenic Provinces of Africa.” Earth Planet Science Letters1:421–34.
21.
CollierPaulHoefflerAnke. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers56 (4): 563–95. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01100.x.
22.
CollierPaulHoefflerAnkeSöderbomMåns. 2004. “On the Duration of Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 253–73. doi: 10.1177/0022343304043769.
23.
CorreiaSergio. 2016. A Feasible Estimator for Linear Models with Multi-way Fixed Effects.”Accessed May 17, 2019. http://scorreia.com/research/hdfe.pdf.
24.
Dal BóErnestoBóPedro Dal. 2011. “Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium.” Journal of the European Economic Association9 (4): 646–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01025.x.
25.
DietrichChristian. “Power Struggles in the Diamond Field.” In Angola’s War Economy, edited by CilliersJakkieDietrichChristian, 179–194. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000.
26.
DubeOeindrilaVargasJuan F.. 2013. “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia.” Review of Economic Studies80 (4): 1384–421. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdt009.
FearonJames D.2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others.” Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 275–301.
29.
FearonJames D.LaitinDavid D. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insugency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review97 (1): 75–90. doi: 10.1017/S0003055403000534.
30.
GarfinkelMichelle R.SkaperdasStergiosSyropoulosConstantinos. 2008. “Globalization and Domestic Conflict.” Journal of International Economics76 (2): 296–308. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.07.005.
31.
GilmoreElisabethGleditschNils PetterLujalaPäiviRødJan Ketil. 2005. “Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science22 (3): 257–72. doi: 10.1080/07388940500201003.
32.
HarariMariaflaviaFerraraEliana La. 2018. “Conflict, Climate, and Cells: A Disaggregated Analysis.” The Review of Economics and Statistics100 (4): 594–608. doi: 10.1162/rest.
HirschJohn L.2001. Sierra Leone. Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. London, UK: Lynne Rienner.
35.
HumphreysMacartan. 2005. “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution.” Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (4): 508–37. doi: 10.1177/0022002705277545.
36.
HunzikerPhilippCedermanLars Erik. 2017. “No Extraction without Representation: The Ethno-Regional Oil Curse and Secessionist Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research54 (3): 365–81. doi: 10.1177/0022343316687365.
37.
JanseA. J. A.1994. “Is Clifford’s Rule Still Valid? Affirmative Examples from around the World.” In Diamonds: Characterization, Genesis and Exploration, edited by MeyerH. O. A.LeonardosO. H., 215–35. Brasilia, Brazil: Companhia de Pesquisa de REcursos Minerais (CPRM).
38.
JanseA. J. A.SheahanPatricia A.. 1995. “Catalogue of World Wide Diamond and Kimberlite Occurrences: A Selective and Annotative Approach.” Journal of Geochemical Exploration53 (1–3): 73–111. doi: 10.1016/0375-6742(94)00017-6.
39.
KeenDavid. 2005. Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford, UK: James Currey.
40.
Le BillonPhilippe. 2001. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography20 (5): 561–84. doi: 10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00015-4.
41.
Le BillonPhilippe. 2009. “Natural Resource Types and Conflict Termination Initiatives.” Colombia Internacional70:9–34.
LeiYu HsiangMichaelsGuy. 2014. “Do Giant Oilfield Discoveries Fuel Internal Armed Conflicts?” Journal of Development Economics110:139–57. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.06.003.
44.
LujalaPäivi. 2009. “Deadly Combat over Natural Resources.” Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (1): 50–71. doi: 10.1177/0022002708327644.
45.
LujalaPäivi. 2010. “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources.” Journal of Peace Research47 (1): 15–28. doi: 10.1177/0022343309350015.
MaconachieRoyBinnsTony. 2007. “‘Farming Miners’ or ‘Mining Farmers’? Diamond Mining and Rural Development in Post-conflict Sierra Leone.” Journal of Rural Studies23 (3): 367–80. doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2007.01.003.
48.
MaystadtJean FrançoisLucaGiacomo DeSekerisPetros G.UlimwenguJohn. 2014. “Mineral Resources and Conflicts in DRC: A Case of Ecological Fallacy?” Oxford Economic Papers66 (3): 721–49. doi: 10.1093/oep/gpt037.
49.
McguirkEoinBurkeMarshall. 2018. “The Economic Origins of Conflict in Africa.” NBER Working Paper No 23056. Cambridge Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.
50.
OlssonOla. 2006. “Diamonds Are a Rebel’s Best Friend.” World Economy29 (8): 1133–50. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00809.x.
51.
OlssonOla. 2007. “Conflict Diamonds.” Journal of Development Economics82 (2): 267–86. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.07.004.
52.
OlssonOlaForsHeather Congdon. 2004. “Congo: The Prize of Predation.” Journal of Peace Research41 (3): 321–36. doi: 10.1177/0022343304043772.
53.
OomesNienkeVockeMatthias. 2003. “Diamond Smuggling and Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa.” WP/03/167. IMF Working Paper. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
54.
ParkerDominic P.FoltzJeremy D.ElseaDavid. 2016. “Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights: Conflict Minerals and Infant Mortality.” The Journal of Law and Economics59 (4): 731–74. doi: 10.1086/691793.
55.
PloegFrederick van derRohnerDominic. 2012. “War and Natural Resource Exploitation.” European Economic Review56 (8): 1714–29. doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.003.
56.
RossMichael. 2006. “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War.” Annual Review of Political Science9 (1): 265–300. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.081304.161338.
Sanchez de la SierraRaul. 2014. On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2358701.
59.
SmillieIan. 2005. Background Paper on Micro Development Issues. Ottawa, Canada: Diamond Development Initiative. doi: 10.1007/s00122-009-0966-9.
60.
SmitsJoeriTessemaYibekalSakamotoTakutoSchoddeRichard. 2016. “The Inequality-Resource Curse of Conflict Heterogeneous Effects of Mineral Deposit Discoveries.” 46. WIDER Working Paper. Helsinki: United Nations University Wold Institute for Development Economics Research.
61.
SnyderRichardBhavnaniRavi. 2005. “Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (4): 563–97. doi: 10.1177/0022002705277796.
62.
SutherlandDonald. 1982. “The Transport and Sorting of Diamonds by Fluvial and Marine Processes.” Economic Geology77 (7): 1613–20.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
