Abstract
For over 30 years, the dominant paradigm in sales force incentive compensation theory has been the principal–agent model. The standard application to sales, first offered by Basu et al. (1985), involves a firm (principal) seeking to design an optimal compensation plan for a salesperson (agent) without being able to observe the salesperson’s selling effort. This two-player model provides valuable insights and has spawned numerous extensions. However, its treatment of the firm as a single decision-making entity masks the interesting and important role commonly played by sales managers.
For example, I worked with a firm (Firm A) that decided to use commission-based incentives for a sales team selling a new product. Because the product’s potential was not evenly distributed among the sales territories due to geographic and other constraints, Firm A decided, in the interest of fairness and motivation, to set three commission rates. Salespeople in the most difficult territories would receive the highest rate and those in the easiest territories would receive the lowest. When determining which rate each territory should receive, the firm asked for input from its first-line sales managers. However, those managers also earned commissions for sales in their districts, so they stood to gain from maximizing their salespeople’s incentives. The result was a lengthy internal negotiation process with every manager arguing for the difficulty of her 1 territory and Firm A trying to distinguish truth from misrepresentation.
More recently, I spoke with a manager from Firm B, which uses quota-based sales incentives. He described the firm’s top-down quota-setting process, in which a global sales target is allocated to individual countries and then to progressively lower levels (e.g., from nation to regions to districts to territories). Sales managers provide input into allocations at the level below their own. For example, a district manager participates in allocating the target for her district to the territories she manages. The manager I spoke with complained of extensive “lobbying” by salespeople and managers at each level to convince their supervisors to assign them lower quotas.
Many firms preempt such lobbying by implementing a formal process through which individuals provide input into quotas. For example, some use a bottom-up process in which salespeople and/or managers provide estimates of sales potential at the territory or customer level, which are then aggregated at higher levels. In fact, a combined top-down/bottom-up approach is commonly discussed by practitioners and incentive design specialists as a best practice (e.g., Eddleman 2012; SalesGlobe n.d.) and has been built into popular enterprise software, such as Oracle Sales Planning Cloud (Oracle 2018). Top-down and bottom-up approaches used alone have critical flaws, as summarized by Capon and Go (2017): “Bottom-up forecasts embrace the granularity (and reality) of sales by customer, absent from top-down forecasts…[but] a serious downside of bottom-up forecasting is salespeople lowballing estimates when forecasts drive sales quotas.” However, reconciling top-down and bottom-up systems typically requires time-consuming (and often tense) negotiations and does not necessarily ensure accurate or fair results.
The first objective of this article is to propose an approach that builds and improves on common practices to achieve the benefits of bottom-up incentive design (incorporating local-level information) while avoiding the primary downside (“lowballing” by salespeople and sales managers). The proposed approach is simpler than top-down/bottom-up negotiations and much more objective and reliable than informal processes such as behind-the-scenes lobbying and ad hoc adjustments. The second objective is to show how the proposed approach can be optimally implemented and to identify when this optimal implementation outperforms the standard theoretical solution of a menu of contracts presented by the firm to its salespeople. Thus, this article shows how to efficiently involve a sales manager in sales force compensation design and when it is optimal to do so.
These objectives are achieved by extending the principal–agent model to include a sales manager. The resulting model captures two common elements of sales force compensation design reflected in the previous examples that are not captured by standard models. The first is information asymmetry between the firm, sales managers, and salespeople. One naturally expects salespeople to be well-informed about themselves and their territories. However, first-line sales managers also spend an average of 48% of their time “in the trenches” with customers and/or salespeople (Fritz 2008). Thus, though the manager in this model is not quite as well-informed as the salesperson, she has better local information than others in the firm who are further removed from territory-level dynamics. In the model, the local information relates to the difficulty of a salesperson’s territory, but the results apply to any case in which the manager has better information than the firm about something relevant to a salesperson’s compensation plan (e.g., his selling ability).
This information gap between firm and manager is irrelevant if the manager always shares her local information openly with the firm. However, she may choose not to do so if her interests and the firm’s interests are not aligned, which is the second new element reflected in my model. Though the firm is primarily interested in profits, a recent survey found that 89.5% of companies base their incentives for first-line sales managers on revenue (Alexander Group 2018). As in the previous examples, this can result in managers misrepresenting their information (e.g., arguing for unnecessarily high commissions or low quotas) to maximize their own expected payouts. In line with the data, the manager in my model has a revenue-based incentive plan. 2 However, this issue arises (and the model applies) under any type of managerial compensation plan, including non-revenue-based plans, as long as the manager’s expected payout increases with the salesperson’s selling effort. Furthermore, the model is not limited to a particular plan type (e.g., commission-based, quota-based) and instead captures the general case in which a sales manager has an opportunity to provide input into the incentive plan of a salesperson she manages. 3 The manager in the model most closely represents a first-line sales manager in most firms but can be any individual who possesses local information and earns incentives that increase with salesperson effort.
Under my proposed mechanism, the firm delegates the salesperson’s incentive parameters to the manager subject to tight constraints, such as limits on the salesperson’s salary or incentive pay. The manager can submit a request to relax those constraints by meeting requirements imposed by the firm. Relaxed constraints always benefit the manager because they allow her to incentivize the salesperson to work harder, thereby increasing her own expected payout. However, the firm can always set the requirements for such requests such that the manager will make a request only when doing so is best for the firm given her information. Thus, the firm can replace internal negotiations and lobbying with an efficient, reliable process that reveals the manager’s true information.
To illustrate what this might look like in practice, consider the example of Firm A discussed earlier. To assign commission rates to salespeople, the firm asked its sales managers to identify the degree of difficulty of each territory but found it difficult to distinguish unbiased input from misrepresentations. Under my proposed mechanism, Firm A would have begun by assigning all territories the lowest commission rate and establishing clear requirements that sales managers had to fulfill to request the medium rate and the high rate. A request for the medium rate could require a manager to complete onerous paperwork, attend a series of meetings with an immediate supervisor, and/or submit a business case outlining the factors that make the territory difficult. A subsequent request for the high rate might require her to submit a detailed territory analysis, provide customer-level projections, and give a presentation to senior management. When the firm’s requirements are set optimally, managers will prefer to submit requests only when the resulting changes in the commission rate benefit the firm, so every completed request should be granted.
The model gives direction regarding the amount of effort each request should require but is indifferent to the nature of the requirements, which can vary widely depending on context. Notably, the model does not require the cost of the manager’s effort to depend on her actual information (i.e., it need not be more costly for the manager to make a false claim than a truthful one). This allows the firm to introduce
When a firm is not fully informed about a salesperson or his territory, the well-accepted theoretical solution has been to allow the salesperson to choose from a menu of contracts (e.g., Lal and Staelin 1986; Rao 1990). Suppose, for example, that territories are either “easy” or “hard,” but the firm does not know which are which, as in the case of Firm A. Existing theory tells us that the firm can design a menu such that a salesperson will choose the contract intended for his territory type, effectively revealing his private information. Critically, however, optimizing this menu requires the firm to know the likelihood that a given territory is easy or hard. Furthermore, determining that likelihood depends on precisely the kind of local information that the firm lacks relative to sales managers and salespeople. Consequently, even the standard solution requires information that the firm does not necessarily have.
The proposed request mechanism adds value by revealing the sales manager’s superior local information, and it outperforms a menu of contracts under broad conditions. Specifically, I show that involving sales managers in designing incentives for their salespeople is optimal when the managers’ sales incentives are not too large or when the optimal menu of contracts results in a salesperson exiting from some types of territories.
This research offers managerial insights for firms that wish to leverage sales managers’ information to design sales force incentives. The proposed mechanism mitigates a manager’s preference for inflating her salespeople’s incentives, allowing the firm to reliably obtain her information using a transparent and efficient process.
In the following sections, I summarize this article’s contributions to the literature, introduce the main model, and discuss the analysis and results. I then present two extensions of the model that demonstrate its robustness and provide additional insights. Finally, I review the key findings and discuss related research opportunities.
Literature Review
This research is most closely related to the literature on sales force incentive design (e.g., Basu et al. 1985; Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt 1994; Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998), joining studies that explore the design of incentives for a salesperson whose type is unobserved by his firm (e.g., Chen, Xu, and Liu 2013; Gonik 1978; Lal and Staelin 1986; Mantrala and Raman 1990; Rao 1990). A core element of these studies is the firm offering a menu of contracts, the optimal design of which requires full information about the probability distribution of the agent’s type. To my knowledge, this article offers the first analysis of a model in which an uninformed firm can delegate part of the incentive design process to an intermediary (a sales manager) who has useful information but also has divergent interests. I propose a mechanism that can be used as an alternative or a complement to the menu of contracts. Furthermore, Krafft et al. (2012, p.107) mention the need for greater attention to “the interplay between superiors and subordinates across sales force management layers in the context of compensation/control.” My article makes a meaningful contribution to the literature on sales management by exploring a game-theoretic model of this interplay.
This study relates to two areas of research in economics: “influence activities” and delegation in organizations. In the proposed mechanism, the firm requires the manager to engage in influence activities, defined as effort exerted by an individual to affect an organization’s decisions, to relax constraints on a salesperson’s compensation design. Most of the literature in this area (e.g., Milgrom 1988; Wulf 2009) focuses on limiting influence activities because they are viewed as wasteful and inefficient. This article joins a small subset showing that such activities can benefit a firm by revealing private information held by the influencing individual. My three-player model (firm–manager–salesperson) is a significant extension of the two-player models in Laux (2008) (firm–manager) and Simester and Zhang (2014) (firm–salesperson). Unlike Laux (2008), I assume that the manager acquires information without cost (with an extension considering costly supplementation), and I focus on truthful revelation. Furthermore, the manager’s tendency to overinvest arises endogenously from incentives in my model, whereas Laux (2008) assumes a taste for “empire building.”
In Simester and Zhang (2014), the salesperson is perfectly informed about a customer’s demand and can lobby for permission to charge a lower price. The findings rely on an assumption that lobbying is more costly to the salesperson when it is not supported by his information. I show that a similar mechanism is feasible in a three-player incentive design model even when the lobbying individual (the manager) is only partially informed. Furthermore, my use of influence activities as a separating mechanism does not rely on an assumed difference in the cost of lobbying; rather, it is based on a derived difference in the benefit to the manager of exerting influence “truthfully” versus “untruthfully.” This significantly expands both the applicability of the mechanism and the range of lobbying requirements the firm can impose. In fact, the firm can impose virtually any requirement as long as it is costly to the manager.
Lastly, my model fits within the “general formulation of the decentralization problem” (Holmström 1984), focusing on delegation within a three-level hierarchy. The economic literature on hierarchies focuses on the threat of collusion (e.g., Imbeau 2007; Laffont 1990; Tirole 1986) and on inefficiencies introduced by delegation (e.g., Faure-Grimaud and Martimort 2001; McAfee and McMillan 1995). One exception is Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1997), which shows that delegation can be as efficient as centralization when production is deterministic and managers have no private knowledge about their subordinates. This is achieved by allowing each individual to offer a menu of incentive schemes to their direct subordinates. In contrast, I study a non-menu-based mechanism in an environment with stochastic production (sales) and information asymmetry between the layers of the hierarchy. The marketing literature also contains studies of incentive design in settings with more than two players (principal and agent) but these typically focus on collusion in nonhierarchical structures (e.g., Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt 1996, 1997). In the context of sales management, analytical research on delegation has focused on the conditions under which delegation of pricing to the sales force is optimal (e.g., Bhardwaj 2001; Lal 1986; Mishra and Prasad 2004, 2005).
Model
I analyze a three-player model of a firm, a sales manager, and a salesperson. The model is defined as follows.
Salesperson
The firm employs a salesperson to sell a product. For simplicity, product sales take one of two values:
The salesperson exerts effort to sell the product, but his effort is costly and is not observed by the firm. Again, for simplicity, effort takes one of two values:
The salesperson’s effort drives the firm’s expected sales by increasing the probability of the high sales outcome,
Because the firm does not observe the salesperson’s effort, it offers him incentives based on sales. Sales outcomes are binary, so the salesperson’s compensation plan is represented by a pair of payout values. He receives
The salesperson receives increasing positive utility
The salesperson incurs increasing positive disutility
The salesperson’s territory takes one of two types: low and high difficulty (or “easy” and “hard”), represented by
If the salesperson exits the firm, his best alternative option provides utility
Sales Manager
The sales manager in the model can represent a manager at any level but ideally one with the best information about the salesperson’s territory aside from the salesperson. The manager’s compensation has the same structure as the salesperson’s:
In practice, sales managers have a broad range of responsibilities, many of which can affect sales directly or indirectly. Consequently, most managers have sales-based incentives, reflected by
Like the salesperson, the manager is risk neutral and obtains utility from income
The components of her utility are assumed to be additively separable. Therefore, the manager’s utility is
The manager’s best alternative option provides utility
Firm
The firm maximizes expected profit with its marginal production cost normalized to 0.
Information
As previously noted, the salesperson’s territory can be easy or hard, denoted by
In the model, the firm assigns a probability of 50% to each territory type, which is represented by
The manager begins with the same uninformed prior but receives a signal,
Sequence of Events
0. Salesperson learns territory type (
1. Firm announces manager’s contract
2. Manager decides whether to accept the contract.
3. Firm announces baseline constraints on salesperson’s compensation
4. Manager chooses request effort
5. Manager announces salesperson’s contract
6. Salesperson decides whether to accept contract and, if so, chooses effort level.
7. Sales are realized and all players receive payouts.
The events in Step 0 are exogenous to the model. Steps 2 and 3 can be reversed with no effect on the results. 7 Accepted contracts are assumed to be binding—the key findings do not apply if the firm can renege on the manager’s contract after observing her choices in subsequent steps. If the manager plays a role in designing the salesperson’s territory, that process is assumed to be completed before the model sequence begins (i.e., the salesperson’s territory must be finalized before his compensation terms are set).
The analysis includes a comparison of the main model to a menu of contracts model in which Steps 3 and 4 are omitted, the firm announces the menu of contracts in Step 5, and the salesperson chooses from that menu (or declines all contracts) in Step 6. The notation introduced here and throughout the article is summarized in Table 1.
Summary of Notation.
Analysis and Results
The model is solved using backward induction.
Salesperson’s Contract Acceptance and Effort Choice (Step 6)
Given a contract
Intuitively, this indicates that the salesperson will increase his effort when the corresponding increase in expected income outweighs the cost of the incremental effort. As
Throughout the remainder of this article, I use the following terminology and notation. A contract induces the effort combination
Manager’s Design of Salesperson’s Contract (Step 5)
Having received a signal about the territory’s difficulty and observed the signal quality, the manager uses Bayesian updating to generate the following belief about the salesperson’s territory type:
Subject to the constraints imposed by the firm, the manager chooses the salesperson’s compensation plan
In other words, the manager maximizes her expected utility by maximizing the likelihood of high sales. That likelihood depends on the salesperson’s effort which, in turn, depends on his territory type. Thus, in assessing a contract for the salesperson, the manager considers her belief about the territory
The manager is indifferent between contracts that induce a given combination of effort levels
where
Her preference between the two options in the middle,
Left unconstrained, the manager always prefers
Manager’s Choice of Request Effort (Step 4)
Given a set of constraints
As shown in the next step, the case in which
Thus, the manager requests relaxed constraints when
Firm’s Choice of Constraints and Request Requirements (Step 3)
Like the manager, the firm can anticipate the salesperson’s level of effort for each territory type under a given contract. It seeks an efficient, implementable contract to induce a given effort combination
See Appendix A for sufficient constraints to implement each effort combination and Web Appendix B for a complete derivation. Lemma 2 implies that, in this stylized model, hard caps are sufficient for the firm to determine the salesperson’s effort in each territory type. In practice, sales outcomes and compensation plans are complex and may require more complex constraints. For example, a firm might choose a quota-based plan and set the payout for each level of quota attainment, then allow the manager to set the salesperson’s quota, perhaps within certain bounds.
Under incomplete information, the efficiency of a contract can be characterized by the expected surplus it provides the salesperson in each territory type relative to his outside option.
(a) When the territory is hard, the salesperson receives no surplus. (b) When the territory is easy, the salesperson receives an expected utility surplus of
Lemma 3 (proof in Web Appendix C) indicates that the firm must pay the salesperson “information rent” when the territory is easy. Furthermore, that rent increases with the salesperson’s effort when the territory is hard
Lemma 3 also indicates that the salesperson’s contract is always efficient when the territory is hard. Thus, the effort expected in an easy territory has no effect on the firm’s profitability if the territory is hard. In other words, the trade-off only works in one direction, so the firm’s preferred effort in an easy territory is independent of its belief about the territory type.
(a) The effort it induces in a hard territory (weakly) decreases with (b) The effort it induces in an easy territory is independent of
See Appendix B for a detailed proof of Proposition 1. Part (b) implies that the firm can narrow its consideration to constraints that result in the “correct” effort
Part (a) reflects the trade-off mentioned previously, with the firm preferring to induce less effort in a hard territory when that type is less likely. This implies that the firm’s ability to choose the best contract depends on the accuracy of its belief about the territory type. Thus, the firm would prefer to rely on the manager’s belief, rather than its own less-informed belief, to determine
The constraints and request requirements chosen by the firm are summarized in Table 2. See Appendix C for derivation of these results and the proof of Proposition 2.
Summary of Constraints and Request Requirements.
aFrom the proof of Proposition 2 in Web Appendix C:
As shown in Table 2, the firm’s choices are divided into two distinct cases. The first occurs when the firm does not prefer
By Proposition 1, the firm prefers
In the second case,
Manager’s Contract Acceptance (Step 2)
When deciding whether to accept the firm’s contract offer, the manager can anticipate how the firm will implement the request mechanism. She can also anticipate her own request effort on the basis of the signal she receives about the territory. Thus, she accepts the contract if her expected utility exceeds her outside option.
When
When she does not make a request, the baseline constraints allow her to induce
Therefore, the manager’s expected utility is weakly increasing with her belief,
Firm’s Design of Manager’s Contract (Step 1)
When designing the manager’s contract, the firm cannot observe her belief about the territory type. The firm values the manager’s contributions (both modeled and unmodeled) enough that it seeks to ensure that she will accept her contract for any value of
Suppose that, after the manager accepts her contract, the firm will set baseline constraints that allow
where
where the indicator function
I begin by solving an adapted version of the firm’s problem, without
In summary, the proposed request mechanism provides a way for the firm to leverage a sales manager’s local information. The mechanism is always feasible, so it can be used to reveal this information under any conditions, thus preventing the manager from misrepresenting it for personal gain. However, implementing this mechanism is not costless. It requires the firm to pay information rent to the salesperson when his territory is easy and information rent to the manager that increases with the likelihood that the territory is easy
Comparison with Menu of Contracts
In the principal–agent literature, the standard approach to incentive design for an agent of unknown type is to offer a menu of contracts designed such that the agent will select the contract intended for his type. Notably, existing models assume that this menu is designed by a firm that has an informed belief about the agent’s type. In the context of my model, this would imply that the firm has costless access to the manager’s local information. In this section, I compare the proposed request mechanism to a menu of contracts designed by the firm without input from the manager. Because the menu of contracts is a well-studied approach, details of its solution are left to the appendices, and the focus here is on comparing the two mechanisms.
Lemma 4 (proof in Web Appendix E) indicates that, in this model setting, the efficient menu of contracts that will induce a given
The comparison of expected profits under the two mechanisms is summarized in Proposition 3.
(a) the firm’s best menu of contracts induces the salesperson to exit when his territory is hard
OR
(b) the manager’s incentive pay
The relative performance of the request mechanism increases as the firm’s decision threshold(s) approach its belief
See Appendix D for a sketch proof and Web Appendix F for a detailed proof. The conditions under which the request mechanism outperforms the menu of contracts are summarized in Table 4.
Conditions for Request Mechanism Outperforming Menu of Contracts.
aFrom the proof of Proposition 2 in Web Appendix C:
The results of this comparison reflect the balance between two factors under each mechanism. The first is the optimality of the salesperson’s effort. The effort combination
The second factor is the efficiency of the manager’s contract, which can favor either approach. Suppose the optimal menu of contracts induces the salesperson to exit when his territory is hard (i.e.,
Figure 1 illustrates the conditions under which the firm prefers the request mechanism to the menu of contracts for a given set of parameters. In the gray region, the firm prefers the request mechanism. The gray section on the left corresponds to part (b) of Proposition 3 (

Illustration of preferred mechanisms.
It is worth highlighting the extent to which the preceding results rely on certain assumptions. First, as previously noted, Lemma 4 implies that a menu of contracts is no more efficient than a single contract to induce a given effort combination
Second, the comparison of the request and menu mechanisms is based on a sequence in which the firm commits to the manager’s contract before observing the salesperson’s choice from the menu of contracts (i.e., before he reveals his territory type). Though this is the most likely sequence, the reverse is also possible. If the firm observes the salesperson’s choice first, it can avoid paying information rent to the manager. Thus, her contract would be more efficient under a menu than under the request mechanism. In that case, part (a) of Proposition 3 does not always hold. Part (b) continues to hold in that the request mechanism still outperforms the menu when
Numerical Example
The following numerical example illustrates the request mechanism and how its results compare with those of a menu of contracts. Consider a firm employing a salesperson supervised by a sales manager. Sales in the salesperson’s territory are either low
For the firm, the incremental value of inducing high versus low effort is
First, consider the menu of contracts approach. As noted following Proposition 2, the firm prefers to induce
Next, consider the request mechanism. From Step 5, when the firm imposes no constraints, the manager will choose to induce high effort in both territory types, which she can do efficiently by offering
If the manager makes a request, her expected utility is
In this case, then, the firm is better off using the request mechanism than a menu of contracts. It benefits from the manager’s ability to induce the salesperson to stay and exert high effort when her (more informed) belief indicates that the territory is sufficiently likely to be hard. Furthermore, the request mechanism allows the firm to reduce the manager’s salary because she also benefits when the salesperson stays. In Figure 1, this case would fall in the gray band along the bottom.
For comparison, now suppose that the manager’s incentive pay is
Finally, suppose that the manager’s incentive pay is even smaller, at
Model Extensions
I consider two extensions of the main model. In the first, I incorporate a broader range of sales manager responsibilities, which allows me to fully endogenize her compensation plan. This analysis shows how the firm can optimize her contract while including her in designing the salesperson’s compensation. In the second extension, the manager can acquire better information about the salesperson’s territory (at a cost) prior to being involved in designing the salesperson’s contract.
Extension 1: Full Optimization of the Manager’s Contract
In the main model, I focus solely on the manager’s involvement in designing the salesperson’s compensation plan. As a result, her incentive pay
In practice, of course, sales managers perform a range of tasks that have direct or indirect impacts on sales, and firms typically use sales-based incentives to motivate managers’ efforts. Furthermore, Proposition 3 indicates that the magnitude of the incentives plays an important role in determining whether the firm should involve the manager in designing the salesperson’s compensation. Thus, I endogenize and optimize the manager’s incentive pay in this extension, which requires extending the model to capture her effort on tasks that affect sales. For example, a sales manager can impact sales directly by joining the salesperson in discussions with important customers and indirectly by improving the salesperson’s effectiveness through coaching and training. There is little research on this type of sales support effort and its interaction with salespeople’s effort. Because this is not the main focus of this research, I employ a simple model formulation that emphasizes parsimony and tractability. More extensive modeling of sales managers’ activities and their impacts is left to future research.
The manager’s support effort takes one of two values,
To make the cleanest comparison between mechanisms, I restrict attention to the case in which the firm always prefers to employ the sales manager and incentivize her to exert support effort regardless of whether the firm uses her information to design the salesperson’s contract. Specifically,
The remaining assumptions are the same as those in the main model. The conditions ensuring that the limited liability constraints do not drive the outcome are
Analysis of this extension supports the robustness of the findings from the main model. The request mechanism remains feasible and outperforms a menu of contracts under the same conditions.
The analysis and intuition closely follow those from the main model (see complete details in Web Appendix G). As with the salesperson’s incentive pay, the optimal incentive pay for the manager
Extension 2: Manager Can Obtain Additional Information
In the main model, the manager acquires territory information passively in the course of fulfilling her responsibilities (e.g., coaching the salesperson, meeting with customers). As a result, the signal she receives is effectively costless but is imperfect. In this extension, the manager can incur a cost to improve her information before deciding whether to make a request for relaxed constraints. For example, a manager can obtain better information by investing additional time (beyond her regular duties) to speak with a salesperson, navigate the salesperson’s territory, visit customers, or assess the sales pipeline. For simplicity, I assume that this investment results in a perfect signal (
The manager’s willingness to acquire information is driven by the potential benefit it provides. In particular, she benefits when the acquired information results in a different action than the one she would have taken without it. For example, she initially prefers to request relaxed constraints if her signal indicates that the territory is sufficiently likely to be hard. Additional information would then add value if it indicates that the territory is easy, leading her to change her decision and save the effort cost of the request. Conversely, if she initially prefers not to make a request, then additional information adds value if it indicates that the territory is hard. In this case, she would make a request and thus would benefit from the salesperson’s greater effort. As in Proposition 3, these reversals are most likely to occur when the manager’s belief
See Web Appendix H for a detailed proof. The conditions under which the manager acquires additional information are summarized in Table 5, with
The firm naturally prefers the manager to always acquire the best possible information. However, the firm benefits from that acquisition only when it changes the manager’s resulting action. In fact, because the request mechanism effectively aligns the manager’s interests with those of the firm, the manager acquires information not only when her own expected benefit is highest but when the firm’s is highest as well.
Proposition 5 is based on a simple model extension in which the manager’s cost of acquiring information is fixed, but the finding is largely robust to relaxing that assumption. In particular, the information acquisition cost might be inversely proportional to the quality (
Conclusions
Sales managers make critical contributions to their organizations, including hiring, training, and coaching salespeople, contributing to territory and compensation design, and assisting with key customer relationships. A common thread in many of these contributions is the manager’s role as a conduit of information between the firm and the sales force. This role is often overlooked in the literature, with models treating sales managers as interchangeable with their firms or omitting them entirely. In reality, a manager’s information and objectives are distinct from those of the firm, which often leads to challenging internal dynamics that prior studies have not fully captured.
This article examines the role of sales managers in designing sales force compensation plans. Optimal compensation plan design requires the best possible local information, and the most informed individuals after salespeople typically are first-line sales managers. However, managers often have an incentive to misrepresent that information because their compensation is based on the output of their salespeople. As a result, firms use formal and informal processes to access managers’ information and limit their potential to bias results. I propose a mechanism by which a firm can reliably and efficiently induce a sales manager to use her information to benefit the firm. Under this “request mechanism,” the firm delegates the design of sales incentives to the manager subject to tight constraints and offers an opportunity for her to request relaxed constraints by meeting specified requirements.
I find that such constraints and request requirements can always be designed such that the manager chooses the best possible incentive plan for the firm given her private information. Furthermore, when the firm is less informed than the manager, the request mechanism can outperform the well-established menu of contracts approach to incentive design. In particular, the proposed mechanism increases the firm’s expected profit when (1) the firm’s best possible menu of contracts results in some types of salesperson exiting and/or (2) the manager’s incentive pay is not too large. Finally, I show that the request mechanism can entice the manager to invest in acquiring additional information when it most benefits both her and the firm.
This article illustrates the value of involving sales managers in sales force compensation design, particularly when the firm establishes a well-designed process with clearly defined conditions and outcomes. The proposed mechanism is a simple, transparent way to prevent managers from seeking more-relaxed constraints (e.g., larger budgets) than necessary, also known as “sandbagging.” It can not only outperform the standard theoretical solution but it also offers an efficient, objective, and reliable alternative to commonly observed processes such as internal (e.g., top-down/bottom-up) negotiations and behind-the-scenes lobbying to determine commissions and quotas.
Although the stylized model used here refers to a general contract (salary + bonus) and corresponding constraints, the results can be applied quite broadly. For example, the “relaxed constraints” that the manager requests could represent lower quotas or higher commission rates. Furthermore, firms can leverage elements of their existing processes when implementing the proposed approach. For example, top-down and bottom-up processes for identifying territory potential can be used to identify the range of possible “types” of territories (or salespeople). Instead of using subjective negotiations to determine the true type, the firm should clearly specify what is required of a sales manager to specify a territory’s type and the implications of that specification (i.e., the resulting restrictions or parameters for the salesperson’s incentive plan). This article identifies the level of effort the manager should be required to exert; however, firm judgment and likely some trial and error will be required to translate that theoretical value into specific tasks or requirements.
This article is the first of its kind to consider the distinct role of the sales manager in sales force compensation design and points to potential directions for future research. For example, I focus here on a single manager and salesperson. The request mechanism and key findings can easily be extended to a manager overseeing multiple salespeople if the firm imposes constraints (and implements the mechanism) for each one individually. However, future research might explore whether the mechanism can be made even more efficient by applying budget constraints to the manager’s entire span of control, allowing her to pool and apply her information across territories.
Future research could also consider other mechanisms for leveraging a sales manager’s private information, such as tying her budget constraints to her compensation. For example, the firm could offer the manager a menu of contracts in which more-favorable compensation terms come with tighter constraints on the salesperson’s compensation. Alternatively, the manager’s contract could include a bonus for using less than her entire budget.
Finally, this article focuses primarily on the manager’s role in designing sales force compensation, but it is worth considering how this task interacts with her other responsibilities. For example, do her incentive design decisions affect the amount of time and effort she spends coaching particular salespeople (or recruiting and hiring, etc.) or vice versa? Would the proposed request mechanism affect her decisions in other areas such as territory design? In the first model extension, I use a simple additive model to represent the effect of the manager’s “support effort” on sales. Future research could consider alternative models that allow for more complex interactions between the manager’s and salesperson’s efforts.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental Material, Involving_Sls_Mgrs_in_SF_Incentive_Design_v9.0_JMR_revision_4_(Web_Appendix) - Involving Sales Managers in Sales Force Compensation Design
Supplemental Material, Involving_Sls_Mgrs_in_SF_Incentive_Design_v9.0_JMR_revision_4_(Web_Appendix) for Involving Sales Managers in Sales Force Compensation Design by Rob Waiser in Journal of Marketing Research
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Acknowledgments
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References
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