Abstract
Keywords
The Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) is typically presented as the metaphysical founder of “modernity” by contending that humans are able to pursue only natural ends. Supernatural ends, in contrast, are entirely beyond their natural grasp and are given by God. Discussions of Suárez have tended to situate him on a large intellectual canvas in support of genealogies of contemporary thought. 1
I wish to examine the Suárez debate in its neglected twentieth-century Jesuit context. Suárez’s confrère Henri de Lubac was a noted critic, and I shall open by summarizing his charge. After this, I shall discuss Jesuit philosophy in the earlier twentieth century, including its institutional setting and formal pedagogical directives. I shall then introduce Pedro Descoqs and the neo-Suárezianism that was taught at the Maison Saint-Louis on Jersey, where de Lubac studied. I shall then appraise how deep de Lubac’s critique of Suárez really goes and suggest that the French Jesuit, despite himself, assimilated key elements of Suárez’s metaphysics and theological approach.
De Lubac’s Critique of Suárez
In Here we have the members of a new Order, founders of a new scholasticism, anxious, as their second General [Diego Laynez] said, for a theology “better accommodated to the needs of new times,” emboldened because of this to promote new theses, of whose novelty they were aware, against the theologians who were the most traditional, fervent defenders of the tradition.
2
Suárez was thus, for de Lubac, a founding father of modern theology. This is indeed suggested by his expository style. In the medieval
For Jesuits, the debate about Suárez concerned their philosophical founding father.
4
De Lubac’s longest engagement with Suárez’s metaphysics occurs in
De Lubac returns to Suárez when discussing the primitive state of humanity. Medieval theologians had entertained, as a hypothesis, that a human could be created in a purely natural condition without grace, justice, completeness, or immortality. Suárez’s innovation was both to accept the possibility of a purely natural state and to contend that, if possible for a finite historical period, it could define the entirety of earthly human life. As de Lubac rhetorically puts it, “Why should not the state of pure nature be prolonged in this way into a natural order, fitted to find its fulfilment in a natural end?” 9 For him, Suárez segues from entertaining pure nature as a hypothetical possibility into affirming it as in reality sufficient because of the ordering of natural power to natural ends.
In his study
In
Suárez, Thomas, and the Maison Saint-Louis
De Lubac could have justified engaging Suárez simply on the grounds of his abiding importance within the Society of Jesus. As Helen John put it as late as 1966, with reference to the nineteenth-century neo-Thomist revival, “at the same time, the older Suárezian tradition has continued among the Jesuits down to the present.”
16
Indeed, until the papal suppression of the Society in 1773, Suárez’s
De Lubac completed his philosophical formation at the Maison Saint-Louis, above St. Helier on the island of Jersey, a British crown dependency close to the French coast. During the interwar period, the philosophate was a major Jesuit intellectual center. It had opened in 1880 during resurgent secularism in French education, which two years later resulted in the Jules Ferry Laws banning religious teaching in public educational settings. 19 Constructed in 1860 as a hotel, the building had been purchased by the English Jesuits to house the philosophates and theologates of the Paris and Champagne provinces. 20 It quickly became the focal point of the so-called “Holy Hill,” which included the Sœurs Auxiliatrices des Âmes du Purgatoire, the naval École de Notre-Dame-de-Bon-Secours, and Aloysius (later De La Salle) College. 21 In 1892, de Lubac’s own Lyons province arrived, replacing the Champenois. Despite a building project and acquiring several neighboring properties, the community, of over two hundred people, lacked space. Because of this, the theologate left Jersey in 1899, leaving just the philosophate. By 1900 the Holy Hill had become, in Diane Moore’s description, a “vast Catholic network” that included three houses of Carmelite nuns, the Jesuit Bon Secours boarding school, and the Frères de l’Instruction Chrétienne de Ploërmel. 22 Alarmed at this development, the States of Jersey (the island’s legislature, which then included the twelve Anglican rectors) outlawed new religious communities of more than six people.
The philosophate was a place of intellectual conflict, principally between Suárezianism and the emerging transcendental Thomism of Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Maréchal. 23 Erick Hedrick-Moser depicts the curricula diversity: students might attend a morning class in French by Auguste Valensin, discussing ancient and modern philosophers, then later that day hear an ontology lecture by Pedro Descoqs, delivered in Latin, in which he demolished modern philosophy. 24 From at least 1915 onward, visitations and correspondence show that this lack of intellectual coherence worried the Jesuit authorities, who thought it confused and disoriented students. 25
The Jesuit formational curriculum is defined in the
The question of how closely Thomas should be followed, and the status of Suárez in Jesuit philosophates, was intensely contested. In 1879, Pope Leo XIII had published his encyclical
In March 1917, the Jesuit superior general, Wlodimir Ledóchowski, wrote to his order’s Scholasticates.
31
The letter was endorsed by Pope Benedict XV, who stated that, although the theses represented “safe directive norms,” they did not necessarily need to be adopted.
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Ledóchowski himself acknowledged that, regarding the Doctors of the Church, “great reverence must be joined with that respectful freedom of thought which is requisite for the advancement of learning.”
33
He then offered an extended eulogy on Thomas Aquinas, affirming both his historic theological supremacy and contemporary relevance. Ledóchowski described Thomas as the Society’s “own special Doctor,” stating that he should be followed in “all propositions of greater moment,” but that in all others Jesuits were free, providing they “do not depart from him
Throughout the letter’s first half, Suárez is notable by his absence. However, Ledóchowski builds the case for his order’s distinctive brand of Scholasticism by citing the endorsement of Suárez by Zéphirin González. The Dominican cardinal describes Suárez as being “after St Thomas . . . perhaps the most outstanding representative of scholastic philosophy.”
36
This prepares ground for the key claim that, contrary to the third thesis, the real distinction between essence and existence is
Pedro Descoqs and neo-Suárezianism
In September 1920, de Lubac arrived at the Maison Saint-Louis for his three years of philosophical studies. That summer, Valensin had been dismissed from his teaching position, and the doctrine of Pierre Rousselot on the light of faith strengthening intellectual assent to belief had been prohibited. 37 At the philosophate, metaphysics teaching was dominated by the combative Pedro Descoqs (1877–1946), whom John justly designates the “leader of the twentieth-century Suarezians” and Emerich Coreth honors as the “last great representative” of the Suárezian tradition. 38
Descoqs had arrived at the philosophate in 1912 and would remain until the year of his death. His major contribution was as librarian. In this role, he secured greatly increased funding, reorganized the collection, traveled widely, obtained collections originating from other Jesuit institutions, built a large extension, and, significantly, controlled student access to books, withholding or restricting those deemed heterodox. He established for the French Jesuit provinces a centralized research library comparable to those already realized elsewhere in Europe.
39
Descoqs also cofounded the
De Lubac describes the “combative teaching” of his “Suárezian master” as a “perpetual invitation to react.”
41
Descoqs’s target was the real distinction of existence (
Descoqs also called into question the second of the theses, that act is effectively unlimited, by appealing to Thomas’s own
Descoqs thus refuted the Thomism of the theses with a blend of Suárezian and Thomist metaphysics. However, he also accepted the theory of a “natural immediate vision of God,” of which the object was not the trinitarian persons but the divine essence itself. He thus attempted to maintain a view of natural beatitude as the vision of the divine essence although not as a supernatural beatitude.
46
De Lubac refutes this theory, arguing that, according to theological tradition, supernatural beatitude is precisely the vision of the divine essence. He calls into question Descoqs’s attempt to justify his theory by means of a distinction between immediate vision, which is natural, and intuitive vision, which is supernatural.
47
Descoqs had noted that the term
While discussing Scotus’s opinion that the desire for supernatural beatitude is innate, Suárez refers to the distinction drawn between the natural and elicited appetites. De Lubac cites this key passage against Descoqs’s idea of an immediate natural vision of God. Of this idea, Suárez writes that this opinion displeases me most of all, since it proceeds from the elicited appetite, of which more below. And that distinction [between the natural and elicited appetites], as I have said elsewhere, has no place in the clear vision of God, with which we are dealing, because if God or any of God’s attributes is seen, the whole essence of God must be seen. Nature cannot be inclined to the vision of God in one way without being inclined to see God in Godself as three, as one, as simply all-powerful both for the works of nature and for grace, and as the ultimate end of all created things, whether natural or supernatural. This is established because the vision of God, as primary cause, is as supernatural as it can be; the reason for the cause and for the vision of God is therefore the same.
49
By thus citing Suárez, de Lubac demonstrates Descoqs’s departure from the teaching of his master. This opens the question of whether de Lubac’s opposition was ultimately to Suárez or to Descoqs, his self-appointed defender.
Suárez, de Lubac, and Metaphysics: Divergence or Appropriation?
De Lubac contested three elements of what he came to regard as the Suárezian system. As has been shown, these were: (1) natural desire is limited to natural ends; (2) supernatural ends may only be superadded to nature and sought by conditioned desire; and (3) grace is not gratuitous but owed as a debt. As has also been shown, de Lubac considered that the early Jesuits were hostile to theological tradition and excessively solicitous to accommodate theology to the perceived needs of the world. This, in summary, is the whole of de Lubac’s critique of Suárez.
De Lubac’s critique does not extend to Suárez’s rejection of the real distinction, by which Suárez opposes the notion that essences may subsist in a heavenly realm without existing in the world of things. Neither does de Lubac target Suárez’s theory of knowledge, according to which universals are functions of reason and language, by which similarities and differences between individuals are identified, rather than subsisting separately from individuals as objective essences on which they are dependent. De Lubac does not question Suárez’s stand against political absolutism, instead endorsing, if unconsciously, his predecessor’s justification of the rights of citizens against despots.
In comparing de Lubac and Suárez, I shall first address the three metaphysical points enumerated above in which de Lubac directly engages Suárez. 50 I am here aided by one of de Lubac’s most trenchant neo-Thomist critics, Lawrence Feingold. A prominent strand of Feingold’s case against de Lubac is that on key points of metaphysics he follows Suárez rather than Thomas.
Appetite and Its End
De Lubac’s first contestation of Suárez, then, opposes his view that natural desire is limited to natural ends. Feingold points out that de Lubac in fact agrees with Suárez that appetite can only be directed to a single end. 51 Suárez argues strongly against the possibility that an action may be directed to two different ends where one is not subordinated to the other. The will cannot have two moving principles, stimuli, or beginnings. 52 Suárez identifies natural appetite with natural ends, thereby preserving natural proportionality. However, de Lubac relates natural appetite to supernatural beatitude on the grounds that, if this is an end, nature cannot ultimately be unable to attain it. De Lubac’s dispute with Suárez is therefore grounded in a deeper agreement about the relation of appetite to end.
De Lubac’s conviction that desire can have only one ultimate end serves, in his eyes, as confirmation that this end must be supernatural. His refusal of dual ends enables him to affirm, for instance, that the supernatural “always represented God’s will for the final end of his creatures.” 53 By excluding the possibility of dual ends, de Lubac avoids ever needing to construe one as the function of the other. In particular, he eliminates the possibility of supernatural ends becoming mere projections of natural ends, even though the latter may always be pursued: the supernatural, de Lubac continues, puts “no obstacle in the way of the normal development or activity of nature in its own order.”
Nature, Desire, and the Supernatural
De Lubac’s second disagreement with Suárez concerns the latter’s view that supernatural ends may only be superadded to nature and sought by conditioned desire. It has sometimes been suggested that de Lubac shifted from an earlier position—that graced desire elevates nature to the supernatural—to a later position more cognizant of the paradoxical, or dialectical, character of any passage from nature to grace, including the need for sanctifying grace to condition desire.
54
Once his Suárezian heritage is recognized, however, this transition may be more accurately viewed as a return. Aged eighteen, during his novitiate at St. Leonards-on-Sea, de Lubac reflected on how acceptance of a “double end” is intrinsic to Jesuit life. Attributing to Suárez the notion that both ends have equal priority (“
Suárez held, like Aquinas, that ends are divisible into proximate and ultimate. An end willed for the sake of something else is proximate, but only an end in which the will rests without seeking another is ultimate.
56
This provides the basis for Feingold’s identification of a Suárezian inspiration behind de Lubac’s recognition of dual ends in his later
The co-presence of dual ends is fundamental in de Lubac’s political theology. When delineating Augustine’s heavenly and earthly cities, he makes clear that these are not two separate realms, but two distinct principles articulated using appropriate equivocation. Church and state are “
At this point, the question may be pressed of how far Suárez truly espoused the systematic distinction between nature and the supernatural that both Descoqs and de Lubac attribute to him, according to which the two run in parallel channels in harmony yet disconnection. In
Conceiving a natural end as a qualifiedly and negatively ultimate end sheds considerable light on the nuances of Suárez’s understanding of the relation between natural and supernatural ends. Every human, he argues, has an unqualifiedly ultimate end for which they aim, which is God. Admittedly, some seek this end by following natural inclination or moral disposition whereas others act on supernatural cognition and virtue. However, rather than portraying these two in disjunction, Suárez sees the first as leading to the second. In his own words, “Although they differ with respect to proximate ends . . . they still all aim at the same ultimate end because that end is indeed the more perfect . . . so that it draws to itself everyone acting well and it alone can satisfy the well-disposed affection.” 62 Indeed, it would be unrealistic to expect a human person, prior to every intention for a proximate natural end, to intend the unqualifiedly ultimate end, because of the cognitive power this would require. 63 It is far more likely that the intellect is moved by the senses and first cognizes particular goods, in which the general good is contained, and that the will is moved by these particular goods. In each of these goods a beginning of the complete good is desired, as a part of a whole. 64 Even a malicious act, Suárez contends, exists only by divine causality and efficacy, improperly seeks an end, and is motivated by a desire for a kind of happiness.
In discerning whether Suárez’s metaphysics entails the system of pure nature that de Lubac associates with it, the Ignatian context is also pertinent. Suárez believed that humans have direct knowledge of self-individuated, unique existents, in contrast with Thomas’s view that the objects of knowledge are universal abstracts cognized by an immaterial intellect.
65
However, a metaphysics that privileges individuals and direct intellection of and by them need not exclude the non-intellectual apperception of the supernatural. Ignatius’s spirituality has been described as the “core inspiration in Suárez’s thought”
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and points to a possible resolution of Suárez’s perceived grace–nature dualism. In Ignatius’s
The Perfection of Nature
De Lubac’s third point against Suárez is that, for him, grace is not gratuitous but owed as a debt (
Moving beyond the debt discussion, this comparison of the grace–nature relation in Suárez and de Lubac may usefully be related to desire viewed as grace subjectively appropriated by the human subject. Feingold avers that, for both Suárez and de Lubac, an innate and unconditioned natural desire for the vision of God is incompatible with a state of pure nature. 70 Suárez assures this state by associating desire with a conditioned connatural final end for the creature. Thus grace assures what is due. De Lubac instead privileges the unconditioned character of this desire, relating it to the creature’s supernatural end and thereby refusing the possibility of a state of pure nature. For de Lubac, grace is thus gratuitous. This presupposes some notion of nature being given its due: if mere ongoing existence required continual gratuitous divine acts, this would entail divine indebtedness to nature.
De Lubac and Suárez: Further Convergences
The previous section demonstrates that de Lubac’s position on key points in Scholastic metaphysical debates points to an underlying endorsement of Suárezian metaphysics. Additional confirmation of the depth of Suárez’s influence may be found in de Lubac’s approach to three other topics. We are aided here by de Lubac’s executor and former archivist, Georges Chantraine, who contends that his thought is rooted in both Suárez’s
Essences as Unique Existents
De Lubac was profoundly alive to the power of ideas both in spiritual introspection and as the primary causes of social and political change. Chantraine asks, “Is not the dynamic schema of knowledge that takes form in Henri de Lubac, like it or not, underpinned by Suárez’s epistemology, which clearly attributes (and this is rarely recognized) the power of the concept to a theory of representation at once intuitive and practical?” 72 Chantraine contends that Suárez defended the “dynamic role of thought, and we see that de Lubac did not remain insensible to this key dimension of Suárezian conceptualism.” He associates this with Suárez’s refusal of the real distinction and his interpretation of Thomas centered on the unity of being.
For Suárez, intellectual essences (roughly, ideas) do not exist in the abstract and are not strictly cognizable. They are unique existents rather than subsisting as universal abstracts in an unchanging eternal realm. In this understanding, Suárez anticipates modern theories of ideology. Ideas exist in political and social contexts and for this reason powerfully determine individual and collective action. In
De Lubac describes a psychic evolution in modernity through the progressive raising of consciousness that is manifested in faith in the application of science to transform nature and society. This produces an
Eclecticism
As has already been seen, Suárez synthesized philosophical traditions and approaches. Carlos Noreña has identified these as extending to Dominican rationalism and Franciscan voluntarism, Platonic realism and Occamist nominalism. 80 Karl Rahner celebrates this feature of his thought, affirming that multiple sources, contexts, and scientific approaches reflect the inherent plurality of knowledge. 81 Juan Antonio Senent-De-Frutos has set Suárez within the context of a Jesuit modernity of “attention to the particular, in its approach of adaptation or accommodation to what is personal and cultural” that is able to “accommodate people, times, and places to achieve a better match in interacting with other subjects and with reality.” 82 The imperative of accommodation impels methodological variety, with method and sources dependent on the topic and its cultural context.
De Lubac himself states that he has “never claimed to be doing the work of philosophical systematization.”
83
In a brief preface to his late Although the texts reproduced here were all intended to be theological, they did not result from a fully developed body of teaching concerned with some central point of dogma or its history or from a long period of research on a particular subject. . . . And, whether the subject is the history of exegesis, political theology, spiritual life or comparative religions, every text was at first purely circumstantial, either in the ordinary sense that it had to be written in response to an invitation to speak at a certain congress or contribute to a collective publication, or—and here is the true meaning of the title—because a given situation whose outcome could have serious consequences seemed to invite me to enter the debate.
84
The notion that these writings are “fragmented,” which is suggested by the translated title, is far from what the original indicates. They were theological engagements, occasioned by events and exigences, in a setting in which theology was a shared, communal pursuit.
In his embrace of eclecticism, de Lubac showed himself more truly Suárezian than the systematizing Descoqs. The clearest evidence of the latter’s rejection of this inheritance is his study of the alleged “crisis” in the use of the theory of biological evolution (a notion popularized in 1909 by Félix Le Dantec) as an explanation of human origins resulting from the purported accumulation of argument and evidence contradicting it. Refuting the former Jersey scholastic Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Descoqs contended that biological evolution and human descent were mere hypotheses. 85 As such, they were countermanded by the classic Catholic dogmas that the world was directly created by God, that Adam was the human prototype, and that original sin is transmitted from him through all later generations. Paleontology could, Descoqs concluded, still be undertaken, but the evidence required reinterpretation to support received teaching. 86
De Lubac’s sympathy for Suárez’s syncretism provides theoretical grounding for his sometimes intense antipathy to neo-Thomism, especially its propositional and systematic tendencies. What, de Lubac asks, characterizes a “Thomist”? He responds by caricaturing his likely assessment of a non-Thomist. De Lubac inveighs: One such author, for example, could have spent his life defending the plurality of personal spirits: what does it matter? Logically, he can only be pantheist. Another has consistently shown that, in the progress of the universe, there has been continuing creation, orthogenesis [directional evolution], the appearance of new being: what does it matter? His system is, and can only be, neo-Eleatism. Yet another has consistently witnessed to divine transcendence: logically, he is an immanentist; etc., etc.
87
Sketching the character of a neo-Thomist, de Lubac continues: He is a man who has nothing to learn, nothing at least that requires him in any way to modify or enlarge his viewpoints; [there is] nothing that obliges him to admit that, without being contradicted in anything, one can however perhaps discover other perspectives from his own. He is a man who has constructed, or rather who has bought himself ready made, a shell, making it impermeable to all salutary rain. A man who has hardened his spirit such that he can no longer welcome anything, and above all can no longer understand anything.
88
De Lubac continues that there are good Thomist historians, good disciples of Thomas, and, of course, Thomas himself. He seeks no dispute with them. However, he also contends that neo-Thomists are “incapable of the ‘discernment of spirits (
Political Resistance
During Suárez’s final decade, the question of how far the duty of political obedience extended was intensely controversial. In 1606, King James I of England had promulgated an oath of allegiance by which Catholics were required to affirm his right to rule and to renounce any papal intervention or influence in national affairs. In response, Suárez penned his
However, Suárez went further by conditionally justifying tyrannicide. He accepts that, if a tyrant may be killed, this should be done by the political community rather than as the act of a private individual. 91 If it were viewed as potentially just for a private citizen to kill a ruler, even a tyrant, the likely consequence would be unending political instability. Even so, a citizen may kill a ruler in self-defense of their own life or body and may resist or kill a tyrant to defend the republic, if the ruler is unjustly attacking the republic and killing citizens. Moreover, Suárez contends that a private citizen may also kill a tyrant in vengeance for previous acts. Such killing, he continues, is permitted “by authority from God, who by the natural law has given to each one the means to defend himself and his fatherland, indeed to defend any innocent person.” 92 Moreover, because civil obedience is subordinate to ecclesiastical obedience, it does not bind citizens in a situation when a ruler “prescribes things illicit or contrary to the salvation of the soul.” 93
In several places, de Lubac recognizes Suárez’s importance as a key defender of the theory that the church has indirect, but not direct, power over civil rulers. 94 For Suárez, spiritual power in temporal affairs was indirect because it orders these to a spiritual good that is of a different order. 95 While recognizing the utility of the indirect power theory in combatting state absolutism, de Lubac held that this was little better than the theory of direct power, which in “making civil power a mere instrument of spiritual power demeans the Church as well as humiliates the State.” 96 It might appear that de Lubac thus opposes any notion of indirect ecclesial or spiritual power over the state, instead accepting authority over individual consciences alone. 97 However, his principal concern with the theory of indirect power is its association with historic disputes over papal prerogatives, such as deposing or nominating rulers, enacting laws, or passing legal judgment. De Lubac argues that the church possesses a power “in” (rather than over) temporal matters that derives from its “power over the spiritual” exercised via its power to bind consciences. 98 He writes, “Since the supernatural is not separated from nature, and the spiritual is always mixed with the temporal, the Church has eminent authority—always in proportion to the spiritual elements present—over everything.” 99
De Lubac’s critical appropriation of Suárez for his liberative political theology contrasts sharply with the neo-Suárezian politics of Descoqs, who contended that French Catholics could cooperate with the monarchist nationalist Charles Maurras, theorist and leader of
Conclusion
De Lubac writes of the Jesuits, “In our Company, there have always been some anti-Thomists. . . . One of the last was the good Fr Descoqs.”
103
This article has shown that opposition to neo-Thomism remained a significant marker of Jesuit philosophy into the second half of the twentieth century. This opposition was primarily grounded not in modernism or liberalism, nor even in
The single point on which de Lubac clearly opposed Suárez was the approach to tradition. Charging the early Jesuit theologians with promoting deliberately iconoclastic methods, de Lubac himself resisted the notion that a
Yet Suárez helped positively shape de Lubac’s understandings of nature and the supernatural, his theological anthropology and theological method, and his political theology, enabling him to engage Christian experience and even to bridge the gap between Scholastic metaphysics and the Christian faith presented in Scripture. In the background of Suárez’s metaphysics stands Ignatius’s We must above all take the theological anthropology of the Bible seriously and persevere in it in spite of all the objections advanced by systematic philosophy. The Bible locates the human “essence” not primarily in what distinguishes humans from other beings, but in their concrete and indivisible wholeness.
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De Lubac pursued metaphysical clarity while respecting the imperatives of lived experience. Because Suárez is now a figure of mainly historical interest it might be supposed that his metaphysics is no longer important, having been finally vanquished by neo-Thomism and its heirs. However, over the past eighty years, Thomism has undergone great transformation. In broad terms, in the readings developed by Cornelio Fabro and Louis de Raeymaeker, the contrast between God as pure act and being as mere potency have been eclipsed and almost refuted by theories of participation, which bring nature and experience into much clearer theological focus. 109 Suárezian metaphysics, including de Lubac’s inflection of it, is now flowing in the theological mainstream. 110
Footnotes
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. On the close relationships within the student cohort generally,see Sarah Shortall,Soldiers of God in a Secular World: Catholic Theology and Twentieth-Century French Politics (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press,2021),34–45;Jon Kirwan,An Avant-garde Theological Generation: The Nouvelle Théologie and the French Crisis of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2018),109–21.25.
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. For the importance of Suárez’s theory of popular sovereignty in the political theology of Pope Francis,see Thomas R. Rourke,The Roots of Pope Francis’s Social and Political Thought: From Argentina to the Vatican (Lanham,MD: Rowman & Littlefield,2016),26–30.