Abstract
Introduction
Since taking power in 2013, the Abd al-Fattah el-Sisi military regime in Egypt has placed urban informality as a political priority. As part of the regime’s Egypt Vision 2030 and tailored to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), detailed in elaborately created promotional videos such as ‘A Smile of Hope’ (notably posted by the Ministry of Defence and produced by the Egyptian Armed Forces), the Egyptian state has announced its intention to ‘eliminate’ informal urban areas.
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The executive director of the Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF) told
To understand how and why the Egyptian state has placed the concept of urban informality as central to its political agenda and as a threat to the state, we have to interrogate and reconceptualise this term and trace its historical geographical emergence in Egypt and beyond. In the first section of this article, I outline contemporary debates on urban informality in both Egypt and beyond. I argue that urban informality is a political intervention and its appearance is always fleeting and geographically specific in an otherwise haphazard context. I understand the appearance of urban informality
In the second section, I contend that the appearance of urban informality in Egypt followed shifts in geopolitical relations. I detail how the specific concept of urban informality was introduced into the Egyptian context by the World Bank and USAID in a period of intense geopolitical transformation at a range of geographical scales. I focus on a 1982 World Bank-funded report that I contend was key to introducing the idea of Egypt being defined by urban informality through the use of outdated and incomplete laws. I note how this same study ignored its own documentation of haphazard urban processes and instead categorised the country as being dominated by informality.
In the final section of this article, I account for why urban informality, despite its variable definitions and contested formations, has emerged as a mainstay to the politics of the el-Sisi military state and resulted in the hazardisation of the urban fabric. The state in Egypt, as part of a global military trend that meaningfully began in the 1990s, militarised urban informality. It is through this historical and analytical frame that the importance that the el-Sisi military state has placed upon urban informality should be understood. I stress, however, that while the regime has made a concerted effort to enact policies to eliminate urban informality this has not meant it has the ability to do so. Despite the ever-increasing social repression by the military state in Egypt it does not act in a social vacuum, and while it may be able to conduct singular and dramatic acts in shaping the built environment, the state’s intervention is also characterised by haphazard negotiations at a range of geographical scales over who can live where and how, what is legal and illegal and the formal and informal in urban Egypt.
This analysis is part of my own continued research on urban dynamics in Egypt since I lived in the country in 2006–2007 and made subsequent visits in 2012 and 2017–2018. This article relies on an examination of both English and Arabic archival documents of state laws and decrees, human rights organisations reports, NGOs (like 10Tooba Applied Research on the Built Environment) and media (Egyptian and international media and social media). This article consists of a critical reading of the 1982 Abt Association study on
Urban informality and power in a haphazard context
In my framing of urban informality, I contend that urban studies scholars should distinguish between the political process that can produce the appearance of a formal and informal divide and the everyday haphazard urban practices that characterise urban life. I understand urban informality not as the border of an object or a mode of urbanisation but the fleeting and geographically specific outcome of a power relationship. Anything can be framed as formal or informal; it requires the application of a durable structure of power to achieve this appearance. The el-Sisi regime would like to show that it has the ability to determine what is formal and what is not, and what forms of informality will thrive and which will disappear. But the historical-geographical record of informality in Egypt shows a more contested, contradictory and complex set of practices. Urban informality is foremost a political process, enacted at a range of geographical scales, that is always fleeting and geographically specific in a haphazard context.
The declared goal by el-Sisi to clear Egypt of the
Several scholars and policy makers view informal urbanism to be
The volume of scholarship on informality and the wide range of different contexts and things to which it refers has led to some academics questioning how analytically useful the distinction between informal and formal is and to the need to search for a more specific urban grammar (McFarlane, 2019). Herrle and Fokdal (2011: 7) have declared urban informality to be a myth due to its ever-changing formations and vague formulations. Accepting this idea, however, would tell us little about why the Egyptian military state has been so preoccupied with this term and has directed great resources in efforts to ‘eradicate’ it or why urban studies scholars have spilt considerable ink trying to come to terms with it. Urban informality is a framework that plays an important role in directly shaping the urban order and struggles within it – at times to devastating effect. The formal and informal urban divide does political work that we need a better understanding of. Specifically, how and why urban informality has emerged as central to politics, to what end and its impact on the built environment and urban social life.
Drawing on Mitchell’s (1991) argument in relation to the state, I contend that the elusiveness of urban informality should tell us something about this concept. Rather than dismissing urban informality as a myth or responding to this accusation by searching for a more specific or fixed definition, we need to examine the political processes through which this uncertain yet powerful concept is produced. My analysis of urban informality contributes to the call by Marx and Kelling (2019: 499) to be attentive to how and why informal distinctions emerge and the social processes that underly what comes to be identified as informal. In this article, I outline how the World Bank introduced urban informality into Egypt in the late 1970s using outdated and colonial laws and the broader geopolitical framework that this was situated within. In turn, I show how the Egyptian state was reluctant to utilise the term urban informality until the 1990s when the military state sought to link the Islamist ‘threat’ to it. It is these political contexts that we should be attentive to in understanding both the ubiquity of the elusive term of urban informality in Egypt and its power.
The scholarship of Roy (2005, 2009, 2018) has been particularly influential in theorising urban informality. Roy (2005) defines urban informality as a
Urban Egypt is not dominated by urban informality on one side and urban formality on another, but by haphazard urbanisation in which anything can be made to appear formal or informal if there is the will and power to do so. Haphazard urbanisation points to the complex social negotiation between a large array of networks through which the urban is practised and formed. To create the appearance of a formal and informal divide in this haphazard context, power has to be mobilised, produced and composed. It has to be a power that is not automatically achieved but the result of a process that is always open to a range of outcomes, and one that is always geographically and temporally specific. As I detail below in the case of Al-Warraq Island, even in the highly authoritarian context of Egypt the ability to produce this power, to create the appearance of divides between the formal and informal, can be resisted and transformed. Due to the contested process of creating the appearance of a formal and informal divide, scholars should also be attentive to how this political process can result in putting urban collective life in danger – its hazardisation.
The appearance of urban informality
Even before the concept of urban informality began to be used by scholars in the 1970s (for a history of the term, see Harris, 2018), who could live where and how occupied a notable place in Egyptian politics. Before the 1952 Revolution, or coup d’état, a series of British and French colonial codes and regulations guided Egypt’s urban planning and design. Following the revolution, Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s government was keen to replace these colonial rules. A complex social struggle ensued between Nasser, various parts of the state and private landowners over who was allowed to build shelter, and where and how. As the Nasserite government focused on industrialisation, and the construction of factories and industries, it mostly took a hands-off approach to how most Egyptians achieved shelter (Hassan, 1978). The government often produced new legal frameworks and amnesties at politically notable moments, such as the 1956 Presidential elections or the conflict of 1967 (Shawkat, 2020). The specific appearance of the formal and informal divide in Egypt as a policy framework and political device, I contend, arose in the crucial period of 1967–1973 and its aftermath.
The war of 1967 had a dramatic impact on the urbanisation process in Egypt as the country focused its resources on the conflict. The war economy resulted in a fast-paced extension and intensification of urbanisation. Higher-income groups sought safety for their assets and ploughed money into land (prices doubled from 1967 to 1972) and the government abandoned the construction of subsidised housing (Néfissa, 2009; Shawkat, 2020). This trend of rising land prices and decreased subsidised housing was continued following the end of the October 1973 war and President Sadat’s announcement of the
The state has never had complete control over what, how and where shelter, and urban social life along with it, emerges. In the Sadat period, the formation of the built environment was impacted not only by the conflict occupying the state but also by the 1973 oil crisis. This period resulted in the rise of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies and meant many Egyptians of all classes went to work and sent remittances back home. The preferred investment for surplus capital from remittances was land, bricks and mortar (Sims, 2010). As a result, land prices continued to rise and real estate emerged as a central component of the economy. Remittances make a notable contribution to Egypt’s economy and according to the World Bank accounted for US$24 billion in 2020, amounting to 6.7% of GDP. This contributed to the haphazard urbanisation process and the appearance of a formal and informal divide – but one that requires further scholarly investigation.
The
Months before Sadat’s assassination in 1981 by Islamist militants, associated with al-Jihad, the government issued an amnesty on demolitions of illegal buildings in parallel to a range of new laws imposing tighter control and punishment of buildings constructed without a permit (Shawkat, 2020: 41). Funding by the US, directly and through its parastatals, was significantly increased to Egypt in the run-up to and after the Accords in 1978 and further again following the assassination of Sadat; mass housing programmes and aided self-help schemes received notable support. CIA archival records detail how Washington feared Sadat’s vulnerability to urban insurrection and sought to reform Egypt’s urban administration (Dorman, 2013: 1593). The World Bank and USAID wanted the Egyptian government to shift their current policy approach to the urban poor from neglect to active engagement through identifying ‘informal settlements’, creating appropriate legislation, construction of infrastructure and ‘aided self-help’– or what the World Bank called ‘site and services’.
From the 1970s onwards, the World Bank actively sought to identify ‘informal’ settlements and encourage governments to facilitate the legalisation (formalisation) of these shelters and allow the urban poor to find their own housing solutions (Harris, 2003). The US in the Cold War era viewed mass homeownership, and specifically aided self-help, as a mechanism through which to expand an American model of capitalism and protect its geopolitical interests. Kwak (2015: 89) argues that American housing advisors who began urging countries around the world to embrace mass homeownership embraced the idea of aided self-help ‘for its quintessentially capitalist, anticommunist ethos’.
Sakr (1990), a senior planner in the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) who worked on the first World Bank-sponsored studies on informal settlements, notes in her PhD thesis that the World Bank and USAID were the first to frame the housing crisis in Egypt as one centred specifically around informality and to suggest solutions to the Egyptian government on how to address it. The Bank and USAID, Sakr (1990: 5) notes, took a two-phased approach, a one-year study phase (1977–1978) and a four-year implementation phase (1978–1982): ‘These projects represented the first attempt in Egypt to explicitly acknowledge the unauthorized self-help activities taking place in informal areas’.
The 1982 Abt Associates study,
Informal housing in the Abt report was considered to be on land that is illegally subdivided in contravention of Law 52 of 1940 or that violates building regulations. 5 It is curious that the study took Law 52 to define urban informality because, as the authors note: ‘According to planning officials interviewed, this law has been ineffective since enactment ... once neighbourhoods are established in illegal subdivisions, the law is virtually impossible to enforce’ (Abt Associates with Dames and Moore, General Organization for Housing, Building, and Planning Research, 1982). The authors omit the fact that this was a colonial law or the implications that using an ineffective and unenforceable law may have on their assessments of urban informality. The sheer number of settlements that violated Law 52 and building codes meant that this classification of urban informality constituted a wide variety of different settlements, ages, security statuses, classes and infrastructural provisions (many areas classified as ‘informal’ had access to basic urban services in line with city-wide averages). But the Abt report neglects the significance of the complex negotiations and active planning between various state institutions (in particular between central and local government), within the legal system, as well as between various stakeholders over the different properties it clumps together as informal. This is even though the authors detail in the report, if one reads carefully, intricate practices of haphazard urbanisation in the implementation and organisation of the urban communities.
The Abt report, on the one hand, does carefully detail the intricate political struggles that went on in claims to the ownership of dwellings. But on the other hand, the authors insist on the appearance of a formal and informal urban divide. For instance, the report cites ‘informal’ land registration being undertaken to transfer land. This entails a seller going to court and alleging partial non-payment from the buyer. The court then charges the buyer in writing and issues a court order, and the buyer pays and receives a receipt from the seller – once the buyer has finished the house, they then register it with the local district. The report details many other instances like this, including: a group of residents due to be displaced through a stipulation in Law 52/1940 over the width of a road who won from the courts the right to remain; and a resident who received a fine from a police officer and then used this same fine to gain recognition as the owner of the property. Even the government, the Abt document reported, fell afoul of laws relating to illegal subdivision, but it negotiated a ‘formal’ outcome. The report adds that, in the provision of infrastructure, ‘once informal housing areas are spatially consolidated and represent permanent residential communities and residents collectively request government recognition, formal provision of infrastructure may be forthcoming’ (Abt Associates with Dames and Moore, General Organization for Housing, Building, and Planning Research, 1982). Notably, as Shawkat (2020: 190) has detailed, these practices continue to this day; Shawkat also cites similar levels of informality being officially reported in Egypt 40 years after the Abt study. Despite the Abt report detailing haphazard urban processes – an array of complex social negotiations between a large array of networks through which the urban is practised – it insisted on the appearance of an urban scene divided into the formal and the informal.
The Abt report was accompanied by the World Bank and USAID prompting the Egyptian government to implement upgrading projects in ‘informal’ areas and to abandon the construction of subsidised public housing. The World Bank wanted the government to focus on what cannot be done by private individuals, such as legalisation, overall planning and the provision of technical and social infrastructure (Sakr, 1990: 6). But the government was, according to Sakr (1990: 7), not convinced by this approach. The government was worried that legalisation and upgrading projects would encourage new informal areas, and it was also reluctant to abandon its highly visible public housing projects for less visible upgrading projects.
Forty years after the publication of the Abt report, the idea that urban Egypt can be divided into the formal and informal is more powerful than ever despite its continued elusiveness. The announcement by the el-Sisi state of the elimination of informality has been accompanied by speculator acts of destruction and construction of the built environment and the passing of laws like the Construction Violations and Reconciliation Law. Despite all these actions, it remains unclear what urban informality is for the Egyptian state – its legal declarations could (like the Abt study) constitute almost the country’s entire urban-scape. But what accounts for the tenacity of the elusive concept of urban informality? Why did the Egyptian state at first show little interest in the concept of urban informality but by the 1990s become increasingly infatuated by it?
Militarising urban informality
In October 1992, an earthquake in Cairo killed 561 people and injured thousands of others, many of whom the government reported to be living in precarious structures (although this is disputed) (Florin, 2009). The government was slow to respond to those in need of assistance compared to fleet-footed Islamic charities and groups who were viewed by those in need and others as far more effective in their provision of assistance, including blankets, food, medicine and shelter. The government did not take kindly to the comparison with these Islamic groups and tore down tents and sabotaged other assistance that they provided (Napoli, 1993). Two months later, the earthquake was followed by the infamous siege of Imbaba, a working-class district in Cairo. Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya, a militant Islamist group, had announced in a televised news conference that it had established an independent Islamic state in the area. The government response was to seize the area – with reports citing as many as 18,000 troops – to ‘cleanse’ this community of the militant Islamist group (Singerman, 2009). Singerman (2009: 115) writes that the political spectacle of the siege stigmatised informal housing areas: The focus on the problems associated with informal housing areas, and informality in general, had been discussed in the media before the siege, but after the siege the print media highlighted a new disturbing link between Islamists and informal housing areas that evoked a sense of crisis, if not hysteria.
This spectacular use of force by the Egyptian government in Imbaba and its intensified focus on informal areas should be placed in a context of increased anxiety in military headquarters across the world over the threat that urban areas posed to global security. The siege of Imbaba was one urban conflict among many in the 1990s that would confirm to many military analysts and urban studies scholars that warfare had been urbanised. The aftermath of 9/11 would further accelerate these trends. In 2003, Richard Norton, a former commander in the US Navy, penned his influential article on ‘feral cities’– defined as a metropolis with a population of more than a million people but where the government has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries. These ‘feral cities’, Norton argues, ‘exert an almost magnetic influence on terrorist organizations’ (Norton, 2003: 98). Emphasis was placed on cities with large Muslim populations, like Cairo, stressing not only their size but their association with militant Islamist groups. Even on the left, scholars voiced similar concerns (see for instance Davis’ (2004: 30) influential thesis titled ‘Planet of slums’, where he detailed how Islamist movements had become the ‘real government of the slums’). This body of work took informal areas, the absence of state-provided basic urban services and physical infrastructure, as well as the informal economy to be key indicators of ungovernability.
There was, however, thin evidence that militant Islamist groups had a strong association with the urban poor. The link with Islamist groups to ‘informal areas’ in Egypt was inevitable, with some definitions of informality incorporating 90% of the country’s built environment. But more substantially, Bayat (2007), in arguing directly against Davis (2004) and others, noted that in Egypt (and beyond) there is no obvious link between the urban poor and militant Islamism. He definitively showed, as the empirical evidence has borne out, that Islamic militancy does not have an ‘urban ecology’. Furthermore, Bayat (2007) stressed that politicians and the academic community in Egypt viewed informal areas (or the ‘ashwai’yyat) through the prism of ‘slums’ formulated in the US where joblessness and the decayed family structure are said to be responsible for crime and violence; the areas identified as ‘ashwai’yyat in Egypt did not suffer from higher crime rates than other areas and were home to a substantial number of middle-class urbanites (Bayat, 2007: 587–588). Despite the absence of any substantive connection between the Islamic military and areas identified as being informal, the siege of Imbaba provoked the Mubarak regime to launch a plethora of initiatives around areas it identified as informal, in order to combat ‘terrorism’.
While (as detailed above) urban informality had been discussed and studied amongst government officials for well over a decade, at the beginning of the 1990s the Egyptian state in the context of the siege of Imbaba ‘discovered’ urban informality as an urgent security issue to be confronted (Sims, 2010: 68). It was also in the 1990s that the term ‘
In 2013, the military coup in Egypt that brought el-Sisi to the Presidency meant a deepening of the militarisation of the state and its urban agenda (Khalil, 2019a: 96). The el-Sisi era has been marked by the hazardisation of the built environment that has been accelerated and deepened by its plans to ‘eliminate’ urban informality. The el-Sisi state has placed concerted attention on urban informality, I contend, because this urban planning concept lies at the intersection of two perceived threats. The first is the continued association by the Egyptian state of Islamist violence with urban agglomeration. The second is the perceived threat that dense urban areas pose as a place for people to gather to protest in the context of the 25 January revolution. The 2011 Egyptian revolution was characterised by urban revolt, and informal urban areas were often identified and characterised by scholars and journalists as being at the centre of the mobilisation of the protest (Adham, 2016).
The period of the 2011 revolution was marked by a notable assertion of the right to the city (Sharp and Panetta, 2016). Urban communities challenged in a highly visible manner the organisation of the built environment, such as constructing alternative highway entrances and enacting their own ‘site and services’ projects. The appearance of urban informality in this revolutionary period was markedly changed and notably targeted the rich and powerful, which had previously not been thought possible. Twenty-eight businessmen, controlling an estimated 80% of land reclamation projects, and several ministers were indicted for illegal lands deals (Joya, 2011: 376). In February 2011, Ahmed El Maghrabi, the Housing Minister from 2005 to 2010, was accused of selling 113 acres of state-owned land in 6 October City (a so-called ‘desert city’ established on the periphery of Cairo by former President Anwar Sadat in 1979) to the Akhbar al-Youm Investment Company to develop middle-class housing. In 2015, Maghrabi has acquitted of all charges, along with nearly all of these cases, which were dropped following the military coup in 2013 (Arese, 2018: 623). The top-down appearance of urban informality – as one seemingly demarked by the state and focused on the urban poor – was restored.
It is through this political history of urban informality, and its militarisation, that the renewed war by el-Sisi to ‘eliminate’ urban informality should be comprehended. In 2011, the Maspero neighbourhood of Cairo, adjacent to Tahrir Square, gained a reputation for being one of the most militant areas – defending and directing protesters to the square. The revolution had also sparked residents into organising and demonstrating against the state’s long-term attempts to displace them (Wahba, 2020: 10). In late April 2018, the 77-acre Maspero Triangle site, an area of prime and strategic real estate, was dramatically turned to rubble. Khalil (2019b), in her documentation of the struggle between the people of Maspero and the state, noted that ‘The Egyptian government uses the term of “development of slums” to describe its efforts to relocate residents, which include forced evictions and the use of security forces to remove the families’. The state has declared its intention to turn this district into a commercial and entertainment hub financed supposedly through land sales in this area. The rubble of Maspero and the rows of military constructed and designed public housing in Al-Asmarat on the periphery of Cairo where many of the residents were rehoused provide a stark materialisation by the state of the formal and informal urban divide.
Maspero and Al-Asmarat, however, while directly impacting thousands of urban Egyptians, do not impact the vast majority of those placed under the various formulations of informality. These definitive actions by the state – that do indeed create a stark divide between the formal and informal – are not how most Egyptians experience informality. An example is the Construction Violations Reconciliation Law, passed by the Egyptian state in 2019 and amended in 2020, which aimed to solidify the appearance of the formal and informal divide by legalising many buildings. The Built Environment Observatory (BEO, 2020) has estimated that this law has incorporated as many as 8.2 million housing units built without a permit since 2007 alone. But, as detailed by the BEO, the ambitions of this law, despite being declared by the machinery of the state, have been met with all sorts of entanglements and compromises: the municipalities did not have the capacity to undertake such a large reconciliation and have been largely reluctant to impose it; the Engineers’ Syndicate tasked with undertaking structural reports to conform to the law is too expensive for most; the law is unpopular with owners of buildings; and there is a lack of clarity over who should apply. The result is that instead of the complete transformation of how property is held by millions in the country (the stated aim of the law), the law has resulted in 32,000 applications for reconciliation (BEO, 2020). Rather than organising the built environment into a more durable appearance of the formal and informal, another hazard has been produced for urban Egyptians to navigate in their quest for everyday survival.
The rubble of Maspero and the lines of public housing in Al-Asmarat are the exceptional instances in which the formal and informal divide has (at least superficially) been made to appear. The vast majority of Egyptians live in a haphazard urban context in which there is a constant negotiation over where Egyptians can and cannot live, and what is formal and informal. The thousands upon thousands of empty apartments in the desert cities are just one testament to this (detailed in Shawkat, 2020; Sims, 2010, 2015). The way in which urban informality by the state can result in the hazardisation of urban life rather than the neat determination of what is informal and what is not has also been articulated in the state’s struggle to impose its definition of informality. The state does not act in a power vacuum; there are struggles within it and beyond over the placement of urban life.
The example of the resistance by residents of al-Warraq Island against the Egyptian state imposing its definition of urban informality on inhabitants is an illustration of how this category can be unsettled. The Egyptian state announced that it planned to turn al-Warraq Island in the Giza district of Cairo into a tourist destination and expropriate the land, planning to evict the estimated 120,000 people that inhabit the island (Arabic Network for Human Rights Information [ANHRI], 2018). Notably, the economic viability of turning this island into a tourist destination and of moving its inhabitants, and the substantive interest of (Gulf) investors to invest in such a project, are all unknown. The government, according to the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) who conducted field visits with the island residents, reported that inhabitants informed them that the state had prevented food supplies reaching the island, had cut off water and had accused them of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The residents mobilised into committees representing the families living on the island to maintain their presence there, running Facebook pages and doing interviews on BBC Arabic and other news channels.
In July 2017, the government began tearing down houses while families remained inside, leading to among the first notable instances of violence between the protesters and the state since the 2011 revolution and the death of a 26-year-old man, Sayed Hassan Al-Gezawy (ANHRI, 2018; Khalil, 2019a: 106). The police and military had reportedly planned to demolish 720 houses but withdrew following protests by the island inhabitants after five houses had been destroyed (Bassam, 2018: 3). The battle for control of the island between the state and the islanders continues, as the state carries on its attempts to transfer 100,000 residents from the island to one of its public housing complexes. In December 2020, the state sentenced 35 of the protesters to prison and hard labour and restated its intention to displace the residents of the island (Al-Muhandis, 2020). Like much of urban Egypt, the struggle continues between the residents of Al-Warraq Island, various factions of the state and business interests. Khalil (2019a: 107) notes that the violence caused by forced evictions is not only limited to al-Warraq but has also occurred in many other governorates. The appearance of the formal and informal divide is a central concept in these struggle. The wrestling over the formal and informal urban divide is resulting in the hazardisation of urban life.
Conclusion
Debates over what urban informality is continue to rage not only within and beyond the state in Egypt but also in the pages of scholarly journals. Several recent articles have called for urban studies to: ‘transcend urban informality’ (Acuto et al., 2019); understand urban informality as a ‘site of critical analysis’ (Banks et al., 2020) or as ‘splintered’ (Beier, 2021); consider ‘informality as a condition’ (Marx and Kelling, 2019); or think of alternatives, like ‘popular urbanization’ (Streule et al., 2020). In this article, I have not argued for a more precise or fixed definition of urban informality or called for alternative formulations to it, but for scholars and policy makers to be attentive to the political processes through which this uncertain yet powerful concept is produced. Through a critical reading of the Abt report that first introduced the language of informality, I illustrated the arbitrary way in which much of urban Egypt was classified as informal. Despite the fact that this study detailed a range of haphazard urban practices, it insisted that urban Egypt was divided into the formal and informal. I in turn highlighted the geopolitical shifts and motivations that underlie the appearance of urban informality. Urban Egypt, I contend, is characterised by haphazard urbanisation, constituted by complex urban struggles, in which it takes the mobilisation of notable power to produce the appearance of a formal and informal divide and make it durable.
My approach to urban informality is one that does not understand it to be an object or a mode of urbanisation that is central to the territorial practices of state power. In tracing the Egyptian state’s engagement with urban informality, I highlighted how the state showed great reluctance in engaging this framework, until it was framed as a threat and subsequently militarised in the 1990s. Urban informality is now viewed by the el-Sisi regime as a central threat to the state but this has not meant that it has been able to dictate the appearance of urban informality. Rather, it has at times resulted in deadly struggles and what I term the hazardising of collective life in the country, making the achievement of a just, beautiful and sustainable city life ever more difficult in the country.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
Funding
ORCID iD
References
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