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Abstract

Chinese

Suburbs are at the forefront of urban change, with urban policy looking to increase the density of suburban centres. Thus, the compact city has emerged as a dominant urban policy paradigm, where policy settings are configured to enable densification in designated centres. For some, this is a form of post-suburbanism, characterised by new drivers, experiences and outcomes of suburban redevelopment pressures. However, suburban densification can emerge as a site of contestation as diverse interests, such as residents, developers and governments, come together. We explore three suburban centres in Sydney, Australia, to identify the diverse array of resident positions, objectives and strategies that emerge in response to suburban densification. Drawing from literature on NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard), YIMBY (yes-in-my-backyard) and urban growth machines, we establish an analytical framework that disrupts simple pro- and anti-development positions, identifying five resident groups: supporters; resisters; opponents; expansionists; and beneficiaries.

Keywords

community land use neighbourhood planning redevelopment/regeneration resident participation suburbs

Introduction

Suburbs are at the forefront of urban change, as policy makers, development actors, and (some) citizens call for their reconfiguration, specifically the need to increase density (Chalmers and Keil, 2015; Keil, 2020a; Maginn and Anacker, 2022). The push for more dense forms of suburbia draws together state and market players to mediate delivery, while opening spaces for conflict and resistance (Pinnegar et al., 2020; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). The state, via urban planning, plays a vital role in creating the possibilities for densification and, therefore, in defining who benefits and who is disadvantaged through these changes (Phelps et al., 2010; Whittemore and BenDor, 2019). Thus, suburban change can emerge as the site of political action (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020), where rezoning can become a catalyst for resident opposition (Brown and Glanz, 2018). For Pinnegar et al. (2020) there is a need to open analysis beyond state and market actors and recognise the diverse set of stakeholders involved and the uneven impacts of suburban densification. Likewise, Haarstad et al. (2023: 7) argue there is need to better understand how ‘compact urbanism is contextualised, lived, and resisted’. They call for research to recognise the antagonisms of the compact city. We respond by investigating how efforts to deliver compact city development in three precincts (Showground, Cherrybrook and St Leonards South) in Sydney, Australia, are contested or supported by residents.

Drawing together literature on NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard), YIMBY (yes-in-my-backyard) and urban growth machines (Molotch, 1976), we develop a framework for identifying the array of resident positions, objectives and strategies mobilised to either support or resist suburban densification. This is an emergent and inductive framework that reveals five resident groups: supporters; resisters; opponents; expansionists; and beneficiaries. These groups do not neatly align with established NIMBY and YIMBY classifications, that are often characterised as opposing forces, being either anti- or pro-development, respectively (Brown and Glanz, 2018; McNee and Pojani, 2022). Our framework presents a complex set of resident positions, informed by patterns of land ownership, willingness to engage with planning processes and established growth machines, and proximity to redevelopment precincts. In exploring resident responses to suburban densification in Sydney, we contribute to an emergent literature that problematises the classification of residents into so-called NIMBYs and YIMBYs as too simplistic to account for the diverse ways residents respond to local planning and development (Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022; Wicki et al., 2022; Wyly, 2022).

We now review the literature on densification, the compact city and post-suburbanism that provides the context for our analysis of resident responses to suburban densification. This is followed by a planning history of the redevelopment precincts and discussion of our methods. We then draw together literature on NIMBYs, YIMBYs and urban growth machines to inform our analysis. The paper then explores the diverse objectives and strategies of each resident grouping. Some conclusions follow.

Changing suburbs: Density, the compact city and post-suburbanism

The emergence of suburbs as sites of political action (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020), characterised by diverse configurations of residents looking to support or oppose densification, is situated in wider debates about the role of suburbs in cities. The Australian suburb is typically envisaged as a landscape of detached dwellings on large plots of land, although the reality is more diverse. While fringe development continues in Australia (Phelps et al., 2023) and beyond (Keil, 2020b), suburban expansion has been characterised as the antithesis of good planning (Freestone et al., 2018). In response, planning policy has looked to enable densification within the existing urban footprint, with the concept of compact urbanism now well established internationally (Haarstad et al., 2023; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). The compact city is a policy response to issues as diverse as climate change, housing unaffordability and social isolation, where density is seen to offer a better use of scarce resources, while fostering social connections via propinquity (Whittemore and BenDor, 2019). Many of these assumptions are contested, with resident displacement, gentrification and the destruction of affordable/public housing amongst the critiques levelled at the compact city (Anguelovski et al., 2019). The compact city is an established planning orthodoxy in Australia, where planning agencies seek to reconfigure cities via the densification of middle-ring suburbs (Randolph and Freestone, 2012; Ruming, 2018), usually taking the form of transit-oriented development through the redevelopment of low-density suburbs surrounding new or established train stations (Pinnegar et al., 2020; Ruming and Fingland, 2022).

Suburban densification has been analysed through the lens of post-suburbanism, where traditional suburbs are seen to respond to new economic, social and political pressures and opportunities (Chalmers and Keil, 2015; Keil, 2020b). A core element of the post-suburb is a transition to more complex, dense and diverse suburban forms (Chalmers and Keil, 2015). These configurations have been defined as ‘blendscapes’ that exhibit multiple built, social and economic forms and functions (Maginn and Anacker, 2022). For Keil (2015: 582), post-suburban cities can be characterised as a ‘new dispersed, multi-focus, discontinuous, variably dense, and multi-centred city’. Thus, the emergence of post-suburban spaces works to reconfigure the city, as multiple centres are established, characterised by a mix of dwelling types and land uses, delivered via local master planning (Keil, 2015). In short, the post-suburban city is that increasingly pursued in strategic planning policy.

However, Pinnegar et al. (2020: 322) argue that policy instruments promoting densification are ‘blunt’, as implementation is left to the private sector, underpinned by development feasibilities and profits. Grodach and Limb (2020: 287) concur, arguing that ‘compact city policy has tended to overly rely on market mechanisms’, requiring ownership, land use and built form arrangements to be reconciled. Thus, the compact city creates conditions for large-scale suburban (re)development, requiring state and market players (such as developers, real estate agents, financiers and planners) to come together to mediate delivery. At the same time, the compact city emerges as a space of political action as some stakeholders, such as local communities subject to uneven impacts of densification, mobilise to challenge (or support) development (Herdt and Jonkman, 2023). Thus, a diverse set of politics can emerge in suburbs targeted for densification, as actors coalesce to shape processes in their favour (Chalmers and Keil, 2015; Whittemore and BenDor, 2019; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). We explore these processes in three suburbs experiencing densification in Sydney.

Suburban densification in Sydney: Three redevelopment precincts

Planning for densification in Australian cities is a three-stage process. First, usually through a new metropolitan strategic plan or precinct-based policy, specific centres are identified for densification. Second, these centres are subject to detailed planning, including master planning and rezoning, that reconfigures land use and development parameters. Third, design and development approval is sought by site owners from local or state planning authorities. Our focus is the first two planning stages, where resident involvement is greatest.

We explore three redevelopment precincts across Sydney (Figure 1) where new planning frameworks have promoted densification. The first two precincts – Showground and Cherrybrook – are located along the new Metro North West Line announced in the early 2010s, with precinct planning commencing in 2013 (New South Wales Department of Planning [NSWDoP], 2013). Eight new stations and development precincts were established, with the State Government producing a Structure Plan for each precinct. For Showground and Cherrybrook, these plans were the foundation for rezoning processes that saw large areas of detached single-family dwellings rezoned for medium- and high-density housing, surrounding new mixed-use centres. In Showground the number of dwellings was projected to increase from 750 in 2012 to 4350 in 2036 (480% increase), with most buildings being 3–6 storey apartments (60%) and 7–12 storey apartments (23%) (NSWDoP, 2013). Similar increases were planned for Cherrybrook, where the number of dwellings was projected to increase from 1100 in 2012 to 4300 in 2036 (290% increase), with most buildings being 3–6 storey apartments (73%) (NSWDoP, 2013). At the time of writing, many Showground residents had sold their properties and development was underway. As Cherrybrook was the final precinct to undergo detailed planning, with rezoning finalised in December 2022, redevelopment had not yet commenced.

Figure 1.

Case study redevelopment precincts.

St Leonards, our third precinct, is in the Lane Cove Council area, on Sydney’s lower north shore. St Leonards is an established centre with a train station and recent history of high-rise development. In 2012 Lane Cove Council commenced planning for the St Leonards South Precinct: a 6.5-hectare area of detached dwellings that had the potential to meet state-imposed housing targets through high-density redevelopment. A master plan was adopted in 2015, with a planning proposal to increase zoning approved in 2016 (New South Wales Department of Planning, Industry and Environment [NSW DPIE] 2020). Following a complex planning and consultation process, the St Leonards South Planning Proposal was approved in 2020, allowing significant increases in density. Throughout the planning process, the rezoning of the precinct was controversial. Most properties within the precinct have since sold, and development has commenced.

Methods

Our analysis draws on 23 resident interviews (Showground: 11; Cherrybrook: 7; St Leonards: 5). To recruit participants, postcards were delivered to all properties within and adjacent to the redevelopment precincts (within 200 m of the boundary¹). The postcards directed residents to an online form where they could volunteer for an interview. Approximately 2500 postcards were delivered, suggesting that less than 1% of households volunteered for an interview. However, this response rate should be considered inaccurate for two reasons. First, it is estimated that one third of properties were vacant when the postcards were delivered. This claim is supported by New South Wales Valuer General² data that show significant sales in the precincts. Second, interviewees recounted stories of being constantly contacted by real estate agents, via postcards dropped in letterboxes. It is likely that many residents disposed of our invitation, thinking it was real estate agent advertising. Our goal was to recruit residents for in-depth qualitative interviews, not generate a statistically valid sample. All interviewees were owner-occupiers. Interviews were conducted online, ranging from 40 to 90 minutes in length. All interviews were recorded, fully transcribed, and analysed thematically; guided by a code sheet, developed inductively, where resident objectives and responses to densification emerged as key themes. To analyse these inductive themes, we draw on several key literatures, to which we now turn.

Understanding diverse resident responses to suburban densification

Our analysis is informed by three sets of academic literature – NIMBYism, YIMBYism and urban growth machines – which, together, help explain both the diversity of resident responses and range of strategies mobilised to support or resist suburban densification (Figure 2). None of these literatures, in isolation, adequately explains the diverse responses to densification in our case studies. Thus, these literatures are not mutually exclusive, but overlap to reveal emergent resident positions, objectives and strategies.

Figure 2.

Analytical framework.

The term NIMBY is often mobilised to describe negative attitudes towards proposed development projects or land uses and is used as a pejorative descriptor of residents who want to ‘protect their own turf’ (Dear, 1992: 288). NIMBY implies characteristics of ignorance, parochialism, prejudice, irrationality and racial or class antagonism (McNee and Pojani, 2022; Tretter and Heyman, 2022; Wyly, 2022). While recent studies have highlighted the diverse social, cultural and economic characteristics of emergent opponent groups, such as young investor owners (Cook and Ruming, 2021), NIMBY opponents are typically characterised as older, wealthy, long-term residents, who own their property outright and often have conservative political views (Whittemore and BenDor, 2019; Wicki et al., 2022; Wyly, 2022). Foundational work by Lake (1993) suggests that NIMBYs are driven by a desire to maintain property values and local amenity. NIMBYs are seen to focus on the (perceived) direct impacts of developments on their material conditions of existence and wellbeing (Teresa, 2022; Wassmer and Wahid, 2019; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022; Wolsink, 2006). These groups support stability, where engagement with planning emphasises potential negative impacts of development, while downplaying potential benefits (Haarstad et al., 2023; Whittemore and BenDor, 2019). Resident opposition to planning efforts aimed at increasing density is more commonly observed in suburbs dominated by single-family, low-density dwellings than in established medium- and high-density areas (Chalmers and Keil, 2015; Cook and Ruming, 2021; Trounstine, 2023; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). NIMBY opponents can act alone or band together into organised groups and adopt both formal acts, such as submitting planning objections or challenging developers in court, and informal acts, including distributing flyers, media coverage and protests (McNee and Pojani, 2022; Scally and Tighe, 2015; Tretter et al., 2022).

Planners sometimes dismiss NIMBY concerns, characterising them as ‘the usual suspects’ that represent a narrow interest base (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020). However, there is growing recognition that dismissing resident opponents as self-interested downplays the complex drivers, associations and interactions that frame resistance (Ruming et al., 2012). A more nuanced understanding of resident opposition has emerged, where opposition is acknowledged as heterogeneous, with diverse concerns, strategies and objectives (Scally and Tighe, 2015). Thus, there is a need to recognise resident resistance as a form of public address (Iveson, 2007), where opposition is understood as an integral part of democratic community engagement (Herdt and Jonkman, 2023; McClymont and O’Hare, 2008). Local opponents exercise their democratic rights and share the civil responsibility through voicing concerns about projects or land uses, which helps define common interests and public utility (Eranti, 2017). For Robinson and Attuyer (2020: 1294) resistance to compact city development is a struggle over ‘the democratic governance of the city’, where residents challenge densification based on concerns of public and civic value. The ‘capacity to engage and speak on behalf of the public [is] a central strategy of resistance’ (Ruming et al., 2012: 434). Indeed, opponents can work to oppose wider social, political and economic forces that operate in favour of ‘capital’ (Teresa, 2022; Wolsink, 2006), opposing the interests of urban growth machines, and contribute to public benefit (McClymont and O’Hare, 2008).

In contrast, there is a growing recognition of urban citizens who advocate for development. This group has been labelled YIMBYs, referring to people that support development near where they live to improve local housing conditions or green projects (Brown and Glanz, 2018). Wyly (2022) stresses the diversity of YIMBY groups in terms of membership, objectives and strategies. However, two broad groups of YIMBY residents have been identified. The first group of YIMBYs are residents, often existing owners, who view new land uses as a positive and want them located nearby, as they are seen to increase amenity and/or property values (Brown and Glanz, 2018; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). This group focuses on the (positive) material and financial impact of individual developments or infrastructure, such as transport, educational or retail development. Examples include open space, libraries and private businesses, such as cafés. These infrastructures, often included as part of mixed-use developments, are seen to have a positive spillover effect on how residents perceive and experience their neighbourhood (Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022; Wicki et al., 2022). These groups might lobby government agencies and private sector developments to locate appealing land uses nearby. For this group local amenity is paramount, and while they may support some types of development, under different circumstances they might mobilise to oppose other unwanted forms of development. For these residents, support for development is not part of a wider pro-growth position, but rather a strategy to secure personal benefits that accrue from certain types of local development.

The second group of YIMBYs are residents who are part of a broader pro-development movement. This YIMBY movement, typically made up of young, educated, professional and renter individuals, calls for increasing density and housing supply as a response to housing affordability challenges (Holleran, 2021; McNee and Pojani, 2022). Indeed, housing tenure (i.e. homeowner or renter) and associated housing goals (e.g. maintain property values or access affordable housing) is a key characteristic that differentiates NIMBY and YIMBY groups (Hankinson, 2018; McNee and Pojani, 2022). A central argument of this YIMBY group is that high-density development should be concentrated around public transport (Holleran, 2021). In this way they support established planning principles that promote compact urbanism. This YIMBY movement supports free market economic rationality (Tretter et al., 2022), claiming that market-led approaches will deliver affordable housing by increasing supply (Tretter and Heyman, 2022). Engagement with planning systems is tied to efforts to drive regulatory reforms, reducing barriers to market-led development (Davis and Huennekens, 2022). In some contexts, including in Australia, pro-development YIMBY positions are also being adopted by left-leaning political parties and activists who support development seen to provide more socially and ecologically sustainable outcomes (Koziol, 2023). Nevertheless, the links between regulatory deregulation and housing affordability, and the social claims made by YIMBYs, remain ‘empirically unsubstantiated’ (Lake, 2022: 332), with YIMBY activists critiqued as ‘gentrifiers and stooges for developers’ (Wyly, 2022: 322). As Tretter et al. (2022) note, there can be a strong alignment between YIMBYs and pro-development growth coalitions, referred to as growth machines (Molotch, 1976), as both agitate to alter planning systems to enable development (Davis and Huennekens, 2022).

Thus, both NIMBY and YIMBY groups emerge in relation to urban growth machines, whereby residents either resist or support/join them, respectively. The notion of urban growth machine originates from Molotch’s speculation that ‘the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality … is growth’ (Molotch, 1976: 309). In this model, local owners emerge as ‘place entrepreneurs’ (Logan and Molotch, 2007: 13) who mobilise alliance-building strategies to draw together stakeholders to further their own interests (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984). Place entrepreneurs enlist a range of influential ‘land-based elites’ into a ‘growth coalition’ (Logan and Molotch, 2007), including:

local and metropolitan capital in construction, finance and banking; professional practices in law, architecture, design and planning; city politicians keen to acquire sponsorship; other indirect beneficiaries of developments like local media and utility corporations; and ‘auxiliary players’. (MacLeod, 2011: 2634)

While the idea of the growth machine has its analytical origins in the inner city, the implementation of the compact city, as it reconfigures suburbs targeted for densification, aligns with the interests of pro-growth alliances looking for development opportunities, where debates centre on tensions around highest and best land use (Lawton and Kayanan, 2023). These growth machines are enabled and shaped by layers of state policies and programme interventions that facilitate economic activity (Phelps and Wood, 2011). Thus, suburban densification policy enables land-based business interests to pursue their objectives (Phelps et al., 2010). The push for suburban densification has seen new pro-growth coalitions establish in locations that might have traditionally expressed anti-growth sentiments (Phelps and Wood, 2011), emphasising the fluid nature of resident responses to development. Affluent and stable suburbs that might have once fought to maintain their way of life have shifted to support development, as landowners look to benefit from development possibilities. These groups are financially motivated, and willing to align with other stakeholders to support pro-development policies (Davis and Huennekens, 2022). Urban development emerges as a mechanism to extract value for both private and public sector stakeholders (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020). Thus, following Logan and Molotch (2007: xx), suburban densification enables the ‘same old growth machine’, where density ‘needs to be understood in relation to interest-laden politics of densification’ (Keil, 2020a: 1285). The next section draws on these interconnected literatures to explore resident positions that emerge in response to suburban densification in our case study precincts.

Identifying diverse resident positions

Proximity is a key factor influencing resident perception of and engagement with planning and development processes, with opposition often increasing the closer a proposed development is to one’s dwelling (Brown and Glanz, 2018; Wicki et al., 2022). Further, planning frameworks establish a spatial configuration by setting boundaries, demarcating those sites that are targeted for redevelopment from those that are not. These boundaries can shape resident perceptions and actions. Therefore, we mobilise two analytical axes to identify resident positions (Figure 3): firstly, location (inside or outside the redevelopment precinct) – the y-axis – and, secondly, opinion on the planning proposal (support or oppose redevelopment) – the x-axis. This reveals five resident groupings: supporters; opponents; resisters; expansionists; and beneficiaries. This section outlines the characteristics and objectives of each group (summarised in Table 1), revealing how they mobilise NIMBY, YIMBY and growth machine logics and strategies to achieve their goals. The size of each group identified in Table 1 is based on our fieldwork; however, it is likely that the size each group will vary between locations.

Figure 3.

Resident groups.

Table 1.

Summary of resident groups.

Resident groups	Sub-group	Location relative to precinct	Perception of proposal	Objectives	Strategies/actions	Likely size of group (in our fieldwork)
(1) Supporters	(1.1) Passive supporters	Inside	Support	Sell individual dwelling that has increased in value.	Limited engagement in wider planning and development activities. Focus on consolidating properties with neighbours and selling properties.	Large group of residents in precinct.
(1) Supporters	(1.2) Proactive supporters	Inside	Support	Maximise dwelling price by increasing planning/zoning conditions.	Extensive engagement in planning process, advocating for higher densities, enabled through master planning. Lobbying of officials. Engage in coalitions with developers and real estate agents seeking to increase zoning/development.	Small group of residents in precinct.
(2) Resisters	(2.1) Passive resisters	Inside	Opposition	Continue to live in current property, resist pressure to sell property (at least in the short term).	Limited engagement with planning process. Limited engagement with neighbours, real estate agents, or developers to enable property sales.	Small group of residents in precinct.
(2) Resisters	(2.2) Proactive resisters	Inside	Opposition	Limit/restrict changes in zoning, sales, and development.	Potential engagement in planning process to restrict increases in development, formation (or expansion) of community resident action groups, political lobbying, including running for elected office.	Absent in our case studies, but potentially large in other locations.
(3) Opponents	–	Outside	Opposition	Restrict/stop planning and development in precinct.	Engage in planning process to restrict increases in development, formation (or expansion) of community resident action groups, political lobbying, including running for elected office.	Residents surrounding precinct. Large group in some locations, absent in others.
(4) Expansionists	–	Outside	Support	Expand redevelopment precinct to include surrounding properties, including their own. Increase property values.	Engage with planning process to change precinct boundaries, engage with residents (supporters) within the redevelopment precinct and development stakeholders (developers) to develop alternative planning strategies, engage in political lobbying.	Small group of residents bordering precinct.
(5) Beneficiaries	–	Outside	Support	Benefit from increased access to infrastructure and services within redevelopment precinct. Increase property values.	Limited engagement with planning process, residents, or development actors.	Majority of residents surrounding precinct.

Group 1: Supporters

Our first group – supporters – were located within the precinct and supported planning and redevelopment (Figure 3). Supporters tended to be long-term residents who owned detached properties. Redevelopment potential was not a consideration when they purchased, viewing these suburbs as ideal locations to raise a family:

When we first came here … we didn’t [know] there was a Metro coming … we moved for different reasons. (Cherrybrook 1)

It’s a lovely place to live … The local high school [is] very desirable … It’s close to [shops] … (Cherrybrook 3)

However, the planning process changed their zoning from low-density residential to medium- or high-density development. While supporters shared characteristics typically associated with (NIMBY-style) opposition to suburban development (i.e. wealthy homeowners) (Ruming et al., 2012; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022), they supported planning and redevelopment activity as it was seen to significantly increase their property values. Suburban densification enabled property owners, as stakeholders with land-based interests, to pursue their economic objectives (Phelps et al., 2010). For supporters, the identification of their suburb as a high-density centre was an unexpected financial windfall. Supporters directly benefited from new planning configurations and expected to sell their property for between two and five times its value pre-rezoning. These price expectations were fuelled by established growth machine coalitions (Davis and Huennekens, 2022), including real estate agents and developers, who contacted residents to sell their properties. Thus, supporters differed from established forms of YIMBY activity, as support for development was based on neither an aspiration to increase housing supply and affordability (Holleran, 2021) nor access to desirable land uses that improve amenity and/or property values (Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). Supporters were motivated by short-term financial objectives through property sales rather than long-term development outcomes.

Supporters operated at two interconnected scales. Firstly, supporters were active at the scale of the suburban block, where they worked to maximise sales price. This was typically pursued by working with neighbours to sell their properties to a single developer – known as lot assembly or collective sales (Easthope et al., 2024; Gallagher et al., 2019). Consolidated properties benefit both developers, who are not required to coordinate multiple purchases, and resident sellers, who are able to negotiate higher sales prices. This was a rescaling of growth machine processes, as residents came together and worked with property intermediaries, such as real estate agents and developers (MacLeod, 2011). Supporters acted as ‘place entrepreneurs’ (especially the leaders of groups pursuing collective sales) that sought to build and maintain alliances to pursue their own interests, maximising financial returns through property sales (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984).

Secondly, supporters operated at a larger scale, engaging with the planning process. The scope of engagement allowed two sub-groups of supporters to be identified. The first sub-group was passive supporters (Group 1.1). These residents were aware of the broad plans for the precinct and were pleased that their property was identified for redevelopment. However, passive supporters did not engage with precinct-scale growth coalitions (including developers, real estate agents and other residents) to reconfigure planning frameworks. Their focus was maximising financial returns within the existing planning and market context by pursuing collective sales with their neighbours, rather than agitating to increase development potential.

The second sub-group was proactive supporters (Group 1.2). Alongside efforts to sell their property as part of a collective sale, proactive supporters engaged in the precinct planning process, seeking to maximise development potential by increasing zoning beyond that proposed by planning agencies:

The Showground Precinct Committee ran a number of protest meetings … protesting against the [original] masterplan [because it restricted development]. (Showground 2)

This is an interesting resident positionality, where proactive supporters, on the one hand, supported plans that enabled suburban densification, while on the other hand, they challenged these same plans as they were viewed as insufficient (i.e. the density increase was viewed as too low). Thus, while challenging the plans, proactive supporters differed from NIMBY-style resistance, where opposition centres on limiting new and unwanted land uses (Teresa, 2022; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022), aligning more closely with YIMBY groups advocating for higher density development (Holleran, 2021; McNee and Pojani, 2022), albeit to different ends (increase own property value rather than increasing supply).

The Showground precinct is illustrative of the actions of proactive supporters, where three strategies emerged. First, proactive supporters formed resident groups, drawing together residents from across the precinct. There is nothing novel about this, with the establishment of groups to challenge planning frameworks being a strategy mobilised by residents with both NIMBY and YIMBY agendas (Holleran, 2021; Scally and Tighe, 2015; Tretter et al., 2022). These groups were typically led by a small group of dedicated residents, often from professional backgrounds that were seen to give them privileged knowledge or relationships, allowing them to advocate effectively and engage with the planning process:

[One resident] was the de-facto Chair of the Showground Precinct Committee … he runs a pretty prominent business in [the area]. (Showground 2)

Membership of the active supporter groups mirrored resident action groups observed internationally, which tend to consist of middle-aged, wealthy, educated homeowners (Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). These small leadership teams claimed to speak for residents within the precinct, thereby seeking a level of legitimacy as community advocates (Ruming et al., 2012). These groups were largely supported by passive supporters who were happy for others to advocate for increased development, without getting actively involved themselves.

Second, proactive supporters, both individuals and groups, engaged in the planning process through formal and informal means. Formally, they reviewed planning documents, attended consultation sessions, and made submissions, advocating for increased density:

The Showground group … were sort of spearheading the neighbourhood, to try and rally council to approve the additional densities. (Showground 3)

Informally, proactive supporters sought to convince political stakeholders to support their alternative development vision. These interactions took place at both local and state government levels, through meetings with councillors, mayors and ministers:

[The leader of the Showground group] met with all the ministers at the time … [he] was certainly using all his … contacts. (Showground 2)

In Showground, when Council refused to alter planning conditions, the proactive supporter group lodged a claim (which was unsuccessful) with the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC),³ challenging the legality of the planning process. Pursuing similar avenues of appeal is a well established strategy mobilised by NIMBY and YIMBY groups globally (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020; Scally and Tighe, 2015). Further, and borrowing from YIMBY strategies adopted elsewhere (Davis and Huennekens, 2022; Tretter et al., 2022; Wyly, 2022), in their dealings with officials, proactive supporters mobilised a pro-development discourse that emphasised the positive outcomes of compact city development, such as sustainability, housing affordability and access to public transport, in efforts to achieve their goal:

You scratch your head and say, here’s a solution [to housing supply and affordability] that when you put infrastructure through you can put higher density living right next to the stations. (Showground 1)

This discourse emerged as strategy to offset any claims that residents were acting out of self-interest, emphasising the wider benefits of increased development.

Third, proactive supporters engaged with wider growth coalitions. At this scale, proactive supporters, especially the leaders of the resident groups, operated as ‘place entrepreneurs’ looking to build and maintain alliances that had the potential to shape planning and development outcomes (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984). Like YIMBY-style development advocates, proactive supporters engaged with broader pro-growth coalitions (Davis and Huennekens, 2022; Wyly, 2022), especially with developers that had purchased in the precinct. In these instances, the interests of resident owners and developers were seen to align, with both benefiting from planning changes that increased development:

[Two leading developers in the area] tried to do the master plan. So they were going to bypass council and go straight to state and do this master plan … they wanted the homeowners to get behind them. (Showground 4)

In opposing the planning vision and advocating on behalf of resident (and developer) interests, proactive supporter groups mobilised planning logics and processes to present an alternative development vision. In Showground, the process of master planning was used as a strategy to advocate for more development. The proactive supporter group developed its own precinct master plan, drawing together members’ knowledge and experience with input from private sector stakeholders, such as developers and planning consultants. Proactive supporters argued that a plan allowing higher densities would enable developers to provide larger, but also better designed, buildings, supported by more open space:

Where the opportunity was lost was with all the people who were willing to pool the properties, you could have actually had like a Greenfield site virtually. Then you could have had a proper masterplan. [The developers] were prepared to put in a school … [make] parks bigger. (Showground 2).

While this alternative masterplan was never adopted, some increases to density were enacted. By engaging with local growth coalitions, proactive supporters acted akin to YIMBY groups observed elsewhere, where planning frameworks were challenged as barriers to market-led development activity. However, rather than being ‘stooges’ for developers (Wyly, 2022: 322), where YIMBY activists support a private development agenda with little evidence of wider public benefits (such as housing supply), proactive supporters were active and aware stakeholders, where engagement with development interests was a strategy to pursue mutually beneficial outcomes.

Group 2: Resisters

The second group were resisters. Like supporters, resisters were located inside the precinct; however they opposed redevelopment, either in the short or long term (Figure 3). This is an important resident group; however, across our fieldwork, no resisters agreed to interviews and, thus, our insights into their motivations and actions are somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, insights into resisters’ objectives and actions emerged from discussions with other residents (especially supporters) and through reviewing planning submissions. As one supporter put it:

There has been a large section of Cherrybrook that … don’t want anything to change. (Cherrybrook 3)

While our data on resisters is limited, the reflections of supporters suggest that many resisters may not necessarily oppose development taking place, but that they were not ready to leave the area and wanted to continue living in their suburb/home. These resisters might be viewed as passive resisters (Group 2.1), as, unlike NIMBY-style opponents (Tretter et al., 2022), they were unlikely to engage wider planning processes or community activism to stop or limit development. The suggestion was that this group was not actively resisting densification per se but resisting the need for the immediate consolidation and sale of their property. They were passive to the extent that they did nothing. Indeed, at the scale of suburban block, passive resisters, and their reluctance to sell their property, emerged as a challenge for supporters who were pursuing collective sales. Passive resisters were often characterised as ‘hold outs’ (unwilling to sell with their neighbours) who destabilised collective sales efforts.

When describing passive resisters, supporters identified two key groups: older residents who have lived in the area for a long period, and young families that had recently purchased. For older residents, it was recognised that a strong attachment to place sometimes shaped their decision:

There were one or two owners who were fairly aged, old, and for sentimental reasons did not want to sell. (Cherrybrook 2)

Young families as passive resisters were most obvious at Cherrybrook, where the planning process had been drawn out. Cherrybrook was seen to appeal to young families due to its transport infrastructure, high quality local schools, large properties and open space:

[My neighbours are] not interested [in coming together to sell as a collective]. They’ve just bought in these streets. They’re really happy. (Cherrybrook 4)

While it is likely that many passive resisters were aware that planning proposals had been finalised, they were happy to continue living in the area in the short to medium term. Unlike supporters, passive resisters were not looking to engage with neighbours or development stakeholders in the pursuit of immediate sales. Nevertheless, like supporters, they will benefit from significant increases in property value due to changes in planning frameworks, and it is possible that some passive resisters will become supporters in the future as sales and development activity increases.

Further, while not observed in our fieldwork, it is possible that in some circumstances resisters might be more proactive in their opposition to planning and development (Group 2.2: proactive resisters), mobilising strategies like those characteristic of NIMBY groups, potentially working with opponent groups from outside the precinct (Group 3: opponents). There is an extensive body of research exploring how residents within locations targeted for redevelopment mobilise to challenge development (Ruming et al., 2012; Scally and Tighe, 2015; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). The absence of proactive resisters in our research was likely due to both the extent of planning and development proposed for the precincts (i.e. a large precinct rather than a single development) and the significant increase in property values that will accrue to owners (i.e. increases in property values due to changes in zoning). Nevertheless, the potential for active opposition from residents inside precincts needs to be acknowledged and included in our framework.

Group 3: Opponents

Our third group – opponents – was located outside the precinct and opposed rezoning and redevelopment (Figure 3). Opponents were typically long-term homeowners who, unlike supporters and resisters, did not directly benefit financially from the planning process, as their properties were not rezoned (i.e. the development potential, and therefore the price, of their property did not change). However, these owners likely benefited indirectly where access to new infrastructure (such as Metro stations) and services in mixed-use centres increase property values in surrounding areas (albeit, not to the same degree as if their property were rezoned) (Wicki et al., 2022). Opponents expressed a desire to remain in the area in the medium to long term and sought to limit perceived negative impacts of development. Opponents were indicative of wider NIMBY-style opposition to rezoning and higher-density development across Sydney (Ruming et al., 2012).

The concerns and strategies mobilised by opponents are familiar, echoing international research on NIMBY movements (Teresa, 2022; Tretter et al., 2022; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022). Opponents challenged planning and development on the grounds of perceived negative impacts on amenity, access to services and infrastructure (including transport and open space), lack of parking and negative impacts on property values:

Where’s the infrastructure, where’s the road access, where’s the green space, where are people going to walk and talk? Where are their kids going to go to school? (St Leonards 1)

In opposing the planning process, they sought to draw into question the value of the compact city and suburban densification as a form of city development (Robinson and Attuyer, 2020). Like proactive supporters, opponents had extensive engagement with the planning process, both formally and informally, albeit to different ends:

We were opposed to it beforehand but [got] active [when] council decided to increase … the land area. (St Leonards 3)

Opponents actively engaged in the planning process by attending consultation sessions and writing formal submissions. They were critical of the consultation process which they claimed failed to adequately engage residents and incorporate their concerns into redevelopment plans:

I found the whole process fairly disappointing and unsatisfying … it seemed to me to be an inevitable progress that couldn’t be stopped … So there were a lot of objections. (St Leonards 1)

The consultation process was critiqued as a tool of planning and development interests, closing off opportunities for genuine resident input (Eranti, 2017; Ruming et al., 2012). Here opponents sought to position themselves as advocates for a wider public, challenging the planning process, claiming that it favoured the private sector, where the interests of urban growth machines were prioritised over residents (McClymont and O’Hare, 2008; Teresa, 2022).

Opponents mobilised a series of additional strategies to influence planning and development processes. For example, opponents surrounding the St Leonards South precinct mobilised an existing community association to oppose the planning proposal. This is a well-trodden path, where new and established community groups emerge as mechanisms to focus resident discontent and coordinate action (Ruming et al., 2012; Tretter et al., 2022). The community association emerged as a group with strong leadership, led by several dedicated residents, which sought to consolidate resident views (through surveys and community meetings) and incorporate these views into the planning process. The group circulated resident concerns via local newsletters, making media comments (Stringer, 2017), and submissions to the formal planning process:

There’s a newsletter, there is a series of email groups … There are some very, very active people in that group … The [community association] were the people that transmitted the information [about the proposal]. (St Leonards 1)

These groups sought to speak on behalf of, and act in the interests of, a wider public, seeing themselves as advocates for the public good (challenging the level of public benefit from redevelopment, such as infrastructure and open space provisions) and democratic processes (questioning the extent to which public concerns were heard and incorporated into the planning process) (Ruming et al., 2012). Interestingly, both the critique of public consultation and the mobilisation of a community group to challenge planning outcomes were also strategies adopted by proactive supporters. While the goals of these resident groups were diametrically opposed, a set of common strategies emerged, each drawing from the NIMBY/YIMBY playbook.

In St Leonards South, opponents pursued local politics as a mechanism to influence the planning process, where one of the leaders of the community association ran for local Council:

We’ve elected new Councillors and we have the ex-President of the [community association] … on the Council now. (St Leonards 1)

Running on a platform of limiting development, reconfiguring planning frameworks and enhancing public consultation, their election suggests a high degree of community opposition from residents surrounding the precinct (by this time most owners within the precinct had sold and left the area). However, despite this election outcome, development has continued. Our opponents category has similarities to existing NIMBY-style categorisations of resident opposition to planning and development. While the identification of opponents is not necessarily groundbreaking, it emerges as just one of a diverse set of positions adopted by residents who surrounded the precincts.

Group 4: Expansionists

Our fourth group were expansionists. Like opponents, expansionists lived outside the precinct; however, they were supportive of planning and redevelopment (Figure 3). Expansionists wanted to increase the size of the area undergoing planning and extend the redevelopment precinct to include their property:

[Out neighbour was] trying to get a petition to be signed … Trying to include our street because we are one street away … and he was trying to get our street included. (Cherrybrook 1)

Expansionists wanted to be included in the precinct, benefiting from increases in property values arising from the rezoning. They were motivated by their own financial objectives:

I was fortunate enough to have two properties in the [potential expanded] zone … I could [have] two five-million-dollar properties now. (Showground 2)

Expansionists argued that by increasing the size of the precinct, a better, more coordinated built form could be achieved, as effective master planning requires a larger site to provide more housing and infrastructure:

[We] actually produced their concept of what the streets would look like … [We had] meetings and we got the giant A3 size, big flip folders and had all the streetscapes and the vegetation and all that stuff. (Showground 2)

This was the same argument mobilised by proactive supporters in their efforts to increase density. In this way expansionists acted like YIMBY-style advocates who call for planning to be reconfigured to enable development, thereby delivering a suite of public benefits outlined in compact urbanism logics (Davis and Huennekens, 2022; Robinson and Attuyer, 2020):

Sensible thing to do would be to make [our property] six to eight floors … It’s ridiculous that we’re six minutes’ walk to a railway station and people … live on quarter acre blocks. (Showground 6)

However, expansionists differed from the classic YIMBY model (i.e. renters advocating for development to increase housing supply) as they owned the land surrounding the precinct. Thus, expansionists’ efforts to expand densification, if successful, would increase their property values and deliver a significant financial windfall.

As with proactive supporters, expansionists participated in the planning process, writing formal submissions, and attending consultation events, advocating for an expanded precinct boundary. Simultaneously, expansionists engaged with emerging pro-development/growth machine coalitions, working with proactive supporters, developers and real estate agents. In Showground, several expansionists became members of the proactive supporter resident group discussed above, where they met with developers, worked on the alternative master plan, contributed to planning submissions and met with politicians. While proactive supporters were seeking to increase development vertically (i.e. increase zoning on lots already identified for redevelopment), expansionists wanted to expand the precinct horizontally, moving the boundary to increase the size of the rezoned area. These different objectives could be pursued in a mutually beneficial way through a single pro-growth coalition consisting of residents inside and outside the precinct, supported by development interests.

At its most simple, expansionists can be viewed as proactive supporters who happen to be located outside the precinct. For both groups, the objective was to increase the value of their property through maximising development potential through the planning system. Expansionists were equally ‘place entrepreneurs’ pursuing alliances with development stakeholders and residents to challenge planning frameworks and reconfigure development outcomes (Molotch, 1976; Molotch and Logan, 1984). For expansionists, this alliance building extended across the precinct boundary, where connections with broader pro-growth coalitions were viewed as essential in justifying claims that boundary expansion was needed (to meet compact city objectives). However, while some proactive supporters were able to increase some density provisions within the precincts, expansionists across our case studies were unsuccessful in their efforts to expand precinct boundaries. Shifting precinct boundaries, thereby identifying new sites targeted for densification, proved more difficult than altering planning conditions on sites already identified for densification. Nevertheless, the expansionists we interviewed were hopeful that zoning changes might occur in the future.

Group 5: Beneficiaries

Our final group were beneficiaries. Like expansionists, beneficiaries were located outside the precinct and were broadly supportive of planning and redevelopment (Figure 3). However, unlike expansionists they did not agitate to alter the precinct boundary. Most beneficiaries were not engaged in the planning process and were only vaguely aware of plans for the neighbouring precinct. Relatedly, beneficiaries had little, if anything, to do with development coalitions operating in and around the precinct; they had not engaged with developers, real estate agents, or other residents. As such, beneficiaries are often absent from research on community responses to compact city development, as they do not mobilise in either active support or resistance. In contrast to opponents, beneficiaries identified a series of benefits arising from living close to redevelopment precincts.

Beneficiaries acknowledged increased access to services and infrastructure. Being within walking distance from a train/metro station was valued, as was access to cafés, restaurants and other commercial and public infrastructure:

I’m actually quite excited about [the new development] … there will be more retail experiences, more dining experiences … which is good. We can kind of get the best of both worlds hopefully where we live in a nice quiet suburban street but within 10 minutes’ walk of something a little bit more lively. (St Leonards 4)

Beneficiaries noted the rare benefits of living in a suburban dwelling (i.e. detached property), while also being close to infrastructure and services typically absent from suburbs. Relatedly, while not benefiting directly from increased property values due to planning changes (i.e. where rezoning increases development potential), there was acknowledgement that financial benefits from redevelopment could flow through in more indirect ways, where access to infrastructure and services increases property prices. In short, a ‘real house’ in a well-serviced densifying neighbourhood will appeal to the market, increasing property values:

The property prices will go [up] and we’ll benefit from it … making more money out of it is definitely good … the positive, of course, is we are walking distance [to the train station]. So anybody who wants a real house [and be] 800 metres from the Metro … that’s a selling point. (Cherrybrook 1)

Beneficiaries were like the first type of YIMBYs discussed above, who view changes in land use as a positive due to increased amenity and property values (Brown and Glanz, 2018; Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022; Wicki et al., 2022). Beneficiaries benefited from positive spillovers from investment inside the precinct. While YIMBY groups sometimes lobby for changes to land use planning or development of infrastructure that is viewed as positive, this was not the case in our research. Further, it is possible that individuals in other resident groups might become beneficiaries in the medium and long term, especially expansionists.

Conclusion

Suburban densification is now an established urban policy goal in Australia (Freestone et al., 2018) and beyond (Keil, 2020a), where suburban redevelopment aligns with the principles of compact urbanism (Grodach and Limb, 2020). In Australia, mixed-use transit-oriented development lies at the centre of compact city efforts, as low-density middle-ring suburbs serviced by new or established train stations are the focus of planning attention, with changes in zoning used to entice private sector-led redevelopment (Pinnegar et al., 2020; Ruming and Fingland, 2022). However, the set of stakeholders involved in compact urbanism and suburban densification is diverse, and the impacts, both positive and negative, are unevenly distributed (Phelps et al., 2010; Pinnegar et al., 2020; Whittemore and BenDor, 2019). Thus, densification emerges as a site of contestation, as planning agencies, residents and private sector development interests mobilise in pursuit of their own objectives (Brown and Glanz, 2018; Robinson and Attuyer, 2020).

In this paper we have responded to recent calls to recognise the antagonisms of the compact city (Haarstad et al. 2023), by investigating the objectives and strategies of five resident groups (supporters, resisters, opponents, expansionists and beneficiaries) that emerged in response to the planning and redevelopment of three precincts across Sydney. Our analysis reveals that many owners within redevelopment precincts engage with each other (passive and active supporters) and form coalitions with other urban actors (active supporters) to facilitate planning and development arrangements to maximise property prices through short-term sales. Other owners within the precincts appear more content to remain in their properties in the short-term, potentially selling in the future (passive resisters). Alternatively, some residents surrounding precincts oppose redevelopment (opponents), challenging planning processes and built form outcomes through formal and informal means. However, our analysis also reveals the possibility for other resident groupings located outside the precincts, where some residents engage with planning processes to extend development boundaries in an effort to maximise their own property value (expansionists), while others are content for nearby centres to be redeveloped and are happy to benefit from access to new infrastructure and services, as well as perceived increases in property value (beneficiaries).

The range of emergent resident groups observed in our case studies does not neatly fit established categorisations of resident responses to planning and development. Rather than position resident engagement with suburban densification as a dichotomy of those against development, typically characterised as NIMBYs, and those in favour, increasingly identified as YIMBYs, our research identified a more diverse set of resident positions. Indeed, our resident groupings highlight how some groups can simultaneously mobilise discourses and strategies that could be identified as NIMBY and YIMBY in nature (especially active supporters). Likewise, some groups that support development do not align with dominant understandings of YIMBY groups. Thus, our analysis contributes to a growing literature that acknowledges the nuance and fluidity of resident positions and actions in response to urban development (Wicki and Kaufmann, 2022; Wicki et al., 2022; Wyly, 2022). Further, in drawing literature of urban growth machines together with NIMBY and YIMBY concepts, we reveal how some resident groups engage with private sector stakeholders to pursue their desired outcomes. In these cases, residents emerge as important stakeholders in establishing and maintaining development coalitions that mobilise in efforts to influence planning processes and deliver mutually beneficial outcomes (i.e. increased zoning conditions).

We acknowledge that a limitation of this paper is the lack of direct data for resister residents. However, based on interviews with other resident groups, we are confident that this group exists, and represents an important resident group with distinct views and responses to suburban densification. Future research should explore the experiences and motivations of this group in more detail.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article: This research was funded by the Australian Research Council (DP200101744: Reassembling the city: understanding resident-led collective property sales).

ORCID iDs

Kristian J Ruming

Sha Liu

Simon Pinnegar

Laura Crommelin

Charles Gillon

Hazel Easthope

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