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With its emphasis on anti-immigration rhetoric and actions, protectionism, as well as populism, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that closely resembles populist radical right-wing parties in Europe. In this article, we first illustrate how the Republican Party has transformed into a radical right-wing party. Second, we examine the degree to which the Trump voter has the same or similar characteristics as the prototypical radical right-wing voter. To do so, we compare some key features of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Trump voters. Through original survey research, we find that the two voter types are alike. Both AfD and Trump voters espouse anti-immigrant sentiment, reject globalization, and position themselves on the right on a left-right ideological scale. This implies that, both from a supply and demand side perspective, the Trump Republican Party has become a prototypical radical right-wing party.

Keywords

Political Parties United States Republican Party Populist Radical Right Trump Support America First Republicans Alternative for Germany President Trump

“Why are we having all these people from shithole countries coming here?”

Donald Trump at a White House meeting on 11/1/18 (CNN 2018)

The signature themes of the Republican Party used to be small government, free markets, and tax cuts. With the arrival of Donald Trump, those talking points have taken a back seat. Instead of propagating pro-business and conservative values, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that is overtly anti-immigrant, anti-elite, and anti-establishment. In this article, we first illustrate that the Republican Party, or at least the dominant wing, which supports or tolerates Donald Trump and his Make America Great Again (MAGA) agenda have become a prototypical populist radical right-wing party (PRRP). Second, we test whether the same applies to the typical Trump/Republican voter. We do so by comparing the voter profile of a typical PRRP, the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), with that of the Republican Party, using an original survey of 2,000 respondents, which we fielded in Germany and the United States in December 2020. Our results indicate glaring similarities not only in the presentation of the two parties but also in their voter profile. Thus, our study confirms that the Republican voter under Trump is just like the typical AfD voter in Germany, or the voter of a typical Western European PRRP, for that matter. This also leads us to conclude that the Republican Party has transformed into a PRRP.

This article proceeds as follows: after introducing the typical positions of PRRPs, we quickly present the supply and demand framework. Using a supply-side perspective, we then illustrate that the Republican Party in the United States has embraced similar positions to a radical right-wing party in Europe, before presenting our comparative case, the German AfD, a prototypical PRRP in Western Europe. We then switch to the demand side of voting by introducing the typical voter profile of a PRRP and illustrate through original survey data that not only does the AfD as a prototypical PRRP match this profile but also the Trump Republican Party. Finally, we summarize our findings and provide some avenues for future research.

What is a Populist Radial Right Party?

Before introducing our supply and demand framework, we want to outline some of the attributes of a PRRP. Although it is not possible to come up with one single definition that would appease all scholars, there has been some consensus as to the main tenets of the populist radical right. First off, these parties contain an element of populism. Mudde (2017a) describes populism as a thin-centered ideology, which pits the "pure people" against the "corrupt elite." From this view, the populist party creates a scenario with a group of pure people whom the elite in society supposedly mistreats (Stockemer 2019). In the party's self-definition, it is its duty to battle the corrupt elite in order to give power back to the pure people. However, it is up to the subjective opinion of the populist party as to who belongs to which category (Mudde 2017, 4).

When it comes to the populist radical right specifically, right-wing populism has become a blend of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (Mudde 2017, 4). As a form of exclusionary populism, this form of populism focuses on sociocultural factors such as maintaining the country's identity and way of life. The populist party presents immigrants as the primary scapegoat, for the country's problems whom they blame for high unemployment rates, high crime rates, and erosion of the country's culture (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 159). The populist right's success hinges upon a discursive frame, which attaches radical ideas to mainstream views such as praising the national culture or women's rights (Aslanidis 2016; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018). For example, radical right-wing parties use the stigma of fundamental Islam as being anti-women. In doing so, they contrast the outgroup with the national culture which should inherently be pro-women. By drawing this dichotomy, radical right-wing parties are able to claim that their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment is not xenophobia but instead a concern for the well-being of the national culture (Morgan 2017).

Finally, populist radical right parties use nationalism as a frame under which they make “us and them” distinctions where the dividing line is between those of the native culture (us) and those outside of the native culture (them) (Caiani and Kroll 2017). As such, populists generally champion illiberal democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 21–24). They use democratic and nondemocratic means to get elected and once elected they begin to erode democracy from within.

The Supply and Demand Framework to Explain the Appeal of PRRP

One of the most important frameworks to explain the success of political parties including PRRPs is the supply and demand framework (see e.g., Van Kessel 2013; Stanley 2019s). In its original sense, the supply and demand framework stems from economics. It explains the success of a product or service in the economic market. The rather parsimonious theory contends that the more a company responds to or convinces potential buyers of the value of a product or good, the more successful this product or good will be. Applied to elections, the supply and demand framework postulates that the more political parties convince citizens of the value of their program, the more successful they will be (Lees-Marshment 2001). At the individual level, the theory would then predict that the more a party appeals to or shapes an individual's values and beliefs, the more likely it would be that this person would vote for that party (see e.g., Golder 2016; Stockemer 2017).

For Western Europe, research has convincingly shown that there is a match between supply and demand in the voter pool of PRRPs. Successful PRRPs in Western Europe have adopted the main tenants of a PRRP. (1) They embrace a culturally closed or exclusionist orientation (Bornschier 2010; Rydgren 2005), in which immigration plays a key role in their mobilization strategies (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). (2) They ground their anti-immigration appeal within a Republican discourse in the search for a homogeneous national community, often based on cultural elements (Mudde 2007). (3) They adopt an anti-establishment rhetoric. Within a context of declining party identification and weakening of traditional social cleavages, PRRPs have managed to mobilize dissatisfaction of voters with mainstream parties. They frame established parties from the left and from the right as providing the same policies and as being corrupt and self-interested (Vaughan and Heft 2023). In contrast, PRRPs claim to defend the “true” people and to incorporate the voice of the “common man” into their rhetorical frames (Jacobs, Akkerman and Zaslove 2018).

The voter profile of PRRPs matches these supply factors (Rooduijn 2015). Traditionally, voters of PRRP are fervent defenders of law and order, in favor of a traditional lifestyle, and strongly anti-immigrant. This voter pattern includes a specific type of anti-immigrant voter, the “Islamophobic” voter, who advocates a conservative state that protects native European people against the Islamic invasion from North Africa and the Middle East (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016; Ivaldi and Mazzoleni 2020; Lefkofridi and Michel 2017). In terms of values, our typical PRRP voter is conservative in terms of social ideas and nationalistic when it comes to economic ideas. Another overarching connection is these voters’ deep suspicion of elites and the political establishment (Stockemer, Lentz and Mayer 2018). When it comes to social background, working-class men with low education used to be overrepresented in the PRRP voter pool. However, more recently this voter pool has diversified to include more women and individuals of diverse educational backgrounds (Geva 2020).

The Republican Party Under Trump: A PRRP Like Any Other

In the United States, we have seen a shift in ideology in the Republican Party over the past 10–15 years. The ideology, which Trump presents, is completely different from that of John McCain or Mitt Romney, the two Republican presidential candidates before him. Under McCain and Romney, conservatism meant upholding conservative values in society, supporting little state intervention, being pro-business, free trade, and interventionalist. Being a Bush, Romney, or McCain Republican did not mean to decry Washington as corrupt, to vilify minorities as scapegoats, and to engage in a protectionist economic agenda. Yet, in the 2020s, xenophobia, anti-elitism, and protectionism are the buzzwords of what it means to be conservative (Lewis 2021).

Anti-Elitism

Just such as PRRP, anti-elitism, anti-immigration sentiment, and nationalism/protectionism are key selling points of the Trump Republicans: When it comes to anti-elitism, Trump's talking points constantly refer to the “the people” and “the corrupt political elites.” For example, in the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump spoke about the people (in this sense meaning non-immigrants) and political elites more than any other presidential candidate before him did (Maurer and Diehl 2020). Famous campaign slogans such as “we will make America great again,” “drain the swamp,” “lock her up,” and “crooked Hillary” are manifestations of this anti-elitism.

Nationalism

Donald Trump's speeches and actions are also ripe with nationalism and protectionism: “America First,” a slogan with associations to white nationalist movements was one of Donald Trump's signature themes during his 2017–2021 presidency (Calamur 2017). The policy involves prioritizing American goals regardless of the effects these decisions might have on other countries. A few examples of Donald Trump's America First agenda include breaking the nuclear deal with Iran (as the only Western country), reducing American forces in Germany without informing the Germans, or becoming the first major nation to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement (McGrath 2020; McTague and Nicholas 2020). Because the United States engaged in these and other decisions without concern for global implications, McTague and Nicholas (2020) label America First policies “America Alone” policies.

Immigration

Another area where we can clearly see a change in the message of the Republican Party is immigration policy. Reagan (1981–1989), Bush (2001–2009), and Trump (2017–2021) were all Republican presidents. However, their immigration policies differed and Trump's build-a-wall rhetoric was decidedly more anti-immigrant in nature than that of any president before him. For his part, Reagan's 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act was rather favorable toward immigrants. Although the Act banned the hiring of illegal immigrants, it also provided amnesty and legalization to all undocumented immigrants who entered the country before 1982 (Sharpe 2020). Similarly, the failed Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 under George W. Bush would have increased border enforcement at the Mexico–U.S. border and created not only a merit-based system for immigration but also would have provided a path to citizenship and legal status to 12 million undocumented immigrants (Smith 2007). Trump's immigration policy was more exclusionary. His election campaign became synonymous with the phrase “build a wall” in order to keep undocumented immigrants (mainly Mexicans) out. Additionally, he aimed at cutting immigration in half by issuing less Green Cards while also imposing a 50,000-person per year cap on refugees and reducing family-based pathways to citizenship (Naylor 2017). In comparing the last three Republican presidents, Trump's approach toward immigration was more restrictive and based on limiting immigration as opposed to embracing it. In fact, in line with conventional radical right-wing rhetoric, he has also scapegoated immigrants for crime and economic problems, as well as embrace xenophobic rhetoric.

Xenophobia

Concerning xenophobia, the Republican Party previously had policies that were anti-minority. Yet, after 2016, there has been an added layer of explicit and overt racist rhetoric, as well (Galvin 2020). In particular, Donald Trump's speeches and comments have been increasingly inflammatory toward minority groups and have departed from conservative principles and Republican orthodoxy. This includes speeches that attack Muslims, Hispanics, women, disabled people and espouse of the myth that Barack Obama, the first Black president in the country's history, is not American and make allusions to a rigged system that benefits illegal immigrants. These talking points signify an attempt to blame the “other” or anyone outside of the sphere of the “pure people“ (Kenneth-White 2016). Xenophobia in the Republican Party has not been limited to just speech but also actions. For example, after being elected, Donald Trump followed through on his campaign rhetoric to ban (some) Muslims from entering the United States by enacting Executive Order 13769 and then Executive Order 13790. By using terrorism as a frame (see McCarthy 2017), the former president was able to portray this act of Islamophobia as a necessary security measure.

Lack of Respect for Democracy

At first sight, Trump's negative influence on American democracy is limited. After all, from 2017 to 2019, the Republican Party held the presidency, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. Yet, democracy has remained in place and most of the democratic institutions are intact. We argue, however, that there was not a lack for trying to change the status quo. In fact, it is because of the strength of the institutions and safeguards that were in place that Donald Trump was not able to plunge the country into a more autocratic regime. The most notorious example is the insurrection on January 6, 2021. On this day, Trump supporters went to Capitol Hill in an attempt to stop the legal transfer of power, a hallmark of any properly working democracy. Although grassroots organizations such as Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys organized this protest, it was also heavily encouraged by Donald Trump. For months even before the election took place, Trump had implied the election would be rigged if he lost, and once the election results did come in, he insisted that the results were fraudulent, claiming he won “by a lot” and urged his supporters to fight back (Sherman 2021).

The courts shot down many of his challenges to the election results, illustrating how an important political institution prevented Donald Trump from circumventing free and fair elections; something an autocrat would do. On January 6, in a speech near Capitol Hill and before the breach of the Capitol, Trump told his supporters “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators, and congressmen and women.” He continued: “we’re probably not going to be cheering so much for some of them because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength, and you have to be strong.” (Sherman 2021). Donald Trump continued to mislead his followers by falsely claiming that Mike Pence had the constitutional power to overturn the election results, another safeguard that made Trump's attempt to overturn a free and fair election fail (Sherman 2021).

This attitude has trickled down to other factions of the party. One hundred and seventy-four Republican House Members raised objections to the election results (Zhou 2021). Equally important, election denial did not stop with the inauguration of Joe Biden in 2021 but rather continued into the mid-terms of 2023. For example, Republican candidate Keri Lake in Arizona, a supporter of Trump and a 2020 election denier, has refused to accept the results of her Gubernatorial loss to Katie Hobbs in 2022 (Narea 2022). In addition, Solomon Pena, a supporter of Trump who also rejected his loss in the New Mexico state legislature, has been charged with planning the shooting of four New Mexico Democrats (Romero 2023). Clearly, Trump's populist radical right agenda has shaken people's belief in elections and Republicans even after the end of his presidency. Trump's repeated attempts to subvert democracy are consistent with the illiberal democratic nature of the populist radical right. The fact that he could not take the United States with him is a credit to the democracy that was in place before he took office, but not in any way an indication that Trump did not try to subvert democracy.

The Republican Voter: A Populist Radical Right Voter Like Any Other?

From a supply-side perspective, there is very little difference between PRRPs in Western Europe and the Republican Party in the United States under Donald Trump. Anchored in an anti-immigration discourse, both PRRPs and the Republican Party are anti-establishment, identitarian, and protectionist (Ivaldi 2019; Taguieff 2012). In this research, we ask the question: Has there been ideological convergence between the “new ideology” under Trump and the values and beliefs of Republican voters? In other words, has the prototypical Trump voter become just like any other PRRP voter?

The prototypical Republican voter used to value freedom, personal responsibility, and individualism. Economically, she supported lower taxes, the free market, and small government and ideologically she believed in Christian religions, gun rights, and a strong military (Sheldon and Nicholas 2009). Typical populist radical right talking points such as immigration concerns, anti-Islam, and fears about the erosion of the national culture did not feature as major reasons for supporting the Republican Party (Mair, Rusch and Hornik 2014). However, with Trump co-opting the Republican Party in 2015/2016, there are some signs that this prototypical voter's profile has changed. For example, there is some evidence that Trump's voter coalition has become whiter and more radical (see Morgan and Lee 2019; Prokop 2021). For example, Tucker et al. (2019) argue that populist attitudes have become a hallmark of the Trump voter. Such attitudes would include being anti-establishment, having biases against the mainstream media, following the will of the people, and having an “us against them” mentality. It also seems that Trump voters are willing to accept Trump's racialized rhetoric pointing to an anti-immigrant mentality (Morgan and Lee 2019).

We also know that Trump has radicalized his appeal and has made implicit or explicit alliances with fringe groups in society. Supremacist groups who have felt that neither party properly represents their views before have now become vocal supporters of the Trump Republican Party. These groups advocate typical populist radical right views such as conspiracy theories (most notably Q-Anon), anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-establishment attitudes, and in some cases call for another civil war (Wendling 2022). For example, David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard, has been a big supporter of the Trump Republican Party agenda. Duke has likened himself to Trump and has said that Trump's solutions to immigration, namely the border wall would help them in the war the media has waged against White people. According to Duke, Trump could help them fight the White genocide that is a consequence of the mass immigration into the United States (Wright and Thompson 2016). Support for Trump has not been limited to singular figures but also many far-right groups who have portrayed themselves as going to war with and for him. For example, Stewart Rhoades, the leader of the Far-Right Oath Keepers wanted Donald Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act after the loss of the 2020 Presidential Election and claimed that Donald Trump would need the Oath Keepers group and their guns (Gallagher 2022).

After Donald Trump told the Proud Boys to “stand down and stand by” during a presidential debate in 2020, the Proud Boys used it as a rallying cry. Their social media account responded that they would obey these orders and one of their leaders, Joe Biggs, responded that Trump was asking his group to attack the other side (Collins and Zadrozny 2020). Both the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers groups were instrumental in the organization of the January 6 attack on Capitol Hill. Leaders and members of both the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers Stewart Rhoades and Joe Biggs have been indicted for seditious conspiracy because of the January 6 insurrection (Wendling 2022).

Even after Donald Trump lost the presidency to Joe Biden, radical views within the Republican Party have not been marginalized but rather continue to make up a significant part of the party's voter base. An indication of this veering to the far right is the growing belief in the Q-Anon conspiracy theory. The main premise of the Q-Anon conspiracy theory is that there is a secret society of politicians as well as members of the media and other social elites who are controlling American political society. This secret society is responsible for: (1) rigging elections to keep power within their secret society, (2) running a sex trafficking ring, (3) engaging in pedophilia, and (4) being part of a satanic cult in which they drink the blood of children as a ritual. The theory also states that a savior named Q is working with Donald Trump in order to defeat this secret society and lead the United States into a utopia. This figure named Q has also been making predictions about the dates when the unraveling of the current secret society will occur. Despite the fact that many, if not all, of the predictions have been incorrect (such as Donald Trump winning the 2020 election or overthrowing Joe Biden on January 6, 2021), the Q-Anon conspiracy theory remains a strong and influential theory. Reports indicate that anywhere between 15 percent and 20 percent of Americans believe in many of the assertions of the Q-Anon conspiracy theory (Todd, Murray and Dunn 2021). Additionally, up to 56 percent of Republicans believe that the Q-Anon conspiracy theory is mostly or partly true which shows that these radical beliefs are no longer a fringe portion of the party but rather a significant part of it (Beer 2020).

Although there are indications from the literature that Trump voters have become more anti-immigrant and more anti-elitist, to name two characteristics, it is still unclear if Trump's rightist populist turn has fully translated to his voter base. It could be that, because of the strong party identification, which is a main feature of the two-party system in the United States, traditional Republican voters have remained faithful to Trump even if they do not condone his anti-immigrant and anti-elitist platform. Yet, it might also be that the Republican voters have followed the turn of the party and have become identitarian, anti-elitist, and anti-immigrant just like the prototypical PRRP voter in Western Europe.

Comparative Case Selection: The AfD as the Protypical Radical Right-Wing Party

To test the resemblance of the Republican Trump voter with the prototypical populist radical right voter, we compare the voter of the Republican Party with the voter of the AfD. The German AfD matches the profile of a prototypical PRRP at least since 2015 or the onset of the European refugee crisis in 2015 (Arzheimer 2015). Founded in 2013, just months before the country's general election that year, the AfD started out as a neoliberal Eurosceptic party, even if a nativist wing was present from the outset. Yet, it did not take long for the nativist anti-immigrant stand to become dominant within the party (Schmitt-Beck 2017). The ousting of the first chairperson, Bernd Lucke, in 2015 and his replacement by the two more radical co-presidents, Frauke Petry and Jorg Meuthen, illustrated this shift to the right. The party's transformation is also indicative of the slogans it used. Although in the 2013 general elections, the party used slogans such as “No to a debt union,” in 2017 the narrative became strongly anti-immigrant (i.e., “Islam does not fit our kitchen,” “stop asylum chaos”) (Muno and Stockemer 2021).

The European refugee crisis in 2015 also provided the perfect structural opportunity for this shift to the far right. Alongside this thematic transformation into a radical right-wing party, the party has also started to adopt a populist frame. The rejection of elites has become the heart of the AfD's self-conception. Since approximately 2015, the AfD has seen elites as compromising the system, a system that goes against the interests of the people. In such a system, the AfD, as the only representative of the people, perceives itself as the sole holder of common sense, and as the embodiment of the truth (Mudde 2007, 2017; Bogaards 2018). This “people against elite” dichotomy features prominently in the party's program, where the party introduces “the people” as a homogeneous group of virtuous people that fight the corrupt German elites (Breeze 2019). The AfD's anti-elitist status also manifests itself in aggressive attacks against the political establishment and, in particular, former Chancellor Merkel. For example, according to Beatrix von Storch, current member of the Bundestag, Angela Merkel is the “greatest lawbreaker in German history” (see Muno and Stockemer 2021).

The AfD's dualistic vision of society into pure people and corrupt elites is coupled with a nativist and xenophobic worldview (Idelberger 2020). As it is the case with other PRRPs, the AfD's discourse rejects immigration as a whole under the pretext of an economic and identitarian threat to the “people,” and by constructing a negative portrayal of immigrants based on religious and cultural practices (Brubaker 2017a, 2017b). Slogans such as “Islam does not fit in our kitchen”, “secure our borders,” or “Bikini instead of Burka” contribute to this anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric (Muno and Stockemer 2021).

In addition to being xenophobic, the AfD is also nationalistic and identitarian (Schmitt-Beck, Van Deth and Staudt 2017). These characteristics manifest themselves through the rejection of globalization and multilateralism. In AfD's view, globalization is threatening the German “people's” heritage. According to the AfD, industrial dislocations, and the EU openness to foreign workers are signs of the destruction caused by globalization (Brubaker 2017a; Careja et al. 2016; Vadlamannati 2020). The AfD further rejects the concept of multiculturalism, prefers “native” employees, and advocates for an economic and cultural closure of the EU borders. Like other populist parties, the AfD also supports policies oriented toward national preference such as welfare chauvinism (Arzheimer and Berning 2019).

The United States and Germany also provide two interesting cases from an institutional perspective. In the United States, the two-party system gives voters fewer choices than the German multiparty system. This increases the possibility that Republican voters could vote for Trump out of resentment for the Democrats or belief in traditional Republican credentials such as a free market economy or low taxation rather than out of outright approval for Trump's agenda. From this institutional perspective, the United States is rather an unlikely case for Trump voters to embrace the PRRP ideology fully. Our analysis will show whether the Republican Trump voter has become a PRRP voter like any other or whether other attributes feature strongly as predictors of the Republican vote. In other words, we will decipher whether the typical Trump voter is a reluctant supporter or whether she embraces some or all of PRRP credentials.

Data and Methods

To illustrate the degree to which the Trump voter has become a PRRP voter like others, we constructed an original questionnaire in which we asked respondents about their vote choice as well as relevant predictors. We fielded our questionnaire to 1,000 respondents in Germany and the United States, respectively, in December 2020 through the survey company CINT. As a sampling method, we used a quota sample from online panels maintained by CINT. CINT's online panel in the United States comprises more than 3 million users and in Germany several hundred thousand users. For both online panels, we implemented quotas based on region, education, gender, and age, so that our samples in the two countries are representative of the population in the two countries. We also excluded all noncitizens from the samples, given that the survey is about voting.

Thematically, we constructed the questionnaire so that we could replicate whether the PRRP signature themes (i.e., anti-immigration sentiment, anti-elitism, and nationalism/protectionism) are pillars in the AfD and Trump vote (see Table 1 for the exact question wording). Our dependent variable captures retrospective voting. We asked respondents for which party they voted in the last national election. In the United States, this was the November 2020 presidential election, and in Germany the 2017 general election to the German Bundestag. We coded all respondents that voted either for the AfD or for Trump 1, everyone else 0. We excluded nonvoters from our analyses. For the first independent variable, anti-immigration attitudes, we used a 0–100-scale measuring whether respondents think that immigrants make their country a worse or a better place to live in. To measure the second independent variable, anti-elitism, we employed the populism index as suggested by Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014). To gauge the two concepts of nationalism and protectionism, we chose three proxy variables. Our proxy variables for nationalism capture: (1) answers to a generic left-right scale, where 0 means left and 100 means right, and (2) answers to the question of whether respondents agree with the statement that they should support their home country even if it is in the wrong (0 stands for disagreement and 100 stands for agreement). The proxy variable for globalization is another 0–100-scale measuring whether respondents deem globalization as something negative (0) or something positive (100). Aside from these main variables, we also control for education, gender, age, and place of residency (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the question wording and operationalization of these variables).

Table 1.
Distribution of Self-Reported Retrospective Voting.

Vote frequency Percent

United States

Republicans 365 36.21

Democrats 466 46.23

Third Party/independent/blanc 51 5.06

Non-voters 126 12.50

Total: 1008 1000

Germany

Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)/Christlich Soziale Union (CSU) 240 23.21

Sozial Demokratische Partei (SPD) 177 17.12

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 150 14.51

Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) 64 6.19

Die Linke 97 9.38

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 101 9.77

Another Party/blanc 72 6.92

I did not vote 133 12.86

Total: 1034 1000

We use these data for two types of analyses. First, we present some descriptive statistics on the distribution of the vote share in our survey for the two countries. Second, we present four logistic regression models. The dependent variable is the dummy variable coded 1 for Trump and AfD voters, respectively. The independent variables include all variables described in Table 1. The first model is a pooled model. The second model is an interactive model in which we interact with the dummy variable for Germany with all right-hand side variables. This interactive model gauges whether the effect of any of the independent variables differs in Germany compared to the United States. Models 3 and 4 are separate models for the United States and Germany. Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we run all models as binary logistic regression analyses. We also graphically display the average predicted effect for all variables in Model 2. These probability plots display how similar or different the effects of any independent variables are on the Trump and AfD vote, respectively.

Results

In our survey, Trump and AfD voters make up 36.21 percent and 9.77 percent of voters, respectively (see Table 1). If we exclude the roughly 12 percent in both countries that indicated that they did not vote, Trump voters make up 41.38 percent of the polled in the U.S. and AfD voters 11.21 percent of the surveyed in Germany. The numbers resemble quite closely the actual share of the vote with Trump winning 46.86 of the vote in 2020 and the AfD winning 12.6 percent of the vote in 2017. More importantly for the purpose of our study, we find that the predictors of the Trump and AfD vote are analogous; albeit with minor differences (see Table 2 and Figures 1–9). Our pooled model (see Model 1) illustrates that, primarily, the Trump and AfD voter in our survey is someone who rejects immigrants, embraces populist attitudes, supports her home country, discards globalization, places herself on the right on a left-right ideological scale, and lives in the countryside (i.e., all these variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction). In contrast, education, gender, and age do not seem to matter as explanatory variables (i.e., the effect of these variables is not statistically different from zero).

Figure 1.
The Predicted Effect of Attitudes Toward Immigration on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 2.
The Predicted Effect of Populist Attitudes on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 3.
The Predicted Effect of Supporting One's Country Unconditionally on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 4.
The Predicted Effect of Political Ideology on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 5.
The Predicted Effect of Globalization on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 6.
The Predicted Effect of Education on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 7.
The Predicted Effect of Gender on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 8.
The Predicted Effect of Age on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Figure 9.
The Predicted Effect of Place of Residency on Voting for Trump/the AfD.

Table 2.
Results of the Regression Analyses.

Model 1 (pooled model) Model 2 (interactive) Model 3 (US) Model 4 (Germany)

Feelings toward immigrants −.027(.003) −.023(.004) −.023(.004) −.036(.006)

Populism-index .012*(.004) .006(.006) .006(.006) .018(.007)

Support for home country .006**(.003) .006(.004) .006(.004) .001(.005)

Left-right scale .046(.004) .048(.005) .048(.005) .039(.008)

Support for globalization −.025(.003) −.026(.004) −.026(.004) −.020(.006)

Education −.018(.081) .065(.117) .065(.117) −.131(.123)

Gender −.118(.149) .067(.185) .067(.185) −.454(.264)

Age .000(.005) .009(.006) .009(.006) −.018(.064)

Place of residency (reference category is big city)

Suburbs .382(.199) .600(.245) .600(.245) −.069(.388)

Town .411(.205) .659(.265) .659(.265) .104(.334)

Village .697(.288) 1.52(.579) 1.52(.579) .264(.364)

House or farm in the countryside 1.28(.330) 1.63(.378) 1.63(.378) .297(.831)

Germany −1.20(.099) .152(1.05)

Interaction Anti-immigrant sentiment—Germany −.013(.007)

Interaction Populism-index –Germany .127(.009)

Interaction Support for home country—Germany .006*(.004)

Interaction Left-right scale—Germany −.009(.008)

Interaction Support for globalization—Germany .005(.007)

Interaction Education—Germany −.196(170)

Interaction Gender—Germany .067(.185)

Interaction Age—Germany −.027**(.012)

Place of residency (reference category is big city)

Interaction Suburbs—Germany −.669(.459)

Interaction Town—Germany −.555(.426)

Interaction Village—Germany −126(.684)

Interaction House or farm in the countryside—Germany −1.33(.913)

Log-Likelihood −602.68 −593.11 −378.92 −214.19

Pseudo-Rsquared .41 .42 .36 .32

N 1766 1766 872 894

Note: Two-tailed test of significance, p < .1, p < .05, *p < .01.

Displaying the predicted effect of our nine independent variables on the Republican/Trump vote and AfD vote, respectively, Models 2–4 as well as Figures 1–9 allow us to compare the effect of any of our nine predictors on the vote for either of the two parties. The interactive model (i.e., Model 2) illustrates that anti-immigration attitudes and support for one's own country have a slightly stronger impact on Trump voters than on AfD voters. This is a particularly important finding, given the binary nature of the U.S. political system and the multiparty nature of the German system. Since there are only two electorally viable parties in the United States, we could expect several factions within the Republican Party. On the other hand, the German system is more favorable to smaller parties with more distinct ideologies where voters can vote for parties in line with their ideology. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that typical features of a populist radical right party are more prevalent in the voter pool of the AfD as compared to the voter pool for Trump. However, the finding that anti-immigration attitudes appear to have a slightly stronger effect on Trump voters than on AfD voters signifies that such attitudes are at least as prevalent in the Trump base as they are among AfD voters. This finding challenges the assumption that the typical Trump Republican voter may vote for the Republican Party solely because she has no alternative. Rather, the prototypical Trump voter votes for Trump or the Republicans because she seems to embrace the MAGA positions and this includes populism, anti-immigration sentiment, and xenophobia.

In addition, Model 2 hints that living in the countryside rather than a big city drives the Trump vote more than the AfD vote. In contrast, younger voters appear to push the AfD vote, something that does not seem to apply for Trump voters. However, Figures 1, 3, 8, and 9, in which the blue line displays how any of these variables influence the predicted probability of voting for Trump and the red line the predicted probability of voting for the AfD, highlight that these differences in the effects of these four variables are modest at best.

The repercussions of these results are twofold. First, the change in the Republican Party's ideology with Trump co-opting the party was not only a change in the orientation of the party's main themes, but it also triggered a change in the voter profile. PRRP selling points such as anti-immigration attitudes, a rightist ideology, and a protectionist mindset appear to be pillars in the Republican voter's mindset. Second, and related, this also implies that we should treat the Republican voters as what they are, the largest PRRP voter base in the world, at least when it comes to the absolute number of voters.

Conclusions

The conclusions to draw from this study are sober ones. First, this study illustrates that the Republican Party has anchored itself solidly in the party family of PRRP. The party's (new) signature themes anti-immigration, protectionism, and nationalism have also become anchors of the voters. In particular, Trump has succeeded in reading, responding to, and shaping voters' sentiments. Trump as the charismatic leader has channeled economic fears and inequality, immigration levels, and cultural backlash into a new ideology and concrete policy suggestions, which his supporters have eagerly supported (see also Mols and Jetten 2020; Norris and Inglehart 2019). In doing so, he has repositioned the Republican Party by also creating new electoral space.

Second, it is very likely that the party's turn to the populist right is for the long run. The Republican voter embraces anti-immigration sentiment, protectionism, and right-wing values. Once developed, these attitudes are unlikely to change (see Stockemer et al. 2020). On the party side, it also becomes clear that moderate voices do not have their space in the Republican caucus anymore. The departure or resignation from office of moderate Republicans such as Jeff Flake or Adam Kinzinger attest to this turn to the right. The sidelining of the few remaining Republicans who have tried to stay within the party, including Mitt Romney and Liz Cheney (who have faced censure votes by their own party and lost their primary race in the case of Cheney), is another indication of the Republican Party's radical turn. Finally, the candidacy of election deniers like Keri Lake or Doug Mastrianois is an additional sign of the radicalization of the base.

Even after the Trump presidency, there is no indication that the Republican Party frees itself from Trump and the more radical elements. If at all, the more radical elements in the party continue to sideline any remaining critical voices. For example, in the race to the House Speakership in early January 2023, radical members of the Republican Party such as Lauren Boebert or Matt Gaetz were able to hold Kevin McCarthy hostage. More from a policy perspective, we would also argue that American democracy is (still) in danger. There is consensus in the European literature that PRRP with their nativist, anti-pluralist, and divisive rhetoric and actions challenge democracy and pluralism (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 21–24, Mudde 2017, 4). Given that the Republicans are a PRRP, they are a danger to American democracy, as well. This applies even more so considering that a large portion of the party's leadership and the base still entertain the notion that the establishment in Washington stole the 2020 presidential election from Donald Trump. For the broader society, this implies that everyone who cares about democracy should fight for it now. In five, ten, or 15 years, it might be too late, and the United States might be part of the current wave of autocratic backlash.

	Vote frequency	Percent
United States
Republicans	365	36.21
Democrats	466	46.23
Third Party/independent/blanc	51	5.06
Non-voters	126	12.50
Total:	1008	1000
Germany
Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)/Christlich Soziale Union (CSU)	240	23.21
Sozial Demokratische Partei (SPD)	177	17.12
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	150	14.51
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	64	6.19
Die Linke	97	9.38
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)	101	9.77
Another Party/blanc	72	6.92
I did not vote	133	12.86
Total:	1034	1000

	Model 1 (pooled model)	Model 2 (interactive)	Model 3 (US)	Model 4 (Germany)
Feelings toward immigrants	−.027***(.003)	−.023***(.004)	−.023***(.004)	−.036***(.006)
Populism-index	.012***(.004)	.006(.006)	.006(.006)	.018**(.007)
Support for home country	.006**(.003)	.006*(.004)	.006*(.004)	.001(.005)
Left-right scale	.046***(.004)	.048***(.005)	.048***(.005)	.039***(.008)
Support for globalization	−.025***(.003)	−.026***(.004)	−.026***(.004)	−.020***(.006)
Education	−.018(.081)	.065(.117)	.065(.117)	−.131(.123)
Gender	−.118(.149)	.067(.185)	.067(.185)	−.454*(.264)
Age	.000(.005)	.009(.006)	.009(.006)	−.018*(.064)
Place of residency (reference category is big city)
Suburbs	.382*(.199)	.600**(.245)	.600**(.245)	−.069(.388)
Town	.411**(.205)	.659**(.265)	.659**(.265)	.104(.334)
Village	.697**(.288)	1.52***(.579)	1.52***(.579)	.264(.364)
House or farm in the countryside	1.28***(.330)	1.63***(.378)	1.63***(.378)	.297(.831)
Germany	−1.20***(.099)	.152(1.05)
Interaction Anti-immigrant sentiment—Germany		−.013*(.007)
Interaction Populism-index –Germany		.127(.009)
Interaction Support for home country—Germany		.006*(.004)
Interaction Left-right scale—Germany		−.009(.008)
Interaction Support for globalization—Germany		.005(.007)
Interaction Education—Germany		−.196(170)
Interaction Gender—Germany		.067(.185)
Interaction Age—Germany		−.027**(.012)
Place of residency (reference category is big city)
Interaction Suburbs—Germany		−.669(.459)
Interaction Town—Germany		−.555(.426)
Interaction Village—Germany		−126*(.684)
Interaction House or farm in the countryside—Germany		−1.33(.913)
Log-Likelihood	−602.68	−593.11	−378.92	−214.19
Pseudo-Rsquared	.41	.42	.36	.32
N	1766	1766	872	894

Footnotes

About the Authors

Kofi Arhin is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. His research interests are far-right populism,political psychology and sociology,party politics,anti-immigrant attitudes,and American politics.

Daniel Stockemer is Full Professor and Konrad Adenauer Research Chair in Empirical Democracy Studies in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Daniel's research interests include political behavior,public opinion research,and political representation. Daniel has published several books and more than 100 peer-reviewed articles.

Marie-Soleil Normandin is a Ph.D. cnadidate in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her research interests are populism,women in politics,and Canadian politics.

ORCID iD

Daniel Stockemer

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THE REPUBLICAN TRUMP VOTER

Abstract

Keywords

What is a Populist Radial Right Party?

The Supply and Demand Framework to Explain the Appeal of PRRP

The Republican Party Under Trump: A PRRP Like Any Other

Anti-Elitism

Nationalism

Immigration

Xenophobia

Lack of Respect for Democracy

The Republican Voter: A Populist Radical Right Voter Like Any Other?

Comparative Case Selection: The AfD as the Protypical Radical Right-Wing Party

Data and Methods

Results

Conclusions

Footnotes

About the Authors

ORCID iD

References