Opposition instead of recognition

Abstract

Axel Honneth reconstructs Hegel’s social and political philosophy on the basis of the concept of recognition. For Honneth, recognition is a constitutive relation between individuals that is in principle symmetrical. By conceiving recognition through symmetry, Honneth effectively bans the inclusion of power within recognitive relation. He thus regards the relations of power as cases of non-recognition or misrecognition. In this paper, I develop an alternative theory of the constitutive relation between individuals for Hegel, one that is based on the asymmetrical relation of power. To this aim, I focus on the chapter of “determinations of reflection” in the Science of Logic. Through a close analysis of Hegel’s Logic, I argue (a) that the most fundamental form of relation between individuals is the relation of opposition, (b) that individuals are solely constituted in and through the relation of opposition, and (c) that the relation of opposition is essentially asymmetrical. Together, these claims establish that, for Hegel, power is not external to the structure of individuals, but is constitutive of them. Finally, in order to illustrate the social ontology based on Hegel’s conception of opposition, I discuss Catharine MacKinnon, who argues that the male and female genders are solely constituted through the relation of power of the former over the latter.