Academic freedom: How to conceptualize and justify it?

Abstract

This article deals with the question of how academic freedom can be conceptualized and justified. First, I analyze two conceptions of academic freedom: institutional autonomy and intellectual and professional autonomy. I claim that institutional autonomy is a limited way to conceptualize academic freedom because there is no guarantee that institutions always favor freedom of intellectuals. In line with this, I argue that academic freedom as intellectual and professional autonomy should be the prior, if not the only, conception of academic freedom. Second, I examine critically different justifications of academic freedom that provide us with reasons to attach high protection to academic freedom as a particular right. I contend that the justification of the university as a realm of discovery of truth and independent knowledge production has to be complemented with the justifications of the university as a realm of democratic free debate and the autonomy of academics to speak freely. This is because, the discovery of truth argument alone does not require us to accept any moral principle other than skepticism about our own beliefs, which is not a strong ground for free speech on its own. Third, I argue that equal autonomy provides a good reason for academic freedom by emphasizing the rights of academics to speak in line with what they believe is true and only in this way can they contribute to the democratic debate in academia. This line of reasoning endorses the value of the search for truth and knowledge too since it is only possible for academics to perform the profession of search for truth when they are able to speak, write and research freely.

Introduction

Academic freedom is a topic whose scope cannot be restricted with the realm of individual free speech theories. ¹ On the one hand, it is a type of free speech which can be justified from the general reasons for free speech and on the other hand, as some might argue, it has a particular importance of its own since it is a freedom that applies to a specific category of people; scholars and researchers; who are entitled to almost unlimited free speech rights.

In this paper, I intend to analyze to what extent and how we can justify academic freedom through general free speech theories and how academic freedom can be saved—what principles should guide us in order to sustain the importance of academic freedom.

Conceptions of academic freedom

Academic freedom is a complicated idea which crosscuts boundaries with the general free speech theories. As Eric Barendt rightly draws our attention, it is not helpful to intend to come up with even a provisional definition in couple of sentences, let alone one single definition of academic freedom. (Barendt 2010, 17) Therefore in the remaining part of the chapter, I lay out certain possible conceptions of academic freedom that are inspired by and rest on our common sense understanding of freedom in academia. Then, by focusing on possible justifications of academic freedom, I intend to reason on what grounds a conception of academic freedom that is capable of surviving in the face of the challenges of the neoliberal age that we live in can be founded.

Academic freedom as institutional Autonomy

Institutional autonomy as a reason for academic freedom refers to two potentially conflicting dimensions of autonomy. Firstly, institutional autonomy might be understood as administrative autonomy of the academic institutions and secondly, it points out the rights of academics to self-rule or participate in the government of the academic institutions. The first conception of institutional autonomy only refers to the non-intervention of the state without any necessary signification of how academic institutions should be governed. The second conception of institutional autonomy specifies both non-intervention and the right to govern of the scholars themselves. For this reason, I believe that when we debate about institutional autonomy, we should particularly refer to the right of the academics to govern or participation in the government of the academic institutions in order to prevent misunderstandings and potential conflicts in what we mean. Mere administrative autonomy does not guarantee academic freedom on its own as long as academic institutions are governed mostly by managerial mentality by professional administrators.

Perhaps it is sensible to start with stating that we can only talk about institutional autonomy in different degrees and dimensions. For instance, in the UK, according to the Higher Education Act 2004, higher institutions of education are free to “determine the contents of the particular courses and how they are taught, and to determine admissions criteria and their application. …UK Universities are not free, for example, to set their own fees or disregard directions from the Higher Education Funding Councils without jeopardizing their funding.” (Barendt 2010, 27) From this, we understand that even though complete non-intervention of the state is not possible, there are certain academic decisions that must be made freely by the universities in order to be claimed as institutionally autonomous. These decisions are important in terms of defining the function and nature of higher education such as decisions regarding teaching and research as well as administrative issues regarding how to allocate resources of the institution. But it seems there is an inevitable financial dependency on funding institutions; be it in the form of government or private funding.

Let us go back to the point I made before concerning the limited scope of institutional autonomy to serve academic freedom. When considered without any connection to the right of the academics to participate in administration, institutional autonomy might conflict with academic freedom. For instance, a university might decide to close a philosophy department and require its faculty to teach basic philosophy courses in other relevant departments. If those decisions are questioned and criticized by professors due to their violation of academic freedom, they could be defended by the administration referring to the argument that university has the autonomy to decide which subjects will be taught and how they will be taught and managed. (Barendt 2010, 30) Manifestly and ironically, the argument of institutional autonomy might undermine the goal of academic freedom rather than supporting it. ²

Institutional autonomy as the right of the academics to govern and participate in the government of the university is based on the assumption that the academic interests will be served better the more academic staff are represented in the governing bodies of universities. In other words, the professional administrators and businessmen in the governing bodies will not prioritize academic freedom over other values such as efficiency and profit. There is a sense in which the argument is sensible and convincing as long as we accept that academic freedom is the highest academic interest of all scholars at all times and in this sense, it is stronger than the mere institutional autonomy argument. There is also an emphasis on the meaning of the university; an institution whose governance and teaching mission are the objects of interference by the teachers rather than powers outside the university. (Said 2005, 31)However, it might be claimed that this argument is also weak against the claims of individual rights to academic freedom when a conflict arises between the university administration and a professor or a lecturer. That is to say, there is no guarantee that the university administration—even with a high representation of academics—will favor academic freedom of the individual scholar over institutional interest. This means institutional autonomy, even with reference to the right to govern of the academics, is limited in its scope to protect academic freedom.

Academic freedom as intellectual and professional autonomy

This definition of academic freedom is based on the idea that scholars, researchers, teachers have an individual right to express and disseminate their views freely. This means that academic staff is entitled to teach, research, publish and speak autonomously as they see fit to their conceptions of facts and truths, without being intervened by other authorities. When put this way, it is a truly individualistic perspective which rests on the universal capacity of each individual to choose and act in this world without any external hindrance to their own will. Therefore, it is justified by free speech as an individual right to autonomous choice. Secondly, it rests on the belief that universities are places where appeals to truths and opinions must be discussed freely due to the professional characteristic of these institutions which aim to discover truth and welcome plurality and diversity.

Barendt states that the above-mentioned meaning has been the major dominant discourse in the UK in terms of what is understood by academic freedom. In the Education Reform Act 1988 that in effect abolished tenure, a provision was added to safeguard academic freedom. It obliges commissioners, in preparing new model statutes for universities, to consider the need to guarantee that academic staff have the freedom, within the law, to question the received wisdom and offer new and controversial opinions and ideas without risking their jobs and privileges at their institutions. (Barendt 2010, 23). He adds that a similar perspective has been taken in US: “the 1940 American Association of University Professors emphasized the freedoms of individual professors and other teachers: full freedom to conduct research and publish results. Freedom of discussion within the classroom; and freedom of extramural expression, that is the freedom of academics as citizens to speak or write without institutional censorship.” (Barendt 2010, 24) In Germany, he continues, The Basic Law guarantees that arts, science, research and teaching shall be free by recognizing academic freedom as an individual right. (ibid.) This recognition extends beyond a professional right by acknowledging that everyone who is engaged in serious scholarly activity, whether they work in a university, another institution or independently, should be entitled to do their work freely.

What is the scope of the claims and privileges of academic freedom as professional and intellectual autonomy? As Alfino points out, the claims of academic freedom can be recognized not only in a court but also in the intramural work relations such as contract compliance and university grievance processes. (Alfino 2010, 440) It is not so rare that academic freedom might be abridged by university administrations which may be acting under government direction or pressure from private funding organizations. However, as an individual right, academic freedom must be respected by universities, states and public and private agencies. (Barendt 2010, 26) In other words, the quality of academic freedom being an individual right—professional and intellectual—requires its protection from unlawful and unjustified hindrance and abridgment by the university and other external institutions.

Justifications of academic freedom

In an attempt to make sense of academic freedom conceptually, I argued that academic freedom must be understood as an individual and intellectual right to free speech rather than solely institutional autonomy in order to maintain its priority and significance. But why is academic freedom important at all? In this part of the article, I aim to discuss the justifications for academic freedom that provide us with reasons to attach high protection and priority to academic freedom as a particular right.

The university as a realm of discovery of truth and independent knowledge production

One of the most conventional justifications for academic freedom is that academic freedom is significant for the possible discovery of truth in a university setting. This argument considers academic freedom as an instrument for achieving knowledge which is based on truth. As Dworkin puts it, according to this view, “a system of independent academic institutions and scholars who are independent within them provides the best chance of collectively reaching the truth about a wide range of matters, from science to art to politics.” (Dworkin 1996, 10) He adds that, the argument states there is a better chance of discovering true knowledge if academics and institutions of higher education are left free from external control. (Dworkin 1996, 10) In this sense, it is the classical Millian argument for the discovery of truth as a reason for general free speech applied to academic freedom.

I think the discovery of truth argument can provide us with a strong reason in some respect by defining academia as a particular realm where the rigorous intellectual search for truth has to happen and it is only possible with the full conditions of free speech applied to academia. It reminds us that university is a special place where what is true is contemplated and deliberated and moreover, where knowledge is produced. This emphasis is, I believe, significant in an age where every value is measured on a scale of profit and contribution to the neoliberal market rather than its contribution and relation to other values such as truth.

However, one might still wonder and ask whether the discovery of truth argument is strong enough to provide a justification that would appeal to our comprehension of academic freedom as a value and the common good that is in need of high protection. In other words, can the justification of discovery of truth on its own provide strong enough reasons for academic freedom?

The sense which might lead us to think that the discovery of truth cannot be a strong ground for academic freedom on its own stems from the very fact that it is a less strong argument for supporting free speech generally. It does not require us to accept any moral or political value other than skepticism regarding the truth of our own held opinions and judgments. (Bilgrami 2015, 13)In other words, the only reason why we should tolerate all kinds of views different from our own is that our past opinions might turn out to be false and that we may never know where truth lies. This kind of skepticism, although it provides a logic and reason for free speech, it is far from relying on any moral foundation in relation to the rights and liberties of individuals and therefore, as Dworkin puts it nicely, “does not seem strong enough, on its own, to justify the emotional power that many of us feel academic freedom has and that it must have….” (Dworkin 1996, 10).

According to Bilgrami, a Millian skeptical argument for free speech might have a chilling effect on academic freedom in and outside the university and interestingly and contrary to what most of us would believe, I suppose, it might invite control and intervention rather than freedom and autonomy. He states: “In the immediate context of political controversies in which we in university life find ourselves, the conception of academic freedom based on such classical liberal form of argument leads directly to the advice we often get, sometimes even from university presidents, about how we should be balanced in what we say in our classrooms, showing consideration to all points of view we confidently know to be wrong.” (Bilgrami 2015, 16) And moreover, he asks, “Is a professor free to say things outside the university in public forums that would be unsuitable for one reason or another in the classroom or at official university events?” (Bilgrami 2015, 24).

Bilgrami considers the invitations to balance one’s views as an implication of too much emphasis on the Millian argument in academia. Balancing out one’s own arguments as well as allowing space to the evidently false arguments is considered by him as a control on free speech. He believes that scholars should be brave enough to express their opinions against the controlling authorities that ask from them to balance their opinions. I am not so sure whether we can easily jump to the conclusion that the Millian argument would lead to the controlling of speech in academia but one thing we can be sure of is that the Millian argument is in need of a stronger moral foundation as an addition to the skeptical argument as long as we commit to academic freedom as a high value to be protected. Two arguments can provide stronger grounds for academic freedom when compared to the argument from the university as a realm of discovery of truth: the justification of the university as a realm of democratic free debate, which is outlined in The university as a realm of democratic free debate below, and the equal autonomy of academics and intellectuals to freely speak and write what they think is true. I shall explain how the autonomy argument might provide a strong ground for academic freedom in The justification of equal autonomy as part of my analysis on how academic freedom can survive.

The university as a realm of democratic free debate

One of the justifications for academic freedom considers the university as a realm of free democratic debate. Unlike the justification of university as a realm of discovery of truth, this justification requires us to accept a moral value; that is, the moral value of democratic free debate. On such a view, the university is imagined as a realm from where to speak freely even if that might mean telling things that would bother and offend students and society as a whole. (Badley 2010, 154).Silencing on the basis of offence or unjustified claims of harm are not recognized as limits to freedom to speak and write in the university.

Of course, it is generally accepted that there might be some limits to the freedom to speak even in the case of academic freedom, but the justification to silence others who think differently requires serious evidence of harm or violence. The mere expression of a controversial belief or opinion should not be treated as a threat since this would mean a fear of open argument. (Badley 2010, 154). As Badley cites from Williams,

“indeed ‘a good institution of higher education is one in which students learn that their questions are not everyone’s questions, and their answers are not everyone’s answers… your world is not the obviously right and true one just because you say it is. Whatever convictions you emerge with will have been tested by this critical exposure to other ways of seeing and other sorts of investigation.” (Badley 2010, 154)

In this sense, universities are regarded as part of the democratic culture of a society where students and teachers learn from each other through open debate, which is essential to develop and respect difference and plurality of opinions and identities. It is a micro space where members are exposed to a variety of opinions and arguments, and develop their capacities of critical and skeptical thinking through open deliberation.

It is important to reflect on the dimensions of the argument for the university as a realm of free democratic debate but it might be at the same time challenging as well in the context of contemporary academia. No platforming practices performed by student unions lately provide a good ground to discuss the scope and nature of free speech in academia in terms of manifesting the complexity of the issue. As Simpson and Srinivasan mention, the term “no platforming” dates back to the 1970s, when the National Union of Students adopted a policy that prohibits student unions in the UK to invite speakers of the fascist National Front Party on British campuses. (Simpson and Srinivasan 2019, 3). Over time, NUS’s campaign enlarged in scope by the exclusion of variety of speakers holding various unpopular views—racism, anti-Semitism, misogyny, Islamophobia and transphobia—from academic platforms. As reported by Simpson and Srinivasan, “recent targets of no platforming include George Galloway over allegations of rape denial, Iranian human rights campaigner and secularist activist Meryem Namazie, for Islamophobia, psychologist Ken Zuzker, for transphobia, and feminists Julie Bindel, Beatrix Campbell and Germaine Greer, also for transphobia.” (2019, 3).

The question whether no platforming of racist, misogynistic, transphobic and Islamophobic views on campuses should be supported and if so, on what grounds is important to consider when discussing the scope of free speech in academia. In the attempted no platforming of Germeine Greer in 2015 at Cardiff University over her skeptical opinions about the womanhood of trans individuals, there was a counter campaign that defended Greer’s right to speak at Cardiff which included an open letter published in the Guardian and signed by several feminists. “The letter objected that where no platforming “used to be a tactic used against self-proclaimed fascists and Holocaust deniers”, now it is used “to prevent the expression of feminist arguments critical of the sex industry and of some demands made by trans activists.” (Simpson and Srinivasan 2019, 6). This demonstrated that the question of no platforming is not a simple one that could be addressed and answered as quickly and easily as one would assume. It is like a double-edged sword in the sense that both the opponents and supporters of no platforming might have reasons to argue for free speech in academia.

Alison Scott-Baumann argues that the most imminent threat to academic freedom is caused by the legal regulations imposed on universities by the political authorities rather than no platforming practices. She discusses the impact of The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in the UK which places certain duties on higher institutions of education. She mentions: “The Act includes, firstly, a reiteration of the 1986 Act instruction to universities to ‘have particular regard’ to actively protecting academic freedom and freedom of speech, secondly a duty to ‘have due regard’ to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and thirdly a duty to ‘have due regard’ to the guidance that accompanies the Act.” (Scott-Baumann 2017, 162). She suggests that the Prevent has to be dismantled because it is discriminatory and has a chilling effect on free speech. In other words, it is against the idea of the university as a place where we must embrace cultural diversity and understanding as an integral part of our existence. (Scott-Baumann 2017, 173).

Scott-Baumann advises students, when they wish to no platform, to seek legal advice and active support from the university and when they decide to proceed to invite a speaker, there should be structured debate. (Scott-Baumann 2017, 172–173). She rightly recognizes and points out the benefits of the open democratic debate for the audience who are present in the debate such as benefiting from debating techniques, knowing how to demand evidence, identify false logic and find out inappropriate use of inductive and deductive arguments. (Scott-Baumann 2017, 172–173) In line with this, she believes that open free debate is the only way we can save free speech and democracy from the establishment ideology and imposition.

Ironically, recently in the UK, a proposal for a new bill, named the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill 2021, was presented in the House of Commons in May 2021. “Provisions in the Bill would: allow the Office for Students (OfS) to monitor and enforce freedom of speech measures at higher education institutions, introduce a complaints system and redress for breaches of free speech duties through the introduction of a statutory tort, extend duties on free speech to students’ unions and create a role of Director of Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom at the OfS.” ³ The bill intends to regulate no-platforming practices and their impacts and allow compensation for no-platformed speakers. However, it echoes the threats and risks to academic freedom that Scott-Bauman points out as a result of external regulation by political authorities. There are several reasons to shy away from such grand external regulations: first, the extent of the threat that no-platforming poses seems not to be as great as some would claim and second and even more importantly, we should intend to support more speech and reinforce the culture of democratic free debate in universities rather than approving external impositions by political authorities.

I agree with Scott-Baumann that the establishment ideology and the imposition from the political authority are significant threats to and obstacles in front of the democratic open debate in universities. I could especially relate to her comments on the chilling effect of establishment ideology on free speech as a scholar who found herself in an academic exile due to the state oppression and dictate on universities in Turkey. In principle, I believe, a straightforward no platforming is wrong so long as we do not want to be afraid of open debate and remain loyal to the culture of democratic debate where all the arguments and opinions are subject to challenge and criticism. I also think that students have the entitlement to demonstrate their political and moral positions by protesting and not inviting speakers whom they think should be no-platformed. However, we, as all the members of the academia, need to be very careful regarding what constitutes serious, evidence-based harm in order not to cut the root of the tree of free democratic debate. After all, the university is a place where democratic culture regenerates through debate, cultural diversity and difference.

The justification of equal autonomy

It would be almost counterfactual to discuss academic freedom without endorsing the value of the search for truth and knowledge, since searching for truth is what academics do as their profession. But, as Dworkin rightly notes, the conventional justification of academic freedom on its own which considers free speech as instrumental to the discovery of truth does not provide strong enough reasons that would justify the emotional power that most of us feel academic freedom has. (Dworkin, 1996, 10) In other words, we need to rely on some other ground/grounds as well as the discovery of truth to claim the power and value of free speech in academia.

As a continuation of what has been said so far, I suggest that we need a solid principled ground for academic freedom which acknowledges that the search for truth/knowledge is an integral part and goal of our profession as academics but at the same time, that we do not have to connect this goal to free speech on an instrumental ground as the discovery of truth argument does. In line with this, I contend that the best candidate for a stronger ground for academic freedom is equal autonomy: it both justifies academic freedom on the right to free speech of academics and underlines that academics can only perform their profession-search for true knowledge-by exercising their right to free speech.

The principle of equal autonomy endorses that individuals are entitled to speak freely in line with their chosen conceptions of good as a result of their autonomous capacities. In other words, it is a requirement of autonomous choices to speak, write and talk freely. In addition to the speaker’s autonomy, individuals have a right to hear and listen freely what others have to say to be justified in their choices as well as developing and criticizing their conceptions of life. Both speaker and listener autonomy are requirements of the equal moral status of individuals who are capable of choosing and living a life they think fit them.

The principle of equal autonomy, when applied to academic freedom, considers professionals in academia no different than individuals who are entitled to speak in line with their conceptions of good. Just like everyone else, academics also have the right and responsibility to speak in line with what they think is true. This is part of their life choices and a requirement of their equal autonomy. Dworkin’s emphasis on the connection and proximity of academic freedom to our intuitions about general free speech rights makes great sense here. (Dworkin, 1996, 12) The life of an academic is founded on a purpose to discover what true knowledge is and how this knowledge might serve society. By its very nature, the profession itself has a particular value in the sense of disseminating knowledge and sharing what was discovered during the research with community at large. In this sense, academics, not only have a right but also an unquestionable responsibility to speak, write and disseminate what was found freely. This is a ground that values the central significance of the search for truth and knowledge in relation to academic freedom too.

The idea/justification of university as a realm of free democratic debate, which I outlined in The university as a realm of democratic free debate above, complements the principle of equal autonomy since democratic participation is a requirement and essential constitutive component of the freedom of speech too. Free speech rights, in order to be fully endorsed, require a democratic context which allows everyone to speak freely in a society. In order for democracy to exist, free speech is a requirement because democracy is about speaking, deliberating, reflecting, and criticizing. In this manner, free speech is a constitutive component of democratic participation. This correlates with what Dworkin notes about the requirement of a democratic political culture—independent culture—for ethical individualism to flourish as opposed to a conformity culture in which dissent from the traditional culture is regarded with hostility. (Dworkin, 1996, 12) Independent culture can only be a component of a democratic culture in which free speech is endorsed as a principle grounded in the equal moral autonomy of each and every individual.

In this last section of the paper, I aimed to contemplate the possibility of offering a strong justification for academic freedom which is sensitive to our intuitions and emotions about the meaning of freedom in the university. I recommended that it is significant to go beyond an instrumental treatment of free speech in academia without totally disregarding the function and value of the goal of the discovery of truth as such. Lastly, I wish to note that I do not intend to claim to solve all the controversial problems relating to the violation of free speech rights that emerge in academia. ⁴ However, where free speech rights of scholars are violated, on my proposed ground for academic freedom, the claims that ask for retribution can find a solid ground of appeal to argue for why it is significant not to violate the right to free speech in the university. In line with what has been said, it is also significant to note that the limits of free speech are not always easily identifiable. Nevertheless, it seems that evidence-based harm and violence relating to speech can help us to determine to a certain extent what qualifies as free speech requiring protection and what does not in academia.

Conclusion

This paper analyzed the topic of academic freedom in relation to free speech while focusing on conceptions and justifications of academic freedom. I investigated how academic freedom can be conceptualized and justified from theories of free speech. First, I focused on two conceptions of academic freedom that reflect our common sense understanding of freedom in academia: Academic freedom as institutional autonomy and academic freedom as professional and intellectual autonomy. I claimed that institutional autonomy, understood as administrative autonomy, is incomplete because there is no guarantee that the administrators will always assign priority to academic freedom over other values. In line with this, I argued that academic freedom as professional and intellectual autonomy has to be prior to institutional autonomy in order to protect the free speech rights of academics.

Secondly, I concentrated on the possible ways to justify academic freedom: academia as a place for discovery of truth and independent knowledge production, academia as a place of democratic free debate and equal autonomy. I claimed that the discovery of truth argument alone does not require us to accept any moral principle other than skepticism about our own beliefs, which makes it a weak ground for free speech on its own. Therefore, I maintained, the argument from academia as a place for the discovery of truth must be complemented by stronger justifications such as the justification of the university as a realm of democratic free debate and the autonomy of academics to speak freely. The university as a realm of democratic free debate provides us a stronger justification by recognizing the priority of free speech rights as indispensable for democratic debate in academia. In other words, it requires us to accept the value of democratic free debate and at the same time does not instrumentalize free speech rights of academics.

Moreover, I noted, the autonomy argument allows us to appreciate the value of the free speech rights of academics to speak and listen freely as part of their profession, the search for knowledge and its production. In other words, I emphasized that the idea of equal autonomy is integral to perform the profession of searching for truth. That is to say, it is not possible for academics to perform their profession without being able to speak, listen, write and disseminate freely. I also maintained that equal autonomy establishes a non-instrumental relation between the value of the search for truth and knowledge and free speech rights, and therefore it provides a strong ground for academic freedom.

On a very last note, I added, the justification of equal autonomy and the justification of academia as a realm of free democratic debate complement each other. This is to say, I concluded, academics can only participate in the free democratic debate by exercising their free speech rights. In other words, democratic debate assumes the presence of and depends on equal autonomy of individuals, and of course, academics.