Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two interrelated questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers to these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.
BusbyJoshuaGreenhillKelly (2015) Ain’t that a shame? hypocrisy, punishment, and weak actor influence in international politics. In Richard FrimanH (ed) The Politics of Leverage in International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 105–122.
2.
ChibaDainaJohnsonJesse CLeedsBrett Ashley (2015) Careful Commitments: Democratic states and alliance design. Journal of Politics77(4): 968–982
3.
CooleyAlexanderRonJames (2002) The NGO Scramble: Organizational insecurity and the political economy of transnational action. International Security27(1): 5–39.
4.
CoxDan GCooperDrury A (2006) Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the democratic peace and economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research43(6): 709–722.
5.
DeMerittJacqueline (2012) International Organizations and Government Killing: Does naming and shaming save lives?International Interactions38(5): 597–621.
6.
DixonWilliam (1993) Democracy and the Management of International Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution37(1): 42–68.
7.
DixonWilliam (1994) Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict. American Political Science Review88(1):14–32
8.
DoyleMichael (1996) Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. In BrownMELynn-JonesSMMillerSE (eds) Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–57.
9.
DürAndreasBacciniLeonardoElsigManfred (2014) The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a new dataset. Review of International Organizations9(3): 353–375.
10.
EpsteinCharlotteBarclayKate (2013) Shaming to ‘Green’: Australia-Japan relations and whales and tuna compared. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific13(1): 95–123.
11.
FranklinJames C (2008) Shame on You: The impact of human rights criticism on political repression in Latin America. International Studies Quarterly52(1): 187–211.
12.
FrimanRichard (2015) The Politics of Leverage in International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
13.
Hafner-BurtonEmilie M (2008) Sticks and Stones: Naming and shaming the human rights enforcement problem. International Organization62: 689–716.
14.
HendrixCullenWongWendy (2014) Knowing your audience: How the structure of international relations and organizational choices affect Amnesty International’s advocacy. Review of International Organizations9(1): 29–58.
15.
ILO (1991–2011) Extracts from the Record of Proceedings. The Conference Committee on the Application of Convention and Recommendations, Part 1A, 2B. International Labour Conference, Geneva.
16.
JacksonPatrick T J (2006) Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
17.
KeckMargaretSikkinkKathryn (1998) Activists beyond Borders : Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press.
18.
KelleyJudith GSimmonsBeth (2015) Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. American Journal of Political Science, 59(1): 55–70.
19.
KolievFaradjLebovicJames (2018) Selecting for Shame: The Monitoring of Workers’ Rights by the International Labour Organization, 1989 to 2011. International Studies Quarterly62(2): 437–452.
20.
KonoDaniel (2006) Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and trade policy transparency. American Political Science Review100(3): 369–84.
21.
KrainMatthew (2012) J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?International Studies Quarterly56(3): 574–589
22.
LebovicJames (2004) Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution48: 910–936.
23.
LebovicJamesVoetenErik (2006) The Politics of Shame: The condemnation of country human rights practices in the UNHCR. International Studies Quarterly50(4): 861–888.
24.
LektzianDavidSouvaMark (2003) The Economic Peace Between Democracies: Economic sanctions and domestic institutions. Journal of Peace Research40(6): 641–660.
25.
MaozZev (1998) Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A theoretical and empirical re-assessment. International Interactions24(1): 3–89.
26.
MaozZevRussettBruce (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review87(3): 624–638.
27.
MarshallMontyElzinga-MarshallGabrielle (2017). Global Report 2017: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility. Center for Systemic Peace.
28.
MeernikJamesAloisiRosaNicholsAngelaSowellMarsha (2012) The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns. Journal of Conflict Resolution56(2): 233–256.
29.
MoravcsikAndrew (1997) Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organization51(4): 513–554.
30.
MurdieAmanda MDavisDavid R (2012) Shaming and Blaming: Using events data to assess the impact of human rights INGOs. International Studies Quarterly56(1): 1–16.
31.
MurdieAmandaUrpelainenJohannes (2015) Why Pick on Us? Environmental INGOs and state shaming as a strategic substitute. Political Studies63: 353–372
32.
MurdieAmanadaPeksenDursun (2013) The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions. Review of International Organizations8(1): 33–53.
33.
RayLee James (1995) Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press
34.
RonJamesRamosHowardRodgersKathleen (2005) Transnational Information Politics: NGO human rights reporting, 1986-2000. International Studies Quarterly49(3): 557–588.
35.
RussettBruceStarrHarvey (2000) From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and conflict in the international system. In: ManusM (ed) Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 215–235.
36.
SimmonsBeth ADannerAllison (2010) Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. International Organization64(2): 225–256.
37.
SchimmelfennigFrank (2001) The Community Trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European union. International Organization55(1): 47–80.
38.
TallbergJonasSommererThomasSquatritoTheresa (2015) Democratic Membership in International Organizations: Sources of institutional design. Review of International Organizations. Epub ahead of print 1 January. doi: 10.1007/s11558-015-9227-7
39.
TermanRochelleVoetenErik (2018) The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the universal periodic review. Review of International Organizations13(1): 1–23.
40.
TomzMichael (2008) Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.
41.
WeisbandEdward (2000) Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame and Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime. International Studies Quarterly44(4): 643–666.
42.
WisskirchenAlfred (2005) The Standard-Setting and Monitoring Activity of the ILO: Legal questions and practical experience. International Labour Review144(3): 253–286.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
