Decision rules,social norms and the expression of disagreement: the case of qualified-majority voting in the Council of the European Union

Abstract

When a group has to make a decision, one can assume that the members’ incentives to state their position vary according to the different decision rules. Decision-making in the Council of the European Union offers an opportunity to study how a decision rule influences the way members of a group state their position. Indeed, in several areas, decisions must be made by qualified-majority voting. But the combination of this rule and of social norms specific to the Council discourages the minority from expressing itself at different stages of decision-making. Decisions seem to be made without opposition at two main stages of the decision-making process: during the plenary sessions, representatives do not vote; according to the official Council records, a high proportion of measures are adopted without opposition.

Lorsque les membres d’un groupe doivent prendre une décision, on peut se demander si la règle de décision utilisée influe sur la façon dont ils expriment leur position. La prise de décision au Conseil de l’Union européenne donne un exemple de cette influence. Le vote à la majorité qualifiée s’y articule à différentes normes sociales pour dissuader l’expression de l’opposition. La non-opposition apparente prend deux formes principales: l’absence de vote en séance plénière et la forte proportion de décisions prises avec l’accord de tous les Etats membres que laissent apparaître les registres publics des votes.