This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont’s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model. Finally it assesses the link between empirical relevance and complexity with reference to models in the crisis bargaining and the war and bargaining literatures.
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