How do domestic political considerations constrain or enable the initiation of interstate wars? We answer this question in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While prominent theories predict that domestic constraints reduce the likelihood of conflict, we show how structural features of Putin's regime rendered these concerns moot. Fighting was not likely to shift the domestic distribution of power favorably for Putin, although invading stood to enrich certain domestic groups and Putin himself. Instead, the invasion is more consistent with evidence that Putin perceived Ukraine to be bluffing, or expected fighting to yield pro-Russia shifts in Ukrainian domestic politics.
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