Abstract
From a mixed gamble perspective, we contend that family firms (FFs) with different family shareholder structures are confronted with different trade-offs among current and prospective financial and socioemotional wealth (SEW), leading to differences in their international acquisition choices. We also explore the moderating role of family leadership and performance aspirations. Our findings show that FFs with a dominant family owner are more likely to pursue international acquisitions, especially when FFs are led by a family CEO or when they experience below-target performance, as in such cases, they prioritize prospective financial and SEW gains, thereby sacrificing current SEW and financial wealth.
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