Abstract
An ill-fated meeting
On the morning of 25 April 1909, Sigmund Freud wrote to Sándor Ferenczi that he was awaiting ‘two very interesting guests’: the German neurologist Albert Moll and Oskar Pfister, a Protestant pastor from Zurich. He added that ‘Moll will be very badly received; Pfister, to the contrary’. The next day Freud sent another letter to Ferenczi reporting that he had scolded Moll and almost thrown him out: ‘He is a disgusting, vicious, maliciously pettifogging individual’ (Brabant, Falzeder and Giampieri-Deutsch, 1993: 55). A few weeks later, Freud explained in a letter to Carl Gustav Jung – who had asked Freud ‘what was I was amazed to discover that he regards himself as a kind of patron of our movement. I let him have it; I attacked the passage in his notorious book where he says that we compose our case histories to support our theories rather than the other way round, and had the pleasure of listening to his oily excuses: his statement was not meant as an insult, every observer is influenced by his preconceived ideas, etc. Then he complained that I was too sensitive, that I must learn to accept justified criticism; when I asked him if he had read ‘Little Hans’, he wound himself up into several spirals, became more and more venomous, and finally, to my great joy, jumped up and prepared to take flight. At the door he grinned and made an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve himself by asking me when I was coming to Berlin. I could imagine how eager he must be to return my hospitality, but all the same I wasn’t fully satisfied as I saw him go. He had stunk up the room like the devil himself, and partly for lack of practice and partly because he was my guest I hadn’t lambasted him enough. Now of course we can expect all sorts of dirty tricks from him.
Moll, who was further characterized by Freud as ‘a brute’ (McGuire, 1974: 223), briefly referred to his ‘courtesy call’ on Freud in his memoirs. Freud had received him with the words:
‘Nobody has attacked me like you have done. You accuse us of forging case-histories.’ In order to prove this, he took out my book about the ‘sexual life of the child’ and agitatedly pointed at the passage. (Moll, 1936: 55)
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For Moll it was clear that Freud was quick to take offence and could not deal with criticism. Although his name is often mentioned in historical works about sexuality, Albert Moll (1862–1939), and even more the contents of his works, are largely forgotten today. In the decades around 1900, however, he was one of the most prominent experts in sexual science in Central Europe. Three monographs established his authority in this new field.
Character assassination
Moll’s criticisms, which were not entirely unreasonable or unusual (Jung, the psychologist William Stern and the journalist Karl Kraus, for example, expressed similar objections), struck at the heart of psychoanalysis.
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Freud and his associates had mistrusted and demeaned Moll before his book appeared. Their misgivings were probably fuelled by their perception of the widespread hostility towards psychoanalysis among prominent medical authorities in Berlin (Abraham and Freud, 1965: 50, 55–6; Gay, 1988: 180, 193–5). Early in 1908, Moll invited Freud and also Karl Abraham to contribute to a new journal about psychotherapy and medical psychology (
What seems to have bothered Freud most about Moll was that
Not only were Moll’s book and his scientific credentials disparaged, but also his motives and personality. It was clear that he had written the book in response to Freud’s
Even more curious was that, during the discussion at the Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung meeting, Freud referred to Moll’s book
All this did not prevent Freud from accusing Moll of plagiarism: ‘Moll has become aware of the importance of childhood sexuality through reading
Ernest Jones’ account of Freud’s reaction to Moll’s work does not make sense. According to Jones (1955: 114), Freud considered libel action because the book ‘was so vehement in its denial of infantile sexuality’. This was obviously not the case, but even if it was – implying that Moll claimed the very opposite of what Freud argued in
The discussion about Moll’s book at the meeting of the Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung, conducted in aggressive and hostile tones that were not unusual in Freud’s circle, was beyond any standard of fair criticism; this was character assassination, and the allegation of plagiarism was preposterous. As I will demonstrate, Moll could, in fact, have made a case accusing Freud of plagiarism – or at least of not paying due tribute to Moll’s earlier views on infantile sexuality, as well as on several other issues that Freud himself presented as groundbreaking in
Myths about Freud’s Drei Abhandlungen
I am not the first to draw attention to the conflict between Moll and Freud and the questionable role of the latter. Apart from Sigusch (2008: 261–84) and Sauerteig (2012), Sulloway (1992) 12 above all has uncovered how the clash was related to the intellectual and social strategies used by Freud and his followers to promote psychoanalysis and claim novelty. The research of the authors cited above is helpful, but their demystification of Freud and rehabilitation of Moll does not, in my view, go far enough. Whereas Sauerteig’s excellent contribution focuses on infantile sexuality and does not cover Moll’s broader views, Sigusch (2008: 264) lists all the essential elements of Freud’s sexual theory that could already be found in Moll’s work, but he does not go into detail. The contents of Moll’s sexological writings published in the 1890s, which were more cautious and nuanced than those of most other sexual scientists, remain underexposed and warrant more attention than they have received so far.
Despite his meticulous analysis of how sexologists, in particular Moll and Ellis, foreshadowed many of Freud’s ideas, Sulloway (1992: 212) argues that
A similar ambivalence can be found in Sulloway’s discussion of Freud’s accusation of plagiarism vis-à-vis Moll. While he first demonstrates at length and convincingly that it was part of Freud’s strategy to stress the originality of psychoanalysis and to disregard criticism, Sulloway subsequently withdraws from the – in my view logical – conclusion that Freud’s attack on Moll was unsavoury. Sulloway suggests that Freud’s priority claim was not undeserved, since his wide definition of infantile sexuality was innovative: it differed from the narrower meaning of sexuality – more exclusively related to genital activity – supposedly sustained by Moll and others. Sulloway writes: ‘Thus what Moll, and later Ellis, appraised as “an undue extension” of childhood sexual theory by Freud, Freud deemed as the essential justification of his scientific priority over them’ (p. 475). Because he creatively elaborated existing ideas, Freud was supposedly groundbreaking after all.
Although Sigusch (2005: 28–32) is very critical about Freud, he tends to make a similar interpretation. In my view, neither Sulloway nor Sigusch are entirely correct with regard to Moll’s sexual theory. Although Moll rejected Freud’s sexual interpretation of various self-centred (oral, anal and genital) pleasures of the infant and their overlap with basic physical needs and functions, such as eating, drinking and defaecation, he was far from defining infantile as well as adult sexuality exclusively in genital terms. He referred, for example, to non-genital ‘erogenous zones’ of the body – using the term ‘
Even if the argument of Sulloway and Sigusch made sense, it still would not be an excuse for accusing Moll of plagiarism. Moreover, Moll may have had a point in criticizing Freud for his vagueness when it came to defining sexuality. Freud responded to this criticism by arguing that an explanation of his broad meaning of sexuality was superfluous, because it was the logical consequence of his overall argument in
Also, Sulloway’s overall conclusion is, in my view, questionable. His book provides a thorough deconstruction of Freud’s manipulative strategies and his professed originality, but in the last chapter he claims that Freud was nevertheless a great thinker because of his formidable ability to take up ideas of others and then go creatively beyond them. Even the myth-making about the development of psychoanalysis – Sulloway (1992: 475, 489–503) identifies as many as 26 fabrications – is all of a sudden seen in a different light: all great scientific discoveries are inevitably surrounded by myths, and there is truth in them since such stories have a powerful impact on the collective imagination. In this way, Sulloway undermines his analysis in the preceding 500 pages.
The image of Freud’s
Apart from the fact that psychiatrists such as Krafft-Ebing occasionally employed Latin in their description of sexual acts in order to prevent being censored, I see little difference between Freud’s rhetoric and that of Krafft-Ebing or Moll. In fact, the works of the last two were rather more explicit: they contained numerous case histories, autobiographical accounts and letters, in which articulate ‘perverts’ freely voiced their sexual experiences and fantasies. Krafft-Ebing and Moll considered such self-reporting as valuable for understanding perversion, and this opened up space for explicit and personalized talk about a wide variety of sexual feelings, which so far had been largely silenced in public (see Oosterhuis, 2000, 2012). Moreover, their studies included descriptions of erotic temptations in cities, the underworld of prostitution and homosexual subcultures, as well as examples from historical, ethnographical, literary and semi-pornographic writings. Freud’s publications about sexuality (1898, 1905, 1908a, 1908b), on the other hand, are more theoretical, largely without case histories and explicit descriptions of concrete behaviour.
In the light of the prevailing standards and prejudices of his time, Moll’s approach to sexuality was at least as liberal and pragmatic as that of Freud, while also tending towards historical and cultural relativism with regard to sexual morality. As a believer in scientific rationality, Moll denounced prudishness, secretiveness, moral crusades and double standards, and pointed out that excessive repression of sexual desire could be detrimental to health and well-being. In 1891 Moll (1891a: 223–46) criticized the moral denunciation and criminalization of homosexuality and, a few years later, he was among the first to support Hirschfeld’s petition (Petition, 1899: 257) against the penalization of ‘unnatural vice’ among men, which Freud signed more than 10 years later. Moll also questioned prevailing medical explanations of ‘perversion’ in terms of psychopathology and degeneration. 15 He was in favour of more equal relations between man and woman, companionate marriage, women’s right to sexual satisfaction, social support for unmarried mothers, and a rational sexual education of children.
Similarities and contrasts
Before elaborating on the parallels between Moll’s
Both were disciplined scholars and prolific writers, but did not succeed at university: Freud’s affiliation at the University of Vienna was that of part-time lecturer and extraordinary professor, and Moll never held any academic post, although his numerous publications qualified him for it. Moll displayed a wider variety of activities alongside his medical practice and writing: he regularly served as a forensic expert in courts; advised government and police officials about public health issues; promoted medical psychology and psychotherapy, in particular by editing journals in this field; and was involved in professional politics, negotiating with medical insurance organizations and articulating his outspoken opinions about medical ethics in terms of patients’ rights. Although he was part of the local medical establishment, Moll antagonized colleagues by voicing relentless criticism of his own profession on a series of issues, such as the involvement of patients in experimental research without their consent, the commercial interests of specialized clinics and private mental institutions, and proposals for laws and measures in the field of eugenics. He also ceaselessly denounced parapsychological and occult experiments and demonstrations as charlatanism and fraud, while striving for the recognition of hypnosis as a bona fide treatment in the hands of doctors. As a consequence of his attacks, Moll got involved in disputes and libel trials, in which he was relentless and sharp and, like Freud, did not shy away from ruthless
Both Freud and Moll cultivated their independence and ‘outsider’ position, and were very confident of themselves and far from easy-going. Whereas Moll’s arrogance and rancour alienated him from others, Freud, although sharing such character traits, was more sociable and strategic. A crucial difference between the two, which explains Freud’s lasting fame and Moll’s eventual oblivion, was that Moll remained an
Similarities in the sexual theories of Moll and Freud
The main points in Freud’s
Already, before Freud defined the libido likewise, Moll had articulated that the sexual ‘drive’ (
For Moll, it was evident that human evolution together with the interplay of nature and culture have made the human sexual drive much more precarious and complicated – transgressive and dangerous as well as potentially beneficial for society – than the instinctual sexuality of animals. The historical and geographical diversity of sexual expressions, including a wide variety of perversions, show that culture inevitably modifies the sexual drive. The artificiality of civilization has advanced the continuing refashioning and amplifying of sensual pleasure and enlarged its psychological and symbolic dimension. Man, Moll (1898: 406–7) wrote, ‘seizes the most ingenious methods to heighten voluptuousness, which one rarely finds among animals . . . All of this shows most clearly how far man has drifted away from nature’.
In the preface of his
Moll indicated that perversions throw light on fundamental aspects of normal sexuality. To a certain extent fetishism is an intrinsic feature of normal sexual attraction and lasting relationships, which are grounded in a distinct predilection for particular physical features of one’s partner. Its perversity depends on the degree in which the predilection for a specific feature or object has dissociated itself from a loved person, and has become the exclusive and obsessive target of sexual gratification without aiming for coitus. Sustaining conventional views of the natural differences between the sexes, Moll explained sadomasochism as an extreme form of normal heterosexuality depending on the polar attraction of active and aggressive masculinity and passive and submissive femininity. Voyeurism and exhibitionism show the prominent role of seeing and being seen in human sexuality in contrast to that of ‘lower’ animals, which have not gone through the evolutionary phase of adopting an upright position and rely on smell in their mating behaviour (Moll, 1897–98: 135, 318, 320, 325; see also Moll, 1898: 377–81).
Moll’s analysis of infantile sexuality further put into perspective the boundaries between normal and abnormal. In his case histories, he found that healthy and ‘perverted’ individuals differed little in their reports of precocious sexual experiences. Various impulses and activities – masturbation, affection for individuals of the other or the same sex and of different ages, attraction to animals, as well as fetishist, sadistic and masochistic penchants – are not uncommon in childhood, nor are they necessarily a foreboding of a lasting perversion in adulthood. Such leanings are usually part of the sexually undifferentiated developmental stage between the ages of 8–10 and the end of adolescence at around 20. At this age a distinct and continuous sexual drive has usually crystallized through the maturation of the sex organs, sensorial stimuli, mental associations and habit formation. Eventually, most young adults will show a heterosexual desire and a minority among them a homosexual or bisexual one, while specific perverse leanings can occur in both groups. Apart from a basic congenital predisposition, the triggers of perversion, Moll argued, can be found in psychological and environmental factors that obstruct the regular transformation of diffuse and erratic infantile inclinations into heterosexual object choice (Moll, 1897–98: 351, 421, 425, 474, 477, 491; see also Moll, 1898: 43–52, 55–7, 83, 325–6, 351, 420–9, 433–9, 469–70, 581; 1891a: 167; 1899: 374–5).
A striking parallel between the perspectives of Moll and Freud is that both distinguished homosexuality from the other perversions. It was not a coincidence that Freud’s
Another consequential finding by Moll was that homosexuals did not fundamentally differ from heterosexuals in their sexual behaviour and feelings, including attraction and love towards a specific individual. He further suggested that both orientations were of the same kind by pointing out that other perversions occurred in a similar way among both groups. In this way, Moll highlighted the dichotomy of hetero- and homosexuality (with bisexuality in between) as the fundamental classification, with other perversions as subcategories (Moll, 1891a: 70–1, 90–2, 105, 122; Moll, 1898: 319–20, 496). Both Moll’s and Freud’s perspective reflected that the gender of one’s sexual partner was to become the organizing framework of modern sexuality, overshadowing taxonomies that started from the reproductive norm, and considered all aberrations from it in the same light. The focus on the sex of the sexual partner shifted the emphasis from the distinction between procreative and non-procreative sexual behaviour to that between relational and non-relational sexuality.
Moll’s judgement of homosexuality was just as ambivalent as Freud’s. They clearly upheld heterosexuality as the standard, but at the same time they seemed to acknowledge that relational object-choice and the associated values (intimacy, equality, empathy) were within reach of homosexuals and that, in this respect, the two orientations were equivalent. In contrast, other perversions (fetishism, masochism, sadism, voyeurism, exhibitionism and paedophilia) were considered as more objectionable. They were felt to be at odds with the requirements of consensual relational sexuality, not only because they mostly sidestep coitus, but even more because of the frequent involvement of non-consensual and unequal partners, unusual locations (outside the private bedroom), promiscuity and their partial focus on particular acts, objects and scenarios. Prioritizing the gender of the sexual partner, the hetero-homosexual dichotomy has led to a side-lining and obscuring of other motives and aims of sexual desire.
Against the background of the new relational norm, the evaluation of masturbation by Moll and Freud was also similar. They distanced themselves from the medical association of masturbation with serious mental and physical disorders, but both authors thought that a lasting, solitary fixation on sexual fantasy was far from harmless because it signalled a denial of relational sexuality. Like perversions, it had to be countered through the stimulation of healthy heterosexuality, the more so because their assumptions about the importance of psychosexual developmental in early life for the shaping of sexual orientation suggest that heterosexuality is not given by nature (Freud, 1898: 71–2; Moll, 1891a: 170–1; 1908: 83, 162–70, 174–7, 240–3, 259).
Moll further prefigured Freud’s approach by taking a nuanced stance in the ongoing discussion about the inborn versus acquired nature of perversion. It was difficult, he argued, to distinguish between these causal influences. He was sceptical about any biological and anatomical explanation that locates the sexual drive in some part of the body (the brain, nervous system, gonads or ovaries) or chemical process such as hormonal secretion. Fundamental inborn needs and impulses of the human body originating in evolution are no more than indefinite and unshaped preconditions, or, as Moll phrased it, certain ‘reaction-capacities’ and ‘reaction-modes’ (Moll, 1897–98: 474, 477, 491, 672; see also Moll, 1898: 53, 83, 88–93, 100, 128, 132, 155–9, 192, 214–16, 306–9, 375–6, 406–7, 471–82, 484, 497, 505–11, 581). The specific materialization of biological potentials hinges on external sensual stimuli, life experiences, patterns of behaviour, individual character, motivations, associations and memory traces, emotional attachments, as well as the broader influence of culture and history. Sexuality is neither completely determined by inborn nature nor entirely shaped by psychic processes and environmental influences, but is the result of the multifarious interaction of these factors. The most reliable indicators for the determination of sexual orientation are not the body and outward behaviour as such, but subjective inner life, in particular dreams and fantasies (Moll, 1898: 53, 83, 398–9, 574, 592–3, 619–25, 676–7, 692, 820).
Moll stressed that the psychic dimension of the libido enables its embedding in intimate relations. The Latin term
Freud’s
Freud’s explanation of the transformation of the polymorphous perverse libido into a clear-cut gender identity and sexual orientation culminating in coital heterosexuality is guided by a normative teleological logic, which was strengthened when he elaborated the Oedipus complex. He invoked the ‘intention of nature’ to underline the primacy of the transition, claiming that the genitals of the child ‘are destined to great things in the future’ and that their ‘coming pre-eminence was secured’ by the infant’s masturbatory activities, the increase of genital pleasure between the age of 8 and puberty, and the apparently spontaneous complementing during puberty of the maturing sex organs and the emerging psychic ‘love function’ (Freud 1905: 42, 57, 69, 75). The very characteristic of perversion, according to Freud and also Moll, is the lack of integration of means and goals. It has got stuck on partial and preparatory forms of lust, which have not developed beyond undirected infantile leanings and have become fixated ends in themselves, thereby abandoning closure in the blessing of coital orgasm (Freud, 1905: 12, 16, 21; Moll, 1897–98: 283).
Space restrictions do not allow discussion of further similarities between Moll’s and Freud’s understanding of sexuality, such as their evaluation of the strained relation between nature and culture, the inevitability of sexual repression for the sake of the civilized order; and also their comparisons of individual development and human evolution, in particular regarding Freud’s explanation of ‘organic repression’ as the effect of an evolved aversion to base animalistic sensations (Moll, 1897–98: 135; see also Moll, 1898: 377–81; Freud, 1905: 20–1, 34). 19 For both experts, it was clear that frustration, anxiety and inner conflicts are inherent in human sexuality and that any lasting harmony was a chimera. Moll (1898: 587) believed that it was a ‘common sense fact of life that the love impulse brings more sorrow than pleasure’.
To what extent Freud plagiarized Moll’s book remains unclear. Some of the new ideas were more widely shared in sexual science, and it is difficult to establish who exactly influenced whom. Freud could have encountered them through different routes, apart from Moll’s works: in particular from Fliess and, like Moll, from the writings of Krafft-Ebing, with whom both Moll and Freud had been in touch (Moll, 1891b; 1924a: iii–iv; 1936: 143–5).
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All the same, against his better judgement, Freud grossly overstated the originality of his
Aftermath
Until the end of his life, Moll continued to criticize psychoanalysis for its dubious methods, feeble empirical underpinnings, biased interpretations of case histories, arbitrary definitions of sexuality, and run-away ‘pansexual’ projections and fantasies (Moll, 1912: 881–5; 1924b, 469–88; 1936: 53–4, 74). Psychoanalysis had provoked a sexualized preoccupation with the searching scrutiny of inner life, which did more harm than good. There was no proof that psychoanalysts had cured patients; most of them tended to experience a worsening of their complaints while paying substantial fees to their analysts. In his memoir, Moll claimed that he saved many of his own patients from being ‘sexually analysed’ in the Freudian mode and that psychoanalysis was a passing fashion, which would soon be regarded as irrelevant. This proved to be a miscalculation because by the 1930s Moll’s work had clearly been eclipsed by the rising impact of psychoanalysis.
Moll also mocked psychoanalysis by suggesting that the therapy was not much more than a series of tricks that could be learned without much effort. During the outbreak of World War I, the German Colonial Office asked him to train a layman for immediate medical duty in a few days. After finding out that the man had a lively imagination, Moll decided that the only expertise that could be taught quickly was psychoanalysis. Had not Freud himself claimed that a medical education was hardly necessary for becoming an analyst? Moll explained to his trainee some major psychoanalytic terms such as ‘conversion’, ‘repression’ and the ‘subconscious’, and the sexual nature of dream symbols, which simply implied that all elongated objects referred to the penis and all openable objects to the vagina. His instruction was successful, Moll smirked: the man served his country loyally as a psychoanalyst (Moll, 1936: 192–3).
The animosity between Freud and Moll did not prevent the latter from inviting the former, in 1913, to join the Internationale Gesellschaft für Sexualforschung, in which Moll played a leading role (Jones, 1955: 104). This society was to serve as the rival organization of the Ärztliche Gesellschaft für Sexualwissenschaft und Eugenik, initiated earlier in that same year by, among others, Hirschfeld. According to Moll and his associates, the latter organization was motivated by leftist and populist politics and dominated by a one-sided biomedical approach, whereas their society was the truly scientific and politically neutral one and also provided scope for a cultural perspective on sexuality (Marcuse, 1914). Apparently, Freud and Abraham were eager to introduce psychoanalysis in both organizations in order to bring it to the attention of medical circles (Abraham and Freud, 1965: 67, 108, 149). During the first meeting of the International Society, however, Freud’s view of infantile sexuality and its role in the aetiology of neuroses was disparaged (Marcuse, 1914: 294–5). Accordingly, Freud declined Moll’s invitation (Jones, 1955: 104), and the same happened in 1926 when Freud and Jones were invited to take a seat on the international committee of the International Conference on Sexological Research that Moll, supported by the German government, organized in Berlin (Moll, 1926; 1936: 228–34). The upcoming event was widely covered in newspapers, and at a press conference Moll once more antagonized Freud, according to Jones (1957: 127), because he used ‘abusive language’ about psychoanalysis.
In the 1920s Moll began to suffer from chronic health problems – another parallel with Freud, who was diagnosed with cancer of his jawbone in 1923 – and he became increasingly embittered (Moll, 1936: 281; see also Goerke, 1965: 239). Moll’s friend Max Dessoir noticed that, under the influence of his ailments and consumption of morphine, he had become ‘downright malicious’. ‘Dealing with him was difficult . . . The lightest dissent made him erupt and talk over the opponent ruthlessly . . . he frightened and tantalized people whose sore points he knew’ (Dessoir, 1947: 128–9). Moll showed his worst side in particular in his feud with Hirschfeld, his main rival with regard to leadership in German sexology. He again and again degraded the work and activities of Hirschfeld, accusing him of misusing science for harmful homosexual agitation and propaganda. Moll’s hinting at Hirschfeld’s ‘problematic nature’ (meaning his homosexuality), on which Moll claimed to ‘have a lot of material’ that he would not publish unless forced to do so, makes it clear that Moll’s treatment of Hirschfeld was even worse than what Freud did to Moll (Moll, 1927: 321–5). In 1934, when Hirschfeld, after a world tour and afraid to return to his home country under Nazi rule, was trying to continue his work in France, Moll completed the character assassination. In a letter he sent to the Dean of the Medical Faculty in Paris, with a copy to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he not only questioned Hirschfeld’s expertise, but also again tacitly brought up his homosexuality. Hirschfeld’s assertion that he could not return to Germany because of his Jewish background and social-democratic affiliations was, according to Moll, a cover-up for the true reason for his exile: his ‘misconduct in a totally different direction’ (Sigusch, 1995; 2008: 197–200, 218–33).
Whereas Freud took refuge in Britain after the German occupation of Austria in 1938, Moll decided to stay in Berlin. Since World War I, his political orientation had shifted from progressive and international leanings to more conservative nationalism, which may explain his naïvety about his fate as a Jew in the Third Reich. Despite his efforts to keep in with the Nazis, as nationalist and homophobic statements in his autobiography suggest, his medical license was withdrawn (Moll, 1936: 65–6, 151–3, 196, 206, 210–28, 231; Winckelmann, 1996). Lonely, impoverished and largely forgotten by the outside world, he died in Berlin on 23 September 1939, on exactly the same day as his – by then world-famous – arch-enemy in London.
