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Abstract

This article explores the macro-origins of redistributive preferences across income groups. While traditional political economy models focus primarily on the role of inequality, our study broadens this perspective by integrating both economic conditions and the institutional context into the proposed explanatory framework. Using a novel time-series cross-sectional design, we examine trends in support for redistribution amongst different income groups across seven European democracies between 1980 and 2017. Our findings reveal distinct patterns of public responsiveness: lower-income groups increase their support for redistribution in response to rising inequality, whereas middle- and higher-income groups are more sensitive to governments’ ideological orientation. Additionally, we observe that economic downturns are associated with declining support for redistribution across all income groups. By uncovering these macro-level patterns and their theoretical implications, our study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the diverse dynamics that shape redistributive preferences in advanced democracies. These findings have important implications for the political sustainability of welfare states, as they illuminate how asymmetrical responses to economic and political conditions across income groups shape the prospects for solidarity and social cohesion in times of economic stress.

Keywords

inequality redistribution policy preferences responsiveness macro polity ECM codes: H10 structure and scope of government general P16 capitalist institutions welfare state

Introduction

Rising income inequality across advanced democracies has fueled public debate and scholarly inquiry into its political consequences (Atkinson, 2015; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Piketty, 2014, 2020; Stiglitz, 2012). A central question in this literature is whether growing inequality leads citizens –especially those at different income levels – to demand more redistribution. While classic models of political economy, such as those by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Bénabou (2000), predict that inequality shapes redistributive preferences through rational self-interest, the empirical record remains inconclusive and often contradictory (Breznau and Hommerich, 2019a).

Much of the existing research has tended to treat the public as a monolithic actor or focused disproportionately on average effects. As a result, we still know relatively little about how different income groups respond to changing inequality, economic conditions, and political environments. Moreover, prevailing studies often isolate inequality from other relevant macro- and institutional factors, failing to account for the broader context in which redistributive preferences form.

In this article, we address these gaps by offering a comprehensive analysis of the macro-origins of redistributive preferences amongst lower-, middle-, and higher-income groups across seven European democracies from 1980 to 2017. Using a novel time-series cross-sectional dataset and a refined estimation strategy, we examine how economic inequality, economic conditions, government ideology, and welfare state design shape redistributive demands. Our approach not only distinguishes between short- and long-term effects, but also uncovers important patterns of heterogeneous public responsiveness that remain obscured in most aggregate analyses.

We find that lower-income groups increase their support for redistribution in response to rising inequality, while middle- and higher-income groups are more influenced by political and institutional cues. Economic downturns, in contrast, reduce support for redistribution across all income groups, suggesting that perceptions of fiscal constraint limit public demand for redistribution even amongst those who might benefit from it.

These findings have important implications for democratic representation and the political sustainability of welfare states. Asymmetric responsiveness to macro-level stimuli raises the possibility that economic inequality may translate into political inequality, challenging the ability of governments to simultaneously address the divergent demands of different income strata. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for designing redistributive policies that are not only effective, but also politically viable in an era of rising inequality and social fragmentation. In particular, the fact that lower-income groups are more responsive to inequality, while middle- and higher-income groups react more strongly to political signals and institutional cues, suggests that policy design and communication strategies must be carefully tailored to resonate with each constituency. Policy-makers must therefore consider both the substantive impact of redistributive policies and the narratives and institutional environments through which they are delivered if they are to sustain broad-based support for redistribution in increasingly polarised societies.

Inequality and the demand for redistribution

Distinguishable groups of citizens, or so-called sub-publics, have measurable, deliberative and meaningful opinions that are dynamic and react in an orderly manner to environmental stimuli (Erikson et al., 2002; Romero‐Vidal, 2020; Stimson, 1991). Considering the rising tide of inequality (Solt, 2020) and different waves of economic and financial hardship (Piketty and Saez, 2003), stimuli related to inequality and redistribution are exceedingly relevant. In typical Eastonian terms (1965), we subsequently wonder if and how inequality itself relates to the redistributive preferences of different income groups. Two competing and diverging schools of thought describe that relationship.

As part of a larger model, Meltzer and Richard (1981) – M&R from here on – posit that growing inequalities increase the overall demand for redistribution.¹ They argue that increasing levels of inequality imply a greater distance between the mean income and the income of the decisive voter (i.e. the median income), with the latter further below the former.² The lower the median income relative to the mean, the more the below-average income group is likely to benefit from the redistribution from rich to poor. Therefore, the more right-skewed the income distribution, the higher the level of desired redistribution by a majority of citizens.³ As a result, welfare policy is expected to “lean against the wind” in the sense that the greater the inequality, the greater the electoral support for government policies that redistribute from rich to poor (Moene and Wallerstein, 2003).

According to the M&R model, the effect of inequality on redistributive preferences is not homogeneous. Lower-income strata always benefit from more redistribution, so they consistently support more of it. Higher-income groups might remain ambivalent to state intervention, as they are less affected by increasing inequality. Therefore, it is the median-income citizens whose support would vary the most as a function of inequality. Their potential gains from redistribution increase when inequality rises because of the right-skewed income distribution in advanced democracies (i.e. the median voter income is below the mean). What remains elusive, however, is the extent to which this effect is related more strongly – or exclusively – to the median voter (middle-income voters).

Alternative approaches question that more inequality leads to a demand for more redistribution. Most notably, Bénabou (2000) suggests that popular support for redistribution actually decreases with inequality. When inequality is low, the welfare-enhancing benefits of redistribution will be broadly supported because large portions of the population benefit from them. As inequality increases, support for redistribution declines amongst the growing proportion of the population that stands to lose from it. Differently put, there is a systematic increase in support for redistribution when aggregate welfare enhancements are relatively large compared to income inequality, and thus support for redistribution decreases when inequality rises.

Bénabou’s model further posits that as inequality rises, lower-income citizens should maintain or increase their support for redistribution.⁴ Simultaneously, higher-income citizens increase their opposition to redistribution. The rich become less motivated to promote redistribution and basically go against their self-interest because they are less likely to continue to gain benefits from public welfare enhancement efforts. This suggests that the top tiers of the income distribution are the primary drivers of the relationship between inequality and the demand for redistribution. Bénabou also considers the possibility that support for redistribution might not stem from economic calculations but from other motivations, such as altruism or the fact that inequality generates social tensions and crime (Bénabou, 2000: p. 118).

An extensive, yet inconclusive empirical scholarship

In their foundational study, Kelly and Enns (2010) evaluate both models in the context of rising inequality in the USA. They find that rising inequality is associated with decreasing levels of support for redistribution in the long-term. At the same time, they find that the negative relationship between inequality growth and the demand for government intervention is comparable for the rich and the poor (Luttig, 2013). While much empirical scholarship about the USA tends to confirm Bénabou’s theorisation (Erikson et al., 2002; Kelly, 2009), such accounts often overlook (or remain speculative about) the responses of the middle class to inequality despite middle-class citizens better reflecting the preferences of the median voter on most issues (Gilens, 2012). While this might simply be due to the fact that the size and relevance of the middle class in the USA continues to decline (Foster and Wolfson, 2010), it remains nonetheless an unanswered question.

In contrast, cross-national research has produced more scattered results. Most studies provide some evidence for the M&R model, meaning that rising inequality triggers redistributive support (Andersen and Curtis, 2015; Kevins et al., 2018). Using individual-level data, Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) show that increases in income inequality are associated with increases in support for redistribution, both among higher and lower-income citizens. Kevins et al. (2018) find a positive effect particularly for median-income voters. Complementary studies show this positive association is not exclusive to middle-income groups but is also present across high- and low-income ones (Andersen and Curtis, 2015). Consistent with these findings, scholars studying the aggregate support for redistribution have also found a positive effect of inequality on redistributive support (Franko, 2016; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). Some studies suggest that income inequality only stimulates support for redistribution amongst the rich (Finseraas, 2009; Schmidt-Catran, 2016), possibly as a result of an increased fear of crime (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016). Much of the evidence highlighting the broader effect for higher-income cohorts remains cross-sectional and not longitudinal, however.

Other comparative studies find little empirical support for the M&R model and question its empirical utility altogether (e.g. Kenworthy and McCall, 2008). They posit that the demand for redistribution does not (necessarily) change as a function of inequality. Bowles and Gintis (2000) argue that voters support the welfare state because it conforms to deeply held norms of reciprocity and altruism. Lübker (2007) finds no overall support for the M&R model, which he attributes to the influence of social justice norms that vary greatly between groups of culturally similar countries. Gimpelson and Treisman (2018) highlight that perceived – not actual – inequality correlates with redistributive demands and triggers conflict between rich and poor. Others have shown that results are likely to vary across countries depending on differences in political culture, as well as the structure and normativity of inequality itself (Aalberg, 2003; Bassett et al., 1999; Breznau and Hommerich, 2019b; Kluegel 1995).

In sum, an extensive scholarship remains largely inconclusive about the actual relationship between inequality and the redistributive preferences of different income groups. This ambiguity certainly relates to the myriad of data sources, levels of analysis, methodological approaches, indicators, and country subsets that different studies use to examine this question. Most importantly, many existing accounts principally focus on inequality as an explanation, while overlooking complementary or rivalling dynamics underlying redistributive preferences. Our approach addresses some of these challenges.

Going beyond inequality: Alternative drivers of redistributive preferences

The models reviewed so far theorise that inequality comprehensively explains redistributive preferences. This assumption has two important shortcomings. First, theoretical models stand grand and overarching, but their empirical support remains conditional or inconsistent. Second, the models suffer from tunnel vision, as they fail to account for other dynamics that may explain redistributive preferences. After all, some of these alternative factors might explain the extensive empirical differences we observe in the literature. As part of our framework, we propose economic conditions and the institutional contest as two such dynamics.

The state of the economy

A classic scholarship relies on consumer choice theory to explain how economic conditions explain political behaviour (Fiorina, 1978). While citizens generally express a preference for increased rather than decreased redistribution, it can be argued that the derived utility diminishes as governmental redistributive policies are implemented. That is, a threshold may be met where the relative weight of the simple desire for “more” is lessened with respect to an individual’s decision-making processes. Durr (1993) argues – and finds – the same is true for the public as a whole. The public will be more willing to redistribute a country’s wealth and pursue alternative goals in times of (economic) security. Citizens become more favourable to government intervention because the corresponding (left-wing) policies typically include more spending and are, thus, more expensive. When the economy appears vulnerable and (economic) returns become scarcer, however, citizens are less favourable to government intervention (Romero-Vidal and Van Hauwaert, 2022). This perspective views a generous government as a luxury that becomes less affordable during economic hardship (Alt, 1979; Stevenson, 2001; Van Hauwaert and English, 2019; Van Hauwaert and Vegetti, 2025).

In contrast to this perspective, the so-called ‘governmental protection hypothesis’ posits the welfare state is a form of social insurance protecting citizens from adverse macro-economic conditions (Blekesaune, 2007; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995). It argues that economic hardship moves the public policy mood to the left (Erikson et al., 2002; Bartle et al., 2011), which – in turn – leads to increased support for redistributive policies (Dallinger, 2010; Jæger, 2013). During periods of economic insecurity and deprivation, citizens are (primarily) driven by their self-interest and public support for redistributive policies increases. This may be due to a higher number of individuals experiencing hardship or perceiving themselves as being at risk.

The literature is divided on which perspective is more prevalent and, to this day, findings remain inconsistent. This could be due to variations in macro-economic indicators used across different studies or the focus on aggregate-level dynamics without considering within-country heterogeneity. Yet, we know that lower-income groups care more about – and are, therefore, more responsive to – unemployment than inflation, and vice versa for higher-income cohorts (Erikson et al., 2002; Enns and Wlezien, 2011). With that in mind, we need to account for the possibility that citizens adapt their redistributive preferences in reaction to different economic factors depending on their own economic status.

The institutional context

A country’s welfare provisions are an important factor that can explain redistributive preferences. While all West European countries have a welfare state with its own distinct historical and organisational roots in place, there are quite some differences between regimes regarding their levels of decommodification, that is the degree to which social policies and programs protect individuals from market forces (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996). Welfare regimes encapsulate specific ideas that shape perspectives on market distribution valuation and the government’s redistributive responsibilities (Svallfors, 1997). Diverse regimes consist of unique cleavage groups with diverse social policy interests. These cleavage groups, in turn, advocate for differing socio-political ideals that can significantly impact public opinion.

While some scholars find limited or inconclusive evidence of a link between welfare regime and public opinion (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Jaeger, 2006; Svallfors, 1997, 2003), others find at least some support for the claim that institutional disparities translate into mass preferences (Jakobsen, 2011; Mehrtens III, 2004). This so-called ‘regime hypothesis’ argues that a more generous welfare regime increases the support for redistribution, and – by proxy – the welfare state. That is, welfare state regimes instigate support for their own underlying logic because they act as socialising forces that reproduce the demand for redistribution, thereby legitimising the regime.

While this might explain country-differences, most notably between liberal (e.g. Great Britain) and social democratic welfare states (e.g. Sweden), the welfare regime type leaves us with notable unexplained variance between citizen cohorts. After all, the principles underlying a welfare state regime and the corresponding decommodification do not necessary affect all societal cohorts equivalently, as they generate variation between social groups as a result of the different redistributive conflicts produced in each regime (Svallfors, 1997). Drawing from earlier arguments of social groups’ self-interest (De Benedictis-Kessner and Hankinson, 2019; Sears and Funk, 1991), this could indicate welfare state recipients (in our case, lower-income citizens) will be more supportive of redistribution.

While welfare regimes can explain, at least partially, the political-structural drivers behind redistributive preferences, it is crucial to also consider the signals conveyed by politicians and their positions in the realm of everyday politics. Political actors are often the most visible point of reference for citizens forming their opinions. This is particularly the case for more salient and politically visible issues (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Pacheco, 2013). Governmental positions and actual policy outputs both serve the role of such political signals. On the one hand, citizens form their redistributive preferences drawing from redistribution policies (e.g. welfare generosity) as a very direct and unmediated signpost, as per the thermostatic model (Wlezien, 1995; Van Hauwaert, 2023; Van Hauwaert et al., 2025). On the other hand, citizens also shape their opinions based on what incumbents do and say about redistribution while in power. We would therefore expect both policy output and partisan control of government to operate as heuristics for redistributive preference formation.

Estimating redistributive preference measures

We track the evolution of redistributive preferences by relying on a large number of survey items collected by the authors (Romero-Vidal and Van Hauwaert 2022). The selected items concern all questions with reference to the welfare state, social benefits, redistribution, taxation, the role of the state in reducing inequalities, the desired degree of government involvement and public spending in fields that directly enhance redistributive policies.⁵ From this broad selection, we identify those items with at least two observations throughout the time frame under analysis and calculate (weighted) distribution-related marginals.⁶ Some of these questions have been included only a few times, others more frequently, but none systematically.

Within each country, these item series are our starting point. We employ a dyadic ratios algorithm to group them and get a single aggregate measurement of the latent support for redistribution in each of the seven countries. This method uses the index of preferences of each iteration of a question as an indicator to estimate the latent support for redistributive policies. In other words, it combines the independent single-item series and estimates a combined redistributive preference measure for each country. For a more detailed account of the methodological foundations of the dyadic ratios algorithm, we refer to Section B in the Supplementary Materials (see also Stimson, 1991, 2018). The result is an aggregate measure that provides us with yearly estimates of redistributive preferences.

Our primary interest lies with the redistributive preferences of different income groups, however. More precisely, we want to compare low-, middle- and high-income groups, which we operationalise by the top (first), middle (third) and bottom (fifth) quintiles.⁷ Accordingly, we split our survey samples in quintiles, although the use of income scales instead of absolute values leads to deviations. Most commonly, the group with lower income represents a higher share of the sample than the top quintile. We correct these errors using a weight measure for each survey. We subsequently use the previously identified survey items and rely once again on the dyadic ratios algorithm to harmonise them. The result is a single redistributive measure for each income group in each country that accounts for an average of around 50.5% of the variance (Eigen estimate) across our series.

Figure 1 displays the redistributive preference series for low-, middle- and high-income groups in each country. Higher (lower) scores indicate a demand for more (less) redistribution. Since the absolute values of each measure are dependent on a country’s individual series, we standardise the measures using country-means.
Figure 1.
Standardised redistributive preferences, per income group and by country. Note: All measures have been standardised using cross-income group country-means. Higher values indicate more support for redistribution, while lower values indicate less support for redistribution.

Figure 1 indicates there is no clear homogeneous structure or trend of redistributive preferences across the included European democracies. Within each country, the movement of redistributive preferences is more cyclical than it is linear. This is in line with Stimson’s (1991) policy mood, which posits that periods of desire for limited redistribution follow periods where citizens want more redistribution, and vice versa. We also notice a sizeable degree of parallelism between the different income groups. With few exceptions, the higher-income groups demand less redistribution than their lower-income counterparts. This is fully in line with our expectations (Romero-Vidal, 2021).⁸

Explaining redistributive preferences: Independent variables

Most movement in Figure 1 appears to be cyclical, which suggests that citizens adjust their demands to changing political and economic contexts (Durr, 1993; Erikson et al., 2002). Previous scholarship clearly highlights that – different from redistributive preferences – income inequality is not a cyclical phenomenon. Instead, it has been consistently increasing, albeit to a limited extent, across most Western European countries.

In our study, we use Gini coefficients on both pre- and post-tax income from the ‘Standardized World Income Inequality Database’ (Solt, 2020). We employ the Gini coefficient on market income, focusing on income before taxes and transfers, because both the M&R and Bénabou models explicitly theorise that citizens respond to market inequality. This metric gauges income inequality without accounting for the impact of taxes and social spending prevalent in a country. However, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of citizens’ real-life experiences, we also replicate all models using disposable income measures. Unlike pre-tax Gini, disposable income accounts for what people have 'in pocket’ each month, making it a more accurate reflection of their practical economic reality. This approach ensures a nuanced exploration of social and economic inequality, considering the tangible experiences of individuals within society.⁹

We operationalise the economic environment by two separate indicators from the ‘OECD Statistics Database’, namely unemployment and inflation. They serve as short- and long-term indicators of economic hardship, respectively (Erikson et al., 2002; Kelly and Enns, 2010).¹⁰ We capture the size of the welfare state by using the ‘Combined Generosity Index’ from the ‘Comparative Welfare Entitlements Project’ (Scruggs, 2022).¹¹ Drawing from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original classification, we simultaneously include a regime dummy, distinguishing between the liberal (Great Britain), conservative-corporatist (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland) and social democratic (Norway, Sweden) welfare regimes. Finally, we also include an indicator of a country’s cabinet composition from the ‘Comparative Political data set’ (Armingeon et al., 2022).¹² Section D in the Supplementary Materials includes an overview of these variables as averages for the countries and time frame under consideration.

Modelling redistributive preferences: Examining public responsiveness

To highlight the interdependence between inequality and redistributive support, we first plot the correlations between our preference series and inequality for each separate income group in Figure 2. The density of observations across the y-axis shows that, on average, low-income citizens tend to display stronger redistributive preferences than the middle category, and that high-income citizens tend to be the less supportive of redistribution. Despite these differences in levels, the fitted lines suggest a common positive relationship between inequality and mass preferences: in contexts of higher inequality, the public tends to demand more redistribution, even if the trend is less apparent for the middle-income groups. These patterns are generally consistent with previous empirical studies showing that the public at large demands more support for redistribution when inequality rises (Andersen and Curtis, 2015; Franko, 2016; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). The positive correlation between redistributive preferences and inequality (pre-tax and post-tax, respectively) is larger for low-income groups (r = 0.23 and 0.20) than it is for middle- (r = 0.03 and −0.05) and high-income groups (r = 0.16 and 0.19). It is only significant at the 0.05 level for lower- and higher-income groups. Contrary to the M&R model, this indicates lower income groups are more closely intertwined with increasing inequality than the middle- and high-income groups.
Figure 2.
Correlation between redistributive preferences and inequality, by income group. Note: For comparative purposes, we standardise redistributive preferences based on their respective country-means. Each panel includes a linearly fitted line with 95% confidence intervals.

While this bivariate relation provides initial insights, it remains descriptive. We need a more rigorous test of our initial theoretical expectations that considers additional dynamics, the serial correlation of public opinion series and the clustering of observations in countries. We, therefore, design a set of multivariate regressions to estimate the effects of our independent variables on redistributive preferences. We use a cross-sectional error correction model (ECM) to do so. An ECM has the particular advantage that it can be used in case of non-stationary time-series because it imposes relatively few restrictions (De Boef and Keele, 2008)¹³. At the same time, it allows for the diagnosis of both short-term and long-term effects. The ECM equation takes the following form, ${∆ Y}_{j, t} = α_{j, 0} +_{α 1, j} Y_{j, t - 1} + β_{1, j} {∆ X}_{j, t} + β_{2, j} X_{j, t - 1} + ε_{j, t}$ where X represents each separate independent variable, t is time and j is country.

Responsiveness to market income

We begin the analysis in Table 1 with three models that illustrate the effects of market inequality on the redistributive preferences of the low-, middle- and high-income categories (columns 1 to 3). Columns 4 to 6 include additional indicators for economic conditions, welfare state regime and political context. It becomes clear from the different models that none of the additional factors substantively change the effects of inequality, and we therefore consider our findings reasonably robust.
Table 1.
Models of redistributive preferences (pre-tax inequality), by income group.

Δ Redistributive preferences

Low income Middle income High income Low income Middle income High income

(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)

Pre-tax inequality

Short-term effect 0.138 0.076 0.065 0.264 0.111 0.039

[0.154] [0.134] [0.170] [0.161] [0.136] [0.173]

Long-term effect 0.072* 0.034 0.037 0.060* 0.041^ 0.023

[0.025] [0.022] [0.027] [0.029] [0.024] [0.030]

Unemployment

Short-term effect --- --- --- −0.169* −0.120* −0.159*

--- --- --- [0.066] [0.055] [0.068]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.005 −0.013 −0.059^

--- --- --- [0.030] [0.026] [0.033]

Inflation

Short-term effect --- --- --- −0.010 0.028 −0.056

--- --- --- [0.043] [0.037] [0.047]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.004 0.046 0.012

--- --- --- [0.042] [0.036] [0.045]

Welfare state generosity

Short-term effect --- --- --- 0.129 −0.027 −0.085

--- --- --- [0.092] [0.077] [0.097]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.060^ −0.073* −0.098*

--- --- --- [0.031] [0.028] [0.036]

Left-wing government

Short-term effect --- --- --- 0.022 0.071 −0.023

--- --- --- [0.055] [0.047] [0.061]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.052 −0.076* −0.114*

--- --- --- [0.034] [0.029] [0.037]

Welfare state regime

Conservative-corporatist --- --- --- 0.884^ 1.248* 1.371*

--- --- --- [0.468] [0.429] [0.531]

Social democratic --- --- --- 1.377* 1.824* 1.782*

--- --- --- [0.566] [0.522] [0.637]

Error correction −0.606* −0.440* −0.484* −0.677* −0.554* −0.576*

[0.065] [0.060] [0.059] [0.066] [0.063] [0.064]

Long-run multiplier of pre-tax inequality 0.119 0.077 0.076 0.089 0.074 0.040

[0.453] [0.732] [0.729] [0.569] [0.633] [0.696]

Constant −3.249* −1.538 −2.200 −1.140 −0.195 1.461

[1.213] [1.038] [1.328] [1.917] [1.650] [2.112]

No. of observations 213 213 213 213 213 213

R-squared 0.298 0.210 0.249 0.361 0.306 0.331

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ^p < .10; p < .05; All models include country dummies. Reference category of welfare state regime variable is the liberal regime.

Our results present several noteworthy findings. The short-term effects of inequality on redistributive preferences are positively signed in all models, but do not reach statistical significance. Long-term effects of inequality primarily exist for the lower-income group, as the corresponding coefficient systematically reaches levels of traditional statistical significance both with and without additional controls.¹⁴ A one unit (percent) increase in the Gini coefficient at time t predicts an increase of about 0.06 in support for redistribution in time t+1 amongst the lower-income group. We can, therefore, calculate the change in support for redistribution within the full range of inequality available in our sample. Most notably, the difference between the least unequal country (Switzerland, average Gini = 40.21) and the most unequal country (Great Britain, average Gini = 51.35) can change redistributive preference with 0.67 points for the poor. At the same time, the increases in support for redistribution cumulate to about 0.09 (0.06/0.68) for the poor, as indicated by the long-run multiplier.¹⁵ The error correction parameters indicate that the public’s responsiveness to inequality (and the broader social environment) adjust at a rather rapid pace. More precisely, this parameter predicts that 68% of the long-run multiplier for inequality would appear in the redistributive preference series in year t+1, with 68% of the remaining effect in year t+2, and so on, until redistributive preferences have increased with a total of 9%. Such a rapid rate of error correction indicates that the redistributive preferences of lower-income groups will reflect about 90% of the total effect within only 2 years.

This result aligns with M&R and Bénabou, as they both argue that redistributive preferences of the poor will increase with inequality. Yet, the lack of evidence of any significant responsiveness amongst the middle- and higher-income groups, even when accounting for alternative dynamics, contradicts the M&R and Bénabou models and some of the individual-level accounts that claim the rich are more responsive to inequality than the poor or the middle-class (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016).¹⁶ Moreover, it suggests there is differentiated responsiveness between the income groups, as the poor are the sole income group consistently increasing their support for redistribution when inequality increases.

Responsiveness to disposable income

As we highlighted earlier, however, it is quite possible that citizens respond to post-tax transfer inequality, as this represents a more pragmatic and real-life indication of what equality feels like for citizens. This is most notably the case in our selection of countries, where – despite differences in welfare state regimes and generosity – the overall redistributive function of the state is prominent, prevalent and visible. With that in mind, Table 2 replicates the same models from Table 1, but using the inequality measure that draws from disponible income.
Table 2.
Models of redistributive preferences (post-tax inequality), by income group.

Δ Redistributive preferences

Low income Middle income High income Low income Middle income High income

(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)

Post-tax inequality

Short-term effect 0.285 0.258^ 0.256 0.357^ 0.263^ 0.294

[0.180] [0.155] [0.198] [0.185] [0.154] [0.199]

Long-term effect 0.125 0.071* 0.089* 0.078 0.070 0.055

[0.042] [0.036] [0.045] [0.052] [0.043] [0.054]

Unemployment

Short-term effect --- --- --- −0.153* −0.109* −0.168*

--- --- --- [0.065] [0.052] [0.068]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.003 −0.013 −0.062^

--- --- --- [0.031] [0.027] [0.034]

Inflation

Short-term effect --- --- --- −0.019 0.027 −0.064

--- --- --- [0.043] [0.036] [0.047]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.008 0.043 0.009

--- --- --- [0.041] [0.035] [0.044]

Welfare state generosity

Short-term effect --- --- --- 0.147 −0.013 −0.067

--- --- --- [0.093] [0.077] [0.098]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.058^ −0.068* −0.092*

--- --- --- [0.032] [0.029] [0.037]

Left-wing government

Short-term effect --- --- --- 0.025 0.077 −0.014

--- --- --- [0.055] [0.047] [0.061]

Long-term effect --- --- --- −0.052 −0.076* −0.114*

--- --- --- [0.034] [0.029] [0.037]

Welfare state regime

Conservative-corporatist --- --- --- 0.924^ 1.320* 1.452*

--- --- --- [0.475] [0.433] [0.533]

Social democratic --- --- --- 1.751* 2.171* 2.048*

--- --- --- [0.632] [0.574] [0.683]

Error correction −0.616* −0.451* −0.498* −0.676* −0.558* −0.583*

[0.066] [0.061] [0.060] [0.067] [0.064] [0.064]

Long-run multiplier of post-tax inequality 0.203 0.157 0.179 0.115 0.125 0.094

[1.551] [2.113] [2.458] [1.504] [1.616] [2.068]

Constant −3.348* −1.940 −3.002* −0.621 −0.455 0.700

[1.199] [1.024] [1.312] [2.221] [1.881] [2.403]

No. of observations 213 213 213 213 213 213

R-squared 0.301 0.220 0.259 0.359 0.311 0.338

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p < .10; *p < .05; All models include country dummies. Reference category of welfare state regime variable is the liberal regime.

Responsiveness beyond inequality: The economy and institutions

Drawing from both Tables 1 and 2, our take-aways remain the same: regardless of whether we include inequality measured based on market or disposable income, our observations about what citizens respond to remain the same. This sort of stability reassures us.

Examining the effects of economic variables, we find additional insights regarding the economic factors influencing redistributive preferences. We observe a countercyclical short-term effect of unemployment, indicating that as unemployment rates rise, citizens across different income levels become less supportive of redistribution. Conversely, we do not find evidence suggesting that any income group adjusts their redistributive preferences based on inflation.

The findings related to welfare policies reveal an interesting pattern. First, we observe that as decommodification levels increase, as indicated by our regime variable, redistributive preferences generally respond accordingly. In contrast to the liberal British system, citizens residing in conservative-corporatist welfare regimes show a greater degree of support for redistribution, while those in social democratic regimes display an even higher level of support. This suggests that, to a certain extent, different welfare regimes could contribute to the perpetuation of their respective underlying ideologies. However, within welfare regimes, we uncover a contrasting trend. When there are shifts in welfare generosity, triggering changes in the level of benefits and support provided by the welfare state, we observe backlash reactions from the public. Specifically, as the welfare state becomes more (less) generous, citizens tend to express less (more) support for redistribution.

This suggests the public’s preferences regarding welfare generosity are subject to adjustments. Notably, the influence of the welfare regime and welfare generosity on redistributive preferences are particularly pronounced within middle- and high-income categories, in contrast to the effect of inequality, which is stronger among lower-income citizens. Our findings reveal a nuanced dynamic where long-term structural patterns reinforce welfare regimes, while the public’s preferences counterbalance changes in welfare generosity.

Our models also indicate that middle- and higher-income citizens change their redistributive preferences based on who is in government. More specifically, they become more favourable towards redistribution when right-wing cabinets are in place. This is in line with some of the classic public opinion literature suggesting that socio-economic status and political sophistication might give affluent cohorts the tools to respond to certain aspects of the socio-political environment (Converse, 1964; Dalton, 2013; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Richer cohorts also tend to express higher levels of interest for and attention to politics, which renders them more able to interpret government signals accurately. By contrast, lower-income groups are less likely to take their own personal finances into account when deciding their political preferences (Duch and Sagarzazu, 2014), thereby suggesting that self-interest and economic priorities can also structure group opinions in distinct ways (Sears and Funk, 1991). Collectively, these findings provide crucial evidence that the societal cues influencing redistributive preferences vary among different income groups.

Discussion and conclusions

Using the rising tide of inequality across Western democracies as a backdrop, this study examined the macro-level origins of redistributive preferences, with a particular focus on how income groups may differ in their response to political and economic stimuli. While classic theoretical accounts like those by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Bénabou (2000) provide strong theoretical expectations about how inequality should shape preferences, most empirical research has remained fragmented and inconclusive. We bring theory and empirics together in a more encompassing manner by applying a comprehensive time-series cross-sectional design covering seven European democracies between 1980 and 2017. Our approach disaggregates support for redistribution by income group, distinguishes between short- and long-term responsiveness, and includes multiple macro-level drivers such as different measures of inequality, economic hardship, welfare generosity and political context.

Our findings reveal clear patterns of differentiated responsiveness. Lower-income groups tend to increase their support for redistribution in response to rising inequality, particularly when measured in terms of disposable income. This aligns with the core intuition of classic political economy models that suggest material self-interest shapes demand for redistribution. In contrast, middle- and higher-income groups are more sensitive to political cues and institutional factors, such as the ideology of the government and the generosity of the welfare state. These groups reduce their redistributive preferences when left-wing governments are in power or when welfare generosity increases, suggesting a potential concern with perceived policy overreach or sustainability. Notably, we also find that all income groups become less supportive of redistribution during economic downturns, indicating a shared perception of fiscal constraint or economic insecurity.

These results have important implications. Theoretically, they underscore the need to move beyond one-size-fits-all models of public opinion and redistribution. Citizens do not respond uniformly to macro-level conditions; their preferences are shaped by their relative position in the income distribution, their exposure to risk, and their interpretation of political and institutional signals. Our study also contributes methodologically by offering a new dataset of yearly redistributive preferences by income group, enabling future work to track opinion dynamics with greater granularity.

For policymakers, these findings highlight the challenges of building and maintaining coalitions in support of redistribution. The fact that income groups respond to different cues suggests that redistributive policies must be accompanied by targeted communication strategies that resonate with each group. Lower-income voters are more likely to mobilize in response to visible inequalities, while middle- and upper-income voters appear more concerned with governance, cost-efficiency, and long-term policy stability. Moreover, the observed decline in support for redistribution during times of economic hardship runs counter to the assumption that downturns naturally generate pro-welfare sentiment. This points to a need for greater attention to the perceived affordability and sustainability of redistribution, not just its fairness.

Ultimately, our findings raise a broader concern about the implications of differentiated responsiveness for democratic representation. If governments disproportionately attend to the preferences of certain income groups – especially those more politically attentive or influential – redistributive policy may become skewed, reinforcing the very inequalities it aims to correct. Understanding how public support for redistribution is shaped and under what conditions it can be sustained is thus essential for ensuring the long-term viability of welfare states and the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In this sense, our study contributes not only to academic debates but to the practical challenges of designing inclusive and politically feasible social policy in an era of economic and political polarization.

Future research can build on these findings in several directions. First, our sample of countries leaves room for expansion. Expanding the geographical scope to include countries with more pronounced inequality or different welfare legacies could test the generalizability of our results. Second, incorporating other socio-demographic dimensions, such as education or occupational class, the electoral and political system, the role of globalization and trade or the role of immigration would enrich our understanding of how redistributive preferences are formed and stratified across society. Finally, examining the degree to which governments translate group-specific preferences into actual policy would provide valuable insights into the functioning of democratic responsiveness in the welfare domain.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Going beyond inequality: The macro-level origins of redistributive preferences among income groups

Supplemental Material for Going beyond inequality: The macro-level origins of redistributive preferences among income groups by Xavier Romero-Vidal and Steven M Van Hauwaert in Journal of European Social Policy.

	Δ Redistributive preferences
Pre-tax inequality
Short-term effect	0.138	0.076	0.065	0.264	0.111	0.039
[0.154]	[0.134]	[0.170]	[0.161]	[0.136]	[0.173]
Long-term effect	0.072*	0.034	0.037	0.060*	0.041^	0.023
[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.024]	[0.030]
Unemployment
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.169*	−0.120*	−0.159*
---	---	---	[0.066]	[0.055]	[0.068]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.005	−0.013	−0.059^
---	---	---	[0.030]	[0.026]	[0.033]
Inflation
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.010	0.028	−0.056
---	---	---	[0.043]	[0.037]	[0.047]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.004	0.046	0.012
---	---	---	[0.042]	[0.036]	[0.045]
Welfare state generosity
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.129	−0.027	−0.085
---	---	---	[0.092]	[0.077]	[0.097]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.060^	−0.073*	−0.098*
---	---	---	[0.031]	[0.028]	[0.036]
Left-wing government
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.022	0.071	−0.023
---	---	---	[0.055]	[0.047]	[0.061]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.052	−0.076*	−0.114*
---	---	---	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.037]
Welfare state regime
Conservative-corporatist	---	---	---	0.884^	1.248*	1.371*
---	---	---	[0.468]	[0.429]	[0.531]
Social democratic	---	---	---	1.377*	1.824*	1.782*
---	---	---	[0.566]	[0.522]	[0.637]
Error correction	−0.606*	−0.440*	−0.484*	−0.677*	−0.554*	−0.576*
[0.065]	[0.060]	[0.059]	[0.066]	[0.063]	[0.064]
Long-run multiplier of pre-tax inequality	0.119	0.077	0.076	0.089	0.074	0.040
[0.453]	[0.732]	[0.729]	[0.569]	[0.633]	[0.696]
Constant	−3.249*	−1.538	−2.200	−1.140	−0.195	1.461
[1.213]	[1.038]	[1.328]	[1.917]	[1.650]	[2.112]
No. of observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
R-squared	0.298	0.210	0.249	0.361	0.306	0.331

	Δ Redistributive preferences
Post-tax inequality
Short-term effect	0.285	0.258^	0.256	0.357^	0.263^	0.294
[0.180]	[0.155]	[0.198]	[0.185]	[0.154]	[0.199]
Long-term effect	0.125*	0.071*	0.089*	0.078	0.070	0.055
[0.042]	[0.036]	[0.045]	[0.052]	[0.043]	[0.054]
Unemployment
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.153*	−0.109*	−0.168*
---	---	---	[0.065]	[0.052]	[0.068]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.003	−0.013	−0.062^
---	---	---	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.034]
Inflation
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.019	0.027	−0.064
---	---	---	[0.043]	[0.036]	[0.047]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.008	0.043	0.009
---	---	---	[0.041]	[0.035]	[0.044]
Welfare state generosity
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.147	−0.013	−0.067
---	---	---	[0.093]	[0.077]	[0.098]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.058^	−0.068*	−0.092*
---	---	---	[0.032]	[0.029]	[0.037]
Left-wing government
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.025	0.077	−0.014
---	---	---	[0.055]	[0.047]	[0.061]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.052	−0.076*	−0.114*
---	---	---	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.037]
Welfare state regime
Conservative-corporatist	---	---	---	0.924^	1.320*	1.452*
---	---	---	[0.475]	[0.433]	[0.533]
Social democratic	---	---	---	1.751*	2.171*	2.048*
---	---	---	[0.632]	[0.574]	[0.683]
Error correction	−0.616*	−0.451*	−0.498*	−0.676*	−0.558*	−0.583*
[0.066]	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.067]	[0.064]	[0.064]
Long-run multiplier of post-tax inequality	0.203	0.157	0.179	0.115	0.125	0.094
[1.551]	[2.113]	[2.458]	[1.504]	[1.616]	[2.068]
Constant	−3.348*	−1.940	−3.002*	−0.621	−0.455	0.700
[1.199]	[1.024]	[1.312]	[2.221]	[1.881]	[2.403]
No. of observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
R-squared	0.301	0.220	0.259	0.359	0.311	0.338

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

We would like to express our gratitude to John Bartle,Ryan Carlin,Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda,Juan J. Fernández,Tim Hellweg,Greg Love,Jonas Pontusson and Ari Ray for their valuable input on various versions of this manuscript (and its spin-offs). This paper was part of a research project we presented in the “Macro Opinion in Comparative Perspective” workshop at the 2018 ECPR Joint Sessions. We thank John Bartle and Tim Hellwig for bringing such a great group of scholars together,as well as all participants for their valuable feedback,comments,and suggestions. We also presented earlier versions of this paper at the 2019 ECPR Joint Sessions and the University of Geneva’s Unequal Democracies Seminar

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Xavier Romero-Vidal

Steven M Van Hauwaert

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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	Δ Redistributive preferences
	Low income	Middle income	High income	Low income	Middle income	High income
	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)
Pre-tax inequality
Short-term effect	0.138	0.076	0.065	0.264	0.111	0.039
Short-term effect	[0.154]	[0.134]	[0.170]	[0.161]	[0.136]	[0.173]
Long-term effect	0.072*	0.034	0.037	0.060*	0.041^	0.023
Long-term effect	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.024]	[0.030]
Unemployment
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.169*	−0.120*	−0.159*
Short-term effect	---	---	---	[0.066]	[0.055]	[0.068]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.005	−0.013	−0.059^
Long-term effect	---	---	---	[0.030]	[0.026]	[0.033]
Inflation
Short-term effect	---	---	---	−0.010	0.028	−0.056
Short-term effect	---	---	---	[0.043]	[0.037]	[0.047]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.004	0.046	0.012
Long-term effect	---	---	---	[0.042]	[0.036]	[0.045]
Welfare state generosity
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.129	−0.027	−0.085
Short-term effect	---	---	---	[0.092]	[0.077]	[0.097]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.060^	−0.073*	−0.098*
Long-term effect	---	---	---	[0.031]	[0.028]	[0.036]
Left-wing government
Short-term effect	---	---	---	0.022	0.071	−0.023
Short-term effect	---	---	---	[0.055]	[0.047]	[0.061]
Long-term effect	---	---	---	−0.052	−0.076*	−0.114*
Long-term effect	---	---	---	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.037]
Welfare state regime
Conservative-corporatist	---	---	---	0.884^	1.248*	1.371*
Conservative-corporatist	---	---	---	[0.468]	[0.429]	[0.531]
Social democratic	---	---	---	1.377*	1.824*	1.782*
Social democratic	---	---	---	[0.566]	[0.522]	[0.637]
Error correction	−0.606*	−0.440*	−0.484*	−0.677*	−0.554*	−0.576*
Error correction	[0.065]	[0.060]	[0.059]	[0.066]	[0.063]	[0.064]
Long-run multiplier of pre-tax inequality	0.119	0.077	0.076	0.089	0.074	0.040
Long-run multiplier of pre-tax inequality	[0.453]	[0.732]	[0.729]	[0.569]	[0.633]	[0.696]
Constant	−3.249*	−1.538	−2.200	−1.140	−0.195	1.461
Constant	[1.213]	[1.038]	[1.328]	[1.917]	[1.650]	[2.112]
No. of observations	213	213	213	213	213	213
R-squared	0.298	0.210	0.249	0.361	0.306	0.331