Transferring conflict-resources to an enemy is clearly irrational in a two-agent contest. But it might be possible (in equilibrium) in a network of contests. This article proves that ex-ante conflict resource transfers to a direct opponent can happen in equilibrium, when there is a network of contests. The article also proves the possibility of a portion of the transferred conflict resource getting employed against the transferer in equilibrium.
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