This article employs the case study method to explore the nature of political interference in rural water schemes through the perspectives of local politicians in eastern Nepal. Using thematic analysis and in-depth interviews with seven key respondents in Panchthar District, the article finds that most delays in rural water schemes are attributed to entrenched political undercurrents, which often result in project failure. This finding aligns with public choice theory, which posits that political interference is rooted in the vested interest of electoral gain rather than optimal and sustainable choices. The study further identifies the presence of the tragedy of the anti-commons in rural water schemes, contributing to further political impasse. However, despite their differences, politicians expressed concern about climate change, and hence the study suggests adopting a utilitarian approach in order to implement sustainable and climate-resilient water schemes.
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