Abstract
This study analyses firms’ labour demand when employers have at least some monopsony power. It is argued that without taking into account (quasi-)monopsonistic structures of the labour market, wrong predictions are made about the effects of minimum wages. Using switching fractional panel probit regressions with German establishment data, I find that slightly more than 80% of establishments exercise some degree of monopsony power in their demand for low-skilled workers. The outcome suggests that a 1% increase in payments for low-skilled workers would, in these firms, increase employment for this group by 1.12%, while firms without monopsony power reduce the number of low-skilled, by about 1.63% for the same increase in remuneration. The study can probably also be used to explain the limited employment effects of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany and thus leads to a better understanding of the labour market for low-skilled workers.
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