I situate the originality and the ambiguities of the target paper in the context of post-cognitivist cognitive science and in relation with some aspects of Charles Sanders Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism. I then focus on what the authors call « pre-reflective self-consciousness », highlighting some ambiguities of the characterizations they propose of this variety of consciousness. These ambiguities can become difficulties once one grants a crucial methodological role to this consciousness in the study of cognitive activities.
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