Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project, we measure the level of gerrymandering according to country expert surveys in Lower House elections in 54 democracies from the second half of 2012 until the first half of 2015. We show that majoritarian systems are more prone to gerrymandering than mixed-member and above all in Proportional Representation (PR) systems. When majoritarian systems are employed in large countries, gerrymandering is exacerbated. Per capita GDP and the age of electoral systems do not significantly affect gerrymandering.
AlesinaA (2003) The size of countries: does it matter?Journal of the European Economic Association1(2–3): 301–31.
2.
AlesinaASpolaoreE (2003) The Size of Countries. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
3.
BorisyukGJohnstonRThrasherM. (2008) Measuring bias: moving from two-party to three-party elections. Electoral Studies27: 245–256.
4.
BormannN-CGolderM (2013) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. Electoral Studies32: 360–369.
5.
ChenJRoddenJ (2013) Unintentional gerrymandering, political geography and electoral bias in legislature. Quarterly Journal of Political Science8: 239–269.
6.
CoakleyJ (2008) Electoral redistricting in Ireland. In: HandleyLGrofmanB (eds) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 155–172.
7.
CoxGW (1997) Making Votes Count, Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
CoxGWKatzJ (2002) Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander. The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9.
GelmanAKingG (1990) Estimating the electoral consequences of legislative redistricting. Journal of the American Statistical Association85: 274–282.
10.
GelmanAKingG (1994a) A unified method for evaluating electoral systems and redistricting plans. American Journal of Political Science38: 514–554.
11.
GelmanAKingG (1994b) Enhancing democracy through legislative redistricting. American Political Science Review88: 541–559.
12.
GrofmanBHandleyL (2008) Introduction. In: HandleyLGrofmanB (eds) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–8.
13.
GrofmanBSelbP (2009) A fully general index of political competition. Electoral Studies28: 291–296.
14.
HandleyL (2008) Delimiting electoral boundaries in post-conflict settings. In: HandleyLGrofmanB (eds) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 191–202.
15.
KingG (1990) Electoral responsiveness and partisan bias in multiparty democracies. Legislative Studies QuarterlyXV: 159–181.
16.
Martínez i ComaFvan HamC (2015) Can experts judge elections? Testing the validity of expert judgments for measuring election integrity. European Journal of Political Research54: 305–325.
17.
MonroeBLRoseAG (2002) Electoral systems and unimagined consequences. Partisan effects of districted proportional representation. American Journal of Political Science 46: 67–89.
18.
NorrisP (2013) Does the world agree about standards of electoral integrity? Evidence for the diffusion of global norms. Electoral Studies32: 576–588.
19.
NorrisP (2015) Why Elections Fail?New York: Cambridge University Press.
20.
PopescuMTokaG (2008) Districting and redistricting in Eastern and Central Europe, regulations and practices’, In: HandleyLGrofmanB (eds) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–264.
21.
SteenbergenMMarksG (2007) Evaluating expert judgments. European Journal of Political Research46: 347–366.
22.
TaageperaRShugartMS (1989) Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.
