This study uses empirical evidence from a nearly comprehensive set of electoral democracies that use single-member plurality systems or mixed electoral systems with single-member plurality components in order to establish empirically the impact of territorial patterns of electoral support upon vote-to-seat conversion. The analysis, employing individual parties as units of analysis and multiple linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors as its main methodological tool, confirms the hypothesis that single-member plurality rules give a representational bonus to parties with low levels of nationalization. This effect is contingent upon absolute and relative party size, so that very large parties, and particularly frontrunners in party competition, receive an advantage irrespective of their nationalization. Mixed electoral rules further facilitate their advantage, while the gains of very small parties tend to be enhanced by large assembly size. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of party system development under Duvergerian conditions.
Amorim NetoOCoxG (1997) Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. American Journal of Political Science41(1): 149–174.
2.
BenoitK (2001) District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties. European Journal of Political Research39(2): 203–224.
3.
BertrandMDufloEMullainathanS (2004) How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?Quarterly Journal of Economics119(1): 249–275.
4.
BlaisACartyRK (1987) The impact of electoral formulae on the creation of majority governments. Electoral Studies6(3): 209–218.
5.
BochslerD (2010) Measuring party nationalization: a new Gini-based indicator that corrects for the number of units. Electoral Studies29(1): 155–168.
6.
BormannN-CGolderM (2013) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. Electoral Studies32(2): 360–369.
7.
BrancatiD (2008) The origins and strength of regional parties. British Journal of Political Science38(1): 135–159.
8.
CaramaniD (2004) The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9.
ChenJRoddenJ (2013) Unintentional gerrymandering: political geography and electoral bias in legislatures. Quarterly Journal of Political Science8(3): 239–269.
10.
ChhibberPKollmanK (2004) The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
11.
ClarkWRGolderM (2006) Rehabilitating Duverger’s theory: testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws. Comparative Political Studies39(6): 679–708.
12.
CoxG (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the Worlds Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13.
CoxKESchoppaLJ (2002) Interaction effects in mixed-member electoral systems: theory and evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy. Comparative Political Studies35(9): 1027–1053.
14.
CurticeJSteedM (1982) Electoral choice and the production of government: the changing operation of the electoral system in the United Kingdom since 1955. British Journal of Political Science12(3): 249–298.
15.
DuvergerM (1954) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
16.
FarrellDM (2001) Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave.
GolosovGV (2010) The effective number of parties: a new approach. Party Politics16(2): 171–192.
19.
GolosovGV (2011) Party system classification: a methodological inquiry. Party Politics17(5): 539–560.
20.
GolosovGV (2014) Party system nationalization: the problems of measurement with an application to federal states. Party Politics. 22(3):278–288.
21.
GolosovGV (2016) Factors of party system nationalization. International Political Science Review37(2): 246–260.
22.
GudginGTaylorP (1979) Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organisation of Elections. London: Pion Limited.
23.
HarbersI (2010) Decentralization and the development of nationalized party systems in new democracies: evidence from Latin America. Comparative Political Studies43(5): 606–627.
24.
HeathAGlouharovaSHeathO (2005) India: two-party contests within a multiparty system. In: GallagherMMitchellP (eds) The Politics of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–156.
25.
HerronENishikawaM (2001) Contamination effects and the number of parties in mixed-superposition electoral systems. Electoral Studies20(1): 63–86.
26.
HickenAStollH (2011) Presidents and parties: how presidential elections shape coordination in legislative elections. Comparative Political Studies44(7): 854–883.
27.
JohnstonRJBallantyneJ (1977) Geography and the electoral system. Canadian Journal of Political Science10(4): 857–866.
28.
JonesMMainwaringS (2003) The nationalization of parties and party systems: an empirical measure and an application to the Americas. Party Politics9(2): 139–166.
29.
JonesBDZalányiLÉrdiP (2014) An integrated theory of budgetary politics and some empirical tests: the U.S. national budget, 1791–2010. American Journal of Political Science58(3): 561–578.
30.
KendallMStuartA (1950) The law of cubic proportions in election results. British Journal of Sociology1(3): 183–196.
31.
KimJOOhnMG (1992) A theory of minor-party persistence: election rules, social cleavage, and the number of political parties. Social Forces70(3): 575–599.
32.
LijphartA (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33.
LipsetSMRokkanS (1967) Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. In: LipsetSMRokkanS (eds) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, pp. 1–64.
34.
LublinD (2014) Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35.
MassicotteLBlaisA (1999) Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey. Electoral Studies18(3): 341–366.
36.
MeguidB (2008) Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37.
MorgensternSPolga-HecimovichJSiavelisPM (2014) Seven imperatives for improving the measurement of party nationalization with evidence from Chile. Electoral Studies33(1): 186–199.
38.
MorgensternSSwindleSCastagnolaA (2009) Party nationalization and institutions. Journal of Politics71(4): 1322–1341.
39.
MoserRGScheinerE (2004) Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis. Electoral Studies23(4): 575–599.
40.
NorrisP (2004) Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41.
OrdeshookPShvetsovaO (1994) Ethnic heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties. American Journal of Political Science38(1): 100–123.
42.
PowellG (1982) Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
43.
PowellGVanbergG (2000) Election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence: implications for two visions of democracy. British Journal of Political Science30(3): 383–411.
44.
RaeD (1967) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.
45.
RaknerLSvåsandL (2013) Competition and participation, but no democracy: the politics of elections in Africa’s feckless regimes. Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrifts Arkiv115(4): 365–384.
46.
RikerW (1982) The two-party system and Duverger’s law: an essay on the history of political science. American Political Science Review76(4): 753–766.
47.
SartoriG (1986) The influence of electoral systems: faulty laws or faulty method? In: GrofmanBLijphartA (eds) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 43–68.
48.
SchattschneiderEE (1942) Party Government. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
49.
ShugartMSWattenbergMP (2001) Mixed-member electoral systems: a definition and typology. In: ShugartMSWattenbergMP (eds) Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–24.
50.
SiaroffA (2000) Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945. New York: Garland.
51.
SingerMMStephensonLB (2009) The political context and Duverger’s theory: evidence at the district level. Electoral Studies28(3): 480–491.
52.
StokesDE (1967) Parties and the nationalization of electoral forces. In: ChambersWNBurnhamWD (eds) The American Party Systems: States of Political Development. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 182–202.
53.
TaageperaR (2001) Party size baselines imposed by institutional constraints: theory for simple electoral systems. Journal of Theoretical Politics13(4): 331–354.
54.
TaageperaRGrofmanB (2003) Mapping the indices of seats–votes disproportionality and inter-election volatility. Party Politics9(6): 659–677.
55.
TaageperaRRayJL (1977) A generalized index of concentration. Sociological Methods and Research5(3): 367–384.
56.
TaageperaRShugartM (1989) Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.
57.
TaylorPJJohnstonRJ (1979) Geography of Elections. London: Croom Helm.
58.
TaylorPJGudginGJohnstonRJ (1986) The geography of representation. In: GrofmanBLijphartA (eds) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 183–192.
59.
TheilH (1969) The desired political entropy. American Political Science Review63(2): 521–525.
60.
TufteE (1973) The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. American Political Science Review67(2): 540–554.
61.
VertzLLFrendreisJPGibsonJL (1987) Nationalization of the electorate in the United States. American Political Science Review81(2): 961–966.
62.
ZiegfeldATudorM (2015) How opposition parties sustain single-party dominance: Lessons from India. Party Politics. 23(3):262–273.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
