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Abstract

This article examines how far-right communities in alt-tech platforms depict and engage with the values of democracy. The study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the impact of far-right populism on democracy and the role of alt-tech social media as an enabling platform for such ideologies. Through applying the concept of polyarchal democracy as an analytical framework, the article conducts a case study of Australian alt-tech communities to explore discourses of democracy. The dataset comprises of text-centric social media posts from the Telegram and Gab platforms during the 2022 federal election period. The findings reveal that, overall, far-right populist discourses in alt-tech communities predominantly support the processes of democracy and uphold most (though not all) of its values. Understanding these discourses is crucial for safeguarding liberal democracy in a context of rising illiberalism.

Keywords

Alt-tech democracy democratic theory extremism far-right populism far-right political communication populism social media

Introduction

How do far-right communities depict, debate and engage with the values of democracy? Across the world today, democratic institutions are under siege from an array of challenges to their authority and legitimacy, and these are exacerbated by the digital revolution. Among the many contemporary challenges to liberal democratic states is the rise of far-right populism in online and offline settings. Far-right populism is widely maligned by political commentators for its apparent erosion of liberal democracy (Galston, 2018). Indeed Freedom House (2022) reports that ‘democracy is under attack by populist leaders and groups that reject pluralism and demand unchecked power’. In liberal democracies around the world, far-right populist leaders have risen to power, extreme-right parties have secured more public support, and online spaces for the articulation of far-right ideologies have expanded through the proliferation of ‘alt-tech’ social media platforms.

Alt-tech platforms, such as Gab, Minds, Telegram, and Parler present themselves expressly as alternatives—hence, alt-tech—to mainstream, dominant social media platforms such Facebook and Twitter.¹ Alt-tech social media platforms are not sui generis far-right platforms, yet they nonetheless frequently operate as hosts of such content due to low levels of content moderation, limited platform regulation and high levels of freedom (Donovan et al., 2019). Because of these characteristics, according to Dehghan and Nagappa (2022), illiberal content has flourished on alt-tech platforms. As such, they provide fertile research ground to find out more about how a range of ideological views—including far-right populism—are expressed outside of, and perhaps as a challenge to, mainstream political beliefs expressed in the public digital spheres of liberal democracy. This article conducts an analysis of far-right populist discourses about democracy from communities in alt-tech spaces to gauge how the ideas shared in such discourses might challenge liberal democracy.

The ideas and ideologies associated with far-right populism (FRP) do not ipso facto challenge liberal democracy. After all, some of the prevailing conceptualisations of democracy highlight the value of free political communication, the formation of groups and associations, and pluralistic ideas for a robust liberal democracy. The discussion of illiberal ideas in the online public sphere might therefore not be necessarily problematic for democracy, especially since such ideas might not gain wider traction beyond these spaces. Indeed, the scholarly literature reveals a complex debate about the relationship between democracy and far-right populism. For some, populism is sometimes deemed ‘good’ for democracy and, for others, it is considered ‘bad’ for it. The article seeks to engage in this debate by offering an interpretivist perspective to a largely positivist scholarly dialogue. The literature does not tend to treat democracy as an intersubjective idea, even while democracy exists as a set of ideas and values that are created and sustained by shared beliefs in its meaning, norms and values (Farrell and Schneier, 2018). It is therefore important to shed light on the ways in which the foundational principles and values of liberal democracy are understood and contested, and especially where new ‘boundless’ spaces of political discourse—whether in mainstream or alt-tech digital platforms—cohere transnational communities.

Practical manifestations of democracy, such as free and fair elections, representative legislatures and free expression, are only as good as the ideas that sustain them. Part of the potential threat to democracy comes not only from illiberal ideas that contradict the liberal component of ‘liberal democracy’, but stem from ideas that evoke disbelief and disregard for democracy as a constellation of ideas about fair and legitimate decision-making practices. Deep disregard for democracy can culminate in a lack of engagement in democratic decision-making, either through abstention or undemocratic means of articulating political preferences such as the use of violence. It is therefore vital to understand how far-right populists, who already promote ideals contrary to liberalism, understand democracy, and depict it to others. This article therefore seeks to find out what is said about democracy in alt-tech spaces that show far-right populist preferences to understand how articulated attitudes to democracy might challenge liberal democracy in its capacity as an ideology for political decision-making. Accordingly, this research feeds into the ongoing popular, academic and policy conversation around whether and how online FRP is harmful to democracy, and the role of alt-tech social media as an enabling discursive space for FRP.

The article unfolds in four parts. Part 1 outlines the relationship between democracy and populism to establish some basic conceptual precursors with respect to the relationship between FRP and democracy that provide the foundation for the investigation. Part 2 introduces the article’s analytical framework—Robert Dahl’s notion of polyarchal democracy. Part 3 describes the research methodology, setting out how and why certain empirical evidence was collected, along with summarising the choice of Australian alt-tech as the article’s case study. Part 4 discusses the empirical evidence—social media posts—through the prism of polyarchal democracy.

Far-right populism and democracy

Populism, the far-right and Australia

Conceptual ambiguity in common contemporary usage of the term ‘populism’ has led to a surge of scholarly research on the concept (Andreu and Simonelli, 2022; Barr, 2018; Fontana, 2018; Hawkins et al., 2018; Kaltwasser, 2018; Moffitt, 2020). Despite this, Mudde’s definition of populism from 2004 remains routinely cited and endorsed across the populism academic literature (Huber et al., 2017; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Mudde (2004) contends that ‘populism’ is an ‘ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of volonte generale (general will) of the people’. In this conceptualisation, populism is presented as an ideology: a framework of connecting beliefs and values that, like democracy, is first and foremost, an idea rather than an immutable objective part of ‘reality’. Mudde’s is a minimal baseline definition that describes the ‘shell’ ideology of populism without determining the content of the ‘host ideology’.

As the above suggests, populism seldom operates ‘unbundled’—to borrow Fontana’s (2018) terminology. Mudde’s minimal definition of populism signals that the bulk of the ideological content of ‘populism’ comes from the array of political ideologies attached to it. And among these ideologies, as Pelinka (2013) notes, ‘contemporary populism is very much a phenomenon of the Far Right’ (p. 8). Although common usage of the term often lacks specificity, the academic literature frequently refers to ‘far-right populism’, ‘right-wing populism’ and the ‘populist radical right’ (Jay et al., 2019; Krämer, 2017; Mudde, 2016; Wodak, 2019; Wodak et al., 2013). This ‘bundled’ form of populism tends to enshrine nativist, nationalist and traditionalist politics (far right values; Mudde, 2019), coupled with an apparent desire for more direct representation of ‘the people’s’ interests in government (populist values; Moffitt, 2020). Exclusion therefore infuses far-right and populist ideologies. Populism’s notion of a homogeneous, unified people necessarily excludes elites and other socio-political actors whose interests do not align with populists’ perceived majority (Moffitt, 2017b), and the far-right’s nativist proclivities exclude, or perhaps aim to exclude, on the basis of characteristics such as ethnicity, race, gender and religion. Liberal democracy, by contrast, is purported to aspire to inclusion through pluralism, political participation, and the rule of law (Dahl, 1998). Accordingly, there is ostensibly an inherent tension between ‘democracy’ (by which many commentators appear to mean liberal democracy) and ‘populism’ (by which many commentators appear to mean far-right populism).

In Australia, there is a growing yet still relatively small literature on FRP and its overlapping concept, right-wing extremism (RWE). The evolving body of Australian-focused literature includes studies of far-right groups to identify their key narratives (Campion, 2019; Dean et al., 2016), mapping exercises to determine the level of risk of online RWE in Australia (Agius et al., 2020; Macquarie University, 2020; Waldek, 2021; Waldek et al., 2020), projects that focus on particular platforms to improve knowledge of how the far right use digital services such as Gab and Facebook (Guerin et al., 2020, 2021), and research into how far right narratives are communicated online (Dowling, 2023; Droogan et al., 2022; Peucker and Fisher, 2023), as well as studies of online mobilisation (Hutchinson et al., 2021) and the offline/online nexus (Hutchinson et al., 2022). Some of this research indirectly speaks to the relationship between the far-right (FR) and democracy by emphasising the exclusionary propensities of the FR, describing the dynamics of populism in Australia, and analysing narratives of FRP parties and leaders (Hutchinson, 2021; McSwiney, 2020, 2023; Moffitt, 2017a; Sengul, 2019). Yet, this is an indirect contribution and emerges incidentally to the main focus of exclusion in the far-right. While some researchers draw connections to democracy, noting, for example, that RWE narratives ‘challenge the fundamentals of pluralist liberal democracy’, these have not yet engaged in unpacking the relationship between far-right populism and democracy explicitly (Ballsun-Stanton et al., 2021). Accordingly, there remains a theoretical and empirical gap in the Australian FR literature on the FRP/democracy debate, making Australia an ideal case study for exploring this area.

Contested concepts: the democracy, populism and far-right ideological nexus

Researching the relationship between populism, the far-right and democracy are problematised by the descriptive and normative ambiguities that frequently inhere to each concept.

Populism and democracy

A robust literature on the relationship between populism and democracy has elucidated these conceptual complexities that inform the populism versus democracy debate that persists in contemporary commentary (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Andreu and Simonelli, 2022; Bang and Marsh, 2018; Canovan, 1999; Dzur and Hendriks, 2018; Galston, 2018; Huber et al., 2017; Kyle and Mounk, 2018; Lemieux, 2021; Liddiard, 2019; Mansbridge and Macedo, 2019; Miller, 2018; Rummens, 2017). Scholars have drawn attention to variations in conceptualisations of both populism and democracy, pointing out that whether populism is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for democracy hinges crucially on what one means by both terms (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Andreu and Simonelli, 2022; Bang and Marsh, 2018; Canovan, 1999; Dzur and Hendriks, 2018; Rummens, 2017; Tormey, 2018). Therefore, despite its widespread portrayal in Anglophone discourse as a danger to democracy, the academic literature indicates that the relationship between populism and democracy is more complex than a simple binary (Moffitt, 2017b).

On one hand, theoretical and empirical research suggests that populism, especially FRP, can be detrimental for democracy because of its disregard for purported features of liberal democracy such as checks and balances on the exercise of political power, contestation of ideas, the rule of law, and pluralism (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Batory, 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Plattner, 2010; Spittler, 2018). Since populism encapsulates a power struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘corrupt elites’, it generates a homogenisation of the idea of a unitary ‘people’ with the same interests which is at odds with pluralism. Indeed, disrespect for minority interests is central, at least for FRP, and can contribute to what Spittler (2018) describes as ‘poisoning the social climate’ (p. 102). Scholars note that while some form of democracy remains in the form of elections, populists ‘hollow out democratic structures’ and challenge the ‘practise’ of democracy (Daly and Jones, 2020: 526). By looking more closely at how FRPs discuss democracy, this article therefore contributes to understanding the subjectivity that pervades democracy as a social structure and informs the ‘practise of democracy’.

However, some scholars have indicated that populism can augment the quality of democracy. The literature shows that populism can increase representation of non-mainstream political preferences, repoliticise ‘post-political’ societies, expose elite corruption, and increase political participation (Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005; Moffitt, 2017b; Mouffe, 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). In this respect, populism has the apparent capacity to increase pluralism by facilitating more diverse and active contestation of ideas. Based on some well-cited conceptualisations of democracy, such practices are key for an ideal liberal democracy (Dahl, 1998; Shapiro, 2009). Indeed, as Moffitt (2017b) points out, populism can ‘include previously excluded or disenfranchised identities within its conception of “the people”’ (p. 142). This is an important finding when considering the threat potential of populist ideologies because if FRPs at least feel represented, perhaps they are less likely to resort to extra-democratic means of interest articulation, that is, political violence.

Whether or not populism is beneficial or detrimental for democracy though, largely stems from what form of populism is enacted and how that too is conceptualised. In the case of FRP, as noted earlier, an inherently exclusionary ideology (FR) is paired with another ideology that can exclude, thus potentially cancelling out populism’s potential to include. Empirical findings support this theorising, revealing a negative correlation between right-wing populism and minority rights, but a positive correlation between left-wing populism and minority rights (Huber and Schimpf, 2017). This reflects a rudimentary tension between liberalism and democracy.

This tension is largely responsible for the ambiguity in the question of the effect of populism on democracy. Liberalism enshrines normative components like the rule of law, pluralism, and individual rights and freedoms, and democracy emphasises participation and majoritarian rule (Mouffe, 2000). The idea of liberal democracy as a combined whole represents an ongoing struggle to balance homogeneity and heterogeneity of a populations’ interests. As eminent democracy theorist Robert Dahl (1998) observes, ‘“democracy” has meant different things to different people at different times and places’ (p. 3). Different interpretations of democracy, including what democracy should be, are captured by a host of concepts of ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997): liberal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, electoral democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, constitutional democracy, sovereign democracy and so forth (see, for example, Dryzek, 2004; Pateman, 2012; Shapiro, 2009).

Yet, despite different the features and characteristics that make democracy democracy, all conceptualisations of democracy accept that citizens’ political participation and deliberation are required. While there is debate within democratic theory about the ideal processes of participation and the extent of participation needed for a robust democracy (see, for example, Pateman, 2012; Dryzek, 2004), any form of democracy needs some degree of citizen participation in political life. Indeed, as Parkinson and Mansbridge (2012: 1) explain, there is ‘growing agreement among political theorists’ that ‘the legitimacy of a democracy depends in part on the quality of deliberation that informs citizens and their representatives’. Deliberation, as a form of participation, is thus not only required for equality, enlightened understanding, or to influence the agenda, but fundamentally underpins the legitimacy of policy outputs and government.

Therefore, while this article develops and applies Dahl’s typology of democracy—polyarchal democracy (described by Tilly (2007) as ‘process-oriented’)—the data procured for the study is based around discussions about participatory processes as a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach to democracy.

Conceptualising far-right ideologies

How do we meaningfully identify and conceptualise political discourses? The ‘left-right’ spectrum is traditionally deployed to characterise ‘politico-philosophical positions on diverse issues that are relevant to a given society in a certain period of time’ (Gindler, 2021: 241). While structured as a dyad, it is nonetheless a spectrum which allows for categorisation of non-binary political views. The spectrum is not, of course, necessarily ‘real’—rather, it is a representation of ‘reality’, a construct which serves as a valuable tool or framework for categorising values, attitudes and beliefs to analyse the broad ideologies (Bobbio, 1996). Taking a ‘dyadic’ approach to understanding ideological positioning is a deliberately parsimonious one that allows us to identify the aggregate underlying ideological commitments of political discourses, without making specific, pinpoint ‘label’ claims for the multiple specific movements, organisations or ideological frameworks.

Indeed, a dyadic approach is particularly important when considering the beliefs grouped around, and attributed to, the ‘far-right’. This is a broad umbrella term that encompasses views that are rejected by mainstream conservative politics, and are sometimes described as the radical or the extreme right. Scholars agree that the heterogeneity of the ‘far-right’ term makes reaching a concrete universal definition difficult (Carter, 2018: 157; Dean et al., 2016), since it is ‘nebulous’, ‘amorphous’, ‘not monolithic’ and ‘heterogeneous’ (Baele et al., 2020; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Campion, 2019; Dean et al., 2016; Hawley, 2018; Hutchinson, 2019).

The general differences between left and right ideologies are apparent on wealth (re)distribution, private property and individual freedoms. Bobbio (1996) points out that the core distinction that these differences arise from concerns attitudes to equality: while the far-left regards inequality between people as negative and structurally imposed, the far-right views inequality as natural and desirable. Stemming from these attitudes is a difference in understandings of the role of the state. For the far-left, an interventionist state is required to guarantee equality, whereas for the far right, the role of the state is to defend inherent inequalities and refrain from intervention (Bobbio, 1996; Mudde, 2017). The ideological position on equality is clearly central to the notion of the left-right political spectrum.

Although this article focuses on FR as a ‘catch-all’ top-level category, it is important to point out that the academic literature on the FR theorises the relationship between different ‘levels’ of ‘right’ and democracy differently. For example, unlike the extreme right, radical right ideology (at least, as understood in the literature) tends to endorse some form of democracy—exactly what form that democracy should take varies among individuals. While adherents may seek to reform democracy, radical right ideology (to the extent that it is homogeneous) does not see it as beneficial to dispense with democracy entirely. As Mudde (2017) describes it, ‘the term radical right is best used for right-wing ideologies that accept democracy, i.e. popular sovereignty and majority rule, but oppose fundamental values of liberal democracy, notably minority rights and pluralism’. This correlates with notions of the broader category of the ‘far-right’ opposing universal equality. Democracy thus appears as a central point of distinction in scholarly conceptualisation of the far-right spectrum.

Analytical framework

Despite the lack of a universally accepted conceptualisation of democracy, some democratic theorists’ articulations of democracy are widely endorsed in the scholarly community (though, often not without critique) and provide a baseline of what, at a minimum, ideally constitutes a democracy. This is fortunate, since, to assess the ways in which FRP ideas about democracy might challenge liberal democracy, a baseline of what constitutes liberal democracy (at least for this exercise) is required. Robert Dahl’s conception of polyarchal democracy is widely adopted (though, of course, not uncritiqued entirely) in the political sciences as it presents an analytical framework for democracy that accommodates intersubjectivity that inheres to its ideological premise. Dahl’s democratic theorising hinges on the notion that democracy is created and sustained through processes. On this logic, the quality of democracy is not fixed, but rather it fluctuates depending on the way the processes are functioning. Importantly, processes are ongoing which means that democracy is always liable to erosion, but likewise has scope to be improved. For Dahl, the processes are contingent upon institutions, which he frames as enduring practices. He posits (Dahl, 1998: 84) that there are six main institutions that large-scale democracy requires the following:

Elected officials

Free, fair and frequent elections

Freedom of expression

Alternative sources of information

Associational autonomy

Inclusive citizenship

Dahl (1998) argues that these are the ‘minimal requirements for a democratic country’ (p. 84) because they enable, facilitate and generate invaluable qualities of democracy including effective participation, control of the agenda, voting equality, enlightened understanding and full inclusion. It thus provides a solid basis for what liberal democracy is, and therefore for assessing potential challenges to it.

Data collection

This article conducts a case study of Australian alt-tech communities to explore alt-tech users’ discussions of democracy, and improve understanding of online discourses of democracy in Australian alt-tech communities to ascertain how users see democracy, and shed light on their preferred avenues of instigating political change. In essence, this article seeks to ascertain how ‘far off the reservation’ these communities are—do they still buy into the democratic system and are they willing to work within it, or do they show a predilection for bypassing democratic methods of political participation? The concerns aired by the Australian government are shared internationally by other liberal democracies (see, for example, ISCP, 2022: 2), and thus while research parsimony necessitates an initial single case study, the research has prima facie relevance beyond the Australian context. This is particularly the case given the transnational spread of illiberal ideologies (Caiani and Kröll, 2015).

Selecting the relevant discourses of democracy among far-right communities presents multiple methodological challenges. Fore mostly, the risk of tautology in any sample or case based on ideological identifiers is high because the research operates and selects on pre-existing inclusion criteria—that is, we engage empirically with the views of far-right communities because of the ‘far-rightness’. I have deliberately selected on the dependent variable—and so on this basis we cannot learn anything about the broader population. However, my aim is not to extrapolate causality, but to investigate and explore, and so while we will not make generalisable claims from the case about the broader population (i.e. far-right communities not included in this case study), I can make claims about what is present in these specific cases. The date taken from case study used here—outlined below—was (1) likely produced within the same socio-political context (case selection), (2) originated in ostensible FRP communities (data selection) and (3) were practically and ethically accessible (data collection).

Data collection

The dataset is made up of approximately 46,000 text-centric social media posts from across the platforms Telegram and Gab,² with a mean word-length of 44 words per post. These posts were downloaded and manually coded by the author into an NVivo database over 12 months, and included only posts that were published between July 2021 and July 2022. This period coincided with the 2022 Australian federal election which generated a concentration of political discussion. Two streams of the primary dataset were created and maintained to enable comparison throughout the analysis: stream 1 constituted by primarily far-right populist communities, and stream 2 constituted by largely far-right extremist communities.

The Telegram and Gab platforms were selected because first, they are the most popular alt-tech platforms in Australia; second, they are based on text-based communication methods; and third, they host communities that focus on news, current events and politics.³ Table 1 shows the five most-used alt-tech platforms in Australia and provides a breakdown of the most popular public chats and groups based on the number of subscribers and members the group had on the date of data collection. As Table 1 shows, Telegram, Gab and Discord host communities with the largest number of subscribers on a text-based platform. While BitChute has more subscribers than most of Gab’s groups, it is a video-based service and many of the videos only offer one user’s views and restrict channel subscriber comments. This means that the content is less likely to capture a large range of users’ views about democracy compared to a text-based discussion platform.

Table 1.

Australian alt-tech social media communities (number of users in parentheses).

Telegram	Gab	Minds	BitChute	Discord
Reignite Democracy Australia (58,603)	Australia (73.8k)	Australia (597)	Australia One Party (6565)	AussieAntics (46,164)
AussieCossack (50,522)	Trucker Appreciation & News (1.9k)	Minds Australia (259)	Australian_Conservative (3901)	Australia Social Gaming (8966)
Australia One Party (44,218; no discussion)	Australia—Southern Land News (1.8k)	Australian Free Thinkers (120)	Sky News Australia (2121)	Australian Army (7704)
Buy Steroids in Australia (33, 547; (not news-related)	Australian gab plus the United States (978)	Australia (81)	Wake up Australia (1529)	Drop Bears (7180)
Australia for Freedom (25,793)	Australian Constitutional Crisis (818)	Anonymous Australia (78)	Deus Vult Traditionalist Australia (1299)	OzzyGaming (6295)

These platforms are, by their technology and design, resistant to sampling. It is difficult to reliably ascertain demographic data and geographic data due to platform design, ethos and user privacy settings and virtual private network use. While this study therefore does not conduct a representative study, as outlined earlier, it does seek to explore and describe their political discourses specifically as they relate to democracy. The communities drawn from for the dataset include the top news-related communities: Reignite Democracy Australia (Telegram), AussieCossack (Telegram) and Australia (Gab).

Stream 1 (the far-right populist sample) consists of posts that were collected from the most popular Australian communities (chats and groups) based on subscriber numbers that (1) permitted comments and discussion and (2) focussed primarily on news and politics. Stream 2 (the far-right extremist ‘FRE’ sample) consists of posts from the Nationalist Socialist Network—one of the most prominent Australian ‘extremist’ online communities (McKenzie and Tozer, 2021). An FRE sample is included for three reasons. One, to account for heterogeneity in the FR spectrum (not all communities that can be described as FR share the same idea or to the same intensity), two, to ascertain ways in which more politically fringe actors discuss democracy, and three, to see if there are significant differences in attitudes to democracy within the broader FR community.

Far-right populist challenges to democracy

In this section, the article considers the findings through the lens of Dahl’s theory of polyarchal democracy. Here, discourses of democracy are assessed alongside Dahl’s criteria for democracy. The purpose of this is to gauge how problematic these communities’ perspectives on democracy are for liberal democracy as an intersubjectively sustained practice.

It is generally communicated in the literature that liberal democracy consists of several modes of public participation in politics, and thus analysis of content about protests, petitions and correspondence with political officials widens the scope of discourse of democracy (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Pateman, 2012). Posts that mention these practices were identified through an NVivo search query of the entirety of the sample posts. Posts were categorised into type of participation (voting, protesting, etc.) as well as sorted into a category that discussed democracy directly. From here, posts were coded into the following categories, and a summary of the data is presented in Table 2:

Values and processes accepted: dissatisfied with outcomes of democracy, but support democratic values and processes of decision-making. The legitimacy of the system is not in doubt.

Values accepted, but processes not accepted: agree with values, but claim that the current system fails to deliver those values and decision-making processes should be reformed to align better with values. The legitimacy of the system is questioned.

Values and processes not accepted: disagree with values and processes of democracy. Advocate for undemocratic processes. The legitimacy of the system is rejected.

Table 2.

Discourses of democracy.

Articulated attitude	Dominant narratives	Example posts
Values and processes accepted	● Lack of good party options.● City people are to blame for voting in the government.● Vote independent.● Protesting, petitioning, and writing letters to government officials can help change the system.● Peaceful protest is effective and worthwhile.	● Vote for independents and minor parties.● Get educated about preferential voting!● Sign this petition against mandatory vaccination!● Rally for freedom on Saturday!● Write a submission against white discrimination.
Values accepted, processes not accepted	● Preferential voting is problematic.● Australian elections are rigged.● Reform preferential voting system.● Publicise electors’ votes.● Protests, petitions and submissions get ignored.	● Let’s make the vote public so we can make sure our votes are going where we want them to.● Secret ballots and preferential voting mean the system is rigged.● Get rid of compulsory voting.● The government doesn’t care about petitions.● The Committee refused to accept our submission.
Values and processes not accepted	● Voting is pointless.● Voting is undermined by heterogeneity in society.● Revolt.● The only way to change the system is with violence.	● Voting won’t get rid of the tyranny. Civil war is the only answer.● Freedom is the problem. It’s what gave women the vote.● Democracy is controlled by the Jewish conspiracy.● Voting only works if society is homogenous.● Elections don’t work. The only thing that will is a hung parliament with stretched necks.● Petitions are a waste of time; we need to form militias instead.

The categories were created based on coding of key narratives about democracy and political participation, along with drawing from Dahl’s notion of democracy as process-based, yet rooted in socio-political values of equality, pluralism, inclusion and so forth. The framework, the ‘Democracy Satisfaction Model’, not only facilitates assessment of what is said about democracy, but also enables assessment of how satisfied FRPs are with the current democratic system. The goal of the model is to facilitate qualitative analysis of discourses of democracy. It does not aspire to deliver a precise quantitative delineation of attitudes.

Elected officials

Dahl’s first criterion for polyarchal democracy is elected officials. For Dahl (1998), this means that ‘control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens’ (p. 84). The empirical evidence shows that the sample FRP communities tend to support the idea of elected officials. For example, posts that advocate for voting and elections such as ‘re-elect Pauline’ and ‘vote so that the major parties are last’ signal buy-in to the institution of elected officials. Although most of the discourse is critical of the outcomes of the current democratic process and condemn the government, they do not challenge the legitimacy of the institution of elected officials itself. The problem articulated in the posts is more to do with the incumbent elected officials rather than the existence of the institution of elected officials, with posts referring disparagingly to politicians. For example, Victoria’s Premier Daniel Andrews is habitually referred to as ‘Dictator Dan’.

Free, fair and frequent elections

Dahl contends that a democracy requires free, fair and frequent elections to support political equality. Elections must be free in the sense that citizens can vote at polling stations without being subject to coercion or duress. Elections must also be fair, meaning that all votes need to have equal value (Dahl, 2005: 195). The view that elections are not fair manifests as one of the key criticisms about the Australian electoral process in the empirical data. Comments pertaining to the need to reform elections illustrate that the communities in the sample tend to support the notion of free and fair elections. For example, posts such as ‘let’s make the vote public so we can make sure our votes are going where we want them to’ and ‘secret ballots and preferential voting mean the system is rigged’ communicate sentiment that the process is unfair and ought to be made fairer. The values of democracy are endorsed but the institutional processes of enacting these values are regarded as flawed.

As the example posts in Table 2 show, there is support for voting for an independent candidate or a minor party stemming from dissatisfaction with the major political parties. This dissatisfaction nevertheless suggests support for elections as a mechanism for representation since the posts encourage voting as a means of changing politics. Criticism for preferential voting is common in the data but represents a view of a design flaw rather than a total disregard for democracy. The FRPs still discuss voting as a legitimate means of electing officials and even though there is criticism about the processes of voting, the reasons for the critiques stem from a desire to align voting processes more effectively with the values behind the practice to ensure fair representation of citizens’ interests. In short, content on elections distils to FRPs as wanting greater representation in formal Australian politics but signals general acceptance of the principle of elections as a means of interest articulation and representation. This finding is therefore consistent with how the literature conceptualises FRP and theorises FRPs relationship to democracy: it prioritises the democracy component of liberal democracy by emphasising the mechanics of public participation in politics rather than the liberal social norms that are attached to that.

Calls for increased transparency in the electoral process signals a desire to support democratic ideals, rather than undermine them. FRPs appear to support the values of democracy, and want to improve processes so that these values, such as equal representation (though who is deemed equal varies), are better upheld. By contrast, the FRE sample shows disregard for elections, with statements such as ‘voting is pointless’ and ‘voting won’t get rid of the tyranny’. The FRE rhetoric thus indicates a lack of support for democratic ideals, given the centrality of elections to democracy.

Freedom of expression

For Dahl (1998), citizens should be able to ‘express themselves without danger of severe punishment’. He contends that it is necessary for a democracy because freedom of expression enables citizens to ‘participate effectively in political life’ and generate ‘civic competence’. It allows voters to gain ‘enlightened understanding’ of policy options and articulate their own interests as well as hear those of others. It enables opportunities to be informed and to actively contribute to government agenda-setting. The involvement of citizens in decision-making processes has significant implications for the perceived legitimacy of policy decisions.

Support for freedom of expression is apparent by the ways in which the posts advocate for protests and petitions as methods of political communication. There are ample calls to join protests and sign petitions, which signal intent to operate within the existing intersubjective democratic system to achieve change. For example, posts such as ‘protest this Saturday!’, ‘rally for freedom!’ and ‘sign this petition’ highlight that these discourses endorse avenues of free political expression. Their calls reflect a desire to initiate change within the system as they perceive it and/or tweak the system to make it more inclusive of FR values. Importantly, the key to instigating change in the dominant discourses is harnessing mechanisms of free expression.

It is also possible to infer strong support for freedom of expression based on the context of the discourses. The discourses occur on alt-tech platforms—self-proclaimed champions of free speech. Alt-tech users are free to articulate whatever views they wish to, including non-mainstream and/or discriminatory views, without much (or any—depending on the platform), repercussion. It is conceivable that users who have contributed to the sample discourses choose to use alt-tech media because they seek greater freedom of expression. Although without studying the users themselves, this claim is speculative only.

Within the discourses, there is ample discussion of freedom and criticisms about government curtailment of freedom of expression, along with other freedoms like association and assembly. Indeed, the FRP discourses are strong advocates for increasing freedom, and seek out opportunities to share their ideas unencumbered by censorship.

Access to alternative sources of information

Relatedly, ‘citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information’—including from other citizens (Dahl, 2005). This is required for enlightened understanding, effective participation and ‘influencing the public agenda’. As Dahl (2005) posits, ‘[h]ow could citizens participate effectively in political life if all the information they could acquire were provided by a single source?’ FRPs are purveyors of alternative sources of information and actively seek out, create and share alternative sources of information. They also promote and create conditions within which alternative information exists and can be accessed by forming chats and pages dedicated to these purposes.

Associational autonomy

Associational autonomy is also a key democratic institution which facilitates agenda-setting, enlightened understanding, and participation. Involvement in voluntary associations provides opportunities for ‘civic education’ and can foster inclusion through exposing citizens to fellow citizens whom they might not otherwise encounter (Putnam, 2000). Associations are pivotal for building robust democratic political culture (Almond and Verba, 2015). FRPs, by creating and engaging in these online communities, therefore may contribute to supporting this pillar of democracy, not only because of their association but also because they actively discuss political ideas within these online communities. Since the FRP communities largely support democratic values, then the ‘associations’ might not challenge democracy. However, the FRE community, while also a form of association, is more problematic for democracy: it is ostensibly more homogeneous (fewer cross-cutting social ties between diverse citizens) and promotes anti-democratic as well as illiberal sentiment. Likewise, calls to rally to oppose government policies take full advantage of associational autonomy, since rallies and protests involve association. Since the discourses endorse free association in this respect, they do not ostensibly challenge the institution of associational autonomy.

Inclusive citizenship

Dahl describes inclusive citizenship as an institution of democracy that enables and entitles all adult citizens to the same rights. The discourses of democracy themselves do not tend to specifically raise topics that shed light on FRP attitudes to inclusive citizenship. Yet the broader discourses in which they are embedded reveal that FRP, and especially FRE, views challenge the notion of inclusive citizenship. Criticism of perceived out-groups such as ethnic minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex (LGBTQI+) populous signals that the FRP groups might not support inclusive citizenship. For example, in the FRP sample, discrimination is evident in posts such as ‘racism is not real’, ‘people knew what the Jew was up to’, ‘the deranged Muslim’ and in the way derogatory labels such as ‘chink’, ‘fa**ot’ and ‘ni**er’ are used. Note that such language is more common in the Gab Australia community than in the other FRP communities such as Reignite Democracy Australia. In the FRE sample, posts are frequently more explicit. Posts such as ‘Jews are disgusting’, ‘hail Hitler’ and ‘Australia for the white man!’ are examples of the type of discourse prevalent in the FRE sample. While the intensity of exclusionary rhetoric differs between the samples, discursive techniques that ‘Other’ by creating an in-group versus out-group binary abound.

Conclusion

The emergence of alt-tech social media platforms has provided spaces for far-right populist communities to openly share their political views and engage in discussion about democracy. By examining discussions on alt-tech platforms, it becomes apparent that far-right populist communities articulate varying attitudes towards democracy. While illiberal narratives in public spheres can potentially undermine democratic principles, not all far-right ideologies directly challenge liberal democracy. Although far-right communities’ engagement with the values of democracy is diverse and multifaceted, far-right populist discourses overwhelmingly advocate for strengthening democracy and express support for most of the values that underpin democratic political culture. Although exploitation of democratic processes to achieve illiberal goals is certainly not unprecedented in history, pro-democracy discourses therefore do not necessarily mean that liberal democracy is entirely and unequivocally safe from FRP, especially given the lack of support for inclusive citizenship that permeates some FRP discourses.

The main thread across the discourses on democracy is a perceived sense of exclusion from politics. Inadequate representation is one of the key narratives in the discourses. In the FRP sample, support for processes like voting is framed by calls to vote for far-right candidates to improve representation of the far-right. In the FRE sample, underlying narratives of white supremacy is a promotion of victimhood based on interwoven narratives of white exclusion perpetrated by non-whites. Exclusion is a condition that can foster a context for political violence (Gurr, 2016; Treistman, 2021). It is therefore valuable to develop and maintain awareness of far-right communities’ ideas about democracy as a means of monitoring their perceived sense of exclusion from politics.

Admittedly, the findings reflect analysis of one case study and thus are not representative of a broader international ‘FRP’ community. This research therefore opens up opportunities to confirm whether similar patterns are observable in other liberal democracies so that it might become possible to make more generalisable claims about FRP challenges to democracy.

Understanding far-right populist attitudes to democracy is crucial for conserving principles and values of liberal democracy. However, given the support for democracy among communities which tend to seek to advance exclusionary political agendas (despite themselves lamenting their own exclusion), perhaps we ought to question whether the aspirational standards of liberal democracy are still sufficient to safeguard against illiberalism.

Footnotes

The author sincerely thanks the reviewers who each provided enormously thoughtful and constructive feedback that has enriched this research. Many thanks to Dr Tim Legrand for his insightful comments during the drafting process.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by Australia’s Office of National Intelligence through its National Intelligence Postdoctoral Grant 2021.

ORCID iD

Melissa-Ellen Dowling

Author biography

Melissa-Ellen Dowling is a Senior Lecturer in digital technology,security and governance at Flinders University. She researches ideological extremism,digital information operations and democratic resilience.

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