What drove the preferences over institutional choices of EU Constitutional Convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates' preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We also find evidence that delegates' party positions on an EU foreign policy are better predictors than delegates' personal preferences of their preferred role for the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. If government and national interests would dominate any policy area, it would be foreign policy. We contend that our finding in this critical case underscores the importance of partisan effects in European integration.
Aspinwall, Mark (2002) `Preferring Europe: Ideology and National Preference on European Integration', European UnionPolitics3(1): 81—111.
2.
Bawn, Kathleen (1995) `Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures', American Political Science Review89(1): 62—73.
3.
Brinegar, Adam P. and Seth Jolly ( 2005) `Location, Location, Location: National Contextual Factors and Public Support for European Integration', European UnionPolitics6(2): 155—80.
4.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran (1994) `Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science38(3): 697—722.
5.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran (1999) Transaction Costs Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New York : Cambridge University Press.
6.
Faas, Thorsten (2003) `To Defect or Not to Defect? National, Institutional and Party Group Pressures on MEPs and Their Consequences for Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament', European Journal of Political Research42: 841—66.
7.
Franchino, Fabio (2001) `Delegation and Constraints in the National Execution of the EC Policies: A Longitudinal and Qualitative Analysis', West EuropeanPolitics24(4): 169—92.
8.
Franchino, Fabio (2005) `A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union ', Journal of Theoretical Politics17(2): 217—47.
9.
Frieden, Jeffry (2004) `One Europe, One Vote? The Political Economy of European Union Representation in International Organizations', European UnionPolitics5(2): 261—76.
10.
Habermas, Jürgen and Jacques Derrida (2005) `February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe ', in Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey (eds) Old Europe New Europe Core Europe, pp. 3—13. London: Verso.
11.
Hill, Christopher (1993) `The Capability—Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', Journal of Common Market Studies31(3): 305—28.
12.
Hill, Christopher (1997) `The Actors Involved: National Perspectives', in Elfriede Regelsberger, Phillippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, pp. 85—98. London: Lynne Rienner.
13.
Hill, Christopher (2004) `Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001', Journal of Common Market Studies42(1): 143—63.
14.
Hix, Simon, Amie Kreppel and Abdul Noury (2003) `The Party System in the European Parliament', Journal of Common Market Studies41(2): 309—31.
15.
Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland (2005) `Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979—2001', British Journal of Political Science35: 209—34.
16.
Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland (2006) `Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament ', American Journal of Political Science50(2): 494—511.
17.
Holland, Martin (1995) `Bridging the Capability—ExpectationsGap : A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa', Journal of Common Market Studies33(4): 555—72.
18.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2002) `Chapel Hill Survey', URL (consulted September 2006): http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/
19.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks ( 2004) `Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?', PS-Political Science & Politics37(3): 415—20.
20.
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks ( 2005) `Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration', European UnionPolitics6(4): 419—43.
21.
Jupille, Joseph (1999) `The European Union and International Outcomes ', International Organization53(2): 409—25.
22.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg (2000) `Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation', American Journal of Political Science44(2): 347—61.
23.
König, Thomas and Jon Slapin ( 2006) `From Unanimity to Consensus: Negotiations at the EU's Constitutional Convention', World Politics58(3): 413—45.
24.
Kreppel, Amie ( 2002) The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
25.
Kreppel, Amie and George Tsebelis (1999) `Coalition Formation in the European Parliament ', Comparative Political Studies32(8): 933—66.
26.
Magnette, Paul and Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) `The European Convention: Bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric', West EuropeanPolitics27(3): 381—404.
27.
Noury, Abdul (2002) `Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians', European UnionPolitics3(1): 33—58.
28.
Ray, Leonard (1999) `Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey', European Journal of Political Research36: 283—306.
29.
Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio (2000) `The Political Basis of Support for European Integration', European UnionPolitics1(2): 147—71.
30.
Smaghi, Lorenzo Bini (2004) `A Single EU Seat in the IMF?', Journal of Common Market Studies42(2): 229—48.
31.
Smith, Michael E. (2000) `Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation', Journal of European Public Policy7(4): 613—31.
32.
Smith, Michael E. (2004a) Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
33.
Smith, Michael E. (2004b) `Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation', European Journal of International Relations10(1): 95—136.
34.
Smith, Michael E. (2004c) `Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-making: Multilevel Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy', Journal of European Public Policy11(4): 740—58.
35.
Thym, Daniel (2004) `Reforming Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy', European Law Journal10(1): 5—22.
36.
Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (2001) CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 2.0. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
37.
Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen (eds) (2004) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. New York: Manchester University Press.
38.
Tsebelis, George (2006) `The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels IGCs: A Veto Player Analysis,' in Thomas König and Simon Hug (eds) Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries, pp. 9—22. London: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science.
39.
Tsebelis, George and Sven-Oliver Proksch (2007) `The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention', Journal of Common Market Studies45(1): 157—86.
40.
Tsebelis, George and Xenophon Yataganas (2002) `Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU afterNice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion', Journal of Common Market Studies40(2): 283—307.
