In this study, I consider the role of legislative hearings in the legislative process. Previous studies of legislative outcomes often omit a discussion of hearings or do not incorporate hearings in a systematic way. One obvious purpose that hearings might serve is to provide the information and expertise necessary to solve any problems with the legislation, and once acquired, this information would allow the bill to move forward. I challenge the assumption that the information produced by legislative hearings makes it more likely that a bill will become law. I propose that in advancing a hearing, members of Congress signal that the legislation involves problems and may not be ready to move forward. To analyze the role of legislative hearings, I use bills introduced in the U.S. Senate during the 104th Congress (1995-1996). I use a bivariate probit model for hearings and subsequent events in the legislative process as dependent variables to determine whether legislative hearings and legislative outcomes are independent. Using information from the 103rd through 108th Congresses, I find that hearings do not increase the likelihood that a bill will become law during that Congress or in later Congresses.
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