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Abstract

Are partisans more likely to endorse political violence when politicians accuse their rivals of election improprieties? I theorize that for Republican partisans in the United States, the answer to this question is yes. Republican partisans are primed to believe allegations of cheating by Democrats and view election improprieties through the lens of racial and xenophobic resentments. Allegations of Democratic election fraud prompt them to eschew nonviolent norms of political behavior and endorse political violence. I test these propositions using an original, online survey experiment involving 140 self-identified Republican subjects. I find that exposure to allegations by politicians that Democrats engage in election fraud prompts Republican partisans to increase their support for political violence. Furthermore, using mediation tests, I find that exposing Republicans to allegations of electoral fraud by Democrats reduces their trust of people of different races and religions which, in turn, increases their support for political violence.

Keywords

election fraud republicans political violence mistrust of outgroups

Do partisans regard the use of political violence to be more justifiable when their political rivals are accused of election fraud? If so, why might this be the case? Adam Przeworski famously depicted democracies as political systems in which political elites agree to lose elections and to do so in an orderly way (Przeworski, 1991). In democracies, Przeworski explained, the question of who governs is relegated to a systematic but inherently uncertain process: the ballot box. Democracies institutionalize, and thereby tame, political competition among elites and their partisans by holding free and fair elections in which contestants agree to forego their bids to control government if they lose elections. Election losers reinforce the integrity of the political system by treating the electoral process as legitimate even when they lose. This is a critical element of the democratic process and is often referred to as “loser’s consent” (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug 2005; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lindberg 2006; Nadeau & Blais, 1993; O’Donnell 2007; Riker, 1983; Schattschneider, 1960). The expected behavior of election losers has significant consequences for peaceful political order in democracies. Implied is that without loser’s consent, partisans may resort to disorderly and non-peaceful political behaviors when they lose elections (Anderson et al., 2005; Przeworski, 1991; Riker, 1983). This is particularly likely when political elites, who are charged with the responsibility of lending legitimacy and stability to democratic systems (Weingast, 1997), allege that an election has been “stolen (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010)” by political rivals.

Recent research shows that unfounded allegations by political elites denigrating the integrity of elections in consolidated democracies increases both public tolerance for the use of political violence as well as actual occurrence of political violence (Piazza, 2022). This is because when political elites in democracies allege, without objective evidence, that elections are fraudulent, confidence is undermined in democratic institutions and practices that constrain political violence (Albertson & Guiler, 2020; Anderson et al., 2005; Berlinski, Doyle, Guess, Levy, Lyons, Montgomery, Nyhan and Reifler 2021; Przeworski, 1991; Riker, 1983). Moreover, grievances that motivate violence deepen (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Donno et al., 2022; Kuntz & Thompson, 2009; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015), while affective polarization grows, and with it the dehumanization of political rivals that makes violence less normatively objectionable (Piazza, 2020). Also an environment arises in which elites, who are critical to preserving non-violent norms of behavior (Weingast, 1997), tolerate and in some cases encourage violence.

In the study, I argue the following: Republican partisans are more likely to tolerate and support the use of political violence when exposed to allegations by politicians that their Democratic rivals cheat in elections. This is due to several factors. The issue of election fraud is highly salient for Republicans in the present environment. More importantly, allegations of Democratic election fraud have become racialized among Republicans and reinforce distrust and aversion towards ethnic and religious “others” in ways that serve to weaken norms against political violence among Republican partisans. I test this argument using an online survey experiment. I find that allegations by politicians that Democrats engage in election fraud prompts Republican subjects to express distrust for racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups which, in turn, prompts them to view political violence as more tolerable. In the next section, I discuss the theoretical expectations that undergird this argument.

The study adds to scholarly understanding of support for political violence by demonstrating in an experimental setting that explicit allegations of election fraud against rivals increase partisan support for political violence. This is crucial given that previous research theorizes, but does not test, a causal relationship between elite denigration of election integrity in democracies and increased likelihood of political violence. The study also identifies the role of political elites as influencers of violence. In the literature, elites play an important role in influencing and emboldening supporters to see violence as legitimate (see, for example, Kalmoe, 2014; Kalmoe & Mason, 2022b), so they are key to the process. Finally, the study shows that allegations of election fraud activate other beliefs and attitudes that work to unlock taboos against the use of violence among rank-and-file partisans, specifically mistrust of people of different races and religions.

The article proceeds as followings. In the next section I outline a theoretical framework linking allegations of Democratic election fraud to support for political violence among Republican subjects. I also explain how increased mistrust of racial and religious outgroups is an important mediator in the relationship between allegations of election fraud and tolerance of the use of political violence. I then present my hypotheses and the research design, which involves an original survey experiment. I conclude with a presentation of my results and a discussion of their implications.

Republicans, Allegations of Democratic Election Fraud and Support for Political Violence

My argument centers on five points. I detail these below:

Election Fraud Salience for Republicans

First, allegations of election fraud are more likely to resonate with Republicans simply because the topic of election fraud is more salient for Republican partisans in the United States. Research by Kimball et al. (2021), Udani et al. (2018) and Wilson and Brewer (2013) finds that self-identified Republicans are much more likely to express concerns about election fraud and are more likely to believe that U.S. elections are affected by election fraud. Republican candidates, conservative commentators and conservative media frequently make unsubstantiated claims that election fraud is rampant in the United States (Leonhardt, 2022) while Republican lawmakers have proposed 148 bills in 27 states restricting access to voting as a means to remedy alleged voter fraud (Brennan Center 2022). Recent public opinion polling shows that around 70 percent of Republican voters falsely believe that Donald Trump won the 2020 election, and that President Joe Biden was not legitimately elected due to voter fraud (Greenberg, 2022). Moreover, empirical research suggests that allegations of election fraud have long found fertile ground among Republicans partisans. Prior to the 2020 elections, Republicans and conservatives already registered significantly higher levels of mistrust for election integrity than Democrats and liberals (Bowler et al., 2015; Wilson & Brewer, 2013; Wilson & King-Meadows, 2016). Because of its heightened salience, I therefore expect Republican subjects to be more attentive to the issue of election fraud and to be more likely to react to their political leaders’ allegations of election fraud against Democrats.

Association of Election Fraud with Distrust of Racial and Religious Outgroups

The second proposition of my argument is that attitudes about election/voter fraud in the United States are closely associated with mistrust and animosity towards racial and religious outgroups. Individuals who harbor racial resentments and who hold negative attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners are also more likely to believe that voter fraud is a significant problem in the U.S. (Appleby & Federico, 2018; Kimball et al., 2021; Wilson & Brewer, 2013). In particular, Udani and Kimball (2018) empirically demonstrate that anti-immigrant resentments significantly predict individuals’ beliefs that voter fraud is widespread and endemic in contemporary politics and are associated with increased support for laws requiring voter identification and other types of restrictions. Moreover, individuals exhibiting “white grievances” – namely the belief that whites now face more discrimination in the United States than racial minorities and feelings of fear and insecurity among whites in the face of a demographic increase in the nonwhite population of the United States – are also less likely to believe that elections are conducted freely and fairly without fraud (Filindra, 2022). This effect is particularly strong for white Republicans.

Republicans Primed for Racial and Religious Outgroup Mistrust

Third, allegations of election fraud by Republican political elites are more likely to resonate with and reinforce racist and xenophobic attitudes that have become central to Republican political identity and mindsets in the United States. Mason (2018) demonstrates that partisan and ideological identity has evolved in the U.S. to become closely linked with racial and ethnic social identities. Whereas in previous eras, Republicans and Democrats largely shared similar racial and ethnic makeups – the partisan base of both parties was, for example, majority white and Christian – in the contemporary era, the parties have sorted into conservative white Christian-majority and liberal racially, ethnically, and religiously-diverse party coalitions. This has resulted in a divide in racial attitudes and religious between Republicans and Democrats. Jardina and Ollerenshaw (2022) further document that intolerant attitudes are highly polarized by political party in the U.S. today, and that white Republicans exhibit higher levels of racial resentment, mistrust of and intolerance toward racial, ethnic and religious minorities. Racial resentments and fear regarding the growing racial and ethnic diversification of the United States have become central components of Republican political attachments and motivations (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018). Levy (2021) argues that white Christian ethnocentrism and stigmatization of racial minorities, immigrants and foreign-born Americans has become a central theme within the contemporary conservative movement in the United States. Similar attitudes also drive support for conservative populist political movement in other democracies (Cutts et al., 2011; Semyonov et al., 2006).

These racial and ethnic resentments were enhanced by the election and presidency of Donald Trump. While campaigning and later when in office, Trump frequently made racist and xenophobic remarks and pursued public policies that targeted racial, ethnic and religious minorities. These actions were important for galvanizing Trump’s base of supporters (Glick et al., 2002; Schaffner et al., 2018; Sides et al., 2019; Tolbert et al., 2018). Research by Mason et al. (2021) provides striking evidence that the ascendance of Trump is strongly linked to white Christian social outgroup intolerance and aversion within contemporary conservatism. Examining longitudinal survey data, they find that respondents that expressed greater levels of mistrust toward African Americans, Latinos, Muslims, and LGBTQ individuals when polled in 2011 were the most likely to support Trump in the 2016 primaries. Moreover, survey research by Cox (2021) finds that Trump supporters are more likely to believe that “traditional” white, male, Christian cultural, social, economic, and political dominance is imperiled by growing multiculturalism and empowerment of minorities in the United States and that Trump is a savior working to stem this tide.

Role of Republican Elites

Fourth, political elites play a crucial role in bolstering allegations of voter fraud and fusing them with racist and xenophobic narratives. A large literature establishes that messaging on election fraud by trusted political elites helps to shape public attitudes about election integrity (Beaulieu, 2014; Udani & Kimball, 2018; Vonnahme & Miller, 2013; Wilson & Brewer, 2013), as well as support for the use of political violence (see Kalmoe & Mason, 2022b). For example, Filindra (2022) demonstrates that survey respondents exposed to elite messaging on the “Big Steal” narrative alleging that the 2020 Presidential election was marred by massive voter fraud that installed Joe Biden into the White House were significantly less likely to believe that elections in the U.S. are fairly conducted. Similarly, racist, and xenophobic messaging by political elites foments racial and xenophobic grievances among individuals. Experimental research by Newman et al. (2021) finds that when subjects are exposed to racially inflammatory speech by political elites, they are more emboldened to express those same beliefs and act upon them.

It is therefore consequential that a growing amount of political rhetoric by Republican elites about election fraud has become racialized (Appleby & Federico, 2018; Dreier & Martin, 2010; Ellis, 2014; Hasen, 2012; Minnite, 2010; Wilson & Brewer, 2013; Wilson & King-Meadows, 2016) – implying that urban voters of color engage in election fraud to guarantee Democratic election victories – or has fixated on unsubstantiated allegations that illegals and noncitizens vote in U.S. elections (Fogarty et al., 2015; Udani & Kimball, 2018). For example, after he lost the popular vote in the 2016 Presidential election, Trump baselessly claimed that millions of undocumented immigrants and noncitizens had illegally voted (House & Dennis, 2017). Fried and Harris (2020) document extensive messaging by Trump in the in the runup and aftermath of both the 2016 and 2020 elections alleging that Democrats had mobilized illegals to vote in elections. Other Republican politicians and conservative commentators have repeated these unsubstantiated allegations in the context of the 2024 election (Swenson, 2024). Republican politicians and commentators in right-wing media frequently depict urban minority and foreign-born voters as unworthy citizens and not fully American, identifying them as a despised outgroup that is threatening to electorally displace white “true Americans” (see, for example, Carlson, 2021). This is consequential given that whites with racist or xenophobic attitudes exhibit higher levels of outgroup mistrust and are less tolerant of the political rights of outgroups (Buyuker & Filindra, 2020; Perry et al., 2022; Strother & Bennett, 2021). Moreover, research finds that nativist whites in European countries tend not to define minorities and immigrants as co-equal or genuine citizens and therefore reject inclusive liberal democratic norms and institutions which allow them to participate as illegitimate (Kokkonen & Linde, 2021).

Mistrust of Racial and Religious Outgroups and Attitudes toward Political Violence

Finally, I argue that the confluence of elite allegations of election fraud with racial or religious outgroup mistrust is likely to prompt Republican partisans to view political violence as a more acceptable behavior. This expectation is in line with intergroup threat theory which posits that members of a social group, usually defined by race or ethnic identity, respond to competition and threat from members of other social groups by more closely affiliating with individuals of the same social group – their “ingroup” – while expressing mistrust, aversion, and intolerance towards members of rival social groups – their “outgroups” (Brewer, 1999). Brewer describes this process as “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate.” Ingroup love and outgroup hate aid and accelerate the process of dehumanization of outgroups, and this helps to set the groundwork for the acceptability of violence (Hogg et al., 2017; Kunst et al., 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Research finds that when ingroups perceive themselves to be in competition with and under threat from rival outgroups, particularly as outgroup rivals are gaining in relative social and political power as is the case in the U.S. today, ingroup members are more supportive of violent extremism (Kunst et al., 2018; Obaidi et al., 2018; Thomsen et al., 2014) and are more prone to violent aggression (Merliees, Cairns, Taylor, Goeke-Morey, Shirlow and Cummings 2013).

Intergroup conflict theory is a relevant paradigm for explaining Republican propensity for outgroup hate and heightened probability for endorsing violence. Researchers have found that burgeoning racial, ethnic, and religious diversity in the United States is associated with an increased fear about demographic displacement among conservative white Americans, leading them to worry that their privileged, dominant social, political, and economic position in U.S. society is under threat (Brader et al., 2008; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Dixon, 2006; Mutz, 2018). In experimental research, when these demographic changes are made salient to subjects who hold negative attitudes toward outgroup members a priori, as do U.S. Republicans, they adopt antidemocratic and intolerant norms and their support for liberal democratic institutions weakens (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Tesler, 2016; Udani & Kimball, 2018). This has consequences for attitudes about violence. Scholars argue that political violence by members of racial, ethnic, and religious majority communities – whites, in the case of the U.S. – is often motivated by anxieties produced by changing social or demographic trends that are seen as supplanting the hegemony of traditionally dominant communities (Ferber, 1998; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Weinberg, 2013). More on point, using an original survey, Cox (2021) found that racially resentful whites who fear demographic displacement in a diversifying America were more likely to endorse violence to preserve “traditional American values.” Similarly, experimental research by Obaidi, Kunst and Ozer (2021) in Denmark and Norway found that making salient demographic trends showing that immigrants and minorities are increasing in relative numbers to whites were more likely to exhibit hostile and violent attitudes.

Hypotheses

Given this, I test the following hypotheses. First, as I explain above, I expect Republican partisans who are exposed to allegations by politicians that their Democratic rivals engage in election fraud to increase their support or tolerance for the use of political violence:

Politician allegations of election fraud by Democrats prompts Republican subjects to support political violence.

Second, I also expect that an important reason that allegations of Democratic election fraud prompt Republican partisans to endorse political violence is because such allegations reinforce and stimulate negative attitudes toward racial and religious outgroups among Republican partisans, rendering political violence more normative. In other words, I expect the effect of allegations of Democratic election fraud on increased tolerance of political violence by Republican partisans to be mediated through increased mistrust of racial and religious “others:”

The effect of politician allegations of election fraud by Democrats on Republican support for political violence is mediated through increased mistrust of racial and religious outgroups.

I do not expect parallel effects for Democratic partisans similarly exposed to allegations that Republican rivals engage in election improprieties, such as voter suppression tactics. I discuss this in more detail below and provide some empirical evidence that is consistent with that expectation.

Research Design

I test these hypotheses using an original online survey experiment involving 139 subjects¹ recruited through the Lucid Theorem panel.² The study was conducted between September 6 and 16, 2021. All subjects were U.S. residents³ over the age of 18 and self-identified as “strong,” “not very strong” or “leaning” Republican partisans.⁴ For the analysis, I use two sets of empirical tests. To test hypothesis 1, I use an ordinary least squares regression technique for the main analysis and an ordered logistical regression estimation to test the robustness of the findings. To test hypothesis 2, I employ a test for mediation using a statistical package developed by Hicks and Tingley (2011).⁵

Sample

The sample only includes self-identified Republicans, as explained above. The average age of subjects in the sample is 52, and around half of the sample is under the age of 45. Around 47.8 percent of the sample identifies as male while around 73.5 percent identify as Christian (various sects) in terms of religion and 79.3 percent identify as white, non-Hispanic for race and ethnicity. The median household annual income for subjects was between U.S. $40,000 to U.S. $49,000. The median subject had completed either post high school vocational training or had some college training but did not obtain a degree. Around 12.9 percent of subjects in the sample obtained at least a bachelor’s degree or more. Being Republicans, the subjects skew conservative in terms of political ideology. However, there is some ideological diversity in the sample. While majorities reported being “conservative” (34.3 percent) or “extremely conservative” (26.4 percent), around 14.3 percent said that they were “slightly conservative” while 21 percent reported being “moderate, middle of the road” in terms of their political ideologies. Subjects were not compensated directly by the author but did receive incentives from Lucid Theorem to participate. Subjects took an average of 17 minutes to complete the survey experiment.

Treatment

After answering some basic demographic and attitudinal questions, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a control and a treatment condition. In both conditions, subjects were asked to read a one-page letter purportedly from a candidate running for the United States Congress. In the letter, the candidate pledges to address a set of issues that generally receive bipartisan support in the electorate: protecting Social Security and Medicare; expanding prescription drug coverage for seniors; making college more affordable; investing in infrastructure; pursing “fair” trade agreements; honoring members of the U.S. military. The letter then ends with a request for subjects’ support in the next election.

For subjects assigned to the control condition, the letter simply contains what is stated above. No additional information is provided in the letter. For the treatment condition, subjects read a letter that was identical to that in the control but contained an additional paragraph alleging that Democratic party politicians engage in election fraud. Specifically, in the treatment, the letter alleges that Democrats: 1) will “stop at nothing to win;” 2) conspired to commit election fraud in the most recent election; and 3) have worked since the last election to try to further corrupt the political system by making election fraud easier and more frequent. This added paragraph ends with a strident statement questioning Democrats’ belief in the American system of government. Like the letter in the control condition, the letter in the Democrats Cheat treatment ends with a request for support in the next election.⁶

Because the experiment involved subject deception – subjects were not made aware that the letters were from a fictitious aspiring member of Congress – I debriefed all subjects post-experiment and provided information on the motivations and aims of the study.

The survey instruments used to create the control and treatment conditions are presented in the appendix. Also presented in appendix are summary statistics for all variables used in the study sorted by treatment and control conditions. These statistics demonstrate that the treatment and control conditions are reasonably balanced in terms of subject attributes. However, I also conduct analyses controlling for key subject attributes, described below, to address for potential spuriousness.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of the study measures subjects’ support or tolerance for the use of political violence. This is measured using five ordinal, Likert-scale questions – three of which are derived from Kalmoe (2014) – that are combined into an additive index that ranges from 5, indicating no support for any form of political violence under any circumstances, to 25 (α = .8166), indicating strong support for all forms of political violence in all circumstances.⁷ Westwood et al. (2022a; )Westwood et al., 2022a argue that support for political violence may be overstated in American public opinion research, and that subject responses to survey questions about political violence may be affected by subject inattentiveness and by different interpretations about what constitutes political violence and exhibit different levels of tolerance or acceptance of different forms or contexts of political violence.⁸ Because of this I employ multiple questions depicting different manifestations of political violence, including destruction of personal property, in different contexts, and apply attention checks in the survey instrument. Support for political violence is relatively uncommon in the sample. Approximately 33.1 percent of subjects rejected all forms of political violence – registering a 5 on the index – while the median subject registered between 8 and 9 on the scale, indicating generally low level of support for only some forms of political violence. Less than nine percent of subjects exhibited a moderately high or high level of support for all forms of political violence. A graph of the distribution of support for political violence within the sample is presented in the appendix.

Though the dependent variable is technically ordinal – or, at least, it is an additive indicator constructed using multiple ordinal measures – I use an ordinary least squares estimation technique. This is because the dependent variable has a large range of values. However, as a check, I also employ an ordered logistical estimation technique and find that this produces the same general results.

Mediator

For the mediator, mistrust of racial and religious outgroups, I developed a variable based on two questions surveying subjects’ level of trust for people who are of a different race and religion. These questions⁹ are each measured on a four-point Likert scale and are combined to produce a measure between 2 and 8, where 8 indicates high level of distrust for individuals of a different race and different religion. The median respondent in the sample exhibited a relatively low level of mistrust toward people of different races and religions, scoring between a 3 and 4 on the 8-point scale. Around 13.7 percent of subjects expressed a moderate level of mistrust of racial or religious outgroups, scoring a 5. Around 7.9 percent expressed a 6 or higher on the scale, indicating a moderate or high level of mistrust toward either people of different races or different religions.

Control Variables

As explained below, I run the analysis both excluding and including control variables. The control variables included in the study are subjects’ gender, age, racial identification, religion, household income, education, level of political engagement,¹⁰ conservative media consumption habits¹¹, social media consumption¹² and political ideology on a liberal to conservative continuum. These help to address potential spuriousness.

Descriptive statistics for variables used in all analyses are presented in the appendix.¹³

Results

The main results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1 and in Figures 1 and 2. The results provide support for both of my hypotheses.

Table 1.

Treatment Effects on Support for Political Violence Among Republicans.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Treatment: Democrats engage in elect. Fraud¹	1.366* (0.698)	1.545* (0.700)	1.495* (0.716)	0.712* (0.328)	1.545* (0.700)
Male		1.907** (0.706)	1.858* (0.692)	0.810* (0.334)	1.907** (0.706)
Age		−0.128 (0.869)	−0.118 (0.818)	−0.086 (0.392)	−0.128 (0.869)
White, non-Hispanic		−0.672 (0.855)	−0.663 (0.851)	−0.335 (0.403)	−0.672 (0.855)
Christian		−0.328 (0.810)	−0.402 (0.998)	−0.095 (0.364)	−0.328 (0.810)
Household income level		−0.109* (0.056)	−0.112* (0.048)	−0.046* (0.027)	−2.504* (1.292)
Education level		−0.234 (0.200)	−0.236 (0.155)	−0.120 (0.097)	−1.636 (1.401)
Politically engaged		0.451 (0.760)	0.453 (0.704)	0.162 (0.355)	0.451 (0.760)
Reliance on social media for News		1.885* (1.067)	1.883* (0.950)	0.747 (0.493)	1.885* (1.067)
Reliance on conservative media for News		−1.326 (1.316)	−1.334 (1.225)	−0.735 (0.657)	−1.326 (1.316)
Political ideology: Conservatism		−0.489* (0.277)	−0.480 (0.322)	−0.219* (0.131)	−2.933* (1.665)
Constant/First Const. Cut	8.470***	12.636***	12.727***	−2.467**	11.805***
Constant/First Const. Cut	(0.505)	(1.843)	(1.875)	(0.873)	(1.606)
Obs.	139	136	136	136	136
F	3.83*	2.54**	3.86**		2.54**
LR Chi-square				24.05*
R-square	0.0272	0.1841	0.1840	0.0387	0.1841
Model	OLS	OLS	OLSSurveyWeightsApplied	OrderedLogit	OLSAll variables scaled 0-1

***p ≤ .000 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .1.

Y = Support for Political Violence, 5-25 scale.

¹Reference category: Control condition.

Figure 1.

Coefficient Plot of treatment effect on support for political violence among Republicans. Note: Results obtained from model 2 in Table 1: standard OLS estimation with all controls.

Republican subjects exposed to the treatment – a letter from a fictitious politician alleging that democrats engage in election fraud – were more likely to exhibit support for or tolerance of political violence. This is presented in Table 1 and it provides support for the first hypothesis. Moreover, increased support for political violence among Republicans exposed to the treatment is mediated through heightened mistrust for racial and religious others.

As evident in Table 1, Republican subjects who were exposed to the treatment exposing them to allegations by a politician that Democrats engage in election fraud were more likely to express support for political violence, post-treatment.¹⁴ Model 1 summarizes the results of a naïve bivariate regression estimation. Model 2, which is the main estimation of the study, includes all controls. Though covariates such as gender, household income, social media reliance and political ideology are also significant, the treatment effect is still positive and significant. In model 3, survey weights¹⁵ are applied to the estimation and the same result is produce and this produced the same finding. In model 4, I use an ordered logistical estimation technique, and reproduce the main findings. Finally, to facilitate substantive comparisons across all variables in the model, I constructed 0-1 scaled versions of all the predictors.¹⁶ These results, also produce the same finding: Republican subjects who were informed that Democrats engaged in election fraud were more likely to express support for political violence. The analysis shows that exposure to the treatment increased subjects’ support for political violence by around 18.6 percent.¹⁷

The substantive impact of the treatment on subject support for political violence, along with the substantive effects of the covariates, are presented in Figure 1. In Figure 1, all coefficients are graphed relative to one another. The most substantive, significant predictor of support for political violence among Republican subjects is gender. Male subjects rate the acceptability of the use of political violence nearly 2 points higher – on a 5-to-25-point scale – than do female subjects.¹⁸ The treatment effect is the next most substantive, significant predictor. Republican subjects exposed to allegations that Democrats engage in election fraud rate the acceptability of political violence at 1.5 points higher than do Republican subjects in the control condition that were not exposed to such allegations. In Figure 1, none of the other predictors reach significance at the p ≤ .05 level.

No Similar Findings for Democrats

As previously stated, I do not expect allegations by Democratic politicians that Republicans engage in election fraud or improprieties to have the same effect on Democratic partisans as do allegations of Democratic election fraud on Republican partisans. This is due to a couple of reasons. First, simply stated, Republican election fraud is not as salient of an issue for Democrats. It is not a theme that has been consistently featured in Democratic party propaganda and messaging. I do not therefore expect exposure to allegations of Republican improprieties in elections to prompt similarly strident attitudes for Democratic partisans. Second, I expect Democrats to exhibit lower levels of mistrust of or animosity against people of different races or religious identities. As previously noted, Mason (2018) argues that the contemporary Democratic party has adopted a multicultural identity that attracts a more culturally diverse party coalition. Attitudes on race and religion have become highly divergent and defining features for Republican and Democratic partisan identity. I therefore do not expect allegations of Republican election misconduct to influence racial or religious mistrust for Democratic partisans.

I do want to clarify, however, that I do not necessarily expect Republican partisans to be more prone to support political violence than Democrats, a priori. Rather, I expect the treatment effect – exposure to allegations of election fraud or misconduct by partisan opponents – to be a driver of support for political violence among Republican but not Democratic partisans. Some preliminary evidence suggests this to be the case. Sampled Republicans are more likely than Democrats to believe that election fraud is a significant problem in the United States¹⁹ and are more likely to mistrust people of different races and religions.²⁰ However, Republicans and Democrats in the sample are not statistically distinct from one another in terms of support for political violence.²¹

To check to see if Democrats exhibit increased support for political violence when treated with allegations that Republicans engage in election misconduct, I reran the main analysis for Democratic partisans using the same independent and control variables, the same control condition but a different treatment group condition. For this check, I randomly assigned self-identified Democratic partisans to the same control condition as was featured in the main analysis – an anodyne letter from an aspiring member of Congress that mentions priorities that enjoy widespread support from both Democrats and Republicans – and a new treatment condition in which subjects are exposed to allegations that Republicans engage in election suppression, manipulation, and other types of election misconduct. For this treatment, I slightly vary the depiction of Republican election misconduct to match salient allegations for Democrats. Democratic politicians, and politically liberal news sources, rarely allege that Republicans engage in outright election cheating. Rather, they more typically allege that Republicans seek unfair advantages at the polls by engaging in voter suppression and disenfranchisement (ACLU 2021; Michaelson, 2022; Shephard, 2021; Smith, 2021).

Subjects assigned to the “Republicans Cheat” treatment read a letter that was also identical to the control condition letter with the exception that it included an additional paragraph. In this treatment, the letter alleges that Republicans: 1) will “stop at nothing to win;” 2) engaged in voter suppression in the most recent election and unfairly excluded thousands of legal ballots in the most recent election; 3) have worked since the last election to enact legislation to restrict and suppress the right to vote. The letter in this treatment likewise ends with a strident statement questioning Republicans’ belief in the American system of government along with a request for support in the next election. The control and treatment instruments used for this test are presented in the appendix. The results of these tests are presented in Table 2. and in Figure 2.

Table 2.

Treatment Effects on Support for Political Violence Among Democrats.

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Treatment: Republicans engage in elect. Misconduct¹	−0.265 (0.676)	−0.493 (0.642)	−0.527 (0.602)	−0.357 (0.289)	−0.493 (0.642)
Male		1.881** (0.706)	1.806** (0.522)	0.907** (0.312)	1.881** (0.706)
Age		1.836* (0.716)	1.845** (0.659)	0.787* (0.316)	1.836* (0.716)
White, non-Hispanic		−2.043** (0.768)	−2.071** (0.679)	−1.031** (0.348)	−2.043** (0.768)
Christian		0.338 (0.685)	0.334 (0.837)	0.115 (0.304)	0.338 (0.685)
Household income level		−0.030 (0.049)	−0.029 (0.037)	−0.024 (0.022)	−0.693 (1.138)
Education level		0.171 (0.184)	0.169 (0.180)	0.099 (0.083)	1.194 (1.290)
Politically engaged		0.862 (0.689)	0.856 (0.587)	0.284 (0.303)	0.862 (0.689)
Reliance on social media for News		1.057 (0.927)	1.090 (0.863)	0.249 (0.416)	1.057 (0.927)
Political ideology: Liberalism		−0.208 (0.215)	−0.210 (0.284)	−0.092 (0.098)	−1.251 (1.289)
Constant/First Const. Cut	9.034*** (0.483)	8.973*** (1.620)	9.052*** (2.339)	−0.999 (0.779)	8.905*** (1.426)
Obs.	178	175	175	175	175
F	0.15	4.54***	11.27***		4.54***
LR Chi-square				44.09***
R-square	0.0009	0.2169	0.2192	0.0540	0.2169
Model	OLS	OLS	OLSSurveyWeightsApplied	OrderedLogit	OLSAll variables scaled 0-1

***p ≤ .000 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .1.

Y = Support for Political Violence, 5-25 scale.

¹Reference category: Control condition.

Figure 2.

Coefficient Plot of treatment effect on support for political violence among democrats. Note: Results obtained from model 2a in Table 2: standard OLS estimation with all controls.

Democratic party-identifying subjects exposed to politician allegations that Republicans engage in election misconduct are not significantly more likely to express support for the use of violence. This is the case across all models and model specifications in Table 2. In Figure 2., some covariates are significant. Male Democrats and older Democrats are more likely to support political violence while White Democrats are less likely. This contrasts with findings for Republican subjects, where only male Republicans were found to be more supportive of the use of political violence. All in all, these supplemental tests determine that Republican and Democratic partisans react differently to exposure to allegations of election fraud and misconduct, with the former increasing their tolerance of political violence and the latter exhibiting little significant change in attitude toward violence. This suggests an asymmetric

Mediating Effect of Mistrust of Racial and Religious “Others”

My second hypothesis is supported by the results from the mediation analysis, summarized in Figure 3. The effect of exposing Republican subjects to allegations that Democrats engage in election fraud on support for political violence is partially mediated through increased mistrust of racial and religious “others.” Figure 3 demonstrates that Republicans that are exposed to the Democrats cheat treatment are significantly more likely to express higher levels of mistrust of people of different races and religions. This, in turn, is a positive predictor of increased support for political violence. Inclusion of the mediator (mistrust of people of different races and religions) into the model reduces the coefficient of the interaction of the treatment effect on support for political violence, which is a hallmark of partial mediation. Around 25 percent of the effect of exposure to the treatment – the allegation that Democrats engage in election fraud – on support for political violence is mediated by increased mistrust of racial and religious outgroups, according to the results. This suggests that outgroup mistrust and animus in an important part of the story linking salience of Democratic election fraud with support for the use of political violence, but it is not the totality of the story.

Figure 3.

Effect of treatment on Republican support for political violence mediated through increased mistrust of people of different race, religion.

Beyond supporting the hypotheses, the results are consistent with several streams within the literature on elections, partisanship, the role of elites, and mistrust of or hostility toward social outgroups. The findings conform to the wider expectation about the pacifying effects of uncontested election outcomes outlined in the loser’s consent argument (Albertson & Guiler, 2020; Anderson et al., 2005; Berlinski et al., 2021; Przeworski, 1991; Riker, 1983). When subjects’ confidence in clean and fair elections in the U.S. is undermined in the study (the treatment condition), they respond with a higher propensity to endorse violent mobilization. The findings also underscore the critical role of political elites as influencers of rank-and-file partisan attitudes about political violence. Exposure to politician allegations that rivals are cheating, Republican subjects respond with increased support for political violence. This is consistent with findings by Kalmoe (2014) and Kalmoe and Mason (2022b), previously referenced. Finally, the study identifies a mediator that helps to better explain why allegations of election fraud prompt partisans to endorse the sue of political violence. The effect of fraud allegations on support for political violence work, in part, because such allegations activate hostilities and mistrust of racial and ethnic outgroups among Republican subjects. This finding adds to the literature that identifies hostility toward racial, ethnic, and religious outgroups as important features of Republican attitudes (exemplified by, among others, Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Jardina & Ollerenshaw, 2022). It also conforms to the expectations of integroup conflict theory outlined by Brewer (1999) and attendant empirical findings showing that violent extremism is driven, in part, by fear of loss of sociopolitical status to minorities (see Kunst et al., 2018; Thomsen et al., 2014).

Though the findings of the mediation test identify mistrust of members of different racial and religious groups as an important mediator, the percent mediated (25%) also indicates that mistrust of the other does not tell the whole story. The findings suggest that there are other potential mediators yet to be tested. This study provides a first cut. Future research may search for other prospective mediators.²² Moreover, the study was fielded before recent salient events that may have changed, perhaps even intensified, the effects found the in the study. These include the hearings and release of the final report of the U.S. House of Representatives select committee to investigate the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol, the 2022 U.S. midterm elections in which several prominent election deniers ran for office, and the 2024 U.S. Presidential election. These recent events have shaped and perhaps hardened attitudes among Republicans about election fraud which could be studied in an updated fielding of the experiment.

Conclusion

In summary, in the study I find that U.S. Republican partisans are more likely to endorse the use of political violence when they are led to believe by political elites that Democrats cheat in elections. They do so because the allegations of Democrats cheating stimulates and reinforces mistrust of racial, ethnic, and religious “others” that are understood to be an important part of the Democratic party’s voter base. Once these racist and xenophobic attitudes are engaged, endorsement of political violence becomes more likely. This process is important to understand from a security standpoint. A wealth of studies (summarized aptly by Kalmoe, 2014) illustrates that expression of support for political violence and its normalization as an attitude is a key ingredient for actual political violence by individuals. The findings in the study may also have implications for ongoing debates on whether various items such as intolerance, prejudice, affective polarization, rigidity, illiberal preferences, and ideological biases are symmetrical or asymmetrical between Republicans and Democrats in the United States.²³ While the study does not determine that Republicans are more likely to support political violence than Democrats, it does find that Republicans are more likely to be triggered by allegations of rival partisan electoral misconduct than Democrats.

Moreover, the experience of the January 6, 2021, violent insurrection at the U.S. Capitol underscores the importance of understanding the role played by irresponsible allegations of election malfeasance by political elites on fomenting political violence by outgoing U.S. President Donald J. Trump. On that day Trump addressed a large, angry gathering of his supporters on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. Repeating an unfounded allegation that he made repeatedly in the runup and aftermath of the 2020 presidential election, Trump charged that his opponent had cheated. In his remarks, Trump touched upon several themes: that the 2020 presidential election was fraudulent²⁴ and that fraud was endemic in U.S. elections generally;²⁵ that unlike his supporters,²⁶ his political opponents and the people who vote for them were nefarious and not real Americans;²⁷ and that his supporters needed to “fight” to save their country (Naylor, 2021).²⁸

It is striking that all of these assertions by Trump during his speech on January 6 fold neatly into the main argument of the paper: Claims of election fraud by Democrats to a receptive Republican audience. Divisive language that reinforces ingroup love and outgroup hate. Demonization of “others” including noncitizens or foreigners. A call to the use of violence. At the close of his speech, Trump urged the crowd to walk to the Capitol building where they then engaged in a violent siege that culminated in seven deaths, hundreds of injuries, including the injury of 138 police officers, more than 700 arrests and an estimated 3 to 30 million dollars in property damage and cleanup costs (Zou & Logan, 2022). This episode illustrates, in conspicuous detail, the consequences when political elites violate loser’s consent. In making (in this case, unfounded) allegations of election cheating against ideological rivals, coupled with language plays upon rivals’ “otherness,” they run the risk of fomenting political violence.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Allegations of Democratic Election Fraud and Support for Political Violence Among Republicans

Supplemental Material for Allegations of Democratic Election Fraud and Support for Political Violence Among Republicans by James Piazza in American Politics Research

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received financial support for this study from The McCourtney Institute for Democracy at The Pennsylvania State University.

ORCID iD

James Piazza

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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