Interpreting the Political,Politicizing Interpretation: Doing Politically Sensible Social Science Research

Abstract

The article outlines a methodological concept of political sensibility, building upon the political difference theory. Merging the ideas of the associative and dissociative theoretical branches of political difference literature, first, an integrated framework of the political condition is presented. From this, analytical dimensions are derived, namely, the associative/dissociative, the political/apolitical/discontentious, the static/processual, and the vertical/horizontal dimensions of the political. Second, the interpretive and ontological turns in social science are conceptualized, according to this framework, as a politicization of science. Taking this motion further, third, ideas to enact a politically sensible science are developed along the methodologically turned dimensions (merging the second and the third to an acknowledging/acting dimension). A political sensibility could deliver analytical categories to look upon political phenomena beyond structurally limited conceptions of “politics.” Methodologically, it could ease designing situated social science research, that is, research that consciously conceives of itself as part of the social realities it studies.

As a political scientist being interested in protest and civil society activism, trying to interact directly with interlocutors always seemed quite an intuitive methods approach to me, as movements and mobilization unfold within peoples’ lived experiences and often do not produce any representational and/or official documentation of their own. Thus, I delved into the field of political ethnography. Its authors regard their scholarly activities as approaching politics with a so-called ethnographic sensibility (see, for example, Jourde, 2009), putting an emphasis on experiencing fields of research and inquiring “lived experiences and meaning-making practices” of their inhabitants (Fu & Simmons, 2021, p. 12; see also Emerson et al., 2011; Wedeen, 2009). Ethnography, in this view, denominates a certain processual quality of doing research, of formulating a research interest, of approaching fields and people, and of representing reality (see Schatz, 2009a, 2009b), rather than a distinct set of methods.

As much as I came to like that approach, starting to reflect a little deeper two things came to puzzle me about it: First, why to do an ethnography as a political scientist, without any of the training and experience ethnologists and anthropologists have? Or: How could my discipline add anything to that project? And second, is political ethnography understood correctly as doing ethnography on politics (thoughtfully: Pachirat, 2009, p. 143f.)? If ethnography is not only an ontic endeavor, what could be the quality of the political in political ethnography? Is there something like a political sensibility to be applied in doing research?

Interpreting the Political

What’s the area of responsibility, the “discipline,” of political science? The textbook that was used in my master’s program says: The “scientifical” (i.e., “distanced” and “objective”) study of politics (Stykow et al., 2010, p. 15). Most commonly, politics is conceptualized as the entities of the state and its institutions (etatistic concepts), the arts of governing (governmental concepts), ¹ or the totality of human action related to the struggle for power ² and control (power-concepts) (Vollrath, 1989; see also Hawkesworth, 2006). These conceptions are reflected in a disciplinary focus of political science research toward the study of “high data” (Weldes, 2006) or “government documents”— that is, the official manifestations of powerful politics actors—historically rooted in a perpetuated “western” political philosophy (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006a). ³

This could be said to problematically narrow the field of political science: Evidentially, it marginalizes the study of discontentious and non-institutionalized politics. ⁴ Put differently, it reduces political science research to the study of an ontically clipped subfield of what could be identified, ontologically, as being political.

That the term politics does indeed not capture the entirety of what can be denominated as being political is the topic of recent theoretical discussions on the political difference (e.g., Arendt, 1994; Arndt, 2013; Mouffe, 2011; Rancière, 1999; Vollrath, 2003). ⁵ Authors in this field largely agree that politics and the political have to be differentiated and that methodologically, this differentiation can be based upon an ontological consideration of both terms. Thus, they all, contrary to the conceptualizations of politics brought up above, search for a particular political quality in social life that would guide the denomination of certain social practices as politics.

Broadly, the political difference branch conceives of every instance as potentially political that (a) addresses the organization of social, that is, in some sense collective, life, and (b) necessitates the making of decisions that (c), inherit an impossibility of ultimate justification. This constellation, (d), leads to some form of discourse and/or conflict, with its agents taking on, individually and/or collectively, (e), a positioning and/or group formation and/or institutionalization.

Some authors, proceeding from Arendt’s conception of the “associative political“ (Marchart, 2007, pp. 38ff.), view the political as a shared sphere of collective freedom, as an instituted place for open discourse, and as a norm by which the real existing politics practices would have to be measured. These practices are imagined as a symbolic foundation of political life, incorporating an ideal of consensus-oriented parliamentary democracy (see Bedorf, 2010; originally: Arendt, 1994; Vollrath, 2003). On the other hand, some authors take Schmitt’s early conception of the political as a “dissociative“ (Marchart, 2007, pp. 41ff.) condition of antagonistically opposed identities, as the starting point to conceive of the political as a room of identitary distinction, hegemony, disruption, and conflict (Bedorf, 2010; originally: Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2011; Rancière, 1999). Between these two orientations, there are strikingly different underlying beliefs with regard to the question of whether there is any common world, in which all political agents reside together or not (on the concept of “multiple ontologies,” see Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017, pp. 39ff.). ⁶ While the associative camp repeatedly bases their unified political imagery on Greek philosophy and a grand West-European history narration (Arendt, 1994; Vollrath, 2003; but also Rancière, 1999), advocates of dissociative approaches meet the Western liberal democratic status quo as such in a rather confrontative way, distancing themselves from Schmitt’s nazistic ideological standpoint though (see, for example, Arndt, 2013; Mouffe, 2011).

For my conception of political sensibility, I want to bridge both streams of the debate. Association and antagonism, in such a conception, are categories of differentiation of certain politics practices, but either do not constitute the political condition in itself, as outlined above.

I presuppose that collectivity has a quality on its own that looks beyond the sum of its parts, that is, the singular individuals forming a group. ⁷ Moreover, I maintain that people do have agency, that is, they are able to make decisions willfully, within the always contingent, complex realm of social life. This means that in a political difference perspective people are to be held responsible for their decisions, as (from this perspective!) there is no greater mechanism, plan, or fate justifying them (or, at least, we could not know about it). This does not forescribe that people themselves act within that same mindset, setting aside, for example, their religious or moral beliefs. Not making that notion, however, I think would just preclude describing reasonably any action as being political (and not, for example, theological, rational, moral, etc.). And I think that there are, from a scientifical point of view, some reality-based arguments that speak for considering ultimate justification as impossible within the realm of human collectivity: First, considering the complexity and fundamental indeterminacy of real social life, neither is it possible to access and manage the entirety of information about any particular problem, nor does anybody have the (proven) ability to foresee the future. Another factor is the sometimes inescapable incommensurability and incomparability of personal, ideological, social, cultural (and so on) values and interests (Clarke et al., 2015; de la Cadena, 2010). This necessitates at some point the making of decisions: Whether unconsciously or consciously, whether imposedly or horizontally deliberated, when there is no ultimate “right“ way to go, we have to decide which road to take at some point. That moment of making a decision, of opting for one and thereby excluding other options, can indeed be read as a moment of exercising power (see Mouffe, 2011, p. 11). As I would, thus, not subscribe to any universalist notion of deliberate consensus (going with Mouffe here), I take issue with antagonistic identity concepts inspired by the Schmitt’ian friend-foe patterns (e.g., Laclau, 2005; see also Mouffe, 2011, pp. 14ff.). I think the incommensurability of political world(-view)s does not necessarily implicate stubborn selfing and othering dichotomies ⁸ ; contingency could also be acknowledged as a modality of political life per se, opening up the question of processing that contingency to political discourse (see Arndt, 2013).

Politics, thus, consists of much more than the moments of decision: In my conception, it is the whole process of coming to societal decisions—from processing contingency to making up an agenda, over group formation and positioning to decision-making, and finally through evaluation and revision toward new contingent politics subjects. One could say, if the political is the ontological condition described above, politics is the entirety of processes and practices enacting it. Polities are all collectivities and individuals involved in that process. ⁹ Building upon diverse values, interests, identities, and norms, the different concepts for putting up, viewing, or resolving the political matter under question could be conceived of as policies or programs. Besides the outward contents of political programs, thus also the loci and modi of doing politics are political questions that do not have ultimately justifiable solutions. ¹⁰

Differentiating between the political as an ontological condition of social life and politics as its real-life enactment makes possible some more analytical differentiations: One is between political and apolitical politics: ¹¹ A political attitude in politics, I would say, is well captured by the famous quote by Evelyn Beatrice Hall: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” Political politics acknowledges contingency and gives room for representing it. On the contrary, claiming ultimate justification upon political decisions, as often done within power structures, ¹² obscures the contingent character of social life and thereby de-politicizes politics. ¹³ Such apolitical politics can be found in autocratic systems, where the political sphere is deprived of its diversity by a ruling individual or group (see Vollrath, 2003), in ideologically laden hegemonic structures, where decisions are submitted to an objectivized logic (Mouffe, 2011), ¹⁴ and in bureaucracy and technocracy, where differences between people and positions are legalistically or scientifically pushed out of the public sphere into the individualistic private (A Phenomenology Collective, 2020, Arendt, 1994; Mouffe, 2011). In its extreme form, apolitical politics can become antipolitical politics, actively suppressing notions of political contingency. On the other end, protest or discontentious politics obtain vital importance as politicizing processes (Arndt, 2013, pp. 132ff.): They by character bring to the fore the contingency of political decisions considered being relevant for the collective and actualize the record of political opportunities (policy, the political, see de la Cadena, 2010; Jackson, 2006; Weldes, 2006). They break the link between direction and response within an institutionalized social surrounding, disclosing and opening up the construction of social order to ordinary individuals (politics, see Edwards, 2014, pp. 213ff.), and forming new polity collectivities (Abăseacă & Pleyers, 2019; de la Cadena, 2010). ¹⁵

With regard to the associative–dissociative argumentative tension, I would say, the associative conception captures a somewhat static account of political politics (which it poses as an ideal state) and views another somewhat static account of apolitical politics as its conditional other. The dissociative approach, on the other hand, seems more suitable to make sense of politicization and de-politization processes, putting a higher emphasis on conflict and hegemony (and idealizing on its part the political struggle and identity conflict). While the first, this way, becomes blind for its own conception’s apolitical tendencies, ¹⁶ authors of the latter—while providing analytical categories for it—seem to have a blind spot in considering the “not-so-nice“ discontentious movements of our times (see below).

This is why I want to make another analytical differentiation the political difference perspective allows for: Particular policies and programs can be categorized as horizontal arguments, representing and substantiating different stances toward the topic under question, ¹⁷ and vertical (a- or even antipolitical) discursive moves, which are intended to shift an agent’s ability to impact decision-making (i.e., their hierarchical power position). ¹⁸ While horizontal argumentation, if addressed at collective organization, can always be considered as being political, with the vertical moves, matters stand a bit more complex: Considering inequalities in resource distribution and power, there is a difference to be drawn between bottom-up and top-down vertical moves. And this differentiation is not at all trivial, as it has to tackle the intersectionality of discrimination and privilege as well as the tension between individual and structural power and resources. ¹⁹ The act of claiming objectivity within a political sphere could, however, always be contested to be a vertical move, aimed at de-politicizing the debate (see Mouffe, 2011, pp. 56ff.).

Being sensible toward the differentiations explained so far, I argue, could help to have a more thorough view of political phenomena, in political science as well as in other scientifical disciplines. The entirety of these phenomena is not inquirable, only deductively assessing official documents and policy outcomes, and institution’s experts are not the only viable address to be asked about the sometimes non-public, non-institutionalized, micro-dynamics of politics, understood that way (Horak & Spitaler, 2002; on “infrapolitics,” see Bayard de Volo, 2009). Methods and sources thus have to be diversified. Moreover, the ontological search for the political provides analytical categories, enabling the study of politics beyond the status quo and its real existing power structures (see Hawkesworth, 2006). Thus, it can be said to be “about creating the conditions under which one can ‘see’ things [. . .] that one would not otherwise have been able to see” (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017, p. 4; see also de la Cadena, 2010). Questioning mainstream demarcations of politics means opening up the search for instantiations of the political, which is why it can be viewed as a methodological—and not “only” a metaphysical or theoretical!—intervention to political science research.

Politicizing Interpretation

Political rulers have different terms of claiming and securing their say in societal decision-making, and beyond using rough violence, most of them inherit claiming some form of ultimate justification. ²⁰

I think there is an interesting parallel to practices of claiming power in institutional politics in some claims for “objectivity” present in social science. Within political sciences, the attempt to make “value-free,” “rational,” “objective,” “valid,” and “generalizable” descriptions, explanations, and predictions about the political world is widespread (see Stykow et al., 2010; critical: Hawkesworth, 2006; Mihic et al., 2005, Weldes, 2006). Methods, within such science conceptions, can be chosen “rationally” (see Schatz, 2009a), ²¹ implicating also a hierarchization of findings: If method and observer are rational, then chaotic, heterogeneous, and indeterminate evidence has to be conceived of as deviance or anomaly (Arendt, 1994, pp. 42f.; Horak & Spitaler, 2002; Jackson, 2006).

However, evidentially researchers can and do—more or less consciously and explicitly—take rather varied perspectives upon ontological and epistemological questions (see, for example, Steinmetz, 2005). ²² Interpretivists conceptualize this methodological indeterminacy: Taking issue with positivist science conceptions, that perspective commends the acknowledgment of human agency ²³ and with that of the unpredictabilities of social life, that is, contingency. Causality is understood as a spectrum of human and social reasoning, the ways people have to make sense of their surroundings and orient themselves within it, and make decisions. ²⁴ The interpretivitist researcher conceives of themself as one situated agent within reality (see Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Yanow, 2006). ²⁵

The possibility of grasping any set, “factual” truth—that is, the researcher’s potential ability of ultimate scientifical justification—is neglected by this scientific conception. That could be viewed as discontentiously politicizing scientific reasoning, as it opens up a space of possibilities regarding the contents, loci, and modi of scientifical meaning-making (see Jackson, 2006, p. 268). Assuming that only “true” objectivity, as long as one believes in that possibility, would be able to unify methods by reason, embracing the politicalness of science means to acknowledge the self-sustaining methodological interconnectedness of ontology and epistemology, of theory and method, and of methodology and research representation (see Emerson et al., 2011, p. 15; also Barad, 2010).

This frames research design—from the choice of a problem to publication—as a process of decision-making (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006b, p. 210), holding, thus, the researcher responsible for these decisions and disqualifying any objectivity claims in science as vertical moves. Putting that theoretical framework in motion, the branch of political science could become to be seen, methodologically, as being a political science.

On behalf of the methodological interventions of the ontological turn (see, for example, Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017), ²⁶ I think one could even intensify the implications of interpretivism, in a politically sensible way: Anthropological and science-technological works indicate a deepening of the interpretivist notion of “epistemic cultures” plurality (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 37), ²⁷ toward ontologically questioning the universality of formations as time/space (Barad, 2010; St. Pierre, 2018), subject/object (Barad, 2010; Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017; de la Cadena, 2010), cause/effect (Barad, 2010), construction/deconstruction (Bhattacharya, 2021; St. Pierre, 2018), straight/queer (A Phenomenology Collective, 2020), universe/pluriverse (de la Cadena, 2010; Mouffe, 2011), and so on. This goes, in the political difference language, beyond methodological policy, in uncovering and/or un/learning (Bhattacharya, 2021) and/or criticizing epistemic power structures and opening up the potential polity, as well as the very notion of being scientifical. Moreover, deepening the question of interpretative practice, one could state that finding and selecting questions, defining modes, positioning within the discourse, and “keeping its horizon open” ²⁸ (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017, pp. ix–x)—becoming a political scientist, so to say—necessitate positive methodological concepts, too.

Designing Politically Sensible Research

So, how to become a politically sensible researcher, and how to design politically sensible research? Building upon the political difference and ontological interpretation framework introduced above, one could say it is all about finding ways of processing the alterity ²⁹ (see Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017, pp. 293ff.) of the political and politics within scientifical research. That is, to acknowledge ontologically the political condition, and, interpenetratingly, to act politically and scientifically throughout the research process—which means to make responsible, reflexive decisions, to make these decisions transparent, to argue for them, and revise them if necessary. And this includes questions of what to see, how to approach it, how to represent it, by whom, with whom, and with which intentions and effects upon society.

A presuppositional statement I want to make plain is that I conceive of science as of a grounded orientation ³⁰ within reality, this being its function and practice at once or its value in itself. This conception aims to liberate research from the rule, as any vertical inequalities stand in the ways of free, content-wise (horizontal) argumentation and thinking. ³¹ This inherits some form of societal critique, as nowadays reality is evidentially shaped by power structures, and if science is inextricably situated within that social reality, it has to face these structures as obstacles to its very own interest.

Acknowledging/acting

As was said in the previous chapter, (intensified) interpretivist, as well as ontological and deconstructionist methodological approaches, could be viewed as opening up the methodological horizon, discontentiously politicizing positivist but also more generally exclusionist (universalist, colonialist, etc.) mainstream approaches to social sciences. These approaches, thus, point to a heightened acknowledgment of methodological as well as social worlds’ diversity, contingency, and indeterminacy. They foster what Holbraad and Pedersen (2017) emphasize as the task of “turning” presuppositions, analysis, and evidence: to remain open for all kinds of sources, evidence, and sensemaking and to remain critically conscious toward one’s own ways of doing research.

In interpretivism, reflexivity in sensemaking is conceptualized, methodologically, in iteration ³² and abduction ³³ (see Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012), whereas, for example, in post-qualitative approaches, there seems to be an animadversion toward such conceptualization of methods (see, for example, St. Pierre, 2018). However, whether explicated or not, within a politically sensible framework, deconstruction can easily be understood as a concept of its own, one that goes, indeed, beyond the level of arguing about research policies and tackles methodological structures, instead. ³⁴ Thus, I would remark that the somewhat mystical or at least very broad conceptions of the “posts” should not be let off the hook to explain what they are doing, instead of only telling what they are not. ³⁵ Processing alterity means taking scientifical decisions, which means enacting moments of power, which may seem controversial in the first place (see, for example, Bhattacharya, 2021, p. 181), but in my understanding poses the very quality of a political sensibility: Acknowledging contingency as well as the necessity to perpetually limit it, making agential decisions, I argue that being conscious and sensible toward that area of tension limits decision-making to (inevitable) moments of power and authority while being attentive at apolitical tendencies toward hegemony and/or rule. ³⁶

To act on behalf of acknowledging contingency, and to acknowledge on behalf of acting within it, can take various forms of enacting reflexivity and responsibility. The first touches more upon explaining terms, concepts, and presuppositions (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, pp. 51f.) to make the particular meaning(s) ascribed to them transparent to the audience. Also, the methodological framework of a project, with its theories and methods concepts, has to fit its particular purposes (Holbraad & Pedersen, 2017, p. 22)—which also needs to be made as transparent as possible—as again the political difference approach should make us skeptical toward any notion of universal functionality the science system is ascribed to (see Mihic et al., 2005; Schatz, 2009b).

Responsibility can be enacted through experience, ³⁷ confrontation, ³⁸ conceptualization, ³⁹ assemblage, ⁴⁰ diffraction, ⁴¹ and experimentation. ⁴² It means to represent carefully the indeterminacies, uncertainties, and contingencies experienced during the research (Emerson et al., 2011). Taking on scientifical responsibility, of course, means that any representations of research are exposed to argument—and, possibly, to critique and revision. Embracing a potentially controversial discourse, however, I would answer, for example, to Bhattacharya’s (2021) qualms, enriches reality-orientation: It forces the researcher to think through and be clear about their own positions, and it diversifies and intensifies collective reflection and is, thus, fervently desirable for political science. ⁴³

On the layer of “field reality,” acknowledging and enacting alterity can take forms of activist science, too. If science is understood as embedded in society, and if knowledge generation is, simultaneously, situated in society, science methodology’s closeness to its fields of interest can range from taking a distant, observing, maybe enclosing, stance, to co-creation, collaboration, critical theory, and actual activism. From this perspective, political science could, broadening the range of voices heard, indeed also be aimed to serve emancipatory and critical scientifical purposes (see Clarke et al., 2015; Horak & Spitaler, 2002; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). ⁴⁴

Association/dissociation

Deriving from the associative/dissociative dimension in the political difference framework, the question here is whether one’s research is pointed toward creating or perpetuating common spaces of discourse and decision or whether one is trying to confrontatively differentiate and group distinct stances and/or identities—or even both at a time.

Considering the associative part of doing science, on a theoretical and/or structural level, common spaces are usually built upon disciplinary, field-oriented, or particular theoretical branches. Association is communicated within literature reviews, media of publication, theoretical discourses, educational subjects, and institutional affiliation of researchers. Nowadays real-existing academia this way can build upon common canons of thinking, which, stepping aside from any idealized imaginary of “free science,” is structured alongside historically rooted global hegemony and its discriminatory patterns. ⁴⁵ This is mirrored in Mouffe’s critique of liberal theoretical thinking, which she accuses of excluding any deviant approaches by universalist morality and a generalized logic of societal progress, which renders enemies (and not adversaries) anyone not subscribing to the values set by liberalism (Mouffe, 2011). ⁴⁶ De la Cadena intensifies this notion, stating that this allegedly associative logic of “consensus” even renders some people not even worthy of being enemies because of their ways of thinking, living, and doing politics (de la Cadena, 2010, p. 360). These arguments, I would say, should lead to a careful consideration of associative methodologies, regarding the questions: Whom do I associate with? On which grounds? And: How?

Association, to be clear, does not necessarily mean consent. It can be understood as the practice of joining the discussion and as acknowledging a topic’s common importance for the collective—as identifying as polity. ⁴⁷ Thus, the association can work as an emancipatory matter: One may associate to a discourse, to make their voices heard here (policy), to discuss and widen its ways of doing politics, or to enrich polity. ⁴⁸ Or one may associate with a collectivity to share resources and empower. Associating could also mean to actively include, that is, to invite outward collectivities to join in an associative space. Acting associatively thus references to certain practices of self-identification, inclusion, and co-creation, as, for example, creating spaces for collaborative working, including interlocutors in research, ⁴⁹ promoting interdisciplinary work, and engaging in meta-discussions on theories of science and methodology. Associating on behalf of reality-orientation means to let other people and views change oneself’s own conceptions of reality, and to do this collectively, responsibly, and reflexively (as does, for example, de la Cadena, 2010).

Dissociation can be practiced on different layers of the political framework: Its logics can serve the grouping and differentiation of stances within a common political space. In its highest intensities, dissociation can mean to leave or deny the association at all or to aim for destroying its grounds. As the intentions of dissociation cannot be evaluated from the outside, they thus have to be made transparent. Dissociative methods can be aimed at disclosing verticality and hegemony, giving voice, and changing social theory (as-practice) ⁵⁰ and practice (as-theory). ⁵¹ They include deconstruction/reconstruction, discontentious experimentation, ⁵² “flight,” ⁵³ “misbehavior,” ⁵⁴ “resistance,” ⁵⁵ and countering or confrontation ⁵⁶

The association/dissociation spectrum obviously touches upon sensible topics of identity and privilege. While I can try to dissociate from the “empire” or “western” hegemony, or to associate with its outsides, I cannot escape my situatedness within it, or my descent from it, which is why I should not deny it (see also Bhattacharya, 2021, p. 182). As a politically sensible researcher, this hits me, as it poses a real-world obstacle to doing science. The notion has to be taken seriously and has to be turned into methodology: How to process unequal relations when trying to orient within that reality? And how to act, even when being identified as a part of the globally privileged, to overcome it?

Horizontality

This leads toward considering the horizontal/vertical dimension of political sensibility. If science is, as mentioned above, seen as a valuable practice of its own, then its discourses are, other than is the case within overall politics, normatively limited to horizontal argumentation. ⁵⁷ That means to put in motion a careful differentiation between legitimate authorization of arguments—here, focusing on the question of scientifical legitimacy—and the practices and heuristics of vertical domination (attempts).

Notions of contingency acknowledgment and politicized interpretation can indeed be abused to claim scientifical credibility, for example, by conspirationists, as well as religious and ideological fanatics, and by economic interest (Allina-Pisano, 2009, p. 53; McIntyre, 2018). Fake news and alternative facts are real, as they do exist and they do impact societal action. However, content-wise, they operate with scientifically non-qualified, and sometimes non-qualifiable, claims of rightfulness. This has to be differentiated when (a) their advocates are trying to vertically claim scientifical authority and (b) when advocates of the objectivity of their own hegemonic approaches are trying to use such attempts as a knockout argument against politically sensible discussants (as does, for example, McIntyre, 2018, pp. 123ff.). ⁵⁸ Conspiracy theory, religious, strategical, and ideological narratives have, one might argue, in common that they lack a reality connection of their accounts, as, for example, conspirationist secret circles by definition cannot be trustworthily experienced. Accordingly, most interpretivists would agree that we can scientifically make sense of even a contingently framed reality, as “Theoretical presuppositions structure the perceptions of events,” “but they do not create perceptions out of nothing” (Hawkesworth, 2006, p. 38).

However, abuse of scientifical authority-claiming, as stated above, is not only an outside phenomenon of academia. Any societal decision, also regarding research, does have an effect on general social reality (see Clarke et al., 2015, p. 20; Milan, 2014, p. 446), and many authors point to the heuristic effects that objectivity claims from scientists have in providing means for securing hegemonic power (generally: Kluczewska, 2018; Nicholas & Hollowell, 2007). ⁵⁹ Thus, associating scientifical means for putting up the horizontal argument, on the one hand, means finding methodological standards to qualify science as science, that is, putting in motion reflexivity and responsibility. On the other hand, it means de/colonizing (and dissociating) the hegemonic body of science, in reality, ⁶⁰ delving into the field of research ethics:

As mentioned already, politically sensible scientifical research has to contain some positioning regarding the researcher’s and their project’s situatedness (see Holmes, 2021; Nicholas & Hollowell, 2007, p. 77). Much has been written in this regard about desirable forms of relationships between researcher and researched, ⁶¹ while I would note that this distinction has to be seen as an analytical one. More generally, there is also some demand to reflect upon the researcher’s position in their fields: The situated researcher has to become aware that their personal characteristics may have a significant impact upon field access (Pachirat, 2009; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012) and that their presence is going to influence the group constellation being studied (Bayard de Volo, 2009; Horak & Spitaler, 2002). Particularly important for effectuating politically sensible research here is that the researcher’s background and the field studied most likely are shaped by patterns of hegemony (see Walsh, 2009; Yanow, 2006; with emphasis on online spaces: Kozinets, 2015, pp. 32ff.; Mercea, 2016, p. 223). They thus need to make efforts to make these power structures visible, position toward them, make choices, and make them transparent. ⁶² What is mentioned less often in the literature is the ethical stance the researcher takes toward themself, dealing with their own personal and moral limits (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, chap. 2) or scientifical scope (Elgesem, 2015), and toward their own academic home, for example, facing the question of how to leave fields for future researchers (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, chap. 6), or having to deal with its institutional limitations (see Katz, 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Last but not least, ethical reflections contain some thought about the possible societal impacts of the research project: On the system of knowledge production, the implications for the collectivities that use scientifically authoritative knowledge to make decisions or are impacted by these, and on the repercussions of the research process for society (Kluczewska, 2018, p. 39; Milan, 2014).

There are no universal and neat guidelines to right and wrong here, and ethical considerations often clash: For instance, when the values of the researcher differ from the values of interlocutors (Wing, 1989). Also, the somewhat ethical scope of providing the world with good research may clash with considerations of ethical behavior toward interlocutors (see, for example, Heise & Schmidt, 2014). Another pressing issue is how to position ethic research toward legal requirements (see, for example, Katz, 2006). ⁶³

I want to remark that “wanting the best” can be ethically the most problematic if this leads to acting paternalistically on the behalf of others or universalizing the own conceptions of that best unreflectedly or simply precluding good outcomes to follow from good intention (Jackson, 2006). Especially, if researchers exhibit features of privilege, these can result in what Pachirat called the “most ironic form of silencing”: Of identifying with a made-up view “from below” (Pachirat, 2009, p. 157). ⁶⁴ This, as well as “trickling down” resources, does not fulfill the above-mentioned criterion of letting oneself be changed by the allegedly other.

Any decision for the overall problem and question I pose, but as well for my theoretical and methodological standpoints, methods, and ways of communication, ⁶⁵ of course reflects my scientifical, philosophical, and logical convictions. But moreover, it also reflects my very own normative belief, for example, with regard to social equality—that is, ethical decisions are most often inevitably normative and political. This means, also ethically, a researcher has to deal with the concept of responsibility (see Barad, 2010, p. 264) and reflexivity (see above). A neglect of power, within that methodological framework, is unfeasible. This is to be underlined, as neglecting one’s own situatedness in existing power structures sometimes serves to evade moral conflicts at all (see Nicholas & Hollowell, 2007, pp. 76f.).

Whenever a decision within a contingent surrounding is made, power is exercised. However, and that is the point, this can be legitimated authoritatively (e.g., by arguments of quality and ethics) or vertically, building upon either violence or (structurally violent) existing hegemony. Thus, striving for horizontality in scientifical argumentation has not much to do with relativism, as it requires processing the above-mentioned tensions between acknowledging indeterminacy and limiting argumentation and between idealized imageries of association and dissociating the real existing power machine.

I think that the political sensibility framework introduced above could deliver a framework for reflecting and enhancing research quality, beyond the existing criteria of good knowledge and training, ⁶⁶ delineating horizontal, reality-bound accounts of quality. Considering failure, it allows to differentiate “falsehood“—to be unemotionally subjected to revision—from “willful ignorance,” and “lying“ (see McIntyre, 2018, pp. 7f.), being disqualified from scientifical discourse. ⁶⁷ And this, indeed, not by contrasting it to any set criterion of “truth,” ⁶⁸ but methodologically, by making visible its lack of reflexivity, responsibility, or horizontality.

As may have become clear, quality and ethics mutually define each other: A high-quality research design must incorporate an elaborate account of research ethics throughout the whole research process, and the best ethics concept is pointless without putting an eye on doing valuable scientifical research (see Barad, 2010, p. 265; DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010, chap. 11).

Designing politically sensible research means to place oneself tacking back and forth between acknowledgment and action, association and dissociation, to perpetually reflect and take on responsibility, always striving to put up horizontal argumentation.

Toward Political Inquiry

Entering the field of political ethnography through the political science door, the first one gets confronted with a set of methods and methodological approaches quite uncommon for their discipline. But making the familiar strange, so to say, and applying ethnographic sensibility and the concepts brought to the fore by the interpretive and ontological turns to it, what became clear to me is that the meanings of too often taken-for-granted terms such as politics or the political are not a “mere” theoretical or philosophical question of definition.

Theories of the political difference can indeed widen one’s potential fields of research and deliver analytical categories to look upon, inquire, describe, and explain political phenomena beyond structurally limited conceptions of “politics.” This is the theoretical part of what political theory thought can add to the field of political ethnography—and, I would state, also to many other fields of qualitative social science research. Moreover, this theoretical argument, using ethnographic, interpretive, or anthropological concepts, can be turned methodologically into what I would call a conceptualized political sensibility.

Doing politically sensible research means applying the thought of an ontological political condition to social science methodology, or to let this thought shift the ways of doing one’s research. And here, I think, political and ethnographic sensibilities can be combined astonishingly fruitful: Acknowledging the contingency of social reality as well as the need to act within it fit well the conception of research as a situated, reflexive endeavor with a focus on meaning-making: Both branches build upon human agency, and both conceive of causality as a function of such agency rather than any objectively determinable mechanism. The principles of situatedness and the political condition, taken together, position research as a political practice of its own, raising questions of ethical responsibility. Viewing research ethics through such a situated-political lens, I would say, deliberates ethical discussions of the accusation to “only” tackle questions of morality: If acting political as a researcher is no longer viewed as an activist stance or even a bias, but as an inescapable condition of social science research, then taking ethical positions becomes a matter of scientifical quality. Reflecting one’s own positionalities and confronting it with other views fits the reality-orientation and reflexivity scopes of science as well as notions of contingency and the areas of tension in association/dissociation, acknowledging/acting, process/state, and horizontality/verticality. It enhances diversifying and decolonizing scientifical meaning-making and at the same time escapes rampant relativism, as political sensibility, besides the notions of diversity, multifacetedness, and the pluriverse, always minds the decision and argumentation dimension within social discourse.

Thus, political ethnography as well as many other politically interested social science endeavors could be understood, methodologically, as being deeply political, as enacting a political quality of their own.

If science is limited to research reflecting powerful world-conceptions, categories, and judgments, any (culturally, socially, philosophically, normatively. . .) other perspectives on reality become hard to describe. ⁶⁹ Moreover, politically irreflexive research cannot reasonably handle the limitations of data and field access within the power structures it refuses to reflect. ⁷⁰

Thus, I hope the concept of political sensibility is helpful for anybody who views their research within the political realm and wishes to mirror that belonging methodologically. And I hope this framework helps to integrate ethnographical, anthropological, and other scientifical works with political interest, as quite some authors state a lack of deepened political reflection throughout disciplines (see de la Cadena, 2010; Horak & Spitaler, 2002; Kubik, 2009). Overall, I hope that such sensibility contributes to shifting nowadays real existing hegemony—while I am aware that my concept mirrors my own particular (and, viewed globally, strikingly privileged) descent. I will not give up on the conviction that flattening hegemony can and should happen from all directions—as power structures are complex, as the efforts of overcoming inequality cannot be put solely on the shoulders of those affected by it, and as I know from own experience that solidarity is not a function of material status only.

I think acknowledging social reality in its multifacetedness and diversity is a matter of academic work, of scientifically representing reality in its liveliness.