Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

What continuities and contradictions can qualitative researchers discern among versions of the grounded theory method? How do contradictions within the method affect research practice? How do new versions of grounded theory advance research practice and critical inquiry? To answer these questions, this keynote address begins with a brief overview of grounded theory for those who are unfamiliar with the method and subsequently discusses the continuities and contradictions between versions of the method. Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) uses the methodological strategies of the original version but builds on its pragmatist heritage, shifts its epistemological foundations, and resolves contradictions in earlier versions of the method. The result means placing grounded theory in the social constructionist tradition, viewing data as co-constructed with research participants, puncturing deeply held methodological preconceptions, and subsequently fostering a heightened methodological self-consciousness. The practice of CGT assists researchers in interrogating their data, nascent analyses, research actions, and themselves each step along the way. Subsequently, researchers can gain awareness of the pervasiveness of Anglo-North American worldviews throughout inquiry. CGT not only aids theorizing and defining and developing emergent critical questions during the research process but also brings power into purview.

Keywords

coding constructivist grounded theory epistemology methodological self-consciousness preconceptions reflexivity

Before beginning my discussion of grounded theory, let me tell you about Emily, a 34-year-old woman who had lost a considerable amount of weight after being heavy all her life. Emily had survived two serious episodes of a life-threatening illness. Consider her remarks the following interview excerpts:

Emily:

I started a diet that, uh, that, over the course of 6 months allowed me to lose 70 pounds.

KC:

Mmm!

Emily:

So, I’ve gone from just over 200 pounds to just under 130 pounds, in a very short amount of time.

KC:

Mmm!

Emily:

Uh, and, uh, that has been an enormous life change, I mean, obviously, but, uh, beyond that, uh, it’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience because I don’t know that person. Because it was, again, so quick. And, I have to say, it’s been reminiscent for me of my previous experience of having to reorient myself with who I am in a very physical way, as well as in an emotional way, because what I used to, I’ve always been overweight. This is the first time that I’ve had a normal BMI [body mass index], this is the first time that I’ve engaged in things like going on a run every day. Um, it’s been—it’s been unbelievable, to—to, to sort of be a different person, in a different body, and, therefore, living in a different world. Very different. (My emphases)

How Do We Make Sense of Such Statements?

I propose using grounded theory methods. For newcomers to grounded theory, and perhaps to qualitative research more generally, here is a definition. Grounded theory methods consist of a systematic approach to qualitative inquiry for the purpose of theory construction.¹ This method begins with inductive data and adopts key strategies for doing research. Since its earliest days when Glaser and Strauss (1967) created grounded theory, the method has emphasized data analysis. It does have implications for data collection, which are beginning to be articulated (Charmaz, 2014a, 2015b). Grounded theory uses comparative methods throughout the analysis, as I explain below. A major benefit of using grounded theory is that it inspires researchers’ continued involvement in the research process. In short, grounded theory is an interactive method from the beginning of the research through the last draft of the report.

Which strategies form the core of grounded theory? What continuities can we discern among versions of the method? What contradictions can we find between different versions of grounded theory? How do these contradictions affect research practice? How do new versions of grounded theory contribute to theorizing and to critical inquiry? and Which practices do we need to enact?

To answer these questions, I begin with a brief overview of grounded theory and the logic of its strategies for those who are unfamiliar with the method. Next, I argue that shifting the ontological and epistemological foundations of grounded theory to the constructivist version resolves contradictions in the method and strengthens it. Constructivist grounded theory (CGT) follows the inductive, emergent, open-ended, and iterative approach of Glaser and Strauss’s first statement of the method but goes further. CGT integrates developments in qualitative inquiry over the past 60 years and, moreover, treats data and theorizing about these data as constructed, not discovered.² Thus, I introduce how CGT rejects the positivist epistemology of earlier versions and builds on the pragmatist heritage of Strauss (1959, 1961, 1993). The result makes the method more flexible, places it in the social constructionist tradition, brings reflexivity into the forefront, and opens a path to critical inquiry.

Grounded theory means that we researchers consider and assess all possible theoretical understandings of our data, including our own new theoretical constructions. We develop tentative interpretations about the data through constructing codes, the labels we give fragments of data, and nascent theoretical categories, the abstract terms we construct to account for batches of data and clusters of codes. Then, we check and refine our major categories. We do that in several ways by (1) using our categories to comb through earlier data that we collected before defining the category, (2) returning to the field site(s) and gathering more data, and (3) building focused questions to flesh out our categories during later data collection.

What distinguishes grounded theorists from other researchers? Grounded theorists value theory construction over description, patterns in the data over individual stories, developing fresh concepts and theories over applying received theory, and theorizing processes over assuming stable structures. Grounded theorists view the contexts, situations, and actions constituting structures as shifting, as well as our responses to them.

Grounded theory is more than a specific method of qualitative analysis. It is a general method and its strategies have been generalized—and stretched over the decades. Questions about grounded theory supersede the method. Rather, current questions and challenges about grounded theory explicate issues pervading qualitative inquiry. Think about adopting British psychologists Henwood and Pigeon’s (2003) view of grounded theory. They see it as a useful nodal point where researchers can discuss and debate contemporary issues throughout qualitative inquiry.

Such discussions and debates raise fundamental questions about qualitative inquiry, how we should conduct it, which purposes it serves, as well as claims about what grounded theory really is, and whose versions should be followed. Grounded theory is a contested method from within and without. Despite being contested, grounded theory has become the most widely adopted qualitative method.

Nonetheless, researchers have often misunderstood and misused grounded theory. (Understand that what stands as misunderstanding and misusing the method flows from specific perspectives of it.) That said, tensions between its positivist and pragmatist roots have been evident from the beginnings of the method until the present. These tensions contribute to misunderstandings and have resulted in contradictions in the method and contested versions of it. Yet, the development of different versions of the method opens new spaces for integrating methodological advancements occurring over almost six decades.

What Continuities Are Discernible Between Versions of Grounded Theory?

Different Versions of Grounded Theory Rely on Similar Methodological Strategies

Essentially, grounded theory approaches are a constellation of methods (see also Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2010, 2014a). Proponents of various versions of grounded theory share certain common methodological strategies.

Grounded theorists of various persuasions subscribe to the following research practices (Charmaz, 2014a, 2015a), even if they do not consistently follow all of them:
Going back and forth between collecting and analyzing data—grounded theory is an iterative process.
Data collection sparks analysis.

Analysis focuses subsequent data collection.

In turn, grounded theorists conduct later data collection to refine and check their developing analyses.

Focusing on what is happening as Glaser (1978) prescribed—what are people doing? What do grounded theorists define as happening? They attend to emergent actions and processes that they identify in the data rather than rely on preconceived general topics, themes, and theories.
A major emphasis is on learning how processes develop and change.

From the beginning, grounded theorists think about conceptualizing what is happening.

Making comparisons throughout the research process is known as the constant comparative method.
Grounded theorists compare data with data, data with codes, codes with codes, and codes with categories.

Categories are emergent conceptual terms to account for the data and codes. Researchers can either raise a code to a category when the code possesses analytic power or create an abstract term that captures and conceptualizes descriptive codes. Analytic codes hold “carrying capacity” (Charmaz, 2014a, p. 247) to put it in Adele Clarke’s terms—turning such codes into categories raises the conceptual level of the analysis.

Through making comparisons, grounded theorists tease out the properties, dimensions, and boundaries of their categories and illuminate both visible and hidden processes.

Using data (e.g., narratives, descriptions, cases, and numbers) to create original conceptual categories. The focus in grounded theory is on the analysis. That said, grounded theorists need not be rigid about one style of presentation of the analysis. We also need to think about audiences and the purpose of our reports.

Creating inductive categories through systematic coding and memo writing. Coding means assigning an analytic term to a fragment of data, while memo-writing consists of writing about our codes, emerging categories, connections between these categories, and questions, concerns, and musings that arise along the way.

Concentrating on defining and elaborating a category or categories rather than addressing a specific empirical topic.

Constructing new theory rather than rely on applying existing theories.

Developing and checking theoretical ideas with later data.

Stating the implications for professional practice and public policy.

To give an idea of how grounded theory works in practice, recall Emily’s story when she tells about seeing her reflected image. How can we analyze Emily’s statements? What might we think is happening in these data? What does Emily mean when she says:
…It’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience, because I don’t know that person.
How might a grounded theorist code Emily’s statement? Although researchers analyze what is happening while interviewing and collecting data (Charmaz, 2015b), coding is generally acknowledged as the first major analytic strategy of grounded theory. In my view, coding is a heuristic device, it’s a way of seeing and defining our data. But these ways of seeing and defining reflect us as well as what we encounter in the empirical world. Coding is a way of engaging with data, a way of stretching our view, expanding knowledge, and raising questions. Codes do not reflect inherent truths. Instead, they reflect what we see and define at a particular point in time, and that may change. Hence, we can change the names we give our codes for a more telling term.

Initial Grounded Theory Codes Emily’s Interview Statement

Contextualizing concernJoining self and bodyStruggling to reconcile past and present images of body and selfCatching glimpses of new bodySeeing unsettling imagesDisavowing the unrecognizable image as selfExperiencing a lag between the new body and self It’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience because I don’t know that person.

Our initial engagement with coding can give us ideas to work with. Already I have gained some interesting ideas about these data. “Experiencing a lag between the new body and self” sparks ideas and speaks to experiences beyond weight. Seeing those unsettling images is an intriguing experience to follow. The notion of “disavowing the unrecognizable image as self” captures my attention.
The data we collect, the codes we construct, the questions we ask, and the comparisons we make, all shape our emerging analyses.
Now let’s look at other research participants’ experience. I followed a subset of my research participants over many years. Think about Tina’s statement as her previously invisible disability became apparent. How does Emily’s statement compare with Tina’s?
Tina:
I’m all stooped over, you know, I catch a glimpse of myself in ah, like a window, it’s very shocking sometimes what I see . (My emphasis)
KC:
In which way?
Tina:
Well, I can see that, other people can see is that, you know, my leg, I can hardly walk on it. And I feel like somehow I’m not a whole person and… people can look at it and feel sympathetic, but they can look at you and see you as less than whole, you know . (Charmaz, 1991, p. 111)

Tina echoes Emily’s concern about the jarring effect of seeing unsettling images of one’s body. Tina’s story also brings in the added dimensions of wholeness, its absence, and sympathy. What is the relationship between body image, self, and sympathy? What can we learn by comparing data? Bonnie’s statement gives some clues when she talks about being in pain and not being able to breathe.
Bonnie:
I do not like that look when someone looks at me when I’m in pain. I don’t like that look.
KC:
What is that?
Bonnie:
…It’s just that look of sympathy or empathy…when I couldn’t breathe, Joe was here, he took me to the doctor and he was just a total jerk, I mean he didn’t want to take me to the doctor, he said, “I haven’t eaten and I’m tired.” He was just that way. So when he came back [from taking her to the hospital’s emergency service], he did say something kind of funny, it was like, “Gawd, I need morphine.” “For what?” He said, “so I can handle your pain.”…I mean the pain in his eyes, I mean it was just so totally beyond him because he’s never experienced anything [like that]…and he knew it was real, he knew it. And I could see it. I just don’t like that look.

Bonnie’s reflection tells of moments when suffering becomes visible and real to those who can—must—look and act. Despite his initial refusal to help, Joe soon sensed that Bonnie needed critical care. Defining “seeing suffering as real” gives me another code for making comparisons. Bonnie’s story also reveals the tensions between the potential helper’s self-concerns and the escalating crisis. Tina’s story tells of people who see her disability but can turn away from it. Like Tina, Bonnie speaks of the unsettling images of body and self that are reflected by another person. Her account brings further complexity into the analysis. What does it mean when a close friend refuses to help? For getting immediate care? For images of self and one’s value? Bonnie’s story also raises further analytic questions about how images of the person sick body not only permeate the moment but also may puncture other people’s taken for granted views of the sick person. Further comparisons with other data may reveal conditions when the illness, which had lurked in the background leaps into the foreground.

Why Are Epistemological Assumptions Important?

Epistemological Assumptions Profoundly Affect Research Practice and Knowledge Production

Researchers from a variety of perspectives can use grounded theory strategies. Some proponents of grounded theory claim that this method can be used with any epistemology or perspective. My response to this claim is “yes” and “no.” Grounded theorists who adhere to different versions of the method can use the strategies of coding data, memo-writing, theoretical sampling, and sorting. How they use these strategies differs according to their epistemological assumptions. Thus, what they produce flows from their assumptions and concrete practices, both of which may be implicit or wholly taken for granted.

A few proponents of grounded theory even view this method as having no epistemology. I disagree. Buried underneath any method is a theory of knowledge. In their 2007 article in Qualitative Health Research, Carter and Little state: “A reflexive researcher actively adopts a theory of knowledge. A less reflexive researcher implicitly adopts a theory of knowledge” (2007, p. 1319). The theory of knowledge to which we subscribe or our claim to having no theory of knowledge has profound implications for which research questions we ask, the data we collect, our relationships with research participants, and how we render our analyses.

Underlying the views that grounded theory lacks an epistemology is the assumption that the strategies of grounded theory are neutral. Methodological strategies may be more or less helpful but they are not neutral. They come from somewhere at sometime. Ultimately, our methodological strategies derive from value positions and contain deeply held assumptions. Such fundamental assumptions inform what we do during our research in both subtle and obvious ways. One much contested assumption about positivist grounded theory is Glaser’s notion that we can enter our research with no preconceptions. He argues that reading earlier research and theory will preconceive how researchers interpret the data.

An increasing number of grounded theorists disagree (e.g., Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2000, 2008, 2014a; Clarke, 2005; Dunne, 2011; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003; Thornberg, 2012; Thornberg & Dunne, in press). Grounded theorists can develop their critical faculties to subject earlier works to thorough critique.

We all make assumptions about the world and about our methods. These assumptions shape our standpoints and starting points. Thus, our assumptions shape what we do during research and affect whether, when, how, and to what extent our standpoints change throughout the research process. Conducting qualitative inquiry means learning about the empirical world. Unlike earlier grounded theorists, constructivist grounded theorists attend to how, when, and to what extent our standpoints change during the research process.

CGT is located in time, space, and circumstance rather than general and separate from its origins and aimed toward abstract understanding rather than explanation and prediction. We constructivists assume that researchers are a part of what we see, we cannot stand apart from it. Our views are multiple and interpretive, not singular and self-evident (Charmaz & Henwood, in press).

Most of us would agree that our research participants’ standpoints change with their experience, and with the women I have quoted, it is a deeply embodied experience. Years before her statement above, Tina had told me about unsettling contrasts between how she experienced her body and the images of self-reflected to her by other people. At that time, Tina’s arthritis caused her to suffer from debilitating pain but it was visible only to herself. Instead, she looked like an exceptionally attractive young woman, an image to which she gave considerable attention.³ Tina said,
I may look like I’m healthy and all this stuff and I get—all these guys start making catcalls and I’m in pain and it just seems incongruous . I go, “What are they whistling at?” I usually identify with how I feel, even though I go through a lot of effort to make myself look good, I still identify with how I feel . It’s like being—feeling like an old person in a young person…. It’s like only an old person is entitled to have all this pain. (Emphasis added)
When we compare Tina’s concerns at different points in time, we see how her standpoints change. Similarly, our standpoints change as we engage with the data and our developing analyses. Following CGT means attending to our standpoints and how they shift and change.

What Are the Contradictions Between Versions of Grounded Theory?

The Positivist and Pragmatist Underpinnings of Grounded Theory Result in Contradictions Between Versions of the Method

Objectivist versions of the grounded theory method echo key tenets of positivism. CGT expresses its pragmatist heritage. This version of the method shifts the foundations of the method from positivism to a relativistic epistemology. By shifting the epistemological foundations of grounded theory, CGT changes research practice.⁴ The following major differences between objectivist and CGT lead to divergent research practices:

Approaches to Grounded Theory

Objectivist Constructivist

Avows no preconceptions (from the literature review and extant theories)Treats data as unproblematic and self-correcting: “All is data” (Glaser, 1998)Reflexivity is optionalDiscover generalities abstract of time, place, or individuals—erases differenceMethods are neutral. Grapples with preconceptions Advocates “theoretical agnosticism” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003)Assumes data are co-constructed, relationships matterReflexivity is crucialData analyses—and methods—are constructed in specific times, locations, and situationsMethods reflect values.

The two approaches reveal striking differences in their respective stands. First, constructivist grounded theorists go beyond and challenge the conventional grounded theory dictum of “no preconceptions” (Glaser, 2013). Yes, constructivists do examine whether and to what extent earlier research and theorizing influences the research process. But we subject earlier works to rigorous critique. In this sense, we engage in what Henwood and Pidgeon (2003) call “theoretical agnosticism.” We are not led blindly by existing research and theoretical literatures. Instead, we dissect and assess them with critical skepticism. Theoretical agnosticism involves doubt. As Locke, Golden-Biddle, and Feldman (2008) have argued, doubt is generative for theory because it drives the fundamental imaginative work for theory construction. Doubt involves opening up what we take for granted as well as scrutinizing our data, methods, and developing analysis.

Second, constructivist grounded theorists go significantly further in examining our preconceptions than earlier grounded theorists. In contrast to them, we grapple with our deeply held preconceptions about the world and our locations within it (Charmaz, 2009, 2014a, 2014b). Thus, we scrutinize where we stand in relation to power, privilege, and the specific positions we hold in everyday life.

Our standpoints arise from our assumptions and shape our most fundamental ideas, that is, what we take for granted to be true. Mannheim (1936) argued this point a long time ago. Standpoints are ideological and unquestioned. Taking Mannheim’s view a step further, the most important things to know about a person are what he or she takes for granted. And these include power, privilege, and position.

Third, constructivist grounded theorists are aware of the pivotal role of language. Preconceptions are embedded in the very language that we use. As Clarke (2005, p. 12) declares, researchers “cannot help but come to almost any research project already ‘knowing’ in some ways, already inflected, already affected, already ‘infected.’” Language shapes our views, how we know the world. In keeping with its pragmatist antecedents, constructivist grounded theorists attend to language and how it shapes participants’ meanings and our own.

If we take another look at Emily’s initial statement, we might sense a broader view of shared language and meaning than words alone. Emily said,
Emily:
I started a diet that, uh, that, over the course of 6 months allowed me to lose 70 pounds.
KC:
Mmm!
Emily:
So, I’ve gone from just over 200 pounds to just under 130 pounds, in a very short amount of time.
KC:
Mmm!
Emily:
Uh, and, uh, that has been an enormous life change….

My incoherent murmurings at first may seem irrelevant. Nonetheless, I am engaging in co-construction of the interview. Each “Mmm” substitutes for words. Along with my body language, gestures, and tone, these sounds validate Emily’s words and encourage her to talk. Like any interviewer or observer, I become part of what constitutes the data.

Treating our language as problematic and open to scrutiny is part of the reflexivity that constructivist grounded theorists invoke in our research. Reflexivity is crucial for conducting CGT. It merges with the foundations of inquiry and is inextricable from it.

Fourth, objectivist grounded theorists accept the positivistic goal of aiming to discover context-free generalizations abstract of time, place, and individuals. This approach erases difference among people, groups, cultures, and societies (Clarke, 2005, 2009; Clarke, Friese, and Washburn, 2015). In contrast, we constructivist grounded theorists seek to be aware of and understand difference. We locate our studies in time, place, cultures, societies, and the conditions of inquiry. And we see our methods as resting on values, rather than founded in neutrality.

How Does CGT Foster Critical Inquiry?

CGT Gives Us a Route to Conducting Critical Qualitative Inquiry

CGT is aimed toward abstract understanding rather than explanation and prediction. To borrow a phrase from critical psychologist Stainton-Rogers (2013, p. 339), we aim for “explication not explanation” and thus move grounded theory away from its positivist roots. CGT offers an alternative to earlier versions predicated on positivism with its two touchstones of objectivity and empiricism, what many researchers call “naïve empiricism.” Rather than aiming for the positivistic goal of explanation of abstract generalizations, explication leads to insight and understanding. It necessitates gaining intimate knowledge of the research topic, participants, and settings. CGT encourages contextualizing the research in ways many grounded theorists have not done.

The pragmatist roots of CGT shape the methods focused on studying meanings and action. This focus supports developing critical inquiry. Meanings matter—whether given in language or hidden in silences. Actions can speak without words. All can heighten our awareness of the reach and content of power. CGT fosters taking power into account.

CGT helps us to unveil what we take for granted as well as what our participants take for granted. Excavating what our participants take for granted enables us to understand them in the context of their lives, including their actions, and concerns as political and public actors. Similarly, engaging in reflexivity helps us to excavate our preconceptions, to understand ourselves as methodologists and researchers, and to learn how our preconceptions reflect our positions (Mruck and Mey, in press; Ruokonen-Engler and Siouti, 2016). Social and cultural preconceptions become engraved in our consciousness. These derive from social class, gender, race, age, health, and professional statuses. If we don’t excavate our preconceptions, we foreclose a valuable route into critical inquiry.

In short, CGT encourages us to engage in Harding’s (1991) “strong reflexivity” and scrutinizes ourselves from our participants’ standpoints. She also asks us to stand behind our participants and view the specific social and cultural content of our project. We can subsequently locate our work in our methods, the hidden assumptions contained in these methods, and identify how this strong reflexivity challenges our standpoints, as well as how our work compares with other studies (Charmaz, 2017). And we can ask Vanner’s (2015) searching question: “Am I doing more harm than good?”

CGT fosters developing awareness of how Anglo-North American worldviews pervade qualitative inquiry—both in method and in practice. I advocate developing a strong methodological self-consciousness that pierces the taken-for-granted individualism in our methods and in our consciousness (Charmaz, 2017). Even social scientists and professionals seldom engage in deep reflexivity about unearned privileges such as those deriving from race, gender, social class, and/or health, unless they are directly affected by them (for notable exceptions, see Bainbridge, Whiteside, & McCalman, 2013; Schreiber & Thomm-Bonde, 2015; Vanner, 2015). Methodological self-consciousness includes examining our data and data collection practices in addition to what we do and how we do it when analyzing data. Engaging in critical inquiry intensifies our need to examine the sources and quality of our data. The stories above indicate the depth of the women’s experience and the openness of their reflections. In the excerpt below, Tina alludes to connections between image and illusion:
Tina:
A lot of people, they miss the arthritis or something, I don’t know what they see actually. But I feel like they miss it, or they discount it or they don’t bring it up or something. And to me, it’s like my main preoccupation. So it’s kind of strange, in dealing with it or coping with it. So it’s almost like, you know, just all illusion, like a film or something. Or if you can just present something, a certain type of image, you don’t have to deal with all the heavy stuff.

Tina’s evocative insight raises intriguing questions about relationships and tensions between image and illusion that transcend illness. We might not only further interrogate the experience of illness but also investigate relationships between image, illusion, and ideology in other realms. CGT not only aids researchers in theorizing but also fosters defining and developing emergent critical questions during the research process.

Qualitative researchers, including myself, have exported Anglo North American qualitative methods across the world. Critics (e.g., Alasuutari, 2004; Amelina & Faist, 2012; Gobo, 2011; Tarozzi, 2011) are correct that qualitative inquiry is imbued with taken-for-granted Anglo-North American ideas and approaches.⁵ Neither fit conducting research in all communities and cultures. Indigenous qualitative researchers here in Canada and across the globe have critiqued and resisted conventional qualitative inquiry (e.g., Kovach, 2016; Smith, 1999). Their critiques and actions indicate the limits of Anglo-North American methods. Numerous paths lead to knowledge and produce numerous knowledges.

When we go deeper into our preconceptions, we find further obstacles that impede developing critical inquiry. Among them are taken-for-granted territorial stakes—for ourselves, our disciplines and professions, our theoretical and methodological approaches—and the careerism and competition embedded in these stakes. Methodological self-righteousness likely follows with claims that my way is the way, the only way. Taken together, they result in making a method an idol and adhering to it with unquestioning dedication: methodolatry.⁶

Conclusion

In sum, the practice of CGT assists us in interrogating our data, nascent analyses, research actions, and ourselves each step along the way. A constructivist stance on inquiry sees our analyses as interpretive renderings, not as objective reports or the only view of the topic. As a result, we increase our awareness of the relativity of the empirical world with its multiple realities and multiple views of our analyses and of our methods.

Objectivist	Constructivist
Avows no preconceptions (from the literature review and extant theories)Treats data as unproblematic and self-correcting: “All is data” (Glaser, 1998)Reflexivity is optionalDiscover generalities abstract of time, place, or individuals—erases differenceMethods are neutral.	Grapples with preconceptions Advocates “theoretical agnosticism” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003)Assumes data are co-constructed, relationships matterReflexivity is crucialData analyses—and methods—are constructed in specific times, locations, and situationsMethods reflect values.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

My thanks are numerous. I thank Bailey Sousa and the organizing committee for the invitation to speak at the 2016 Qualitative Health Research Conference,Joyce Duckles for her interest in my work,Sandra Davidson for her generous introduction to my talk,Alex Clark for inviting me to publish it in IJQM,and Yvette McWatt for handling myriad details before,during,and after the conference. I appreciate having Katie Querna’s helpful comments on an earlier version of this article and thank her for giving it a close reading. Special thanks are due to the conference delegates whose enthusiasm for qualitative inquiry made the event memorable.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

Alasuutari

(2004). The globalization of qualitative research. In Seale

Gobo

Gubrium

J. F.

Silverman

(Eds.), Qualitative research practice (pp. 595–608). London, England: Sage.

Amelina

Faist

(2012). De-naturalizing the national in research methodologies: Key concepts of transnational studies in migration. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35, 1707–1724.

Bainbridge

Whiteside

McCalman

(2013). Being, knowing and doing: A Phronetic approach to constructing grounded theory with aboriginal Australian partners. Qualitative Health Research, 23, 275–288.

Bakan

(1969). On method. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Bryant

(2017). Grounded theory and grounded theorizing: Pragmatism in research practice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Carter

Little

(2007). Justifying knowledge, justifying method, taking action: Epistemologies, methodologies and methods in qualitative research. Qualitative Health Research, 17, 1316–1328.

Chamberlain

(2000). Methodolatry and qualitative health research. Journal of Health Psychology, 5, 285–296.

Charmaz

(1991). Good days, bad days: The self in chronic illness and time. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Charmaz

(1995). The body, identity, and self: Adapting to impairment. Sociological Quarterly, 36, 657–680.

10.

Charmaz

(2000). Constructivist and objectivist grounded theory. In Denzin

N. K.

Lincoln

(Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 509–535). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

11.

Charmaz

(2008). Constructionism and grounded theory. In Holstein

J. A.

Gubrium

J. F.

(Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp. 319–412). New York, NY: Guilford.

12.

Charmaz

(2009). Shifting the grounds: Constructivist grounded theory methods for the twenty-first century. In Morse

J. M.

Stern

P. N.

Corbin

Bowers

Charmaz

Clarke

A. E.

(Eds.), Developing grounded theory: The second generation (pp. 127–154). Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

13.

Charmaz

(2010). Studying the experience of chronic illness through grounded theory. In Scambler

Scambler

(Eds.), Assaults on the lifeworld: New directions in the sociology of chronic and disabling conditions (pp. 8–36). London, England: Palgrave.

14.

Charmaz

(2014a). Constructing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

15.

Charmaz

(2014b). Grounded theory in global perspective: Reviews by international researchers. Qualitative Inquiry, 20, 1074–1084.

16.

Charmaz

(2015a). Grounded theory. In Smith

J. A.

(Ed.), Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods (3rd ed., pp. 53–84). London, England: Sage.

17.

Charmaz

(2015b). Teaching theory construction with initial grounded theory tools: A reflection on lessons and learning. Qualitative Health Research, 25, 1610–1622.

18.

Charmaz

(2017). The power of constructivist grounded theory for critical inquiry. Qualitative Inquiry, 23, 34–45. doi:10.1177/1077800416657105

19.

Charmaz

Henwood

. (in press). Grounded theory methods for qualitative psychology. In Willig

Stainton-Rogers

(Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage.

20.

Clarke

(2005). Situational analysis: Grounded theory after the postmodern turn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

21.

Clarke

(2009). From grounded theory to situational analysis: What’s new? Why? How? In Morse

Stern

Corbin

Bowers

Charmaz

Clarke

(Eds.), Developing grounded theory: The second generation (pp. 194–233). New York, NY: Routledge.

22.

Clarke

Friese

Washburn

(2015). Situational analysis in practice: Mapping research with grounded theory. New York, NY: Routledge.

23.

Danziger

(1985). The methodological imperative in psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15, 1–13.

24.

Dunne

(2011). The place of the literature review in grounded theory research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14, 111–124.

25.

Glaser

(1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press.

26.

Glaser

(1998). Doing grounded theory: Issues and discussions. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press.

27.

Glaser

(2013). No preconceptions: The grounded theory dictum. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press.

28.

Glaser

Strauss

(1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. Chicago, IL: Aldine.

29.

Gobo

(2011). Glocalizing methodology? The encounter between local methodologies. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14, 417–437.

30.

Gurman

Kniskern

(1978). Technolatry, methodolatry, and the results of family therapy. Family Process, 17, 275–281.

31.

Harding

(1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press.

32.

Henwood

Pidgeon

(2003). Grounded theory in psychological research. In Camic

P. M.

Rhodes

J. E.

Yardley

(Eds.), Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding perspectives in methodology and design (pp. 131–155). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

33.

Janesick

(1994). The dance of qualitative research design: Metaphor, methodolatry, and meaning. In Denzin

N. K.

Lincoln

Y. S.

(Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (p. 215). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

34.

Kovach

(2016). Moving forward, pushing back: Indigenous methodologies in the academy. In Denzin

Giardina

(Eds.), Qualitative inquiry through a critical lens (pp. 31–39). New York, NY: Routledge.

35.

Locke

Golden-Biddle

Feldman

(2008). Making doubt generative: Rethinking the role of doubt in the research process. Organization Science, 19, 907–918.

36.

Mannheim

Karl

(1936). Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace.

37.

Mruck

Mey

(in press). Grounded theory methodology and self-reflexivity in the qualitative research process. In Bryant

Charmaz

(Eds.), Handbook of grounded theory (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage.

38.

Ralph

Birks

Chapman

(2015). The methodological dynamism of grounded theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 14, 1–6. doi:1609406915611576

39.

Redman-MacLaren

Mills

(2015). Transformational grounded theory: Theory, voice, and action. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 14, 1–12.

40.

Ruokonen-Engler

Siouti

(2016). Biographical entanglements, self-reflexivity, and transnational knowledge production. Qualitative Inquiry, 22, 745–752.

41.

Schreiber

Thomm-Bonde

(2015). Ubuntu and constructivist grounded theory: An African methodology package. Journal of Research in Nursing, 20, 655–664.

42.

Smith

L. T.

(1999). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples. London, England: Zed Books.

43.

Stainton-Rogers

(2013). Research methodology. In Fox

Prillettensky

Austin

(Eds.), Critical psychology: An introduction (2nd ed., pp. 335–354). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

44.

Strauss

(1959). Mirrors and masks. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press.

45.

Strauss

(1961). Images of the American city. New York, NY: Free Press.

46.

Strauss

(1993). Continual permutations of action. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.

47.

Tarozzi

(2011). On translating grounded theory: When translating is doing. In Martin

V. B.

Gynnild

(Eds.), Grounded theory: The philosophy, method, and work of Barney Glaser (pp. 161–174). Baca Rotan, FL: Brown Walker.

48.

Thornberg

(2012). Informed grounded theory. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 55, 1–17.

49.

Thornberg

Dunne

. (in press). Literature review in grounded theory. In Bryant

Charmaz

(Eds.), Handbook of grounded theory (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage.

50.

Vanner

(2015). Positionality at the center: Constructing an epistemological and methodological approach for a Western feminist doctoral candidate conducting research in the postcolonial. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 14, 1–12. doi:10.1177/1609406915618094

Initial Grounded Theory Codes	Emily’s Interview Statement
Contextualizing concernJoining self and bodyStruggling to reconcile past and present images of body and selfCatching glimpses of new bodySeeing unsettling imagesDisavowing the unrecognizable image as selfExperiencing a lag between the new body and self	It’s been a very interesting experience for me, certainly in terms of my own self-perception, given that I have a difficult time, sort of coming to terms with the reflection in the mirror, when I walk by a store, for instance, when I catch reflections off the windows, for instance. It’s a freakish experience because I don’t know that person.