Abstract
Keywords
Introduction
On 2 April 2011, Ethiopia began constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 6000 MW giant dam, on the Blue Nile (also known as the Abbay in Ethiopia), which is one of the Nile’s main tributaries. The project’s commencement evoked various reactions from the Eastern Nile Basin countries. While Ethiopia has consistently emphasized that the dam is a crucial endeavor to address its citizens’ severe lack of hydroelectric power, Egypt has labeled it as a threat to its survival and an illegal encroachment on its historical Nile rights. Sudan, on the other hand, has shown a wavering stance toward the construction of the dam. Many of the reactions from the riparian countries have referenced different colonial treaties concerning the Nile (De Falco and Fiorentino, 2022; Degu Belay, 2014; Gebreluel, 2014).
GERD has been constructed on the Abbay river, which is one of the major tributaries of the Nile, which flows through 11 African countries and is the longest river in the world. Throughout history, various European colonizers who have conquered the Nile basin region have signed different colonial treaties to govern the use and management of the Nile (Alemayehu, 2024; Carvalho, 2008; Kassa, 2015; Lumumba, 2007). Since the start of the project, these colonial treaties related to the Nile have been the main topic of discussion among riparian countries and other concerned parties. This has led various media outlets to pay significant attention to these treaties in their coverage. Both international and local media outlets of the riparian states have been closely analyzing the construction of GERD in relation to these colonial treaties. The Egyptian
The impact of colonialism and its structural legacies in the postcolonial period has received scholarly attention. However, most of these studies have primarily focused on English, comparative literature, psychology and other related fields (Chikerema and Nzewi, 2021; Gandhi, 2020; Said, 1979; Young, 2004). Though the impact of colonialism and its aftermath on mass media is visible, there have been limited empirical studies that scrutinize this impact (Shome, 2016; Shome and Hegde, 2002). The media’s focus on colonial treaties with regard to the construction of GERD provides an opportunity to explore the nexus between colonialism and the structural legacies of colonialism, news media content, and transboundary water governance in the postcolonial era. Specifically, this scenario creates a conducive environment to examine the portrayal of colonialism and Nile colonial treaties in the media, the impact of these portrayals on the GERD project, the cumulative effect of the media portrayal of colonial treaties on negotiations among riparian countries, and the overall contribution of the media to either cooperative or conflictual dynamics in an integrated manner.
To this end, this article examines the portrayal of the Nile (colonial) Water Treaties in the
Literature review
Colonial legacies on transboundary rivers
Colonial legacies refer to the cultural, economic, social, religious, security, legislative and other aspects that were passed down by colonial powers to their colonies. These legacies have a significant impact on the socio-economic, political, ideological and security conditions of present-day Africa (Chikerema and Nzewi, 2021; Gandhi, 2020; Loomba, 2005; Said, 1979; Young, 2004). As Gandhi (2020: 4) puts it, ‘newly emergent postcolonial nation-States are often deluded and unsuccessful in their attempts to disown the burdens of their colonial inheritance’.
The end of colonialism or the withdrawal of colonial forces from their colonies’ lands did not simply mark the end of colonialism and the independence of colonial states. Even though the direct colonial conquest is over, its aftereffects are still visible in postcolonial states. These effects manifest in various areas, including but not limited to internal conflicts, coups, governments faced with suspicion, territorial hostilities, identity crises, and conflicts over shared resources. In addition to these consequences, colonialism is also evident in literature, artistic and mass media works, globalization, and cultural hegemony (Arora, 2007; Ashcroft et al., 2013; Gandhi, 2020; Hamadi, 2014; Mishra and Hodge, 2005).
One area where the visible impact of colonial legacies is particularly pronounced is in the use and governance of transboundary rivers. Historical as well as current water management practices in Africa are largely influenced and shaped by colonialism and colonial treaties and agreements. Colonialism and the treaties and agreements associated with it hold a significant place in contemporary African water use and governance for three main reasons. Firstly, most of the laws, treaties, agreements, conventions, customs, and traditions that regulate transboundary rivers in Africa today were signed and enforced by colonial powers. Secondly, although riparian states have entered into bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties after gaining independence, these agreements are still heavily influenced by the preceding colonial treaties. Thirdly, many of the water conventions, treaties, laws, customs and traditions endorsed by international organizations in the modern era can be traced back to the colonial treaties. Consequently, colonial treaties play a substantial role in the management of transboundary waters in Africa today (Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015; Knobelsdorf, 2005; Lautze and Giordano, 2005).
Worsening the scenario, for the most part, these colonial treaties were not meant to ensure the fair allocation of water but to maximize European objectives in the colonies. In this regard, Kimenyi and Mbaku (2015: 1), for example, argue that ‘[d]uring the colonial period, European countries that undertook the development and implementation of transboundary water agreements often did so not to ensure the fair allocation of water to benefit the African populations but to maximize European objectives in the colonies’. The colonial treaties signed on the Nile were not different either, as ‘Britain, which controlled most of the Nile Basin, planned to secure the waters of the Nile for the benefit of Egypt because of the latter’s cotton industry and debts’ (Kasimbazi, 2010: 720). Additionally, Great Britain was aware of the vital importance of Egypt’s stability for its own gains and the essence of access to water for the greater stability of Egypt (Elshaikh-Hayaty et al., 2021; Kasimbazi, 2010; Kasimbazi and Bamwine, 2021; Matthews and Vivoda, 2023; Pemunta et al., 2021; Tekuya, 2021a, 2021b).
As a result, these colonial treaties and the hydro-discourses that emanate from them affect the negotiations that have taken place between riparian states and the potential adoption of more effective policies. In line with this, Williams (2020: 1), for example, argues that ‘[i]n certain policy areas anachronistic instruments and approaches continue to persist. This is often in spite of evidence of their unsuitability or the availability of potentially more effective alternative policy approaches. One manifestation of this is the persistence of certain discourses or narratives that appear ill-suited to the requirements of contemporary policy-making contexts and processes’.
The Nile Water Treaties
Negotiations on transboundary rivers have a history of more than a century. Riparian countries have engaged in a series of negotiations to establish binding agreements on the use and management of shared resources (Biswas, 1993; Dinar, 2014; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015; Lautze and Giordano, 2005). According to Kimenyi and Mbaku (2015) and Lautze and Giordano (2005), more than 150 treaties, agreements, protocols and amendments have been enacted over the past 140 years, involving more than 20 African river basins.
Historical records and literary documents reveal an abundance of colonial treaties, protocols, agreements, and letters of exchange pertaining to the Nile. These documents were exchanged among the various colonial powers that historically governed the Nile basin region. The majority of these treaties, from 1885 to World War II, were between Egypt, Britain, and other colonial powers. During this period, when the entire Nile basin was under the dominion of foreign, mainly European, powers, these treaties committed themselves to Egypt and Britain that they would respect prior rights to, and especially claims of, ‘natural and historic’ rights to the Nile waters, which Egypt asserted (Abdalla, 1971; Hailemichael, 2019; Kasimbazi and Bamwine, 2021; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015; Lumumba, 2007; Okoth-Owiro, 2004; Pemunta et al., 2021; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Tekuya, 2021a; Veilleux, 2015).
The 1891 protocol between Italy and Great Britain, the 1902 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, the 1906 London agreement between Great Britain and Congo, the 1925 Rome agreement between Italy and Great Britain, the 1929 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Great Britain (on behalf of Sudan), the 1934 London agreement between Great Britain (on behalf of Tanganyika) and Belgium (on behalf of Rwanda and Burundi), the 1949 Own Fall Agreement between Great Britain/Egypt and Uganda, the 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, were among the colonial treaties on the Nile. However, with the exception of the 1902 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, none of these treaties included Ethiopia despite its 86% contribution to the water of the Nile (Ashebir, 2009; Kasimbazi, 2010; Kasimbazi and Bamwine, 2021; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015; Okoth-Owiro, 2004; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Tekuya, 2021b).
The 1891 Protocol, also known as the Anglo-Italian Protocol, was signed between Great Britain, which was the colonizer of Egypt and Sudan, and Italy, which was colonizing Eritrea. Its purpose was to demarcate their respective territories and their spheres of influence. Under the protocol, Italy agreed not to construct any dams or irrigation projects that could significantly affect the flow of the Atbara river. The main focus of the protocol was to protect Egypt’s interests in the Nile by prohibiting the construction of any dams or irrigation routes on the Atbara river that would alter its flow into the Nile (Ashebir, 2009; Kasimbazi, 2010; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Swain, 1997).
The 1902 treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, which is one of the controversial treaties, was signed between Great Britain (on behalf of Sudan) and Ethiopia. Article III of the agreement stipulates: His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Sudan.
However, Ethiopia argued vigorously against it, bringing forth different justifications and rationales, and finally officially declared the agreement obsolete. One of the arguments raised by Ethiopia was the fact that the treaty was signed with a colonial power that no longer existed in the region. As can be seen below, the Amharic version of the treaty only obligated Ethiopia to Great Britain, not to Sudan.
Excerpt: The Amharic version of Article III of the 1902 treaty. This Amharic version obligates Ethiopia to reach an agreement with the Britannic government before undertaking any projects on the Nile.
Ethiopia raises a second argument stating that this agreement does not prohibit Ethiopia from harnessing the Nile as long as it does not ‘arrest’ the water. It argues that hydroelectric dams such as GERD only use the water to generate electricity by rotating turbines, and once the water has been used, it continues to flow downstream. Accordingly, to Ethiopia, this agreement allows it to harness the river, as long as it does not completely impede the flow of water (Ashebir, 2009; Hailemichael, 2019; Kasimbazi, 2010; Kassa, 2015; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Waterbury, 1987).
The other justification given is related to the fact that this agreement was never ratified by Ethiopia or Great Britain. Although it was expected that both the Ethiopian and British parliaments, or other concerned state organs, would ratify the treaty, neither party endorsed or ratified it. In other words, the treaty was not ratified by the Ethiopian Crown Council or the British parliament. Therefore, Ethiopia argues that a treaty that has never been ratified by authoritative councils should not be considered binding (Kasimbazi, 2010; Kassa, 2015; Kendie, 1999; Waterbury, 1987).
One more justification raised by Ethiopia to nullify the 1902 agreement relates to Great Britain’s denial of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Ethiopia argues that the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale between Italy and Ethiopia had become obsolete due to variations in the Amharic and Italian versions of Article 17. However, European powers accepted the Italian version and considered Ethiopia to be de facto, a ‘protectorate’ of Italy. Scholars point out that Great Britain entered into the 1891 and 1925 agreements with Italy even though the issues addressed in these agreements were concerned with Ethiopia and colonies of Great Britain. These agreements suggest that Great Britain denied Ethiopia’s independence, which should be taken into consideration to abrogate the 1902 treaty (Kasimbazi, 2010; Kassa, 2015; Kendie, 1999; Waterbury, 1987).
The 1925 Rome agreement between Great Britain and Italy was an exchange of notes that aimed at securing Great Britain’s water rights to the Nile and fending off any interest to construct any project to the source of the Blue Nile, Lake Tana. However, it is important to note that though this agreement only focused on projects related to Lake Tana in Ethiopia, Ethiopia was surprisingly excluded from the negotiation process and was only sent a copy of the agreement. In response, Ethiopia sent a letter to Italy and Britain expressing its intention to take the matter to the League of Nations, as the agreement didn’t involve it. The League of Nations found the agreement not binding to Ethiopia (Abdalla, 1971; Abdo, 2004; Shih and Stuz, 2012).
The 1929 water treaty came after Great Britain realized that its attempt to control Lake Tana in the 1925 Rome agreement was unsuccessful. This treaty, which involved Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, allocated 48 billion cubic meters of water to Egypt and 4 billion cubic meters of water to Sudan, leaving nothing for the other riparian countries. Unsurprisingly, this treaty grants Egypt the power to veto any Nile-related projects in the upper riparian countries and the right to develop Nile projects that it deems beneficial to its own interest (Abdo, 2004; Ashebir, 2009; Shih and Stuz, 2012).
The 1959 Nile Water Agreement, which is seen as an extension of the 1929 agreement, was signed between Sudan and Egypt. It allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of water to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters to Sudan, while excluding other riparian countries from receiving any water allocation. Importantly, this agreement was reached without the involvement of the other riparian states. Egypt and Sudan maintained the authority to approve or veto any projects on the Nile. Consequently, the construction of the Aswan High Dam, capable of storing the entire flow of the Nile, was authorized under this agreement (Abdalla, 1971; Abdo, 2004; Ashebir, 2009; Mekonnen, 2010; Shih and Stuz, 2012).
These colonial treaties on the Nile have become a source of tension in the management of transboundary water in modern times (Abdo, 2004; Lautze and Giordano, 2005; Shih and Stuz, 2012). In line with this, Lautze and Giordano (2005: 1059) concur that: As the United Kingdom was signatory to all Nile Basin agreements in the colonial period, one could make the case that no more than one true Nile riparian is included in any single treaty. Since core elements of at least some of these bilateral agreements concerning the Nile still apply, it should come as no surprise that tensions exist between the watershed’s ten current riparian states surrounding the allocation and management of the basin’s waters.
Similarly, Abdo (2004: 64) argues that ‘[t]he UK had a deep-rooted interest in controlling the water of the Nile, which was to provide irrigation for cotton plantations in the area which could provide raw material for its industries in Europe. This laid the foundation for water utilization patterns that favored Egypt at the expense of the interest of other riparian states’. In line with this, Shih and Stuz (2012: 16) also affirmed that the majority of these colonial agreements ‘favor Egypt because of its favored role to Great Britain’. Thus, Great Britain entered into different treaties to secure Nile water for Egypt because Egypt’s stability was more important to Great Britain than that of the other riparian states; and the most crucial factor for stability in Egypt was access to water.
These colonial treaties are categorically rejected by the riparian states except for Egypt and to a certain degree Sudan. In this regard, Kimenyi and Mbaku (2015: 2), for example, wrote: Today’s Nile River riparians, except for Egypt and the Republic of Sudan, consider these agreements anachronistic holdovers from the colonial era and want them abrogated and replaced by a new international watercourse legal regime that enhances equity in the allocation of the Nile River’s waters. Egypt and Sudan, however, insist that the existing Nile Waters agreements be maintained or that, in the event a new legal regime is established, Egypt’s historical rights—those granted by the original agreements—should be honored.
This interest of Egypt to maintain these colonial treaties has also been manifested in its position toward the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The CFA document annexed the following attachment: [Article 14b]: Attachment At the end of the negotiations, no consensus was reached on Article 14(b) which reads as follows: ‘not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin States’. All countries [Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda] agreed to this proposal except Egypt and Sudan. To this effect, Egypt proposed that Article 14(b) should be replaced by the following wording: ‘not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State’ (NBI, n.d.: 70).
Egypt’s insistence on replacing Article 14(b) with ‘not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State’, clearly depicts their interest in maintaining the colonial treaties, which put it in a favorable position.
Mass media and post/colonial studies
Throughout much of its history, research examining the nexus between mass media and post/colonialism has been limited. The majority of postcolonial theorizations have been primarily rooted in literature. To this end, Shome (2016: 14), for example, wrote: ‘Postcolonial studies, for the most part, has been squarely situated in the disciplines of English and Comparative Literature. It has hardly addressed, in any expansive way at least, the importance of media, popular culture, and technology, for engaging and understanding colonialism’.
However, for Shome (2016: 14), a focus on media has ‘much to add to our understanding of colonialism and contemporary global inequalities’ because more people have better access to mass media over literature in the contemporary new/media age. We are witnessing greater access to and preference for television, tabloids and mobile technologies, the internet and social networking platforms, among others, than literature. Mass media not only offer wide circulation, ease of accessibility, and simplicity in expressing and understanding postcolonial dilemmas, but it is also considered effective in traversing and impacting various power structures in society today. However, it is not only the preferred nature of mass media that matters, the role of mass media in postcolonial studies must also be tied to issues of postcolonial justice (Alhassan and Chakravartty, 2011; Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Parameswaran, 2018; Shome, 2016; Soo-Hyun Mun, 2019).
Studies (Alahmed, 2020; Jansson, 2003; Leezenberg, 2021; Schein, 2020; Serrão, 2022), for example, pointed out that colonial and oriental sentiments are not only received from Western colonial hegemonic discourses toward the postcolonial Africa, but also are perpetuated by the colonized people themselves. In other words, the North’s colonial politics which produced the South as orient are internalized and reproduced by the postcolonial societies of the South, resulting in ongoing forms of colonization. This concept, which is referred to as ‘internalized orientalism’, suggests that the media in colonized Africa play a crucial role in the reproduction and perpetuation of structural legacies of colonialism. In this regard, it is argued that, ‘Orientalist discourse in media content reflects and reproduces Western colonial constructions of the global South by the Southern people themselves’ (Alahmed, 2020: 423). Therefore, examining how colonial and oriental discourses are reproduced and perpetuated in the news media of postcolonial states is crucial to understand the impact of colonialism and its legacies in postcolonial Africa.
Analysis of the media representation of issues connected to colonialism or colonized-colonizer affairs should be assessed from a postcolonial theoretical perspective. Media content on issues directly related to colonial affairs reflects colonial sentiment even in the contemporary period. The postcolonial approach allows researchers to critique existing media content and the context in which it is produced, enabling them to uncover the reproduction of knowledge regulated by dominant media discourse (Alam, 2021; Imre, 2014; Luthra, 2020; Rao and Wasserman, 2007; Sanz Sabido, 2015, 2016).
Theoretical framework
This article is guided by the postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory deals with the impacts of colonization and colonial actions on cultures and societies in the contemporary world. Postcolonial theory is a complex and debated concept, but one point that postcolonial theorists generally agree on is that it does not propose a completely new world devoid of the negative impacts of colonialism. Instead, it suggests both continuity and change (Arora, 2007; Ashcroft et al., 2013; Hawley, 2010, 2015; Said, 1979) In other words, quoting Sanz Sabido (2015: 91), ‘what is known as postcolonialism is, in fact, still a form of colonialism’. As Arora (2007: 30) puts it, to the postcolonial theorists, ‘though colonialism is over, it has its aftereffects in postcolonial countries notwithstanding their vigorous political sovereignty’.
Postcolonial theory is ‘a set of theoretical approaches which focus on the direct effects and aftermaths of colonialism’ (Arora, 2007: 330), which is ‘an always present tendency in any literature of subjugation marked by a systematic process of cultural domination through the imposition of imperial structures of power’ (Mishra and Hodge, 2005: 382). Postcolonial theory studies the aftereffects of the response and ‘resistance to the legacy of colonialism’ (Arora, 2007: 330).
Developed by pioneering scholars such as Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said, postcolonial theory posits that the effects of colonial actions, as well as the atrocities committed during colonization, did not come to an end with the cessation of direct colonization. In this regard, Hamadi (2014: 70) asserts that ‘[t]he consequences of colonialism are still persisting in the form of chaos, coups, corruption, civil wars, and bloodshed, which pervade many of these countries, mainly because of the residues of colonization’. Postcolonial theory, thus, is used to ‘conceptualize the complex condition which attends the aftermath of colonial occupation’ (Gandhi, 2020: 4). As a result, argues Gandhi (2020: 4), postcolonial theory is a ‘disciplinary project devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering and, crucially, interrogating the colonial past’.
Although postcolonial theory initially had its roots in literature and philosophy, it has gradually evolved into an interdisciplinary field, ‘at least as comfortable in the social sciences as it is (sometimes controversially) in the humanities’ (Hawley, 2015: 2). Postcolonial theory, as an interdisciplinary theory, is currently used in various contexts to encompass the examination and analysis of European territorial conquests, the different institutions of European colonialism, the ways in which empire operates through language and communication, the complexities of constructing identities within colonial discourse, and the resistance demonstrated by individuals within those contexts. Additionally, it focuses on the diverse reactions to such incursions and the enduring effects of colonialism in both nations and communities, both before and after their independence (Ashcroft et al., 2013; Hawley, 2010; Luthra, 2020).
Postcolonial theory has often been overlooked in media and communication studies, despite its significant presence in cultural studies – an area that holds great importance within the field of communication studies. Similarly, scholars in postcolonial studies rarely give importance to investigating communication or mass media, even though platforms like newspaper, radio and television have played significant roles in the formation, growth and sometimes decline of modern nation-states in the postcolonial era (Kumar, 2014; Kumar and Parameswaran, 2018; Merten and Krämer, 2016; Shome and Hegde, 2002). In this regard, Shome (2016: 1) asserts that ‘postcolonial studies has paid minimal attention to the role played by media in the context of transnational, colonial, and nationalist relations. It has also paid limited attention to the ways in which media cultures intersect in, and inform, many contemporary postcolonial sensibilities’.
However, these scholars agree that postcolonial theory is more relevant to media and communication theory because it introduces and develops a matrix of interrelated concepts like otherness, subalternity, marginality and hybridity, which are central to the terms and arguments that shape current debates about the globalization of communications, mass media, cultures and identities.
Media studies have always been concerned with issues of representation, stereotyping, identity formation, and ideological influences of popular media cultures (Cere, 2011; Merten and Krämer, 2016). In some instances, these representations, stereotypes, identity formation and ideological workings in the media can be traced back to colonial actions and their impacts. This junction makes postcolonial theory relevant to the interpretation and study of contemporary media discourse, especially if the issue at hand has something to do with colonial actions. On top of that, as Sanz Sabido (2016: 92) put it, postcolonial theory ‘provides a useful theory of meaning to contextualize the application of CDA, whenever the objective is to examine discourses produced in postcolonial milieus’. To this end, Sanz Sabido (2016: 92) argues that postcolonial theory ‘can offer useful insights and tools for the analysis of media representations’.
Riparian countries often refer to colonial treaties in their debates over the construction of GERD. Egypt, in particular, has been asserting its ‘historic right’ to the Nile, citing these treaties to support its claims. On the other hand, Ethiopia consistently argues that it had no involvement in these colonial treaties and therefore should not be bound by their terms. The significance of postcolonial theory lies in its ability to shed light on the impact of these colonial treaties and agreements in shaping the media discourse on the fair use policy of the waters of the Nile and negotiations on GERD among riparian countries. Thus, this research article employs postcolonial theory as a guiding framework.
Approach and methods
This study employs the postcolonial critical discourse analysis (PCDA) method. According to Sanz Sabido (2015: 200), PCDA is a methodological and theoretical approach that draws on postcolonial theory and critical discourse analysis, aiming at ‘exploring past and contemporary discourses that are impregnated with postcolonial political, economic and social structures’. This methodological approach, as explained by Sanz Sabido (2015: 200), ‘concentrates on the connections between the media and colonial legacies’. PCDA is used as an analytical tool to investigate how past colonial events are portrayed in contemporary media discourses (Darko, 2023; Sanz Sabido, 2015, 2016; Sarfo, 2021). PCDA provides a multilevel analysis, which includes analysis of texts, discourses, and the broader relationship between text production and socio-political and historical contexts (Chen, 2024). The PCDA is constituted by postcolonial theory (PT) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) due to the shared objectives of these two fields. Both PT and CDA address issues of ‘power’ with each aiming to expose oppression and power inequalities: ‘While CDA deconstructs discursive strategies to uncover the ways in which power is reproduced in media discourse, PT focuses on the power imbalances derived from (post)colonial conditions, practices, and structures, which are perpetuated in contemporary societies’ (Sanz Sabido, 2016: 91). In other words, while CDA is concerned with unveiling the production of power imbalances, PT is concerned with imbalances of power driven from colonial encounters. As a result, PT ‘provides a useful theory of meaning to contextualize the application of CDA, whenever the objective is to examine discourses produced in postcolonial milieus’ (Sanz Sabido, 2016: 91).
Though postcolonial theory offers valuable insights and tools to analyze media representation, it is a broad field of study that requires a context-specific perspective to be applied to specific case studies. As a result, PCDA provides ‘a useful approach to the analysis of media content insofar as it focuses predominantly on the postcolonial relations of power that underpin the production of that content’ (Sanz Sabido, 2016: 9). CDA is crucial here because it aims to expose the socio-cultural and political injustices embedded in specific discourses and their impact on a given society (Carvalho, 2008). Besides, the postcolonial rubric within CDA helps to identify studies that examine discourse in relation to the power relations inherited from postcolonial backgrounds (Carvalho, 2008; Darko, 2023; Sanz Sabido, 2015, 2016). Therefore, PCDA is an ideal approach because it ‘helps to expose some of these causes and consequences by recognizing that postcolonial legacies are at the center of some of the existing power imbalances in the world’ (Sanz Sabido, 2016: 102).
In this particular study, PCDA as an analytical framework is an adaptation of CDA, especially the discourse historical approach (DHA). This approach places due emphasis on the impact of historical and socio-political contextual factors on discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015; Sanz Sabido, 2016). DHA aims at examining how a phenomenon is referred to, the features attributed to the phenomenon, the arguments employed, the perspectives to which these arguments are attributed, and the intensification or mitigation of the phenomenon (Reisigl, 2018; Reisigl and Wodak, 2015; Wodak, 2001). DHA is useful in the context of the current study because it takes into account the historical and socio-political contexts within which texts about Nile colonial treaties are produced. Thus, the study employs PCDA to qualitatively examine the representation of the Nile colonial treaties in reference to the construction of GERD in the Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian media.
In terms of data collection, news stories about GERD spanning from January 2017 to December 2022 were collected from the online archives of
Once the 310 news stories were identified using purposeful random sampling, news stories that made explicit or implicit reference to colonial treaties were purposively selected. To do this, we first identified news stories that explicitly dealt with colonial treaties using key words such as colonial treaty/ies, colonial, colonialism, Great Britain, Italy, and years such as 1902, 1906, 1925, 1929, 1934, 1949, and 1959. These years are the significant times in which various colonial treaties concerning the use and management of the Nile were signed. In addition to the explicit words and years, we carefully reviewed the contents of the news stories to include those that implicitly referred to colonial treaties. This selection process resulted in a total of 114 news stories (56 from
Once we identified the news stories to be used for the analysis, we read them carefully and continuously to understand ‘the postcolonial relations of power that underpin the production of that content’ (Sanz Sabido, 2016: 9). Moreover, we related the content of the news stories with research and literary works on the socio-economic, historical and cultural contexts of the Nile to figure out the historical and socio-political contexts within which texts about the Nile colonial treaties were produced. We also held reflection sessions during which we examined and commented on each other’s patterns and themes. Finally, we interpreted the major themes qualitatively and analyzed them as follows.
Analysis and discussion
This section examines how the three newspapers in focus discursively portrayed the Nile colonial treaties. The analysis reveals that
The comparative analysis of these variables (‘portrayal’, ‘rationales’, ‘implications’, and ‘solutions’) depicts the overall impact of the Nile colonial treaties on the discursive representation of GERD, the yielding nature of ongoing negotiations, and the media’s overall contribution to either cooperative or conflictive terms for the Nile basin region. Apart from the news stories from the three newspapers, research findings and official documents have also been incorporated to bolster the analysis and discussion. Therefore, after discussing the trichotomic portrayal of colonial treaties in the three newspapers (binding, alternative and obsolete), we delved into the justifications and rationales presented or omitted by the newspapers to support their arguments. Finally, we explored the consequences and solutions discussed by the three newspapers.
Portrayal of Nile colonial treaties in the news media: The binding, alternative and obsolete trichotomy
The three newspapers portrayed the colonial treaties in different ways, providing their justifications and rationales.
As shown in the following news story,
Touting the binding nature of the Nile colonial treaties does not seem to be limited to the Egyptian media; it is also stipulated by their Constitution. Article 44 of the Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution (2014) stipulates: ‘The state commits to protecting the Nile River,
The perpetual portrayal of the Nile colonial treaties as binding legal regulations in
Both countries have to struggle to cope with the new reality facing the negotiations on the GERD. As much as Egypt and Sudan see this process as a violation of international law and thus appear to lose interest in a negotiated settlement, they would also see that the possibility of securing the type of agreement that could even remotely recognize existing water use aka historical rights may have been lost. Ethiopia may also have increasingly little or no incentives left to ink a binding agreement on a project that nears completion. (
Overall, it is evident that the three newspapers presented differing and opposing viewpoints regarding the legality of the colonial treaties. According to
The polarized portrayal of the Nile colonial treaties, especially the binding-obsolete dichotomies of
Rationales to justify the binding, alternative, obsolete trichotomy
News media never portray crucial issues without offering justifications that they believe will help solidify their portrayals and persuade their readership. Similarly, the three newspapers’ portrayals of the colonial treaties are not without justifications in support of their respective arguments.
Egypt and Sudan have never asked Ethiopia to commit to the provisions of the 1929 agreement on the White Nile or the 1959 agreement that Egypt and Sudan signed after the end of the colonial era in both countries. However, Addis Ababa is still obligated under international law to fulfill the terms of the treaty it signed as a fully sovereign and independent nation in 1902. Under this treaty, Ethiopian emperor Menelik II pledged that his country would not construct or permit the construction of any structures on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat River that would impede the flow of Nile water to Sudan and Egypt.
However, although
As discussed in the literature review, Ethiopia was a party to the 1902 treaty (Lautze and Giordano, 2005; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Waterbury, 1987). However, that treaty did not allocate water shares, except for prohibiting Ethiopia from ‘arresting’ the flow of the river. Otherwise, Ethiopia was not a party to any colonial agreement that allocated Nile water to Egypt and Sudan. Scholars argue that it is practically difficult to force transboundary riparian states to enter into a binding agreement over water allocation, let alone argue about the binding nature of an agreement to which a nation was not a party. Studies indicate that reaching a basis for actual allocations can be challenging due to the opposing principles that riparian states often adopt in negotiations. For example, Lautze and Giordano (2005: 1060) argued in this regard that ‘[w]hile it has been asserted that the inclusion of flexible water allocation principles is integral to resilient transboundary water law, arriving at a basis for actual allocations can prove difficult because of the opposing principles that riparians often adopt in negotiations’.
As a result, Lautze and Giordano (2005: 1060) further argue that ‘actual negotiations tend to move away from these two extreme principles and instead result in a vague compromise position known generally as limited (or restricted) territorial sovereignty, which allows for the “reasonable and equitable use” of international waters so long as “no appreciable harm” is inflicted on co-riparians’.
However, as discussed above, Ethiopia was a signatory to the 1902 Nile colonial agreement (Lautze and Giordano, 2005; Shih and Stuz, 2012; Waterbury, 1987). To start with the 1902 treaty, this was a colonial time treaty and there is a general rejection of colonial agreements except for those demarcating borders. The reason for this is that those colonial treaties were concluded at the time when colonies did not have say in the content of the treaties and that the colonial powers exercised undue influence in the process. So, when it is seen from this perspective, the 1902 treaty does not have any legal force. However, even assuming that it is a valid one, Egypt’s invocation of the 1902 treaty, does not require Ethiopia to get prior approval to use its natural resources. In that treaty, Ethiopia undertook to refrain from completely stopping the flow of the river, and GERD, as a hydropower dam, does not completely arrest the flow of the water. (
Furthermore, in the
In general, the three newspapers provided their justifications for labeling colonial treaties as binding, alternative or obsolete.
Implications of colonial treaties for GERD negotiations and suggested solutions
The three newspapers also take pains to explain the implications of riparian states’ failure to adhere to the binding, alternative and obsolete nature of the colonial treaties. Furthermore, they provide suggestions for potential remedies that the states should consider in order to reach an agreement on the ongoing dispute concerning GERD.
Similarly, Khartoum was also forced to give Ethiopia a lesson in its own history. Ethiopia was an independent state at the time it signed the treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia of 15 May 1902 governing the use of the Nile. Furthermore, if Ethiopia repudiates its obligations under that agreement, then it also renounces its sovereignty over the Benishangul region. As the Sudanese Foreign Ministry statement put it, ‘Sudan does not need to remind Ethiopia that its unwise usage of such misleading claims and its disavowal of previous agreements undermines Ethiopian sovereignty over the Benishangul region, sovereignty over which was transferred from Sudan to Ethiopia in accordance with the agreements under this treaty in particular.’
Treaties between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, relative to the frontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, aka the 1902 Treaty, consists of two articles that specify the demarcation of the borders between Sudan and Ethiopia. Article I of the Treaty stipulates: The frontier between the Sudan and Ethiopia agreed on between the two governments shall be: the line which is marked in red on the map annexed to this Treaty in duplicate, and traced from Khor Um Hagar to Gallabat, to the Blue Nile, Baro, Pibor, and Akobo Rivers to Melile, thence, to the intersection of the 6th degree of north latitude with the 35th degree longitude east of Greenwich.
Article II of the Treaty also states: ‘The boundary as defined in Article I, shall be delimited and marked on the ground by a Joint Boundary Commission, which shall be nominated by the two High Contracting Parties, who shall notify the same to their subjects after delimitation’.
As can be seen, these articles stipulate the demarcation of boundaries between the two countries that share a large border area. However, none of the articles discuss the transfer of land from one country to another, as claimed by
Studies (Beyene et al., 2018; Cascão, 2009; Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010; Darwisheh, 2018 reveal that Sudan’s diplomatic and foreign policy toward the Nile has been shadowed by the supremacy of Egypt. To this end, Darwisheh (2018: 3) notes, ‘Even after its independence Sudan remained within Egypt’s sphere of influence in the Nile Basin’. Oftentimes, Egypt systematically extracted Sudan’s compliance with occasional threats to use military force, boycott Sudanese exports, and worsen the living conditions of Sudanese residents in Egypt, among others, to maintain the status quo. At other times, Egypt has been using other soft power techniques such as diplomatic, cultural and economic relations (Darwisheh, 2018) to extract Sudan’s acquiescence. Given this experience, it is safe to argue that
The attempt by
According to
From these news stories, it is evident that
The For centuries, Egypt has been digging its heels on the colonial era agreements which lavishly provide the country to sustain a monopoly control over the shared river Nile, and experts say the issue of ‘historic right’ holds no water other than running contradiction against modern thinking as it perpetuates years of historical injustice. The so-called historical rights which Egypt claims in reference to the 1929 and 1959 agreements have been the major bargaining chip of Cairo and it has for long tried to sugarcoat these exclusionist agreements as permanently binding sacred deals. (
Furthermore, the
The
The
However, for the
Another news story by
As a solution,
Overall, the positions held by the news media from the three conflicting Nile basin states, particularly
However, it is important to note that
Overall, it is evident that the Nile colonial treaties have had a significant impact on the current GERD conflict. Unfortunately, the national media has become entangled in these treaties, exacerbating the GERD disputes rather than helping to resolve them.
Conclusion
This article examines how
The three newspapers also provided different justifications to cement their portrayals of these colonial treaties.
The three newspapers also pinpointed the implications and consequences the Eastern Nile basin countries face for failing to comply with the binding, obsolete or alternative nature of the Nile colonial treaties.
The three newspapers also provided their solutions, recommending how the riparian countries should act regarding the Nile colonial treaties in relation to GERD. As per
Different studies (Kasimbazi, 2010; Kassa, 2015; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2015; Lautze and Giordano, 2005; Waterbury, 1987) have argued that the Nile colonial treaties generally lack fairness and equity because they were designed to protect the interests of the colonial countries in the region. Particularly, Great Britain entered into various colonial treaties to tip the balance in Egypt’s favor and benefit Great Britain. The unfairness of these treaties led the riparian countries, except Egypt, to unconditionally reject these colonial treaties upon gaining independence. Given this context, it is reasonable to argue that the differing perspectives on these colonial treaties presented by
Apart from following their respective nations’ divergent and polarized trichotomic discourses, it could also be safe to argue that the three newspapers have been directly affected by colonialism and its aftermaths, as evidenced by the Nile colonial treaties in the context of this study. The trichotomic discourses by the three newspapers can be attributed to the positions of the Nile colonial treaties toward these three important riparian states.
Media discourses on transboundary rivers can influence the development of cooperative or conflictual terms (Deka et al., 2023; Delang, 2020; Dieperink, 2011; Wei et al., 2021). In light of the findings of this study, it can be argued that the polarized and divergent media discourses on the Nile colonial treaties, especially that of Egypt and Ethiopia, contribute to conflictual terms. This is evident in the failure of the riparian countries to reach a binding agreement on GERD despite extensive efforts. The impact of the structural legacies of colonialism and colonial treaties can also be observed in contemporary Africa, where conflicts, disagreements, and hostilities are evident in various aspects, including the use and management of transboundary water resources. This calls for consideration of the multifaceted impact of colonialism and its aftermath in searching for lasting solutions to emerging problems that have their roots in colonialism and colonial treaties.
Footnotes
ORCID iD
