In response to my critics, I highlight areas of agreement and disagreement. I also argue that my view is better suited than narrativism to account for the difficulties that we encounter in trying to understand other agents. Moreover, the points brought up by Gallagher and Hutto do not succeed in showing that our understanding of an agent’s reasons for acting proceeds independently from reenactive empathy.
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2.
HuttoD. D. (2012). Understanding reasons without reenactment: Comment on Stueber. Emotion Review, 4, 66–67.
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StueberK. (2011). Imagination, empathy, and moral deliberation: The case of imaginative resistance [Spindel supplement on empathy and ethics]. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49, 156–180.
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StueberK. (in press). Explaining human agency: Reasons, causes and the first person perspective. In D’OroG. (Ed.), Reasons and causes: Causalism and non-causalism in the philosophy of action. Palgrave Macmillan.
