Abstract
Introduction
In recent years, Central Asia, a generally stable region, witnessed several large-scale protests that had far-reaching political consequences.
1
For instance, in Kazakhstan, at the beginning of 2022, what started as an expression of public discontent in response to an increase in the oil and gas prices in the West Kazakhstan region spread across the country. Several thousand protesters took to the streets demanding not only a revision of oil and gas prices but also widespread economic and political reform. This event, known as “Bloody January,” ultimately led to the downfall of longtime leader Nursultan Nazarbayev. Although Nazarbayev had resigned from the presidency after 29 years in power, he retained significant influence through other powerful positions (Troitskiy et al., 2023). Likewise, Uzbekistan, in 2023, also experienced massive protests over the government’s decision to end Karkalpakstan’s status as an autonomous region. This event resulted in the death of at least 21 people, and several more were injured or jailed (Putz, 2023). In Tajikistan, in 2022, the state security forces killed 25 ethnic Pamiris, a minority group, during protests in the autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region (Tondo, 2022). These events are both recent and politically consequential, yet academic research on public uprisings in Central Asia remains scarce. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, both the frequency of protests and levels of participation tend to be relatively low in Central Asia (Clark & Regan, 2016), which may help explain the limited academic attention to the region. However, as discussed above, these protests have had deadly and far-reaching political consequences, thus warranting a timely study. Total Number of Protests in Central Asia, 1991–2020 Protest Participants in Central Asia, 1991–2020
Indeed even though some large-scale protests have resulted in several political upheavals and human casualties, political dissent remains largely understudied in the Central Asian context (Radnitz, 2005; Satybaldieva, 2021).
2
Kuran (1991, p. 7) warned that “political revolutions will inevitably continue to catch the world by surprise,” and the recent events from Central Asia discussed above, seem to corroborate that assertion—and may continue to do so. Yet, the scholarly focus has been evading this region. As such, we utilize the newly available
We begin by discussing five prominent theories that we deem best explain why Central Asians engage in protests—relative deprivation theory, framing, collective action theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity structure. Next, we engage in in-depth case studies to identify which of these theories best explains mass mobilization for each of the countries included in our sample. We conclude the paper by discussing key findings and by providing avenues for future research.
Theories of Political Dissent in the Central Asian Context
Collective action theory suggests that individuals are often disincentivized from participating in mass mobilizations, as their individual contributions are unlikely to be recognized. They may still reap the benefits of a successful protest without actively participating, while also avoiding the potential costs and risks associated with its failure (Olson, 1965). In authoritarian states, like much of Central Asia, the utility of participating in protests is expected to be low, as the chances that demands will be accommodated are slim, whereas potential costs if protests fail are high due to the repressive nature of the regimes. While the collective action theory does a decent job of providing a valuable framework for analyzing the decision-making process behind the choice to participate in the protests, it does not necessarily explain why, despite the potentially high costs of mass mobilization, they still take place, albeit sporadically, in the Central Asian context.
It is in this vein that a single theory cannot explain the dynamics of collective actions in the Central Asian context thus necessitating a need for a multifaceted and a more nuanced approach (Achilov, 2015). As such, we discuss prominent theories of public dissent, namely, relative deprivation, framing, resource mobilization, and the political opportunity structure, and examine which, if any, of these theories help us understand protest dynamics for each of the Central Asian countries.
Relative Deprivation
Economic grievances are often considered one of the primary reasons for people’s participation in political dissent, including in Central Asia (Achilov, 2015). Some suggest that economic grievances can serve as a precondition for mass mobilizations (Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005). As Gurr (1968, 1104) suggests, relative deprivation—which could be defined as perceived misalignment between people’s value expectations about the “goods and conditions of life they are justifiably entitled” and what they think is accessible and attainable to them—explains most conflicts. However, relative deprivation as a motivation for public participation in protests suffers from some lapses.
One of the problems with relative deprivation theory stems from the difficulty of specifying the reference group that people will consider as a baseline to help them evaluate their conditions (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). For instance, in the case of labor protests, which are common in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, the reference group for Kazakh workers with low wages could be the workers of foreign companies with higher incomes. The feelings of frustration with the unequal distribution of wages can lead to protests. The protest leaders or government officials can frame the issues in a favorable way by selecting a relevant reference group, resulting in the mobilization or demobilization of the group. This suggests that framing processes may offer a valuable theoretical framework for explaining the emergence and dynamics of public uprisings in Central Asia.
Framing
According to the framing theory, protests are likely to occur when the opposition group is able to interpret and frame people’s long-standing grievances as an unjust situation that requires immediate change in alignment with the public’s worldview (Opp, 2009). In 2002, during the Aksy protests in Kyrgyzstan, people demonstrated against the jailing of Azimbek Beknazarov. Community leaders brought people together by saying his arrest affected everyone: “we are all related [...] we all should help and support each other” (Radnitz, 2005, p. 415). Similarly, Fumagalli (2007) suggests that the painful memories of the 1990 Osh conflict were strategically framed by organizations and politicians that highlighted the importance of inter-ethnic stability to get the support of the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, framing can also be used for the demobilization of public protests (Fumagalli, 2007). The government might utilize collective memory about some tragic event from the past or make it seem like peace and economic prosperity depends on the stability of the existing regime to deter people from participating in activities that could undermine the government.
Also, in Tajikistan, the traumatic memories of the civil war that scarred an entire generation of people are now often used as a deterrent for people to engage in mass mobilizations despite growing economic grievances. The government regularly invokes the living conditions experienced during the civil war as a reference point to dissuade people in the present from protesting (Lemon & Roberts, 2021). Meanwhile, the opposition leaders are likely to use the unjust accumulation of wealth by elites and the condition of life in other countries as a referent to instigate mobilization. Therefore, the likelihood of grievances and feelings of frustration due to unmet expectations to turn into active protests could be conditional on their framing by their leaders.
Resource Mobilization
Nevertheless, framing the issue could only be a part of the picture as the availability of resources and capacity of protesters can significantly affect the likelihood and scale of the protests. This refers to the resource mobilization theory, which prior studies identified as another leading theory that can help in the explanation of protest dynamics, including in Central Asia. According to this theory, “the extent of available resources of various social networks is central in mobilizing protests” (Achilov, 2015, p. 7). According to Opp (2009, p. 139), the concept of resources in resource mobilization theory includes “financial means, access to media, support by sympathizers, the loyalty of groups or members or third parties, availability of rooms (for meetings or office work), rights, knowledge, and abilities.” For instance, Radnitz (2005) suggests that Aksy events in 2002 Kyrgyzstan were vital for the development of protest culture in Kyrgyzstan as they laid the foundations for future mobilizations by showing people that mass protests were effective means to get their demands met by the government, and by improving the mobilization skills of the opposition groups. As a result, the protesters used tactics similar to those they had trained during the Aksy events in the 2005 Tulip Revolution, which had a significant role in Kyrgyzstan’s history. Therefore, the availability of resources for social networks and opposition groups creates favorable conditions for mobilizations, leading to more protests.
Political Opportunity Structure
Another prominent explanation of political protests that have dominated the literature is the political opportunity structure (POS) theory, which claims that the way the public chooses to voice its dissent and demand something is heavily influenced by the changes in the political environment of the country (Lipset, 1963; Tilly, 1978). Tarrow (1998, 76) identifies “(1) the opening of access to participation; (2) the evidence of political realignment within the polity; (3) the appearance of influential allies; (4) emerging splits within the elite; and (5) a decline in the state’s capacity or will to repress dissent” as representations of such political processes that might influence the likelihood of protests. In the context of Central Asia, where elections have served more of ceremonial roles, the period of power transition or reelection of the incumbent presents a critical moment that creates a window of political opportunities for mobilization as the regime is in a vulnerable position and might not be able to repress protests effectively (Tucker, 2007). According to Corduneanu-Huci and Osa (2003), the potential of political processes to translate into opportunities presents a fertile field for mobilization when it is combined with the existence of resources like access to opposition media (Jost et al., 2018) and social networks (Radnitz, 2005).
Moreover, Murdie and Peksen (2015) suggest that the openness of political systems has an inverse-U effect on nonviolent protests. On the one hand, in an open, democratic political system, periodic elections provide the public with a channel for expressing their dissatisfaction with the status quo. On the other hand, in a consolidated authoritarian system, there is little to no incentive to engage in nonviolent protests since they will be, in the best case, ignored and, in the worst case, lead to punishment (Meyer, 2004). Countries such as Turkmenistan or Tajikistan could arguably be considered as a part of this group. The rest of the countries would probably belong to the middle part with a more open political system, where initiating and joining nonviolent protests might be a rewarding initiative since the costs are not extremely high, and the benefits are tangible.
The difference in the pattern of protest participation among Central Asian countries despite the shared historical background could be explained by the combination of relative deprivation, mobilization resources, political processes, and the triumph of either the government’s framing or the opposition’s framing of the situation in the country. In-depth analyses of major protests in the region would further help shed light on the driving forces behind protests in the region.
Case Studies
Protests in Central Asia
Although these countries share a common Soviet background and relatively similar historical and cultural roots, there are still significant discrepancies in each state’s intersubjective understanding of different issues, the ways governments respond to public uprisings, the way individuals react to such responses, and many more. Moreover, these countries occasionally engage in disputes with each other, specifically on the issues of water and energy distribution (Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012). Further, although most of these countries share similar political systems, they are by no means monolithic; thus, a nuanced and in-depth analysis provides a richer understanding of the causes and consequences of protests in the region.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is the most democratic country in the region, with a significantly greater number of protests since its independence than any other country in the region. Introducing it first would be appropriate since it is an outlier case that could be used as a point of comparison for other countries to identify the factors that make the latter less active despite sharing deep historical, social, and cultural ties. Such an approach is similar to “the method of difference,” often employed in qualitative analyses of cases with different outcomes (George & Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1971). For example, similar to this approach, Shahin et al. (2016) utilized the “different systems” design for case comparisons between the protest patterns of Brazil, China, and India (Przeworski and Teune, 1970).
Alternatively, “the method of agreement” approach can be employed in this study as well due to the overlapping mobilization patterns in Central Asian countries, excluding Kyrgyzstan. This method is often utilized when studying irregularities within one country, such as environmental protests in China (Huang & Sun, 2020). All in all, both methods of difference and agreement have been helpful in studying the protests in authoritarian states, where the lack of data often emerges as a significant obstacle, which is why utilizing them in this work is appropriate as well.
Primary Protester Demands in Kyrgyzstan
Primary State Responses to Protests in Kyrgyzstan
The foundation for future mobilizations was laid out during the 2002 Aksy events (Radnitz, 2005), where community leaders were able to mobilize a significant number of people to protest the detainment of Azimbek Beknazarov, who was a politician that people believed represented their interests in the government. The accumulated grievances over poor living situations, the structure of village government, and networks of personal relationships served as an effective precondition for large-scale protest. The post-independence reforms that formalized the tribal structure of existing village institutions of self-governance created political opportunities for protests to emerge. Also, as mentioned before, leaders framed Beknazarov’s arrest as a communal problem, which, in combination with the rest of the factors, allowed them to effectively mobilize (Radnitz, 2005). The government responded with violence, injuring dozens and killing at least five protesters. The Aksy events were a turning point in Kyrgyzstan’s history that helped to train mobilization networks and tactics, making the organizations of future mobilizations more feasible.
Furthermore, on March 14, 2005, opposition activists rallied against the political regime of a country in the city of Uzgen, holding local government officials hostage (Pala, 2005). Ten thousand protesters demanded the resignation of President Akayev after detecting inaccuracy in elections. President Akayev claimed the protests were illegitimate and accused the opposition of trying to drive the country into civil war. He mentioned that no one except a small number of the “opportunists” needed revolts (Pala, 2005). Despite such a verbal response, the general needs of the public were accommodated. Compared to the other Central Asian states, in Kyrgyzstan, despite the scale or the issue of the protest, the government did not use violent measures to disperse the crowds, as in the case of Uzbekistan, for example. Although the officials utilized similar framing tactics to the ones proposed by Fumagalli (2007), their attempt to accommodate the political demands of the protesters is a unique phenomenon in the scope of the region.
However, such a response is not homogeneous across time. In that same year, from March 20 to March 22, the same number of ten thousand protesters addressed their concerns regarding political behavior in Dzhalal-Abad city (The Economist, 2005). These protesters stormed and occupied the office of the local government official because of the fraudulent elections. Initially, the police responded to these demands with beatings and detainments. This action angered the public, leading to throwing petrol bombs at police officers to free detained activists. The police attempted to gain control over the crowd by using air shots and tear gas but ultimately abandoned both government and police buildings. This case sheds light on the other unique aspect of the nature of the Kyrgyzstani protests. As one of the least repressive countries in the region, repetitive protests and the state’s unwillingness to use indiscriminate force may have lowered the expected costs of rallying for the Kyrgyz public (Olson, 1965; Tucker, 2007). Nevertheless, in general, the most common response from state officials to the overwhelming majority of protests was simply ignoring the protesters. Only in rare instances, the government relied on crowd dispersals, arrests, and demands for accommodation.
The next large protest happened from April 12–19, 2007, when around eight thousand protesters from Bishkek rallied against Bakiyev’s candidature in elections (Institute for War and Peace Reporting [IWPR] 2007). These individuals advocated for the early elections and constitutional reforms, highlighting the general attitude towards the incumbent across the country. President Bakiyev acknowledged that these grievances were a legitimate expression of the public’s concerns but warned people not to cause any chaos. This attempt by the government to accommodate the needs of the people was largely unsuccessful, still leaving the President as an unfavorable figure. As was the case in previous rallies, the large number of participants did not immediately cause violent responses from the government, compared to other neighboring states. One massive protest being considered constitutional signals the transitioning democratic status of Kyrgyzstan, compared to the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes of the rest of Central Asian states (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2019).
Interestingly, all the largest protests mentioned above occurred during reelection processes, which correspond to the POS theory and could have been the most convenient time for social networks and opposition media to mobilize and lower the costs of the collective action problem (Achilov, 2015; Opp, 2009). Moreover, the vast majority of protester demands in Kyrgyzstan are focused on political behavior and process, which is a pretty broad category that covers objections about elections and who gets to make crucial decisions in the country, and calls for reforms and democratic transitions. Considering Kyrgyzstan’s distinct history as a Central Asian country that came closest to democracy, it is not surprising to see that most of the protests were highly political and reflected democratic values.
Kyrgyzstan’s unique protesting nature reflects different aspects of the theories provided by Murdie and Peksen (2015). The inmates’ poor living conditions in the Osh city protest or the general Kyrgyz public’s unrest regarding the fraudulent elections in Bishkek, Dzhalal-Abad, or Uzgen cities reveal the difference between their “value capabilities” and “value expectations,” meaning that individuals seem to feel relative deprivation of the political or other resources they have the rights to possess. Similarly, opportunities for resource mobilization can also be observed in this matter, as it was proved time and time again how quickly social networks gather the needed protest support, like in the cases of Aksy or Dzhalal-Abad. Therefore, the potent role of communicational and financial resources provided by the opposition groups in facilitating protests supports the resource mobilization theory.
Nevertheless, after careful observation of the Kyrgyzstani case, it becomes evident that the most significant and large-scale rallies occur during the reelection periods, a clear indication of political opportunity structure. The transition of the political incumbent is likely to gather the special attention of the public and opposition due to the political opportunities that such periods propose.
Kazakhstan
The largest post-Soviet Central Asian country that exited the Union the last after its collapse is Kazakhstan. As mentioned in the section on protests in the Soviet era, the government, regardless of its free-framed policies, blocked any public discontent, especially those of ethnic minorities. Kazakhs, despite their official status and population number, could still be considered a minority to the Russian population due to the discrimination happening in the Soviet state, with the protests remaining undocumented, covering up the pieces of information on them (Helsinki Watch 1990). Any protests that did occur were brutally repressed, like the one in 1986, where massive detainments and alleged torture practices happened to the students rallying against the appointment of a non-Kazakh official to the most critical governing position of the Kazakh SSR. As the country was approaching reaching its independent status, the territory, the instabilities occurring across the whole post-Soviet region, and the emerging opportunities to gain power could create a conducive environment for public reprisals (Isaacs, 2010).
Primary Protester Demands in Kazakhstan
Primary State Responses to Protests in Kazakhstan
Indeed, the end of the 20th century in Kazakhstan was marked by a heightened number of rallies (Clark & Regan, 2016). One of the earliest and most prominent examples of a large-scale mass mobilization in Kazakhstan during the process of gaining independence is a rally that occurred in Oskemen (previously Ust-Kamenogorsk) city on September 29, 1990 (Remnick, 1990). During this protest, ten thousand residents showed their dissent regarding the recent explosion near the nuclear plant established close to the city. Previously, the Soviet government used the Eastern Kazakhstani territories to test its weapons of mass destruction, which led to significant adverse health consequences for the residents in the surrounding regions. The uprising of such a large group of people can be explained through the political opportunity structure (POS) theory, which highlights how certain conditions may flip the cost-and-benefit analyses of civilians in autocratic regimes (Opp, 2009). The social networks of the residents and their willingness to address the long-pressing issue may have incentivized the population to gather despite the possible consequences of such action (Jenkins & Form, 2003).
Moreover, this event gathered people of different backgrounds, with numerous educated writers and other individuals coming together, granting access to media and the loyalty of various societal groups, corresponding to the resource mobilization theory (Achilov, 2015). Such actors had the power to frame the issue according to the grievances of the public, further shedding light on the issue of improper nuclear testing. Consequently, the lack of enough care for these plants triggered public suspicion towards atomic technologies and the political processes subordinating them, overpowering the possible cost obstacle in collective action problems. However, though this massive protest spurred by such a triggering to the public topic encompassed such a vast number of protesters, the government decided to refrain from addressing this topic in any way. Additionally, despite the 90s being a rocky period in Kazakhstani politics, the Soviet government did not seem to pay as much attention to the political processes concerning nuclear plants.
The next massive protest took place between 24 and 25 February 1992 in the space center of Kazakhstan, Baikonur (previously Leninsk). During that time, around 17,000 construction troops workers addressed their concerns about the inhumane treatment by their superiors (Associated Press, 1992). The labor conditions, although not entirely, also correspond to economic grievances theory, as the workers not only experienced maltreatment but also got issues with unpaid wages (Achilov, 2015). According to this theory, reasons like low wages or currency devaluations may be prominent reasons for rallies in authoritarian countries. The protest under discussion initially led to crowd dispersals but later turned into a violent case, with the state responding with killings. It is safe to assume that grievances that touch on the labor conditions of workers seem to be a sensitive issue for the government.
It is not surprising that most of the protesters’ demands in independent Kazakhstan have focused on wage disputes since it can be explained by the presence of an unofficial social contract between the government and the public to prioritize economic grievances. One of the main aspects of former president Nazarbayev’s social contract with the public was the idea that economic growth should come before political reforms. It is also highlighted under the slogan “Economy first, then politics” in the “Kazakhstan-2050” national strategy that outlines the course of development for Kazakhstan to enter the list of the top 30 most developed countries in the world (Akorda, 2012). It seems like it worked for a certain period, and the public was comfortable with the idea since Kazakhstan has considerably higher levels of economic development and living conditions than other Central Asian countries. So, most of the protests erupted when the government failed to meet the conditions of the social contract, and the promises of economic prosperity proved to be empty for some segments of society.
However, in Kazakhstan, economic development is limited, and economic inequality is high, so people perceive political reforms to ameliorate these concerns (Bereziuk & Yaremchuk, 2020). It seems like, over time, the public came to understand that as well, with political behavior and process being the second most popular category among the protester demands after wage disputes. Also, it can be explained by the fact that wage disputes could quickly develop into political protests as they did during one of the most infamous cases of mass mobilizations in Kazakhstan, known as the Zhanaozen massacre. It was a series of rallies that occurred in the West of Kazakhstan in 2011 when workers and their relatives expressed their concerns regarding unpaid wages that lasted more than 6 months and culminated on Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, resulting in mass arrests and shootings with the dozens of protesters being killed by police (Kramer, 2011).
Political protests can arise on their own grounds as well, which is evident from the increased number of protests for political reasons in recent years, starting from the resignation of the longest-reigning President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the current President, Tokayev, taking office, which can be tied to the political opportunities that arise during power-transitions. The largest one of those happened on June 9th, 2019, in two cities of Republican significance, Almaty and Astana (previously Nur-Sultan). This rally touched on the topic of political processes and encompassed from five to ten thousand people. Individuals used a chant, “Shame!” to address their questions regarding the fairness of the elections. Tokayev was handpicked as his successor by Nazarbayev (AP News, 2019). The election polls showed around 70% support of the incumbent. Although election rigging is not new in Kazakhstan, the government response was more violent during this period (France 24, 2018; Reuters, 2019), utilizing arrests, with police officers forcefully dispersing crowds, claiming the protesters were radicals destabilizing society.
These events showcase the increased use of framing practices by the government, where they not only label people a certain way but also grow a negative connotation towards these expressions via national media and other sources (Fumagalli, 2007). Among all the other protests, in recent years, the government seems to have developed an extreme sensitivity regarding the issue of the country’s regime and questions towards it, but the media sources did not detect killings. In general, similar to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan’s government mostly ignores the protesters and uses crowd dispersal, arrests, and accommodation in more extreme cases. The reasons for such behavior might include the international image the new incumbent strives to build around the country and the way questioning it could lead to the crumbling down of the newly “democratic” perception of it (Akorda, 2022).
Kazakhstan’s protesting nature clearly skews more towards the theory of relative deprivation. As mentioned, alongside the nation taking the course of economic development, a significant portion of the rallies took place because of wage disputes and other economic reasons. In Baikonur and Zhanaozen’s cases, the workers faced significant discrepancies between their deserved and received, or not received, to be precise, salaries, and such discontent, reflected in thousands of other individuals ready to voice their grievances in an authoritarian country, reflects the theory of resource deprivation even further. Compared to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan does not seem to possess an established protester or opposition network that would help mobilize the public, with most rallies being small scale; only a few, all of which were reflected in this passage, gained thousands of supporters. Since resource mobilization theory is not as prominent in this case analysis, it is safe to assume that the few times when the protests could gain large followings took place when the participants saw opportunities in them. Continuous politically motivated protests in recent years may have occurred due to the transitioning process from the long-reigning president who did not seem to leave the office in the near future, which may have possibly spiked out the perceived benefits of protest participation more than in the previous years.
Uzbekistan
The most populous Central Asian country, Uzbekistan, has had around 52 recorded protests since its independence (Clark & Regan, 2016). Uzbekistan’s post-independence trajectory when it comes to its treatment of political dissent can be defined by its impressive repressive capabilities and the scapegoating of radical Islamists.
The first massive protest in Uzbekistan after its independence revolved around economic issues, where, from the 1st to the 2nd of October 2004, four thousand women market traders in the cities of Kokand, Buxoro, and Jizzax rallied over the government’s new regulations on imported goods sales (Clark & Regan, 2016). Because of these regulations, all traders selling foreign goods needed to register, and those not compiling were arrested and had their goods confiscated. These repressive policies exacerbated economic grievances and heightened the intensity of public dissent (Achilov, 2015). The protesters beat the police and tax officials, setting their cars on fire. Some human rights activists reported the initial number of protesters as ten, scaled down to four thousand. The government responded with crowd dispersals, using water cannons to restrain the traders. Uniquely, this case not only reflects the government’s decision-making patterns but also the public’s sensitivity to economic issues. This could be the case because of the direct negative impact unexpected economic policies can have on the general well-being of society, especially since its considerable share are traders. Interestingly, compared to the Kazakhstani protesters who mostly showed discontent through their bodies, utilizing hunger strikes, for example, appealing to the larger public, these individuals, similar to Kyrgyz protesters, expressed their discontent directly to whom they perceived to be the causes of their unfavorable situation.
Aside from economic reasons, the following year, in 2005, what became known as the Andijon events was a turning point in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy and its approach to political dissent. In May of 2005, armed men stormed the prison in Andijon and freed 23 local businessmen on suspicion of belonging to a radical Islamic group without any substantial proof (Naumkin, 2006). The public included the friends and families of those accused of religious extremism (International Crisis Group, 2005). In response, Karimov ordered shootings of every person who happened to be outside, including children, women, and retired individuals (International Crisis Group, 2005; Radio Liberty 2005). The number of protesters during this rally varied from ten to thirty thousand people. Although the mobilized groups’ radical actions did pose a threat to society’s well-being, the state’s order to kill all protesters indiscriminately shows the government’s intolerance towards policy-related mass mobilization.
There are various interpretations of the causes and consequences of Andijon events for Uzbekistan’s society. Hill and Jones (2006) attribute Karimov’s brutal repression to the pending elections and his paranoia over losing power, considering the Color Revolutions that were taking place in the post-Soviet arena at that time. Moreover, the Andijon events were a turning point in the foreign policy of the country that moved away from close cooperation with the United States on security issues towards Russia and China, who would not condemn Uzbekistan’s repressive politics (Naumkin, 2006). Karimov was able to reframe the Andijon events from local conflicts into the “crisis threatening Uzbek national identity” and himself as the “only bulwark protecting society from radical Islamism” (McGlinchey, 2009, 5). Therefore, it can be argued that the memories of Andijon events serve as a demobilizing frame in Uzbekistan. This case highlights the way governments can manipulate protesters’ identities using framing since by labeling the protesters as extremists; the former can delegitimize the grievances of the latter. The public response to these accusations translates into how the Uzbekistani public can mobilize in political situations as well.
Even after the power transition from Karimov to Mirziyoyev, the protest patterns in Uzbekistan remained the same, with small scale, isolated, and rare protests that often do not even target the regime (Clark & Regan, 2016). As showin in Table 5, the Uzbek government has mostly responded with no reaction and, to a lesser degree, used crowd dispersals and accommodation to deal with the few protests that have broken out. So, the low levels of political protests in Uzbekistan seem to stem from the political environment filled with more barriers than opportunities and the use of memory about tragic events in the history of the country as a demobilizing frame (Schmitz & Wolters, 2012).
Primary State Responses to Protests in Uzbekistan
Primary Protester Demands in Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Primary Protester Demands in Tajikistan
Primary State Responses to Protests in Tajikistan
Despite the well-institutionalized repressive institutions, the economic struggles faced by people sometimes become unbearable, resulting in sporadic and inconsistent protests against the government. The rally encompassing the most significant number of participants in Tajikistan was the one on February 17th, 1990, in Dushanbe, the capital city (Mullojanov, 2016). Around ten thousand youths tried to address the issue of living conditions, specifically inflationary pressures, reflecting the economic grievance theory (Achilov, 2015). This rally later reflected the deep-seated discontent with the Soviet regime that attempted to frame protesters as “European haters,” delegitimizing the riot and fostering further hatred. For some time, the protest turned violent, with local buildings being attacked. In the long run, this protest affected the negative affiliation towards the Soviet past among the Tajik people, reflecting its usual response to the issues concerning it. In this case, the framing and labeling of the protesters proposing their economic grievances on ethnic grounds could have contributed to the growing discontent with the ruling regime and opposition groups. Later, after gaining independence, a number of small-scale protests took place, with some mentions of negative attitudes or skepticism towards the previous Soviet rule, much more frequently than in other Central Asian countries. This pattern could suggest not only the public’s affiliations with the Soviet state but also some possible framing narrative about the previous external threat to the nation’s well-being.
Following the previous rally, from 12th to May 16th, 1996, around four thousand residents of Khojand expressed their concerns regarding the economic, political, and legal issues (Human Rights Watch, 1998). As was evident in the other Central Asian states, economic and political concerns remain to be one of the constituents of public discontent in these countries. The new ruling Tajik state made some accommodations to the individuals’ demands after 3 days of protests when the police chief of the northern region, Rajabov, was replaced with Kosimov, discrediting the opposition’s legitimacy. Interestingly, compared to Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, a large number of protesters seemed to not shake up the Tajik government as much, with both ruling regimes responding to the protests in a nonviolent way in the 90s (Clark & Regan, 2016).
With a similar demand revolving around political processes, the next large picket happened from February 26th to March 6th, a year later, with three thousand locals from the Bokhtar (prev. Kurgan-Tyube) city (Clark & Regan, 2016). The government decided to ignore this rally, compared to the accommodation outcome in the previous protest. Interestingly, the opposition radio got involved in this rally, possibly signaling the mobilization channels of these troops. The presence of these radio channels and opposition networks could also correspond to the POS and RMP theories of mobilization (Achilov, 2015).
Another feature of Tajikistan’s protesting nature revolves around the issue of fragmentation within social groups of the state. From 22nd to 24th August 2012, in the city of Khorugh, three thousand residents raised their concerns regarding police brutality (BBC News, 2012; Eurasianet, 2012). In this case, the government forces opened fire in the Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region at those who gathered to dispute the killing of the informal leader of the area. Several young people surrounded the government building after that individual’s burial, throwing stones. As a result, two people were wounded, causing further suspicion of the death of Imomnazarov and shaming the government for installing troops and hurting citizens. In this case, the symbolic value the government’s violent response had on the public could potentially shed light on the trigger some groups may respond to and mobilize themselves. Although not every state in Central Asia has a structure encompassing autonomous regions, previous public outrage regarding the detainment or assassination of particular leaders has been previously observed in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Clark & Regan, 2016). Moreover, the government’s decision to utilize violence not in the previous political or economic cases but in this protest revolving around the autonomy of regions shows the state’s commitment to maintaining such territories under control with all the means available.
Tajikistan ranked as the seventh least free country in the world (Freedom House, 2023). The political elites abuse their far-reaching influence in all sectors of the government to intimidate any individual, group, or organization that might pose a threat to the government. Targeted people are falsely prosecuted in courts and denied access to healthcare and job opportunities. Even fleeing from the country does not end the repression, as the government starts targeting the families of the political dissidents by taking away their passports, subjecting them to arbitrary arrests, public humiliation, economic pressure, and even sexual violence (Lemon, Furstenberg, and Heathershaw, 2017). Therefore, it is not surprising that there are no active and consistent mobilization efforts from the public (Schmitz & Wolters, 2012).
Tajikistan’s case offers some additional explanation to the relative deprivation theory, as it was observed how frequently citizens showed their discontent towards the living standards and other reasons in Dushanbe or Khojand protests. However, possibly due to the repressive practices described above, Tajikistan’s protests cannot be accurately described by the resource mobilization theory because the attempts to manage communication and establish other networks and chains of support, like in the case of Bokhtar protest, remain largely speculated and unsupported. Tajikistan’s protest environment, therefore, can be most accurately described by the political processes theory, where the government’s intolerance towards public expression and closed systems of communication explain the lack of large-scale protests occurring in the country.
Turkmenistan
Primary Protester Demands in Turkmenistan
Primary State Responses to Protests in Turkmenistan
Nevertheless, similar to other Central Asian countries, the first documented protest in the country occurred over political skepticism towards the ruling regime. It took place in 1995 and included around a thousand Russian-speaking population who protested against Niyazov’s, also known as Turkmenbasy, oppressive regime (Radio Azattyq, 2022). The government responded to such grievances with ignorance, possibly aware of the stability of the engraved authoritarianism in the country.
The second protest revolved around a similar Central Asian demand, that is, addressing police brutality. It happened in 2008 and lasted 3 days, with the rally including 300 Iranian truck drivers protesting over poor conditions in the Ashkabad transit cargo terminal. The protest escalated due to the 60-year-old driver being beaten by the Turkmen police but was again ignored, which could be the result of the small scale of the protest (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2008).
According to the economic grievances theory, the third protest took place in 2011, when 50 individuals gathered to address the state’s order to evict residents and take their housing (Fitzpatrick, 2011). In Uzbekistan, a similar concern over the country’s economic policy took place, and it was met with crowd-dispersing actions similar to those in the case of this protest. As it was evident in the examples of a few states now, the governments seem to be more sensitive towards not only the scale of the protest but also the economic nature of demands.
Lastly, in 2014, at least 50 residents protested against the state’s decision to deprive people of air conditioning so as not to ruin the external looks of buildings (BBC News, 2014). People gathered to address their concerns to the house owners, and the latter, scared of the public outrage, called the police. The police officials were met with curses and stones, similar to some protests in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the brutal public response triggered some accommodation or the complete overturn of the government. In this case, such a public force also leads to accommodation.
The lack of recorded protests is not surprising, as Turkmenistan is known as the “North Korea” of Central Asia. The incumbent Serdar Berdimuhamedow, who succeeded the “throne” from his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhadow, in 2022, is continuing in his footsteps and using excessive repression and censorship to prevent any form of meaningful opposition. The absolute control over all physical and digital communication channels leaves almost no ground for public expression, reflecting the political opportunity theory. The resource mobilization and relative deprivation theories become irrelevant in this case due to heavy-handed dictatorial practices, as only four grievances emerged in 30 years, and there were no networks to support such concerns.
Conclusion
What drives citizens in authoritarian countries, such as those in Central Asia, to engage in public dissent? To address this question, we utilize a newly available dataset—
That said, some puzzles regarding the other key drivers of mass mobilization in Central Asia remain. First, how prevalent and effective are digital tools in shaping the landscape of current public dissent in the region? Since our focus primarily relied on the analysis of
Future research could build on our work in several ways. First, our analysis suggests that while in some countries, multiple causes exist for protests, in some; the causes tend to center mostly around economic grievances. This is particularly puzzling given that these countries have historically belonged to similar income groups -- at least during the early years of independence. So, what explains these discrepancies? In other words, why do people in some countries often protest over political issues (e.g., Kyrgyzstan), while in others protests are mainly fueled by economic concerns (e.g., Kazakhstan)? This is especially puzzling because Kyrgyzstan is the most liberal Central Asian country. Second, scholars could also identify why, in some cases, the government tends to accommodate protesters’ demands and, in some cases, they resort to repressive tactics. Some protests end up bloody and some end without much human casualty. What explains these discrepancies? Relatedly, future research could investigate the strategies employed by governments to suppress public demonstrations, including the specific policies implemented to prevent protests from escalating (see Adhikari et al., 2024). This study mostly focuses on citizen’s motivation. Future studies could study the government’s approach to reduce the extent and scope of public dissent in these countries.
Footnotes
ORCID iD
