Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

The current research examines immediate regrets occurring at the time of a meaningful life outcome to better understand influences on real-life regrets. This research used a longitudinal approach to examine both initial severity and the rate of change in immediate regrets. Initial severity was associated with greater past control over the outcome and lower levels of future ability to attain goals relevant to the regret and correct the regretted situation. Regret decreased over time, but less so if it concerned attainable ongoing goals. These contrasting effects of future opportunity on initial severity and change over time support a Dynamic Opportunity Principle of regret. Furthermore, the effects of past opportunity and of actions versus inactions on immediate regrets diverged from past findings about retrospective regrets. Immediate regrets may fundamentally differ from retrospective regrets, and implications for our understanding of regret are discussed.

Keywords

regret counterfactual thinking opportunity emotion

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Beike

Markman

Karadogan

(2009). What we regret most are lost opportunities: A theory of regret intensity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 385–397.

Epstude

Roese

N. J.

(2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168–192.

Escobedo

J. R.

Adolphs

(2010). Becoming a better person: Temporal remoteness biases autobiographical memories for moral events. Emotion, 10, 511–518.

Fishbach

Shah

J. Y.

Kruglanski

A. W.

(2004). Emotional transfer in goal systems. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 723–738.

Gilovich

Kerr

Medvec

V. H.

(1993). Effect of temporal perspective on subjective confidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 552–560.

Gilovich

Medvec

V. H.

(1995a). The experience of regret: What, when, and why. Psychological Review, 102, 379–395.

Gilovich

Medvec

V. H.

(1995b). Some counterfactual determinants of satisfaction and regret. In Roese

N. J.

Olson

J. M.

(Eds.), What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking (pp. 259–282). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gilovich

Medvec

V. H.

Kahneman

(1998). Varieties of regret: A debate and partial resolution. Psychological Review, 105, 602–605.

Girotto

Legrenzi

Rizzo

(1991). Event controllability in counterfactual thinking. Acta Psychologica, 78, 111–133.

10.

Kahneman

Miller

D. T.

(1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136–153.

11.

Kruglanski

A. W.

Shah

J. Y.

Fishbach

Friedman

Chun

W. Y.

Sleeth-Keppler

(2002). A theory of goal systems. In Zanna

M. P.

(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology: Vol. 34 (pp. 331–378). New York, NY: Academic Press.

12.

Landman

(1993). Regret: Persistence of the possible. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

13.

Markman

K. D.

Gavanski

Sherman

S. J.

McMullen

M. N.

(1995). The impact of perceived control on the imagination of better and worse possible worlds. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 588–595.

14.

McMullen

M. N.

Markman

K. D.

Gavanski

(1995). Living in neither the best nor worst of all possible worlds: Antecedents and consequences of upward and downward counterfactual thinking. In Roese

N. J.

Olson

J. M.

(Eds.), What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking (pp. 133–167). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

15.

Moore

B. S.

Sherrod

D. R.

Liu

T. J.

Underwood

(1979). The dispositional shift in attribution over time. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 553–569.

16.

Nasco

S. A.

Marsh

K. L.

(1999). Gaining control through counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 557–569.

17.

Peterson

(1980). Memory and the “dispositional shift.”. Social Psychology Quarterly, 43, 372–380.

18.

Raudenbush

Bryk

Congdon

(2007). HLM [Computer Software]. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.

19.

Roese

N. J.

Summerville

(2005). What we regret most … and why. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1273–1285.

20.

Sanna

L. J.

Turley

K. J.

(1996). Antecedents to spontaneous counterfactual thinking: Effects of expectancy violation and outcome valence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9, 906–919.

21.

Savitsky

Medvec

V. H.

Gilovich

(1997). Remembering and regretting: The Zeigarnik effect and the cognitive availability of regrettable actions and inactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 248–257.

22.

Shimanoff

S. B.

(1984). Commonly named emotions in everyday conversations. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58, 514.

23.

Smallman

Roese

N. J.

(2009). Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral intentions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 845–852.

24.

Taylor

S. E.

(1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The mobilization-minimization hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 67–85.

25.

Torges

C. M.

Stewart

A. J.

Nolen-Hoeksema

(2008). Regret resolution, aging, and adapting to loss. Psychology and Aging, 23, 169–180.

26.

Wilson

A. E.

Ross

(2001). From chump to champ: People’s appraisals of their earlier and present selves. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 572–584.

27.

Zeelenberg

Pieters

(2007). A theory of regret regulation 1.0. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17, 3–18.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.01 MB