Abstract
Democratic values are widely endorsed principles including commitments to protect individual freedoms. Paradoxically, the widespread normativity of these ideas can be used to justify prejudice. With two nationally representative U.S. samples, we find that prejudiced respondents defend another’s prejudiced speech, using democratic values as justification. This vicarious defense occurs primarily among those who share the prejudice and only when the relevant prejudice is expressed. Several different democratic values (e.g., due process, double jeopardy) can serve as justifications—the issue is more about
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
