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Abstract

Contemporary scholarship suggests that in post-Soeharto Indonesia, politics have become more democratic, replacing a brutal military dictatorship with considerable autocratic governance that appears to value a democratic governance system. However, exactly why there has not been an actual change in democratic policy-making in the parliament remains poorly understood. Contemporary scholarship asserts that the Indonesian policy-making process is characterized by ‘empty ritual’ instead of a genuine political process, due to the oligarchic nature of Indonesian politics. Nonetheless, there are few explanations of how or to what extent oligarchy dictates the policy-making process at the legislative level; instead, we are left with an unclear picture of the current political process of policy-making in the parliament. This study aims to fill this gap and investigate how oligarchy has used cartel-like strategies to overcome the legislative process in the parliament. A literature review and analysis of secondary data sources were employed to answer these questions. The findings show that the persistence of oligarchic cartels is evident in the legislative process of the Election Act 7/2017. This suggests that Indonesian oligarchs have hijacked the parliament's democratic policy-making process, finding ways to achieve consensus in passing bills and thereby evading complex disputes to dictate policy to their economic and political benefit.

Keywords

cartels legislation oligarchy parliament policy-making

Introduction

In the post-Soeharto regime, after 1998, some scholars had hoped that Indonesia would transform itself from a brutal authoritarian regime to a new era of reform (Acemoglu and Robison, 2001; Robison and Hadiz, 2004, 2017). However, much-anticipated benefits from such a reformation have not transpired; instead, Soeharto's military brutal authoritarianism has been replaced by an undemocratic oligarchic political system (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019; Berenschot, 2018; Mietzner, 2013; Winters, 2016, 2013).

This study examines how the oligarchy has intervened in the legislative process of Indonesia's national parliament. Mainstream political discourse claims that, in the post-Soeharto regime, Indonesian politics has shifted from authoritarianism to oligarchy, in which material power determines Indonesia's politics and economy (Abdullah, 2016; Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003; Choi, 2009). Scholars such as Hargens (2020), Slater (2018, 2004), and Ambardi (2011, 2009) suggest that Indonesian politics post-Soeharto is characterized by cartels. Slater (2018) proposes that these cartels have engendered unbalanced interactions among political parties so that Indonesian politics is now dominated by a group of strongmen. Hence, this study explores how oligarchy employs cartelized strategies and functions in the legislative process.

The central hypothesis of this research is that the Indonesian oligarchy uses cartel strategies to capture the decision-making process in the parliament, thus maintaining their ascendancy in Indonesia's politics and its economy to perpetuate their domination. Election Act 7/2017, particularly its Article 222, will be discussed to substantiate this hypothesis. This particular Act is examined because the legislative process of this bill enables a valuable analysis; this process has substantially impacted the political process in contemporary Indonesian politics and is considered a core strategy for party oligarchs to entrench their political hegemony to enable their access to state resources and broader networks in the new political landscape (Persada, 2020; Rakhmatulloh, 2021; Sucahyo, 2021).

This article is organized as follows. Firstly, I will discuss the research objective, followed by a literature review. In the study's central part, we have the case analysis and discussion. Finally, I summarize the findings and articulate the conclusion.

Research objective and research method

Much earlier scholarly analysis claims that oligarchs ostensibly defend the democratic system or pretend to defend the interests of the populace to disguise their self-serving agendas (Abdullah, 2016; Abinales, 2000; Abinales and Amaroso, 2005; Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003). This malicious strategy shields their political and economic motivation from public scrutiny (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014, 2010; Robison, 1986). Their ostensible defence of the democratic system enables the oligarchy to retain their domination of politics and the economy and to have privileged access to state resources (Robison and Hadiz, 2017; Winters, 2011, 1996).

Mainstream scholarship proposes that contemporary Indonesia is characterized by a political landscape in which political parties operate as cartels (Ambardi, 2011, 2009; Hargens, 2020; Slater, 2018, 2004), and where oligarchic power decides political outcomes (e.g. Mietzner, 2015, 2013; Slater and Simmons, 2012). However, what remains poorly understood is how oligarchy dictates the policy-making process at the legislative level; instead, we are left with an opaque picture of the current political process in the parliament, particularly its policy-making process, and thereby we are left with the baffling picture of those with power as being undifferentiated, untamed and all-powerful. This study fills this deficiency and examines how Indonesian oligarchs use cartelized strategies to capture the legislative process in the parliament to perpetuate their ascendancy in economic and political domination. By examining the intervention of oligarchy in the legislative processes, we will gain two distinctive understandings of how the Indonesian legislative process achieves its decisions, particularly in the case of legislative process of the Election Act 7/2017, Article 222. This study thus makes two contributions. Firstly, it seeks to contribute to current scholarship on the politics of legislative policy-making in Indonesia's parliament. Secondly, this research expands and improves the current international literature on the oligarchic-cartel nature of Indonesian politics, particularly regarding the legislative process. The overarching research question of this study is: ‘How does the oligarchy use cartelized strategies to overpower the legislative process in Indonesian's parliament?’. This research uses literary study and an analysis of secondary data sources to answer the research question; the data were gathered from the academic literature, web-based archival materials and material published by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Literature review

Oligarchy

This study applies two main theories: oligarchy as proposed by Winters (2011), and party cartels as developed by Kartz and Mair (1995, 2009). ‘Oligarchy’ is a term that has long been recognized in the political science literature. In its classical sense, it is often defined as government by only a few people in power (Slater, 2018; Winters, 2011). In Indonesia, the term ‘oligarchy’ is often used interchangeably with elites, dynasties and oligarchs of political parties and when discussing socio-political problems (Primayogha, 2021). When there is corruption, ecological damage, human rights violations or corrupt policies, oligarchs are often seen as the culprits. However, many still understand ‘oligarchy’ in its classic sense as defined by Winters (2011).

On the one hand, the use of the term ‘oligarchy’ should be welcomed in the discourse. Firstly, it shows a consensus to identify oligarchy as the cause of the problem. Secondly, efforts to help the public at large understand the dangers of oligarchy require a long process (Abdullah, 2016; Abinales, 2000; Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003; Hargens, 2020; Ufen, 2018). On the other hand, interpreting ‘oligarchy’ in its classic sense can also lead to misunderstanding because this interpretation is insufficient to explain the problem of ‘a few people in power’ and its relation to issues such as corruption, environmental damage and human rights violations. Such connotations cannot be avoided (Fukuoda, 2013; Ufen, 2018). Indeed, there are always a few people or elites in every organization who lead; this is called ‘the iron law of the elite’ (Michels, 2017). Thus, the classic meaning of ‘oligarchy’ may cause confusion and inaccuracy in formulating problems. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a modern understanding of oligarchy.

Several political scientists have proposed a broader understanding of the term, such as Jeffrey A Winters (2011), Richard Robison (1986, 2004) and Vedi R. Hadiz (2004). Expanding the notion of just ‘a few people’ will include factors like wealth and the goals of the oligarchy. In his book Oligarchy, Winters (2011) distinguishes two terms in describing this problem: ‘oligarch’ and ‘oligarchy’. An oligarch, according to Winters, is an actor who controls a large concentration (wealth concentration) of material resources which can be used to maintain or increase their wealth and exclusive social position (wealth defence). Oligarchs are always individuals, not corporations or other groups. Meanwhile, Winters (2011) defines oligarchy as the politics of wealth defence by actors who have material wealth. Richard Robison and Vedi R Hadiz (2004) describe the problems of oligarchy in their book Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets. They define ‘oligarchy’ as a system of power relations that allows the concentration of wealth and authority as well as collective protection against it.

The two explanations above have a different emphasis, as identified by Michele Ford and Thomas B Pepinsky (2014). While Winters emphasizes individuals or actors, Robison and Hadiz emphasize systems of collective power relations. Even though they have these differences, they both use the same term in defining oligarchy: ‘wealth defence’. These two definitions are sufficient to explain the difference between classic and contemporary notions of oligarchy. This allows us to appreciate the difference between oligarchy and other elite traits: their status based on material wealth and their motive for wealth defence. Without having to simplify definitions, keywords can make it easier to grasp the concept of oligarchy. If oligarchy is characterized by ‘the few’ in the classic sense, it is also characterized by ‘the wealthy’ in the contemporary sense. The characteristic of oligarchy is thus the few and the wealthy.

There are two approaches to studying the concept of oligarchy in the literature. The Aristotelian concept defines oligarchy as capital or material power. Alternatively, elite theory defines oligarchy in regards to non-material power. Winters’ theory and Robison and Hadiz's analysis are Aristotelian, emphasizing that oligarchs are a few ruling minorities empowered by capital power. The elite theory approach was developed in the late 19th century by Michels (1876–1936), Mosca (1858–1941) and Pareto (1848–1923), who are recognized as the founders of elite theory in social and political science. In essence, oligarchs are a few elite people who perform governing and non-governing functions (Homans and Curtis, 1934; Hübsch, 2006). However, this elite approach has not been widely accepted in contemporary scholarship (Winters, 2011).

This study applies Winters’ (2011) analysis to examine the role of oligarchy in controlling the legislative process in the Indonesian parliament. Winter's theory is useful in discussing oligarchy's role in Indonesian politics, where it can be considered a political strategy for obtaining power through controlling (a) access to material resources and (b) capital power. The literature also finds that oligarchy embeds the ability of the ultra-rich to gain and perpetuate power, maximize and manage the control system, perpetuate the ascendant status quo and expand and consolidate their wealth (Aspinall, 2014, 2003; Eppinger, 2015; Hutchinson et al., 2002; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1998). Winters (2011) suggests that oligarchs are actors who overwhelm the party-political system to increase their social position and wealth. Oligarchy is a political strategy which maintains power for (a) defending wealth and (b) controlling political resources. It is a small circle of actors who aim to concentrate their power, control politics and perpetuate their ascendancy over it to maintain economic access and the status quo. In Indonesia, post-Suharto authoritarian oligarchic groups flourish and have transformed into predators who dominate the country's economy and politics (Hadiz, 2004).

Party cartels

This study refers to the analysis of Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) on cartels. These, in essence, are political forces or oligopolistic practices that overwhelm political parties by hindering fair competition in order to defend the electoral status quo. The term ‘cartel’ reinforces the collusive symbiosis between political parties and the state. Therefore, the cartel party system is typified by inter-party and state–party collusion. The growth of party cartels relies on collusion between ostensible rivals and on agreements that demand the consent and collaboration of relevant political parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). Cartels indicate a deceitful interpenetration of political parties with the state (Detterbeck, 2005). Party cartels are also typified by a dependence on benefits and privy access or privileges to state resources (Bolleyer and Weeks, 2017) – which is also amenable to the nature of oligarchy.

Party cartels use state resources to maintain cohesion and dominate politics. After Soeharto's authoritarian regime, party cartels have dominated Indonesian politics (Slater, 2004; Hargens, 2020). While some scholars refute this by contending that party cartels exist and function in European political parties, it is apparent that post-Soeharto Indonesian politics exhibits these cartel characteristics (Hargens, 2020): (a) interpenetration of political parties with the state, and (b) inter-party collusion. Hence, politics has an ideological purpose of serving the people (Enroth, 2017; Omar and Hamdi, 2013).

Case analysis: Election Act 7/2017

Oligarchy in the legislation process of Election Act 7/2017

This section is the central part of this article and examines how oligarchy uses cartelized strategies to dominate the legislative process in the parliament by looking more closely at Article 222 of Election Act 7/2017. This stipulates the presidential threshold, stating that either a single party or party coalitions must propose a presidential candidate with a minimum of 25% of current seats in the parliament or 20% of valid national votes in the previous elections (Mukhrijal and Fadhlullah, 2018). In substantiating oligarchic-cartel strategies in the legislative process, this study examines four mechanisms: orders from party oligarchs to the factions in parliament, political lobbying, party elites’ interpenetration and state and party interpenetration.

Orders from party oligarchs to the factions in the parliament

Orders from party oligarchs to parliamentary factions are central in making parliamentary policy decisions and have been a common practice in the Indonesian legislative process (Ford and Pepinsky, 2014; Mietzner, 2015). Party oligarchs’ role in determining policy decisions has stemmed from the situation in which parties’ financing system is over-reliant on oligarchs’ donations (Mietzner, 2015). Political parties cannot finance their party, so oligarchs have become a lucrative source of financing for party operations. Consequently, the party's decisions depend on the approval of the oligarchy (Robison and Hadiz, 2017). Oligarchs’ capital power has seized the political parties’ decision-making, including the MPs who make the laws. They merely function as political instruments who ostensibly secure the democratic process (Hargens, 2020).

Per Winters’ (2013) analysis, orders from party oligarchs to parliamentary factions represent vertical or top-down intra-organizational relationships. Similarly, Ansell et al. (2016) argue that oligarchic power fosters a vicious cycle, where the political party really means the party leader who functions as a military commander – factions in parliament should obey whatever the commander orders (Webber, 2006). Party members in both the executive and legislature are expected to accept the party elites’ orders. For example, in her speech, Megawati, Indonesia's fifth president and the PDIP chair, stressed that even a president is a party worker (Yahya, 2021b). Megawati's speech represents the oligarch's domination in politics and their supremacy over the parties, as well as that Megawati herself is a hidden oligarch (Winters, 2013).

Table 1 shows seven party leaders who gathered at the house of PAN party chair Zulkifli Hasan on 8 July 2017. At Hasan's house, party elites reached a consensus and, consequently, the drafting of the Act in the Special Committee became faster since party elites dictated the decision of the presidential threshold (Hargens, 2020). When the Election Bill was brought to the table, MPs ostensibly pursued a democratic legislative process. Nonetheless, this was a ruse since there was no genuine dialogue on the bill's drafting; the MPs followed the party elites’ orders. The parliamentary factions have not developed democratic processes; instead, they have been overpowered and used by oligarchy cartels as a political device to control political parties (Edy, 2017).

Table 1.

Party leaders who met at Zulkifli Hasan's house (Hargens, 2020).

No	Name	Party	Office
1	Zulkifli Hasan	PAN	Chair
2	Prabowo Subianto	Gerindra	Chair
3	Romahurmuziy	PPP	Chair
4	Muhaimim Iskandar	PKB	Chair
5	Edy Yudhoyono	Demokrat	Secretary-General
6	Oesman Sapta	Hanura	Chair
7	Sohibul Iman	PKS	Chair

Table 2 shows that government representatives were also at Hasan's house to discuss the legislative process of the Election Bill. When the media confronted the party leaders, none acknowledged that they had discussed a legislative strategy to reach a consensus on the provision of the presidential threshold. However, according to Hargen's (2020) analysis, the meeting of the seven party leaders was a collusive inter-party operation to achieve a consensus on the provision of a presidential threshold.

Table 2.

Government officers who met at Zulkifli Hasan's house (Hargens, 2020).

No	Name	Party	Office
1	Tjahjo Kumolo	PDIP	Former Home Affairs Minister
2	Yasonna Laoly	PDIP	The Law and Human Rights Minister

Mochtar, a constitutional law expert, claims that the oligarchy purchased the presidential threshold to concentrate the power of the ruling parties (Sucahyo, 2021). Mochtar's claim aligns well with the analysis of Slater (2018), Hutcheson (2012) and Katz and Mair (2009), who suggest that party oligarchs perpetuate power accumulation for their own benefit. Likewise, Satriawan (cited in Sucahyo, 2021) believes that the presidential threshold in Article 222 was a strategy by oligarchs in political parties to concentrate their political domination by hindering smaller parties from proposing presidential candidates. The presidential threshold's provision was stipulated to force smaller parties into electoral competition and maintain the monopoly of major parties. Hence, small parties could not compete and, in 2019, the oligarchs’ agenda prevailed; only two pairs of candidates appeared (Jokowi-Amin vs Prabowo-Uno). This oligarchic modus operandi in capturing the legislative process illustrates the cartels’ strategy (Slater, 2018) of collusion to limit electoral competition to maintain the oligarchs’ electoral dominance and secure profitable opportunities. The presidential threshold impedes ‘newcomers’ (see Table 3) and secures the oligarchs’ domination in gaining advantages in elections (e.g. Katz and Mair, 1993, 1995, 2009; Wiwoho, 2021).

Table 3.

Legislative election results in 2019 (adapted from KPU, 2019).

No.	Party	Votes in 2019	Seats in the parliament in 2019	Percentage seats in DPR	Major party in 2014?
1	PDIP	27,053,961	128	22.3%	Yes
2	Golkar	17,229,789	85	14.8%	Yes
3	Gerindra	17,594,839	78	13.6%	Yes
4	Nasdem	12,661,792	59	10.3%	Yes
5	PKB	13,570,097	58	10.1%	Yes
6	Demokrat	10,876,507	54	9.4%	Yes
7	PKS	11,493,663	50	8.7%	Yes
8	PAN	9,572,623	44	7.7%	Yes
9	PPP	6,323,147	19	3.3%	Yes
10	Perindo	3,738,320	0	0	No
11	Berkarya	2,929,495	0	0	No
12	PSI	2,650,361	0	0	No
13	Hanura	2,161,507	0	0	No
14	PBB	1,099,848	0	0	No
15	Garuda	702,536	0	0	No
16	PKPI	312,765	0	0	No

Table 3 illustrates that only the significant parties (see numbers 1–9) in 2014 could obtain parliamentary seats in 2019, and only those political parties met the presidential threshold requirement. Hence, the collusive cartel strategy by oligarchs was applied in the 2019 presidential election (Gatra, 2018). In this case, the notion of cartel party capture (Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2014; Katz and Mair, 1995) is essential for understanding how oligarchy manipulates the legislative process for the political benefit of party oligarchs.

Political lobbying

Monetary exchange dominated the drafting process of the Election Act 7/2017 long before the plenary meeting in parliament (Hargens, 2020). The lobbying process involved the presidential palace and party and parliamentary elites to achieve a consensus on the presidential threshold among the party factions as quickly as possible before the end of their terms and before the 2019 presidential election. A consensual approach, including lobbying between faction leaders in the parliament, between the members of the Special Committee and between cabinet members, transpired in the bill's legislative process (Hargens, 2020).

A collusive interpenetration between the state and parties represents the nature of the oligarch cartels. According to Katz and Mair (2009), the cartel party is characterized by (a) interpenetration between state and party and (b) inter-party collusion. Interpenetration between the state and parties is reciprocal: the state penetrates political parties via regulations that bind and subdue parties, while parties are allowed to occupy the strategic resources of the state. In the case of Election Act 7/2017, government MPs served the party oligarchs’ interests. The government compelled parliament to ensure that the 2019 presidential elections would not offer more potential presidential candidates (Persada, 2020). The government initiated the act, and initially most MPs rejected the presidential threshold since it could undermine them. However, party oligarchs enforced the presidential threshold and the MPs had to obey. According to Katz and Mair (1995), these collusive party-state networks indicate the cartel's strategies of overpowering the legislature. State-party interpenetration could also be seen in the fact that Tjahjo Kumolo, the Minister of Home Affairs, and Wiranto, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, had mobilized support from the parties to achieve consensus on the presidential threshold as stated in Article 222. This article was essential for the government since they wished to secure a second term for Jokowi (Edy, 2017).

Collusion among party elites

This section illustrates the nature of oligarchic cartels – collusion within party elites – represented in an informal meeting at Hasan's residence. As per Katz and Mair (1995) and further reinforced by Detterbeck (2005), this event reflects cartel formation. The meeting also represents the collusive strategy of party oligarchs to perpetuate ‘pie-sharing’ by using cartelized strategies to stifle dissatisfaction and disagreement among MPs, particularly from the ruling coalitions (Slater, 2018). There was an indication of monetary transaction, including pie-sharing of material rewards among MPs, during the passage of Act 7/2017 (Hargens, 2020). This situation accurately reflects the nature of cartels as proposed by Kart and Mair (2009): cartels conspire by interparty cooperation to manage shared interests among the parties and the misuse of state resources to reinforce the cartel's position vis-à-vis competitor parties. In this legislative process, the compromise among the party coalitions served to secure their agenda to plunder state assets after the election (Van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014).

Table 4 demonstrates the pie-sharing of material or economic resources post election (after Jokowi's second presidential election victory); this also aligns well with Winters’ (2016) analysis of politik bagi-bagi or the politics of capital transfer among the elites. This political formula has become entrenched in Indonesian politics, including during Jokowi's government.

Table 4.

Some cases of pie-sharing after the 2019 election (Asmara, 2021; Yahya, 2021a).

No	Name	Party/office	Previously opposition?	Joined coalition recently?	Alleged pie-sharing
1	Prabowo Subianto	Gerindra/Chair	Yes	Yes (2019), appointed Minister of Defence	Procurement megaproject for a primary weapons system (US$110 billion)
2	Edhy Prabowo	Gerindra / Chief of Gerindra faction	Yes	Yes (2019), appointed Minister of Maritime and Fisheries	Recently sentenced to nine years in prison for corruption related to the determination of lobster seed export permits; High Court cut sentence to only four years
3	Sandiaga Uno	Gerindra	Yes	Yes (2021), appointed Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy
4	Zulkifli Hasan	PAN/Chair	Yes	Yes (2021), appointed Minister of Trade in 2022

When interpenetration among party elites was achieved, the ruling factions (GOLKAR, NASDEM, PDIP, PKB and PPP) – which initially had various views on the presidential threshold provision – then supported the bill (Baidowi, 2018). The PDIP, as the largest party, insisted that the provision of the presidential threshold would secure the stability of the presidential system, which was further accepted by the coalition parties. However, some scholars refute this notion, arguing instead that the presidential threshold is essentially designed to perpetuate the ruling parties’ hegemony in the guise of securing political stability to gain public support (Media Indonesia, 2021). The Act serves the ruling parties in imposing systematic measures to exclude minor parties from Indonesian politics, including restricting them from parliamentary seats. In the presidential election in 2019, Jokowi-Amin obtained 55.5% of the ballot; subsequently, two prominent opposition parties, PAN and Democratic, entered into coalition with the ruling party (Pebrianto, 2021). This case illustrates Kart and Mair's (2009) theory and Slater's (2018) analysis that the party cartel operates to maintain major parties’ domination to obtain post-election economic and political advantages.

Collusion between party and state

Another characteristic of cartels is state-party collusive interpenetration (Detterbeck, 2005); this mechanism is reciprocal: the state permeates parties through regulations that subdue and bind political parties, while political parties are granted access to the state's strategic resources (Slater, 2018). In the case of Article 222, interpenetration between state and parties transpired in which government officers (GOs) Tjahjo Kumolo, the Minister of Home Affairs, Yasonna Laoly, the Law and Human Rights Minister, in the legislation process, and Wiranto, the Coordinating-Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, orchestrated support from parties to reach consensus on the presidential threshold (Hargens, 2020; Putri and Wibowo, 2017; Tashandra, 2017). Furthermore, MPs were also compelled to follow the political standing of the GOs to demonstrate their standing as party members (Baidowi, 2018). This manoeuvre of these GOs on the political parties ended dispute about the presidential threshold among parliament's factions. Katz and Mair's (1995) theory shows that collusive party-state networks are instrumentalized to exploit the legislative process to benefit party oligarchs by hindering any potential presidential candidates outside of the ruling parties (Rakhmatulloh, 2021).

Table 5 indicates that presidents consistently establish big coalitions (82%) and eliminate party opposition. This is compatible with Slater's (2018) observation of Indonesian politics, which can apply to Jokowi's administration, where the principal opposition party enters into a large coalition with the ruling parties. For instance, the Gerindra party has been considered the pillar of the opposition since President SBY's government. However, in his second term, Jokowi appointed Prabowo Subianto, Gerindra's chair, as Minister of Defence. Edhy Prabowo from the Gerindra party had also been appointed Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (Mustakim, 2021). In 2021, Edhy was charged by the KPK with a corruption scandal and was forced to resign. Recently, the PAN party has also joined the ruling coalition, leaving only 18% of parliamentary seats as opposition (see Table 5). In the case of the legislative process of Election Act 7/2017, Jokowi's government was concerned to remain ascendant in the presidential election in 2019; a big coalition is essential to better penetrate political parties and then exploit them to pass a bill into legislation. This situation reflects Detterbeck (2005) and Katz and Mair (2009), that party-state fusion is a cartel in nature, employing codifying electoral regulation for the political advantage of the ruling parties’ aim to expand their domination in the economy and access state assets (Ahmad and Herdiansah, 2012).

Table 5.

Current party coalition vs. party opposition (Mustakim, 2021).

No	Party coalition	Seats	Party opposition	Seats
1	PDIP	128	Demokrat	54
2	Golkar	85	PKS	50
3	Gerindra	78
4	Nasdem	59
5	PKB	58
6	PAN	44
7	PPP	19
Total		471/575 (82% of the whole seats in the parliament)	Total	104/575 (18% of the whole seats in the parliament)

In sum, state-party linkage has been a common practice in the post-Soeharto era; it accords with a cartel strategy of oligarchs maintaining their status quo and domination in politics and economy (Hakim and Jurdi, 2017). As demonstrated in Table 5, Jokowi, in his second term, successfully eliminated parliamentary opposition and created a big coalition, accounting for 82% of total seats in parliament. This coalition is vulnerable to being overpowered by the state, with the parliament's role being reduced to rubber-stamping legislation and undermining democratic processes in policy decisions (Winters, 2011).

Discussion

This section demonstrates how the above research findings are proven or disproven by comparing them with the relevant literature. This study's most significant finding proposes that party oligarchs dominated the legislative process of the Election Act 7/2017 by using cartelized strategies to capture the parliamentary policymaking process. Economically, cartels restrict competition to maximize profits for oligopolistic companies (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Party cartels have thus cooperated to secure economic and political benefit while also enjoying the advantages of interparty collusive strategies. In the case of the Election Act, the ruling parties (PDIP, NASDEM, PPP, GOLKAR and PKB) initially had differing perspectives on the presidential threshold clause (Edy, 2017). However, party leaders employed cartelized strategies to create an interest-based consensus to develop harmony and mutual benefits among political parties in the parliament (Baidowi, 2018). In achieving this consensus, party leaders gathered at the PAN chair's house and established a symbiotic collusion by which parliamentary parties agreed on the presidential threshold provision. This symbiotic collusion typifies a cartel's nature (Bolleyer, 2009; Katz and Mair, 2009) and, from Winters’ (2013) perspective, a commitment to secure economic and political benefits among party elites to perpetuate the equilibrium of their interests. Collusion between parties becomes necessary to maintain political stability and policymaking effectiveness. Compromise among political parties is required to perpetuate an equilibrium in oligarch-dominated democracy to secure a share of the post-electoral pie. Winters (2011) called this politik bagi-bagi – the obligatory oligarchic spoils-sharing by squeezing and grabbing the state's assets for their benefit.

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, elections have become more democratic; however, the policymaking process is essentially in the hands of a few oligarchs (Mietzner, 2013; Robison and Hadiz, 2017; Tapsel, 2015; Ufen, 2018; Winter, 2013). For instance, the political competition in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections was between technocratic populism and oligarchic populism (Mietzner, 2015). General Prabowo originated from robust networks of high-ranking backgrounds, business tycoons and strong military power, whilst Jokowi emerged from ordinary civil society as a carpenter. However, Jokowi's rise was not purely from the grassroots: he was supported by media and party oligarchs (Tapsell, 2015), which is why his political standing was vulnerable to the influence of oligarchs (Mietzner, 2015). The fact that Jokowi comes from ordinary civil society does not mean that oligarchic power has failed: oligarchs do not require that a president originate from their networks to remain intact. However, whoever is the candidate must be supported by oligarchs to win a presidential competition (Mietzner, 2015). This is why Jokowi's government still operates like the others and has failed to diminish the oligarchic networks.

Nonetheless, if viewed procedurally, parliament's policymaking procedures are a democratic process involving civil liberties. However, according to Edy (2017), democratic participation in policymaking is not effective; for instance, there has been no authentic debate and discussion regarding the presidential threshold in the parliament. As Robison and Hadiz (2017) demonstrated, democratic procedures are really only malicious strategies to shield the dominance of powerful oligarchs in the policymaking process. Baidowi (2018) and Edy (2017), as members of the special committee on the legislation process of the Electoral Bill, confirmed that there was no authentic debate in the parliament and that the public's involvement would have had no impact on the presidential threshold clause. Party oligarchs ostensibly accommodate public involvement in the legislation process. For instance, Edy (2017) records that some NGOs did propose the rejection of the presidential threshold clause. The Association for Elections and Democracy (PERLUDEM), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Elections and Democracy Syndication (SPD) and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) insisted that the presidential threshold not be ratified. However, their voice did not have any impact (Hargens, 2020). Hakim and Jurdi (2017) argue that public participation in the policymaking process is no more than an empty ritual to complement democratic policymaking in the parliament. Mundayat et al. (2017) support this claim that, in an oligarchic-based government, the policymaking process in parliament serves party oligarchs instead of civil society. Civil engagement in policymaking is only to hear a conclusion without a democratic discussion.

Several NGOs, such as Forum Betawi Rempug, are controlled by political parties to influence public opinion (Brown and Wilson, 2007; Mundayat et al., 2017). There had been a consensus that political parties should exclude arguments that resist the presidential threshold clause. Indeed, procedural democracy was upheld in the legislation process; however, legislators and government officials shut down debate and discussion when dealing with disputes on this matter (Hargens, 2020). According to Bolleyer (2009), in an oligarchic-dominated democracy, oligarchs can only partially evade public participation; however, they can make it ineffectual or useless (see also Blais, 2010; Boulianne, 2019; Reichert, 2018). This is because the relationships between parties and civil society should be ones of mutual support but are more like top-down political engineering (Enroth, 2017).

In overpowering the legislative process, oligarchs also use strategies such as dominating parliamentary fractions in the parliament, and government officials affiliated with political parties being aggressively involved in policymaking. Lobbying between government officials and factions in the parliament was another strategic measure to ensure the enactment of the presidential threshold (Article 222 of the Election Act), which was in the ruling coalition's interest. In the lobbying process, the collusion between political parties (inter-party collusion) – mainly the ruling coalitions (PDIP, NASDEM, PPP, GOLKAR and PKB) – was very influential in securing the presidential threshold (Hargens, 2020). This collusion typifies cartels’ strategies which entangle collaboration between ostensible competitors, requiring ‘mutual agreement’ among all participants (Katz and Mair, 1995).

Interparty collusion also expedited the legislative process of the Election Bill. This collusion resulted in an agreement to establish a consensus regarding a specific policy choice – in this study, to ratify the presidential threshold. Interparty collusion has been a dynamic after Soeharto, and the relations imbalance between parliament and the president in a multiparty system engenders power-sharing opportunities across political parties (Ahmad and Herdiansah, 2012; Ufen, 2006). Political lobbying aims to harmonize the parties’ interests and create a harmonious interparty interest in the executive (president and his ministers) and legislative (parliament). In the case of Election Act 7/2017, government officials’ influence in managing interparty collusion eventually achieved a remarkable result, where party elites consensually compromised to avoid lengthy debate and discussion among legislators concerning the presidential threshold provision (Edy, 2017).

According to Ufen (2018), the ruling individuals in the political parties have consistently dominated the parliamentary policymaking process in post-Soeharto Indonesia. This interpretation is amenable to Winters’ (2011) analysis regarding the resources of oligarchic power, which are official positions in political parties and government. Michels (2017) also agreed that the dominance of party leaders typifies the oligarchic nature of political parties to dictate the rules of the game, and is also consistent with Robison and Hadiz (2017), Fokuoda (2013) and Von Loubke (2010). This study also clarifies the powerful oligarchy in the Philippines – from Quezon in 1935 and Marcos in 1965, to Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos Jr in 2022 – where ruling individuals in the political parties are immensely powerful in controlling the policymaking process.

The collusion between parties and state is also characteristic of cartels (Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2014; Katz and Mair, 2009). In the case of the legislative process of the Elections Bill, the oligarchic nature of the political parties reached into the links between the elites in the political party's central office and party members in the government offices and parliament. Such a relationship shapes policymaking decisions at both government and parliament levels. The relationships between government officials and parliament reflect the collusion between the state and political parties. This is a strategy by party oligarchs to overpower the parliamentary policymaking process, which again confirms the analysis of Katz and Mair (2009), Slater (2018) and van Biezen and Kopecky (2014) concerning party cartels’ modus operandi. Party–state collusion transpired formally through political lobbying between government officials and legislators in the parliament building and informally through government officials’ initiatives outside the parliament building. Hence, the Indonesian legislative process is a collusive democracy (Slater, 2004).

Ministers involved in the legislative process of Election Act 7/2017 represented the state, even though they originated from political parties. Government officials acted on the state's behalf and represented executive power (i.e. the president). Members of parliament followed these officials as an act of solidarity in purposely orchestrating the policymaking process of this legislation (Hargens, 2020). Furthermore, government officials and legislators colluded to stipulate the presidential threshold to serve the interests of the incumbent government in the next election (i.e. 2019) and of the political parties. Officials enforced the will of party elites by leading legislators to believe that Election Act 7/2017 would serve their political careers. Political parties, government officials and legislators eventually agreed that they should hinder candidacy pluralism; they were more interested in serving their political careers to secure their economic benefit (Edy, 2017). Baidowi (2018) undoubtedly believes that party elites conspired to manage the presidential threshold for their status quo and the political and economic spoils. This aligns with Campos and Giovannoni's (2017) analysis of 26 countries in Europe – collusion is a political strategy in the policymaking process of political institutions. The case of the Election Act vividly represents the symbiotic collusion of parties and state, and the interparty to fix policy to serve their benefit instead of that of the populace, thus perpetuating their economic and political ascendancy (Bolleyer, 2009; van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014).

Indonesia's multiparty system engenders a party-dominated presidential system, and competition between parties is more likely to overpower the nation's strategic resources to perpetuate the ascendancy of party oligarchs and their parties (Slater, 2018; Ufen, 2018). In post-Soeharto Indonesia, ‘parties’ means ‘party oligarchs’ since political parties are mainly run, controlled and owned by them (Mietzner, 2013; Robison and Hadiz, 2017; Winters, 2013). However, the fact that government officials in this study control parties and that parties employ the state in the policymaking process strongly indicates cartelized strategies (Slater, 2018). Party elites orchestrate government officials and legislators, while government officials enforced legislators’ compliance as party elites ensure the collusive nature of the legislative process.

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to investigate how oligarchy uses cartelised strategies to overpower the legislative process in the parliament. A review of literature and analysis of secondary data sources were employed to do this. Three main findings can be drawn from this research. Firstly, political parties are essentially owned by party oligarchs / wealthy businesspeople who maintain symbiotic connections between the state and political parties to capture the legislative process to consolidate, expand and maintain their ascendancy and benefits in politics and the economy. Secondly, the investigation of cartelized strategies was also apparent in the legislative process of Article 222 of the Election Act 7/2017, particularly in the provision of the presidential threshold. Party oligarchs captured the legislative process by using at least four mechanisms: orders from party oligarchs to the factions in parliament, political lobbying, party elite collusion and state and party collusion. These powerful actors secured fundamental changes to the provision about the presidential threshold with no authentic discussion in the parliament, and undermined public involvement in the legislation process. Hence, this legislation must be recognized as an ‘empty ritual’ that only parroted democratic processes in its passage.

Nonetheless, despite these conclusions, the evidence proposed in this study does not constitute legal proof; however, it is sufficient and consistent enough to substantiate a robust argument that oligarchic cartels have captured the legislative process in the parliament. The notion that the oligarchy has hijacked the legislative process using cartelized strategies is supported by compelling circumstantial evidence which, while it may not hold up in a court of law, is nevertheless still legitimate to support the claim that undemocratic legislative processes transpire in Indonesian parliament.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Derwin Tambunan

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