Abstract
Keywords
Introduction
The U.S. model of higher education greatly influenced the Republic of China (1912–1949). On the one hand, the United States established several universities in China, including Union Medical University and Yenching University (Bullock, 1980). On the other hand, a considerable number of Chinese students studied in the United States during this period, significantly impacting China's educational development upon returning home (Ye, 2002). Therefore, the United States had a profound impact on China's higher education and scientific development during the Republic of China (1912–1949). However, education and academic exchanges between China and the United States were interrupted in 1949 and the subsequent outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953). China took over the running of the U.S. Missionary University in the country, with the U.S. influence on higher education strongly criticized (Brazelton, 2015). At this point, the development model of higher education began to shift completely to the Soviet model.
Since its reform and opening-up, China has extensively studied the experiences of Western countries in various fields, including politics, economy, science and technology policy, education, health, social welfare, and government management (Gewirtz, 2017, 2019; Liu & Wang, 2018). In doing so, China has drawn inspiration from various countries of different sizes and political ethos, including large Western countries like the United States and Germany, smaller countries like Singapore and Sweden, as well as communist countries like the former Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland (Vámos, 2018; Wilson, 1990; Yang & Ortmann, 2018). As a result, China is considered a “learning country” (Yang & Ortmann, 2018).
In the field of higher education, China has learned the most from the United States. Indeed, from the late 1970s, a considerable number of Chinese students and scholars studied in the United States, with some 14,000 returning to China in 1984 alone (Lampton, 1986, p. 173). As interpersonal communication invariably involves the exchange of ideas, it is no surprise that the U.S. higher education model has had a profound impact on China since the late 1970s.
Nevertheless, there is markedly little in-depth and systematic research on the impact of the United States on Chinese higher education since 1978. In this respect, Hayhoe (1984) revealed the influence of French, German, Soviet, and U.S. education models on Chinese higher education after 1911. In
From April 25 to May 15, 1978, Clark Kerr, then chairman of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, led a delegation visiting China. During their tour of the country, the delegation visited several universities, including Sun Yat-sen University and Tsinghua University, as well as various primary and secondary education institutions and factories. Kerr (1978) pessimistically concluded that the differences between the U.S. and Chinese systems were almost insurmountable, making learning from each other difficult. This raised a number of questions, including whether Kerr's concerns were warranted, whether it was difficult for China to learn from the U.S. higher education model, whether China truly succeeded in learning from U.S. higher education, and which experiences and U.S. practices the country learned and adopted. This study addresses these questions using three case studies.
Learning from the United States: A general overview
As Table 1 shows, since the launch of China's reform and opening-up in 1978, its higher education has adapted many aspects from U.S. higher education practices. These aspects involve macro-level institutional design (e.g., university planning), the establishment of a national science foundation, and a three-level degree system. They also included meso- and micro-level aspects (e.g., the credit system), the Doctor of Education (EdD) degree, and the Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree. Owing to space limitations, this study selects three cases for comparative analysis.
China's adaptations from U.S. higher education since 1978.
Comparative analysis of three case studies
Reform of undergraduate education: General education, the credit system, and undergraduate scientific research
In the late 1970s, China began sending university lecturers to the United States and other Western countries. At the time, such groups were known as visiting scholars. Most visiting scholars returned to China and attempted to employ the teaching methods that they had learned in Western countries to reform Chinese university teaching (Shoresman, 1998). In addition to visiting scholars, numerous students were sent overseas to study, many obtaining their PhDs in the United States and returning to China. Although these scholars hoped to import foreign university teaching methods to China, they were not overly successful (Interview with a sociology professor, April 2018).
A feature of U.S. higher education is the importance it attaches to general education at the undergraduate level (Baker, 1947; Calhoun, 2000). After 1949, Chinese universities implemented a Soviet-style professional education system. In 1953, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education criticized the idea of general education in the United States (Zeng, 1953). However, following the initiation of its reform and opening-up policy, China gradually referenced the reforms and practices of the U.S. model of general education through various channels, including Chinese-U.S. scholars and study abroad programs. In 1978, Chen Ning Yang, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics, gave a lecture on university education at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) during which he mentioned the relationship between breadth and specialty. According to Yang, a disadvantage of U.S. education was its overemphasis on breadth, whereas the problem of Chinese university education was its excessive focus on specialty. As Yang (1978) noted: China also has a bias on the issue of “Breadth” and “Specialty.” It is that Chinese universities pay too little attention to the direction of “Breadth,” and only develop in the direction of “Specialty.” In almost all universities, students select a major as soon as they enter the university, this major is quite limited. It is very difficult for a student to transfer to another major. I think this will greatly affect the university's first responsibility, which is to train talents with independent thinking ability.
Yang (1978) also mentioned the development trend in science of paying additional attention to the links between subjects so as to blur the boundaries between them, noting how interdisciplinary collaboration had contributed to many advances in science. Accordingly, he argued that Chinese universities “go in the direction of fewer majors” and “increase elective courses.” In 1983, Yang gave another speech in China in which he reiterated that excessive professional education is not conducive to the cultivation of innovative talents: Under the situation of high-level technological development and high-level technological differentiation, an important condition for important breakthroughs is the need to educate many young people to be able to deal with scientific problems with several disciplines at the same time. This need runs counter to the professional system. (Zhang, 1994, pp. 74–76)
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the support of international organizations and the Chinese government, university presidents led numerous educational delegations visiting the United States to learn more about the U.S. higher education system. Such visits were typically more than 2 weeks in duration, with some lasting up to two months. During these visits, Chinese university leaders noted that engineering education in the United States involved both engineering knowledge and knowledge of the humanities and social sciences. Reflecting on a study tour of the United States in 1979, Jinming Lin (1980) noted how impressed he was with the general education model in the United States: Students in engineering colleges are not just studying science and engineering theory courses. Each university requires students to take humanities, which account for about 10 percent of all credits, so that students have the social and humanities knowledge they deem necessary.
Israel (1983) argued that Chinese higher education in the early 1980s was “eighty thousand miles away from general education.” However, during this period, Chinese university leaders turned their focus to the problem of the over-professionalization of courses and began reforming the university curriculum through educational inspections and the reflections of Chinese-U.S. scholars. One of the major reforms in this respect was the requirement that students in the humanities and social sciences take courses in science and engineering and vice versa (Shen, 2018). From the mid-1990s, a number of comprehensive universities, including Peking University and Fudan University, took the lead in a new round of general education reforms. Among them, Peking University adopted both the U.S. style of general education and the core curriculum model. In this case, many of the faculty members who had returned from the United States participated in the general education curriculum reform and made explicit use of the American model as a reference. According to Professor Ke’an Li, the Director of academic affairs at Peking University, the university's general education system was “developed by studying the core curriculum system of Harvard University and the actual situation of Peking University” (Li, 2006).
Certainly, China has been relatively successful in adapting the U.S. general education model. For instance, there is consensus among both the government and universities that undergraduate education should integrate professional and general education (Shen, 2018). This has been facilitated by the fact that Chinese have encountered little resistance in the process of implementing general education. The actors promoting general education include academic elites from both the humanities and social sciences and science and engineering. The process has been facilitated by the strong affinity between the ideal of whole-person education contained in the concept of general education and the educational ideal of traditional China.
According to Levine (1984), in history, only two civilizations have valued liberal and general education, namely, ancient Greece and ancient China. However, China did not fully embrace the U.S. idea of general education. For example, while the U.S. associates general education with citizenship education and democratic politics, China generally does not associate general education with these two issues. Moreover, despite the popularity of the concept of general education in China, another closely related concept, liberal education, is neither fully understood nor accepted by Chinese academics. In a 2007 address, American scholar John Churchill tried to explain the concept of U.S. liberal education to Chinese audiences—an attempt immediately hindered by the concept's connection with civic education and critical thinking in the United States (Redden, 2009).
In addition to general education and credit systems, Chinese universities borrowed the undergraduate research system of U.S. universities in the 1980s. For instance, in the 1980s, the USTC based its reform model on the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). In 1981, Vice President Haibo Yang led a 12-member delegation from USTC on a visit to the United States. Of particular concern was the experience of undergraduate education at Caltech, specifically undergraduate research practices. In the outline of the study tour drawn up before the visit, one aspect that the delegation hoped to understand was the issue of undergraduate research in the United States—particularly in respect to the slogan of “Teaching in Science.” Upon returning home, the delegation summarized their thoughts on Caltech as follows: California Institute of Technology also uses undergraduate methods to train undergraduates, and this experience is of reference value. In the future, we should increase the number of elective courses for undergraduates, increase the time for self-study, allow some students with good academic performance to take higher-level courses, and plan to recruit students to participate in scientific research from the third year of college to train them for scientific research ability. Allow some students who are outstanding in their studies to advance to the graduate school. (Delegation of University of Science and Technology of China, 1981)
In its subsequent reform of university curricula, USTC borrowed some practices from Caltech.
Transforming engineering universities into comprehensive universities
In the 1950s, China began vigorously developing specialized universities under the influence of the Soviet model. In 1952, university reform based on the Soviet model categorized colleges and universities into three types: comprehensive, industrial, and specialized universities. By 1955–1956, China had 194 universities: 14 comprehensive universities, 42 industrial universities, and 138 specialized (agricultural, normal, and medical) universities. The comprehensive universities, such as Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University, were distilled into industrial universities, with the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences departments of these universities relocated to other colleges and universities.
On July 3, 1978, Chen Ning Yang visited Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), where he proposed to the leader of the institution that SJTU, as a key university in the country, should do well in natural sciences. He suggested that a university with only an engineering school was insufficient (Jiang & Liu, 2019). From September to November 1978, an SJTU delegation visited the United States, where they investigated the development of higher engineering education in the country. Over the course of their 47-day visit, the delegation gained a deeper understanding of the U.S. higher education system. They were particularly impressed by the combination of science and technology in U.S. universities. Indeed, of the 27 universities they visited, none were purely technical; instead, all of the inspected universities offered a wide range of disciplines in sciences, engineering, medicine, and humanities. From 1979, SJTU began to adopt the U.S. university model and established the development principle of “supporting the natural sciences with engineering, promoting engineering with natural sciences, and combining natural science and engineering.” The university subsequently began developing its social sciences facilities and established the School of Management in 1984 (Jiang & Liu, 2019).
The Huazhong Institute of Technology (now the Huazhong University of Science and Technology) provides another example of the successful transformation of an engineering university into a comprehensive one. The transformation of this university was implemented under the leadership of Jiusi Zhu. In 1979, with the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) sent two delegations to study foreign higher education systems: Led by Zhu, one delegation visited the United States, Japan, and Canada, while the other investigated Western European countries. Over the course of a 10-week investigation of the U.S. system, Zhu's (2003) delegation found that engineering universities, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), were comprehensive institutions with a focus on the development of science and technology. This finding made Zhu deeply skeptical of a university model that only developed engineering science.
Although the Republic of China (1912–1949) had a tradition of comprehensive universities, the United States had a marked influence on the transformation of engineering universities into comprehensive ones. For example, the U.S. experience played an important role in Zhu's reform of the Huazhong Institute of Technology. Indeed, as Zhu (2003) noted, his university was the first in China to break through the Soviet model and implement reforms after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Other engineering universities followed suit and introduced reforms. For instance, Tsinghua University gradually reestablished other fields, such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, economics, management engineering, management information systems, foreign trade, and finance. Of course, not all universities used MIT as a reference in following the path of a comprehensive university. For example, the Chinese University of Science and Technology used the small-scale Caltech as a reference in their reform (The Chinese University of Science and Technology Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1979).
Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, there was consensus in the education community regarding the transformation of engineering universities into comprehensive ones, while the adjustment and reorganization of higher education institutions (
Another aspect of China's transition to the Soviet model was the establishment of universities under different government departments, such as the ministries of finance, health, agriculture, and metallurgy. In 1985, the Chinese government issued a landmark education reform document titled, “The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of the Education System.” One of the consultants, Changlin Tian, a Chinese-U.S. scientist and then the Vice-Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, suggested that all higher education institutions under the control of different government departments should break away from the affiliation with the departments. Although the opinions of Tian and the other consultants were valued in the fifth draft of the document, which included a “revocation of ministries and commissioned universities,” this suggestion was deleted from the sixth draft (Tian, 1986). Nonetheless, although Tian's (1986) proposal was not accepted in that year, the structural reform of higher education in China followed the suggested path. In 1998, the State Council of China transferred the control of the majority of affiliated institutions from different ministries to local governments.
The tenure-track system
In recent years, one of the most influential policies in China's higher education reform has been the introduction of the tenure-track system, undeniably a product of learning from the United States. However, unlike the introduction of the general education model and the reform of engineering universities, Chinese universities have encountered considerable resistance in trying to transition to the tenure-track system. Although China's higher education community has been aware of the tenure-track system since the early 1980s, attempts to implement such a system in Chinese universities in 2003 were unsuccessful. Even recent attempts to enforce this system in research universities have not been completely successful.
The tenure-track system originated in the United States. In the 1880s, in the face of competition from Johns Hopkins University, Harvard University President Charles William Eliot began increasing the requirements for faculty members, with those that did not meet the requirements asked to leave. Although this move marked one of the earliest examples of the modern “up or out” system (Geiger, 2014), the first codification of “up or out” tenure occurred under Harvard President James B. Conant in the spring of 1936 (Teichgraeber, 2017). It was not until the 1960s that the tenure-track system was widely implemented in the United States.
After 1949, the management of Chinese university faculty was characterized by a unit ( An assistant professor can be promoted to associate professor only after he has worked for at least three years, and has been assessed in three areas: teaching, scientific research, and social services. There is a saying in US universities, “publish or perish.” If you do not publish papers, you have to be fired. Only after being an associate professor is it possible to obtain a tenure in a university (in some universities only professors are tenured).
At the time, Chinese universities were facing various problems, including overcrowded faculty, faculty members with insufficient research capacity, and high academic inbreeding ratios. Indeed, many of the young and middle-aged university faculty were Worker–Peasant–Soldier students who enrolled during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and did not receive rigorous academic training during their college education. In this respect, implementing the tenure-track system and promoting the mobility of university teachers appeared to offer a solution to this dilemma. In 1981, Chinese universities had a total enrollment of 1,279,472 students, with some 666,339 university faculty and staff, 249,876 of whom were full-time faculty members. In 1981, the ratio of students to full-time faculty members was 5.11:1; by 1983, the ratio of students to faculty members was 3.98:1 (Department of Planning and Finance of the People's Republic of China [DPFPRC], 1984, p. 50).
To address the problem of the excessive number of faculty members, the practice of faculty mobility became a template for learning. For example, the leaders of SJTU visited various units outside the university to investigate the needs of employers, whereafter they successfully transferred more than 500 SJTU faculty to other institutions (Science and Technology Cadre Bureau of the State Science and Technology Commission, 1984). At the time, Nanjing University and Fudan University were similarly successful in transferring some faculty members to administrative positions or other non-university institutions (Pepper, 1982). However, Chinese universities did not have the conditions necessary to implement the tenure-track system.
In late October 1985, the State Education Commission held an international conference on teacher management in colleges and universities at Fudan University. Nine experts attended the meeting and reached a consensus that Chinese universities should implement an appointment system (
The central government subsequently began reforming the management of university teachers. An important reform in this regard was the introduction of the Faculty Appointment System and the implementation of a structured wage system. Consequently, in addition to their basic salary, university teachers received further income based on their performance. The Faculty Appointment System was initially piloted in eight universities before being adopted nationwide (Cao, 1998).
In 1986, Zhejiang University issued “Regulations for the Appointment of Teachers in Zhejiang University” (discussion draft) and began trialing the appointment system for teacher positions in order to promote talent mobility (Office of the President of Zhejiang University, 1986, p. 14). In 1988, with the consent of the MOE, Zhejiang University decided to open the professorships to applicants at home and abroad (Office of the President of Zhejiang University, 1988, p. 25).
However, until the 1990s, universities did not have the financial foundation necessary to implement a tenure-track system. Given that the income of university faculty was low across all disciplines, the academic profession was not particularly attractive and retaining outstanding young talent was difficult. Indeed, approximately 27% of young faculty members were recruited after 1981—many of whom were considered “promising” or “core” members of their department—had left by 1991 (Cao, 1998). With the endorsement of a market economy as the ultimate goal of China's economic reform in 1992, China's economy gradually began recovering (Coase & Wang, 2016). Correspondingly, Chinese universities slowly emerged from their economic difficulties to accumulate the economic conditions necessary for further reform. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese universities have tried to break the so-called “iron rice bowl” and introduce a personnel contract system.
In 2000, the Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Personnel, and the MOE jointly issued “Opinions on the Implementation of Deepening the Reform of the Personnel System in Higher Education Institutions,” which proposed that colleges and universities sign personal contracts with university teachers and evaluate their teaching and research work. If the teacher proved unqualified for their job after the assessment or if the circumstances of the university had changed significantly, then the university could terminate the employment contract and relationship through dismissal or resignation. Accordingly, this policy document laid the legal foundation for the implementation of the tenure-track system. In 2003, Peking University borrowed from the U.S. tenure-track system and initiated personnel reform, which was considered an essential step in building a world-class university. However, implementation of such reform ultimately failed due to the resistance of younger faculty members. Reflecting the difficulty of such reform, Peking University's personnel reform prompted considerable discussion in the media and evolved into a nationwide public debate. Learning from the lessons of Peking University, some universities have since adopted a quiet approach in introducing a tenure-track system.
Yinxing Hong, Secretary of the Party committee of Nanjing University, participated in the first China–Yale University Leadership Seminar in 2004. Greatly inspired by the discussion of the tenure-track system, he subsequently initiated similar reform at Nanjing University, although the system was properly adjusted to Chinese university culture (Hong, 2004). In 2006, the MOE sent 19 Chinese research university leaders to the University of Michigan to participate in a 2-week Michigan–China University Leadership Forum covering the strategic management of universities, university–government relations, technology transfer, and economics. In addition to development, university faculty, and undergraduate and postgraduate education, the tenure-track system was part of the curriculum (Cook, 2008).
In 2005, Peking University began implementing tenure-track in the Center of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies. From 2014, all newly recruited faculty were managed under the tenure-track system, creating two faculty groups in the tenure (i.e., the new system) and non-tenure (i.e., the old system) tracks. In June 2016, the tenure track comprised some 360 faculty members, accounting for 13.9% of the university's total faculty (2,585 members). Broadly speaking, while those in the new system enjoy higher incomes, they also face more demanding evaluation standards. For example, to ensure a tenure position, they need to publish in top international journals and receive positive feedback from international experts in tenure review. Personnel reform has been in operation since 2016, with universities required to assimilate all non-tenure-track faculty into the tenure-track system in the next few years. The integration of the two systems should be completed within 5 to 10 years. Additionally, as of 2017, associate professors have to be on the tenure-track system in order to apply for full professorship. The new personnel system means that the majority of faculty members no longer enjoy an “iron rice bowl.” The primary motivation behind such reform is Peking University's desire to enhance its global standing in a short timeframe (Shen & Ma, 2018).
By 2015, most of China's 985 national colleges and universities had already implemented the tenure-track (“up or out”) system, as had some local colleges and universities (Yue, 2015). Although Peking University and Tsinghua University have implemented the tenure-track system for several years, the system conflicts with the
Discussion and conclusion
Examining the reform of Chinese universities, Pepper (1982) posed an interesting question: Can a U.S. branch successfully grow on a Soviet tree in a Chinese garden? In this respect, Pepper (1982) noticed that the reforms of the leadership system of Chinese universities at the time—including the separation of the Party and government, strengthening the power of the university's administrative system, and weakening the Party committee's influence in universities—were inspired by Western countries, particularly the United States. However, Pepper (1982) argued that such reform conflicted with China's socialist environment in several ways, including the still-unified and centralized university textbook system, university curriculum arrangements, admissions system, and work distribution system.
The findings of this study are based on systematic historical review and comparative analysis of three case studies. After the launch of China's reform and opening-up policy, the United States became the primary model for Chinese higher education, with China learning much from the U.S. experience. However, applying what was learned was another matter entirely. In the 1980s, China established a three-level degree system based on the U.S. model, transforming engineering universities into comprehensive ones and following the United States in establishing a Natural Science Foundation system to rebuild the scientific research functions of universities. Since the 1990s, the effect of the U.S. model on Chinese higher education has further penetrated curriculum and personnel system reforms, resulting in the development of general education courses and EdD degrees as well as the introduction of the tenure-track system.
Certainly, some lessons from the United States proved unsuccessful or were discontinued. For instance, a key aspect of university management reform in the early 1980s was to distinguish between the functions of university administration and university Party committees and weaken the influence of the latter. However, this reform has failed and a reverse trend has emerged in recent years—the power of Party committees in university management has been strengthened.
What factors affect the success or failure of policy migration? As the comparative analysis of the three cases in this study's shows, if the transferred policy aligns with the local culture, then policy learning will be relatively smooth. The transfer of the general education model from the United States to China illustrates this phenomenon. In contrast, conflict between a borrowed higher education model and the local culture will result in significant resistance. This has been the case in the long and troubled history of the introduction of the tenure-track system in China, which provides a particularly interesting case of policy learning, and is worth further study.
Researchers often emphasize the role of those who have returned after studying in the United States in policy learning (Mohrman, 2005). However, this study suggests that intensive educational investigations and Chinese-U.S. scientists in the United States played a greater role. Indeed, the knowledge of Chinese universities regarding the general education curriculum model, the tenure-track system, and the U.S. research university model was first acquired through educational visits. In terms of policy learning, Chinese-U.S. elite scientists, such as Tsung-Dao Lee, Chen-Ning Yang, and Chang-Lin Tien, played a key role insofar as they introduced the U.S. system and submitted direct reform proposals to Chinese leaders.
As the French scholar Bastid (1987) observed, China's learning from Western educational practice is eclectic, with China actively mitigating the dominance of any foreign education model. Since the 1970s, China's educational policy learning has exhibited a similar characteristic. Although the influence of the United States is dominant, China has also referenced the higher education models of other countries, including Germany's higher vocational education system and the United Kingdom's research evaluation system. This study focuses on the influence of the United States on the development of higher education in China. However, including the influence of other countries, such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, is essential to fully understand the external influences on China's higher education reform.
Policy learning is often pursued for pragmatic purposes, thus ignoring the guiding philosophy and ideology of the countries from which it is borrowed. Such was the case when the United Kingdom borrowed from the German experience in developing educational reform (Phillips, 2004). China exhibited similar pragmatism when drawing from the U.S. experience. Since the 19th century, in the process of learning from the West, China has faced the problem of how to deal with the relationship between the individual practices and functions of the western countries (
Chinese universities have continuously learned from the experience of Western universities over the past 40 years. Nevertheless, various aspects of Chinese universities—including the internal governance model (i.e., the president responsibility system under the leadership of the Party committee), the relationship between the university and the government, and the curriculum model (e.g., mandatory Marxism–Leninism courses)—maintain Chinese characteristics.
Chinese universities have become increasingly confident as a result of the continued development of their research capabilities and rise in international rankings (Rhoads et al., 2014), and academics have begun discussing the Chinese university model (Li, 2012; Zha & Hayhoe, 2015). Over the past four decades, Chinese universities have been learning from the West with the mindset of students. However, as their quality and status continue to improve, it is worth asking whether Chinese universities will begin emphasizing their own characteristics instead of continuing the tradition of learning from the West. This question and the potential ramifications of such a shift are worth exploring further.
Of course, policy transfer is a two-way process. In the 1980s and 1990s, several American scholars argued that China and the United States could learn from each other in education (Gardner, 1989; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). Certainly, China's excellent performance in the PISA test have led to the gradual recognition of some of the advantages of the Chinese educational model. In Western countries like New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the Chinese education model has become a source of policy referencing and recognized as holding value for policy learning (Ho & Wang, 2016; Sellar & Lingard, 2013; You & Morris, 2016). However, how the United States views the Chinese higher education model in the context of the rise of Asian universities is worth investigating (Levin, 2010).
As a result of its analytical perspective and spatial constraints, this study has several limitations. Notably, although this study notes that the introduction of the tenure-track system has failed in several instances, the overall focus has been on successful policy transfer. In fact, China's attempts to import U.S. higher education policies—including college student loan policies and the community college model—have frequently failed. These issues warrant further investigation going forward.