Abstract
Introduction
The 20th century has seen the rise of international sports
After German reunification, however, sport was also used as a tool to enhance national unity and solidarity in the reunited country, for example, by giving the TV broadcast of the Olympic Games 1992 a highly patriotic orchestration, which was coined as “the new nationalism” of the German sports media (Gebauer, 1996). Moreover, the staging of the FIFA World Cup in 2006 and the associated marketing campaigns were also used to envision a tolerant, friendly, and open-minded nation and to foster a new self-image of the Germans, unburdened by the shame and guilt of World War II (Kersting, 2007; Schrag, 2009). Hence, the peculiarities of its history make Germany a very interesting case for studying sportive nationalism. Whereas older generations were socialized in two different states with contrasting ideologies, fiercely competing for superiority in the field of sport, younger cohorts were raised in a reunified country, where sport is seen as a tool to tie the nation together. Moreover, the open display of patriotism has recently become commonplace, at least in the realms of sport, which is also in stark contrast to the former norm of a reserved and dispassionate consumption of national sporting events (Ismer, 2011).
The fact that sport has been widely used as a vehicle for national identity politics has inspired scholars to assume that international sport plays a key role in reinforcing feelings of national identity and national pride (Washington & Karen, 2001). Scholars have particularly focused on effects associated with the
In addition, there exists a vibrant research on the relation between
Other researchers have addressed the question of how
However, some key questions surrounding sportive nationalism have remained unexplored. Based on the assumption that its history turns Germany into an ideal laboratory for studying the relationship between sport and national identity, research presented here addresses some of these questions: First, we examine the
Sports-Related Policies in the Divided Germany
As in other domains, the division of Germany resulted—at least initially—in different trajectories of sport policy making. In the FRG, the sport movement struggled to recover from its collaboration with the Nazi regime that had compromised most of sport’s leading figures (Daume, 1973). These efforts for reconstruction resulted in a lasting tendency to present West German sport as an “Olympic model student” committed to particular high moral standards. Sport was now framed as a domain in its own right independent from politics and economics. Accordingly, the government was supposed to respect sport’s autonomy and to abstain from interventions (Krüger, 1995). Mainly due to the sporting challenge by the GDR, these efforts to abstain from using sport as vehicle for identity politics proved not sustainable (Balbier, 2005).
However, sport soon became a symbol of the successful reconstruction after the devastating defeat in World War II. The unexpected West German win of the Football World Cup in 1954 resulted in a national euphoria giving rise to the feeling of “We are somebody again” (Brüggemeier, 2004). The East Germans had their own athletic reconstruction heroes. Cycling world champion Gustav-Adolf “Täve” Schur became a legend and an ultimate communist role model when he waived his own chance for victory for a team mate during the 1960 World Championships. Schur remained a staunch supporter of the GDR even after its collapse and was voted East Germany’s biggest sport idol of all times in 1990 (Sajutkow & Gries, 2002).
Beyond serving as a reconstruction symbol, sport became a vehicle for identity politics as the East Germans turned sporting successes into a means for gaining diplomatic recognition. West German sport organizations tried to prevent such recognition on the basis of the Hallstein Doctrine, declaring the FRG as sole legitimate representative of Germany. Accordingly, East German elite athletes were turned into “diplomats in training suits” (Holzweißig, 1981) and the two Germanys became involved in a “Cold War on the dirt track” (Balbier, 2005). The quest for athletic dominance resulted in the creation of highly sophisticated sport systems utilizing the latest advances in exercise and training physiology (Hunt, 2007). As a matter of fact, the East German strategy proved to be successful as outstanding performances forced international sport authorities to finally recognize the GDR (Balbier, 2005). After the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had become increasingly tired of the intra-German arguments, the GDR was allowed to participate in the Munich Games of 1972 as a sovereign state and defeated the West German team on its home ground (Braun & Wiese, 2005). Thanks to enormous investments in training science, inclusive talent screening, and a clandestine “state doping” (Franke & Berendonk, 1997), the GDR became a sporting world power competing with the Soviets and the United States (Dann, 1996). Although the success of the GDR’s efforts to use sport as vehicle for increasing the legitimacy of the socialist regime and for creating a distinct East German national identity have been controversially discussed (Andersen, 2011; Fetzer, 2003; Holzweißig, 1995; Krebs, 1995), most scholars would admit that sporting successes have at least somewhat improved the identification of the GDR citizens with the socialist regime.
However, East German athletic dominance came with consequences for West German sport as the West German political elite perceived international sport as an important Cold War arena as well. The political interest in athletic achievements inspired the modernization of structures and policies within the West German sport movement because the federal government offered heavily increased subsidies in exchange for efforts to improve performances (Balbier, 2005, see also Meier & Reinold, 2013). Yet the increased politicization of sport remained controversial in West Germany. Sport became ideologically contested after the “New Left” adopted a highly critical stance toward high-performance sport and depicted sport as means of discipline and the extension of capitalist logics into leisure time (Rigauer, 1979). Thus, sport never occupied such a central role in West German self-representation and identity politics.
Thus, in sport as in other domains, the division of Germany served to create quite different institutions and policies. The fact that reunification has placed two very different societies under the West German regime has raised the question if and how East German attitudes and behaviors would adapt (Arnold, Freier, & Kroh, 2015; Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2011; Fuchs, Roller, & Weßels 1997; Konietzka & Kreyenfeld, 2002; Lee, Alwin, & Tufis, 2007; Svallfors, 2010).
Research Questions
In light of these peculiarities of its history, Germany represents an ideal case for studying the long-term effects of identity politics. The division of Germany has created a unique laboratory for examining political socialization effects of sport-centered identity politics. Three important yet unresolved questions are at the core of this study:
Method and Data
Data Source
The
Variables
Research presented here uses the GGSS measures for
Results
The Importance of Sport as a Domain of National Pride
In several GGSS waves, respondents were asked which achievements make them feel proud of Germany. We document the share of respondents who are proud of Germany with regard to its achievements in the (a)
Domain-Specific National Pride in East and West Germany, 1992-2008.
Tau-
Respondents in
Data on East Germany, however, reveal a very different pattern. East Germans are less proud of civic achievements like the constitution, the parliament, or the welfare system. This may be due to their socialization under a very different political regime. Moreover, their pride in the economy declined sharply from 55% in 1992 to 37% in 2008, reflecting the enduring economic decline in the East German federal states. However, sport-related national pride is of far greater importance for East Germans compared with West Germans, because about one in two East Germans selected sport as a domain for national pride. This high level of sportive nationalism in East Germany is in line with the socialization hypothesis, which assumes a formative and thus long-lasting impact of the former GDR’s identity politics. Thus, even in 2008—18 years after reunification—the importance of sport as a domain for national pride varies strongly between East and West Germany. Sport is less important in West Germany, where the economic, scientific, and civic domains appear to be more important for national pride. In East Germany, however, sportive nationalism is far higher and positioned among the top domains for national pride.
At second glance, however, the data also support the notion of convergence between East and West Germany: Whereas sportive nationalism was 2.55 times higher in East than in West Germany in 1992 (51% vs. 20%), this ratio dropped steadily over time, to 2.35 (1996: 54% vs. 23%), 1.91 (2000: 42% vs. 22%), and 1.70 in the 2008 survey (46% vs. 27%). Hence, differences in sportive nationalism between East and West Germans became smaller and may converge in the long run.
Sport-Related National Pride and General National Pride
The last wave of 2008 included a question on general national pride, so that the relevance of sport for general national pride can be assessed. Accordingly, an ordinal regression model was conducted with general national pride as the dependent variable and domain-specific national pride scores as the predictor variables. Age, gender, and educational level of the respondents served as control variables. The model was calculated for East and West Germany separately (Table 2).
Association of Domain-Specific National Pride With General National Pride in East and West Germany (Survey Year 2008).
Share of respondents who are proud of at least two of three political institutions (constitution, parliament, welfare services).
It has to be noted, however, that cross-national research supports the idea that Germans show comparatively low levels of national pride (Evans & Kelley, 2002). In the GGSS samples, about 15% to 20% of the adult population report a strong sense of national pride. These rather low numbers are usually ascribed to Germany’s inglorious past. In view of the atrocities of the Nazi regime and due to the collective guilt over these crimes, the open expression of national pride is still considered inappropriate by many, particularly in older generations. Hence, those who openly express a strong sense of national pride are mostly younger people, those with right-wing political orientations and a rather uncritical attitude toward Germany’s history.
Results reveal that sportive nationalism is a strong predictor of general national pride in both parts of Germany. Respondents who chose sport as an important domain for national pride also indicated more general national pride. Besides the economic sphere, sport is most closely correlated with general national pride. At least in West Germany, civic and scientific national pride are also positively correlated with general national pride; however, the effects of these domains are not as strong as for sport. In East Germany, perceived achievements in the civic and scientific domains are not significant predictors of general national pride. Pride in artistic and cultural achievements is not substantially associated with general pride in West Germany and even negatively correlated with general nationalism in East Germany. Hence, athletic success does not only lead to sport-related national pride but also fosters general nationalism. Achievements in other societal domains, for example, in the field of arts and literature, might nurture domain-specific pride but do not increase general national pride to a noticeable degree.
The Sociodemographics of Sportive Nationalism in Germany
Concerning the sociodemographics, previous research suggests that higher levels of sportive nationalism correlate with a lower educational level and fewer economic resources. Here, we analyze the sociodemographics of sportive nationalism with regard to age, gender, education, income level, self-placement in the left–right political spectrum and place of residence, that is, East versus West Germany.
Given the fact that Germany provides a “natural experiment” for studying socialization effects of sport-centered identity politics, it is of utmost interest to examine East–West differences and changes in the sociodemographics of sportive nationalism over time. Therefore, we tested for interactions of the sociodemographic variables with (a) East and West Germany and (b) with the survey year. The first set of interactions accounts for differences in the sociodemographic distribution of sportive nationalism among East and West Germans, whereas the second set of interactions allows for trend analyses over a 16-year period (1992-2008). Although we tested for all possible interactions, the final logistic regression model (Table 3) only includes those effects which turned out as significant.
Sociodemographics of Sportive Nationalism in Germany, 1992-2008.
Significant
These findings appear to be quite stable over time because only one of the interaction effects with the survey year reaches significance. Namely, the significant interaction with East/West Germany shows that the main effect—that East Germans feel more pride when Germany’s athletes succeed—has decreased over time. Similar to a number of other legacies of East German political socialization, differences in sports-related pride appear to wane over time and even may converge in the long run.
Nevertheless, the differences between East and West Germany with regard to sportive nationalism are still striking. Besides the markedly higher level of sport-related national pride in East Germany, further socialization effects are indicated by the fact that sportive nationalism in East Germany is less influenced by education, less “gendered” and more equally distributed among different generations. Hence, East German women and better-educated East Germans are more likely to display sportive nationalism than their West German counterparts. Moreover, older East Germans show more and younger East Germans less sports-related pride compared with West Germans of the same generation. In addition, East German identity politics seem to have succeeded in dissolving the relationship between right-wing attitudes and sportive nationalism. Whereas in West Germany sportive nationalism is more common among those who place themselves further right on the left–right political continuum, there is no such effect in East Germany. Hence, one effect of the GDR’s sports-centered identity politics may be seen in the fact that sportive nationalism is much more equally distributed between various social groups (with regard to age, gender, class, etc.) in East Germany compared with West Germany.
Discussion
Taking Germany as a crucial case, research presented here has addressed a number of questions concerning the role and specific contours of sportive nationalism. By analyzing a unique longitudinal German data set consisting of four surveys and covering a 16-year period, we addressed some unresolved key questions concerning sportive nationalism and sports-based identity politics.
Regarding the relative importance of sportive nationalism, we were able to demonstrate that pride in athletic achievements represents an important source of national pride, but that other societal domains, such as economy, science, and culture are more important. This, however, is not true for East Germany, where pride gained from athletic achievements is a more prevailing phenomenon. However, pride in athletic achievements has also grown in West Germany until 2008, which might reflect the rise of sport as a global entertainment industry and may mirror the German “summer tale” of 2006 where the national football team inspired the masses at the German World Cup. Moreover, sportive nationalism proved to be a main predictor of general national pride. Hence, athletic success is to a greater extent linked to the nation as a whole than achievements in science, arts, or politics.
Furthermore, we have explored the sociodemographics of sport-related national pride. The findings support a number of intuitive assumptions concerning sportive nationalism. A higher degree of sportive nationalism is more common among younger generations, males, individuals with lower and medium educational levels, and a lower income. These findings inspire a number of interpretations. First, sportive nationalism might indeed serve self-esteem enhancing purposes for most vulnerable social groups. Second, the gendered character of sport has the effect that the domain represents a far less important source of national pride for women. Third, sport-centered identity politics have long-lasting socialization effects. The emphasis on success in high-performance sport under the socialist regime in the former GDR has indeed resulted in higher levels of sportive nationalism among East Germans, continuing until today. However, just like other legacies of the socialist regime, the socialization effects of the GDR’s identity politics wane in the long run. From reunification until 2008, a significant trend toward convergence can be detected when it comes to the levels of sportive nationalism in East and West Germany.
Finally, it is necessary to reflect on the limitations of our study. While we believe that the longitudinal character of the GGSS data serves to increase the robustness of our findings, two major limitations have to be mentioned. First, the forced choice format used by the GGSS is far from optimal and should be replaced by rating scales. Second, the exclusion of immigrants prevented us from addressing the question how sportive nationalism figures among ethnic minorities.
