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Abstract

This research is part of a program to identify common forms of forgiveness and study the outcomes associated with different ways of forgiving. Two samples, one in Canada (N = 274) and one in India (N = 159), completed a third version of the Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire (R4FQ), several measures of individual differences, as well as measures of affect and mood while imagining their injurer. Nine R4FQ subscales were derived: For the Relationship, To Feel Better, Based on Principle, Because Injurer Reformed, To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, Because Understood Injurer, For God, Because of Social Pressure, and For Pragmatic Reasons. These subscales were differentially related to religiosity, attachment security, trait anger, collectivism, and individualism. Positive emotional outcomes were associated with forgiving for the relationship, based on principle, because injurer reformed, and because understood injurer. In contrast, negative outcomes were associated with forgiving To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, Because of Social Pressure, and For Pragmatic Reasons.

Keywords

forgiveness well-being pastoral care emotion experimental psychology psychology social sciences attachment counseling psychology applied psychology psychotherapy clinical psychology

What does it mean to forgive? It is widely acknowledged that there is no consensual definition (Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Scobie & Scobie, 2002; Younger et al., 2004). Most psychological researchers agree that forgiveness involves a reduction in negative emotion and responses, does not involve condoning or excusing, and ought to be differentiated from reconciliation (e.g., Kearns & Fincham, 2004). However, they disagree on other issues such as whether forgiveness is primarily an intrapsychic event or an interpersonal one (see Baumeister et al., 1998, for review). Moreover, psychologists as a group tend to differ from philosophers (Boleyn-Fitzgerald, 2002) and from theologians (Frise & McMinn, 2010). In terms of lay definitions, research in the last two decades has established that forgiveness means different things to different people, and, sometimes, different things to the same person, depending on the context (DeCourville et al., 2008; Friesen & Fletcher, 2007; Jo & An, 2013; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Scobie & Scobie, 2002; Stewart et al., 2010). In addition, there are widespread cultural differences (Augsberger, 1992; Sandage, 2005). The extent that forgiveness involves reconciliation is a good example of the diversity of opinion. While most psychologists would draw a sharp distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation, theologians are less likely to do so (Frise & McMinn, 2010), as are lay persons (Friesen & Fletcher, 2007; Hook et al., 2012; Kanz, 2000; Younger et al., 2004), especially individuals in collectivistic cultures (Sandage, 2005).

Given these varying definitions, how should research proceed? We would argue that currently there are neither research-based nor widely accepted philosophical or theological grounds for the existence of one form of “true” forgiveness. Therefore, our approach is to document common forms of forgiveness and study the outcomes associated with each. Furthermore, we have found that why people forgive is closely related to what forgiveness means to them; therefore, we have focused on studying reasons for forgiving as a fruitful approach to documenting types of forgiveness (Belicki et al., 2013; cf. Ballester et al., 2011). This approach is exemplified in the groundbreaking dissertation by Mary Trainer (1981). She defined her work as identifying types of forgiveness, but to do so she primarily studied what she called forgiveness motives. Building on her research, we have developed a Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire (R4FQ). This article describes the final form of that questionnaire and examines some conceptually relevant correlates of its subscales.

Studies of Reasons for Forgiving

In the first study to identify types of forgiveness based on the functions of forgiving, Trainer (1981) developed a 34-item questionnaire that contained three subscales: Role-Expected, Expedient, and Intrinsic forgiveness. Both Role-Expected and Expedient involved an overt expression of forgiveness, either in response to perceived pressure to forgive (Role-Expected) or to achieve some practical goal (Expedient). Both forms were associated with residual anger that increased over time. In contrast, Intrinsic Forgiveness involved a shift from unforgiveness to benevolence and was associated with decreased anger.

Since her work, there have been only a few studies, but all have confirmed that there are different reasons for forgiving. Two of the initial studies did this through content analysis of open-ended questions asking why participants forgave (Younger et al., 2004) and qualitative analyses of interviews (Bright et al., 2006). Subsequently, in addition to our group, three research teams have developed measures of different reasons for forgiving.

Ballester et al. (2011) constructed a dispositional measure of “motives” for forgiveness and unforgiveness that assesses five motives for forgivingness: through restoration of sympathy (e.g., being inclined to forgive when an offender apologizes), because of moral principle, to maintain a relationship, to recover “mastery” (e.g., to exercise control over an injurer), and as a challenge to the injurer or others.

While undoubtedly a dispositional measure has utility for certain research questions, in our research we developed an offense-specific measure. This approach is supported by findings from a meta-analysis that forgiveness is more strongly predicted by situational variables than by dispositional, even dispositional forgivingness (Fehr et al., 2010).

Two other research groups have taken this offense-specific approach, but in the context of specific situations: marriage (Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004) and workplace offenses (Cox et al., 2012). Like us, Cox et al. derived a number of their items from Trainer’s original questionnaire and then supplemented these with an undisclosed number of additional items based on prior literature. Following factor analysis, they retained 17 items in five subscales: Moral, Relationship, Apology, Religious, and Lack of Alternatives. They found that subjective stress was negatively correlated with forgiving for a moral principle, but positively correlated with forgiving (or reconciling) out of a sense of religious obligation or because of a lack of alternatives. Poorer self-reported health was positively correlated with forgiving (or reconciling) due to a lack of alternatives. However, an issue with their work is that they combined forgiveness with reconciliation, and arguably these should be separated. Presumably a person could do one, but not the other, and the reasons for forgiving might well differ from reasons for reconciling.

Our own research builds from and improves on the existing work in a number of ways: We developed an offense-specific measure that is focused on reasons for forgiving separate from reconciliation. Any new items that we developed were based not just on the literature but on interviews with a community sample (DeCourville et al., 2008) and content analyses of students’ written responses to an open-ended question (Belicki et al., 2013). A shortcoming of the questionnaire-based studies is that they measure only a handful of reasons, and we sought to expand this number. Moreover, we refined our measure over several studies.

In our first study (Belicki et al., 2013), 142 undergraduates completed a preliminary version of the R4FQ with 53 items, 32 drawn from Trainer’s dissertation either in original form or slightly modified, and 21 items based on an interview study (DeCourville et al., 2008). Participants were instructed to think about someone who had hurt them deeply, but whom they had forgiven, and indicate the extent to which each item described why they had forgiven.

In an exploratory factor analysis of the items, 32 loaded on six factors: To Feel Better, For the Relationship, For Altruistic Reasons, To Avoid Social Repercussions, To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, and For Religious Reasons. Subscales based on these items had Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .71 to .89. Forgiving for the relationship, to feel better, and for altruistic reasons were all correlated with greater offense-related forgiveness as assessed by McCullough and Hoyt’s (2002) measure of Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM); the other reasons were not.

The Belicki et al. (2013) study was an encouraging beginning, but we knew from our own work (Stewart et al., 2010) and that of others (e.g., Cox et al., 2012; Younger et al., 2004) that there were other frequent reasons that we had not yet captured in the R4FQ, such as forgiving because the offender apologized. Moreover, some items had not performed well (e.g., had poor response distributions). We therefore revised the measure and included it in two studies that addressed other issues (Shepherd & Belicki, 2008; Snieder et al., 2008). Exploratory factor analyses in both studies again found six factors to be the best solution; these were very similar to those found with the first version of the questionnaire.

In these studies, we had the opportunity to explore the relations of R4FQ subscales to several dispositional variables. Although we did not expect strong correlations, because the R4FQ is an offense-specific questionnaire, in both studies, the HEXACO (honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness; Lee & Ashton, 2004) measure of emotionality, which taps emotional sensitivity, including a propensity to seek the support of others, correlated positively with forgiving for the relationship. In addition, honesty-humility negatively correlated with forgiving to demonstrate moral superiority. Furthermore, having an anxious attachment style was associated with forgiving to avoid social repercussions and forgiving to demonstrate moral superiority, whereas having an avoidant attachment style was correlated with forgiving to avoid social repercussions and negatively correlated with forgiving for the relationship. Collectively, these findings provided initial support for the validity of the R4FQ.

Based on the item analyses in these two studies, we again refined the wording of some items, dropped other items that cross-loaded onto factors or did not load, and added new items giving us a total pool of 80 items. In the two studies reported here, we examined several issues:

Could we capture more of the reasons that we had found in our interview and content analysis studies in subscales that were internally consistent and demonstrated adequate test–retest reliability?

Would those subscales correlate with relevant dispositional variables, not only providing further evidence of the questionnaire’s validity but also beginning to map the predictors of different forms of forgiving?

Would the different reasons for forgiving be associated with differential emotional outcomes?

Dispositional Predictors of Reasons for Forgiving

To examine dispositional predictors, we measured attachment security, religiosity, trait anger, and individualism versus collectivism. As noted above, we had already observed correlations with attachment security. We further expected religiosity to correlate with forgiving for religious reasons and with forgiving for altruistic reasons.

Trait anger was studied because it ought to be an impediment to the kind of forgiveness that Trainer (1981) described as Intrinsic—forgiveness that is inspired by compassion or empathy. In contrast, people high on trait anger may prefer forms of forgiveness that redress injustice, such as forgiving to demonstrate moral superiority.

Finally, we examined the relation of individualism and collectivism to reasons for forgiving. Individualism versus collectivism was initially conceived as a characteristic that differentiated Western cultures, with their valuing of individual independence, from Eastern cultures that place greater emphasis on social harmony (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). However, it was swiftly recognized that people within cultures varied in their orientation, and Singelis (1994) further observed that in individuals these characteristics were orthogonal. Therefore, measures of individualism and collectivism as dispositional variables were developed. Hook et al. (2012) demonstrated that individuals who scored more highly on a measure of collectivism were more likely to conceptualize forgiveness as involving reconciliation. It follows that such individuals would also be more inclined to forgive to preserve a valued relationship.

Reasons for Forgiving and Emotional Outcome

In detailed interviews of people who had forgiven significant events (DeCourville et al., 2008), we observed a wide range of emotional outcome that appeared to arise from the form that forgiveness had taken for the interviewee. For example, one woman described forgiveness as a public declaration of forgiveness in which she conveyed her contempt for the injurer. For another, forgiveness was an act of compassion toward the offender in a heartfelt desire to free the injurer from crippling guilt. The first woman was transparently angry when describing the offense, whereas the second was serene. Others have observed differing outcomes as a function of different types of forgiveness. Both Trainer (1981) and Cox et al. (2012) have found that forgiving out of obligation or for a pragmatic reason is associated with lingering anger (cf. Huang & Enright, 2000).

To examine the emotions associated with various reasons for forgiving, we asked participants in our studies to imagine they were sitting beside the injurer and with that in mind indicate how they felt on measures of anger, mood, and, more generally, positive versus negative affect. We expected that types of forgiveness that were centered around other-oriented reasons such as concern for an offender or for the advancement of ethical principles would be associated with more positive moods and less anger, whereas forgiving because of social pressure or to demonstrate moral superiority would be associated with greater anger and negative affect.

Study 1 (Canadian Study) Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from a mid-sized university in Ontario, Canada (Brock University), by means of notices on bulletin boards and announcements in the Introductory Psychology course asking for volunteers who had forgiven a significant interpersonal injury. The sample consisted of 274 university students (194 women, 79 men, one undeclared) ranging in age from 17 to 34 years (M = 20.4, SD = 2.25).

A total of 163 (59.5%) were first year students, two (0.7%) were MA students, two did not state their year of study, and the remainder were divided among second, third, and fourth year undergraduate students (15.7%, 9.1%, and 14.2%, respectively). Only 49 (17.9%) were psychology majors. In terms of ethnicity, 187 (68.2% of total sample) indicated they were Caucasian, 27 (9.9%) Asian, 14 (5.1%) African, six (2.2%) mixed Caucasian and African, four (1.5%) Middle Eastern, and three (1.1%) other, whereas 20 (7.3%) did not answer and 12 (4.4%) listed their ethnicity as Canadian.

Eighty-one (29.6%) noted they had no religious affiliation and 150 (54.7%) indicated they were Christian. The remainder classified themselves as follows: 11 (4.0%) Muslim, eight (2.9%) Hindu, four (1.5%) Buddhist, three (1.1%) Sikh, two (0.7%) Jewish, 12 (4.4%) other, and three (1.1%) unreported. Religious observance was generally not important to this sample, with 111 (40.5%) reporting it was “not at all important” on a 7-point scale and only 45 (16.4%) rating it as “very or extremely important.’

Participants either received course credit for participation or up to $15 CAD ($10 for first session, $5 for second).

Measures

Cronbach’s alphas for all multi-item measures are given in Table 1 for both this and the Study 2 sample.

Table 1.

Psychometric Qualities of Measures of Disposition and of Reactions to Offender.

	Canadian study				Indian study				t test (p)
Variable	M	SD	α	Skew	M	SD	α	Skew
Dispositional variables
Religiosity	2.94	1.95	.90	0.77	5.44	1.34	.64	−0.84	−14.32 (.000)
Interdependent	4.99	0.75	.76	−0.09	5.40	0.74	.72	0.74	−5.47 (.000)
Independent	4.96	0.80	.74	−0.04	4.91	0.74	.65	0.74	0.76 (.45)
ECR Avoidant Attachment	2.95	1.15	.95	0.51
ECR Anxious Attachment	3.47	1.15	.92	−0.01
STAXI Trait Anger					2.04	0.50	.78	0.54
STAXI Anger Control					2.79	0.50	.83	−0.13
STAXI Anger Expression Out					2.16	0.55	.72	0.40
STAXI Anger Expression In					2.19	0.50	.64	0.06
Reactions to offender
TRIM Revenge	1.55	0.68	.83	1.33	2.30	0.70	.59	−0.02	−11.01 (.000)
TRIM Revenge, Time 2	1.48	0.69	.89	1.55
TRIM Avoidance	2.22	1.10	.94	0.79	2.77	1.03	.90	0.03	−5.15 (.000)
TRIM Avoidance, Time 2	2.20	1.13	.94	0.80
STAXI State Anger	1.32	0.54	.95	2.74	1.59	0.63	.93	1.48	−4.74 (.000)
PANAS Positive Affect	2.68	0.95	.89	0.29	2.94	0.81	.83	−0.14	−2.92 (.004)
PANAS Negative Affect	1.61	0.70	.87	1.52	2.04	0.76	.82	0.90	−5.90 (.000)
PANAS Fear	1.52	0.74	.86	2.00	1.98	0.82	.77	0.80	−5.82 (.000)
PANAS Hostility	1.76	0.90	.89	1.34	2.22	0.85	.75	0.59	−5.17 (.000)
PANAS Guilt	1.30	0.63	.88	3.01	1.90	0.82	.78	1.02	−8.52 (.000)
PANAS Sadness	1.62	0.86	.85	1.62	2.28	0.87	.68	0.46	−7.53 (.000)
PANAS Joviality	2.82	1.28	.96	0.10	3.00	1.01	.87	−0.24	−1.59 (.113)
PANAS Self-Assurance	2.80	0.94	.80	0.05	3.15	0.85	.71	−0.11	−3.81 (.000)
PANAS Attentiveness	2.71	0.91	.67	0.22	2.99	0.94	.64	−0.12	−2.99 (.003)
PANAS Shyness	1.55	0.63	.61	1.22	2.05	0.78	.56	0.58	−7.20 (.000)
PANAS Fatigue	1.61	0.77	.80	1.48	1.98	0.80	.64	0.61	−4.70 (.000)
PANAS Serenity	3.26	1.24	.88	−0.26	3.16	1.08	.66	−0.12	0.81 (.416)
PANAS Surprise	2.12	1.01	.66	0.83	2.60	1.03	.65	0.16	−4.65 (.000)

Note. Scale scores were calculated by taking the mean of the item scores. Higher scores indicate more of the construct as named; therefore, higher scores on TRIM Revenge reflect more vengefulness, whereas higher scores on TRIM Total Forgiveness indicate more forgiveness (more benevolence, less vengefulness, and less avoidance). ECR = Experiences in Close Relationships; STAXI = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory; TRIM = Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.

Questions about the offense

Participants were asked the question, “Please describe a hurtful event that you have forgiven.” They were then asked to indicate when this had occurred, how hurtful they found the event both at the time and now on 7-point scales from 1 = “not at all hurt” to 7 = “extremely hurt,” the degree to which they had forgiven this person (see section “Measures of forgiveness”), the nature of the relationship with the person who had hurt them, and how close was the relationship (at the time of the hurtful event and now) rated on a 7-point scale from 1 = “not at all close” to 7 = “extremely close.”

Measures of forgiveness

To assess forgiveness of the target event, as part of the section with questions about the hurtful event, participants were asked to rate “To what extent would you say you have forgiven this person” on a 7-point scale from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “completely.” Hereafter, this rating will be referred to as Forgiveness Rating.

In addition, they completed McCullough and Hoyt’s (2002) version of the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (TRIM). The 19 items are rated on 5-point scales from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree.” It includes five items assessing a desire for revenge (e.g., “I’ll make him or her pay.”), seven assessing avoidance (e.g., “I keep as much distance between us as possible.”), and seven assessing what the authors describe as benevolence, but which also includes a desire for reconciliation (e.g., “Despite what he or she did, I want us to have a positive relationship again.”). McCullough and Hoyt report that Cronbach’s alphas for all three subscales reliably exceed .85. Benevolence was not used in analyses because some of its items better captured reasons for forgiving than degree of forgiving.

Reasons for forgiving were assessed by means of the Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire (R4FQ) developed for this research. It started with an open-ended question: “In our initial studies we have found that people differ considerably in why they forgive. Please think about the hurtful event that you described above and tell us what was your most important reason(s) for forgiving the person who hurt you.” The principal purpose of this question was to ensure that participants completed the questionnaire with a specific event in mind. They then read the following instruction: “Please rate how much you agree with the following reasons for forgiving the person who hurt you. When you see a “_____,” please think of the person who hurt you.” They then rated 80 items on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree.” See online Appendix for the items.

A total of 13 items were either identical to items on Trainer’s (1981) 34-item questionnaire (two items) or to slightly reworded versions (11 items). Other items were inspired by Trainer items, but in our preceding studies had been substantially reworked either based on feedback from participants or because the item did not perform well psychometrically. Finally, many of the items were derived from statements made by participants in prior research of our group, either in interviews or in response to open-ended questions about reasons for forgiving.

Trainer items that were not used fell into two groups. Some contained too much information (e.g., “Both (X) and I participated in the hurting process. I felt drawn to mutually forgive and be forgiven by (X) and by God.”). Other items did not measure reasons (e.g., “I forgave but I won’t forget and I won’t let (X) forget what he or she did to me.”).

Reactions to the injurer

The following was based on our observations from both formal and informal interviews that merely thinking about an offender could elicit visceral responses. Participants were given the following instruction in the questionnaire package:

We are interested in how people feel when they are with the person who hurt them in the past. Please take a minute to imagine that the PERSON WHO HURT YOU IS SITTING BESIDE YOU RIGHT NOW. How do you feel? Please mark the answer that reflects how you feel RIGHT NOW, as you imagine this person who hurt you.

They then completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule–Expanded Form (PANAS-X) which consists of a list of 60 words describing moods that are rated on a 5-point scale from 1 = “not at all or very slightly” to 5 = “extremely.” This measure is scored for two broad dimensions of positive affect (10 items) and negative affect (10 items) and for 11 specific mood scales: Fear (six items), Hostility (six items), Guilt (six items), Sadness (five items), Joviality (eight items), Self-Assurance (six items), Attentiveness (four items), Shyness (four items), Fatigue (four items), Serenity (three items), and Surprise (three items). Summarizing the results of several studies, Watson and Clark (1994) report Cronbach’s alphas of .83 to .93 for the Positive and Negative Affect scales and from .70 to .93 (mostly high 70s to high 80s) for the specific mood scales.

The PANAS-X was immediately followed by the State Anger subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory–2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1988). This was introduced with the instruction “Please mark the answer that reflects how you feel RIGHT NOW as you imagine this person who hurt you.” The State Anger subscale consists of 15 items (e.g., “I am furious.”) that are rated on a 4-point scale: 1 = “not at all,” 2 = “somewhat,” 3 = “moderately so,” and 4 = “very much so.” Spielberger reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .93.

Dispositional measures

Attachment security was assessed with the Experiences in Close Relationships–Revised (ECR-R; Fraley et al., 2000). It consists of 36 items rated on 7-point scales from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree,” 18 of which assess attachment anxiety (e.g., “I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them.”) and 18, avoidance (e.g., “I prefer not to show a partner how I feel down deep.”). Sibley and Liu (2004) found high internal consistency for these subscales (Cronbach’s αs of .93 and .95, respectively) as well as high test–retest reliability over a 6-week period.

Collectivism was assessed with the Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). This measure consists of 24 items based on items in three prior measures by other authors, slightly rewritten for student samples. These are rated on 7-point scales from 1 = “disagree strongly” to 7 = “agree strongly.” There are two subscales comprising 12 items each: Interdependent (e.g., “I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments.”) and Independent (e.g., “I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.”). Singelis reported Cronbach’s alphas of .69 and .73 and noted that while these are marginal, they are better than reported internal consistencies of other measures.

Calculating questionnaire scores

In both this study and in Study 2, for measures with multiple items, the mean of item scores was calculated to prorate for any missing items.

Procedure

Ethical approval for this study and for Study 2 (conducted at Karnatak University in Dharwad, India) was granted by the Brock University Research Ethics Board.

Questionnaires were completed in small groups. Participants first read and signed informed consent forms.

Four orders of questionnaires were randomly distributed. All participants completed the demographic questions first. Half the participants then completed the dispositional measures followed by the event-specific measures, whereas the other half completed the event-specific measures first, followed by the dispositional measures. For the dispositional measures, the ECR-R was given before the Self-Construal Scale. For the event-specific measures, all participants were first asked the questions about the offense. Half then completed the R4FQ followed by the TRIM, whereas half received these in the reverse order. The two forgiveness measures (R4FQ and TRIM) were followed by the general measure of mood (PANAS-X) and then the State Anger subscale.

After completing the questionnaires, participants wrote a brief summary of the event that they sealed in an envelope on which they wrote their name. Two to three weeks later, they returned for a second session. They were given their envelope to open and asked to use that event for completing the questionnaires. They then completed the R4FQ followed by the TRIM.

Study 2 (Indian Study) Method

Participants

Students at Karnatak University, a small university in Dharwad, India, were invited to participate through in-class announcements soliciting volunteers who could remember a hurtful event that they had forgiven. While 229 students completed at least a portion of the questionnaires, from the open-ended questions it was clear that some did not have a sufficient grasp of English. These data were eliminated, leaving a sample of 159 participants: 114 women, 42 men, and three undeclared, aged 18 to 30, M = 21.8, SD = 1.95. The majority (n = 105, 66.0%) were enrolled in an MA program, whereas 47 (29.6%) were undergraduates and two (1.3%) were doctoral students; 89 (60.0%) were psychology majors.

In terms of religious affiliation, 106 (66.7%) were Hindu. The remainder classified themselves as follows: 31 (19.5%) Christian, 13 (8.2%) Muslim, one (0.6%) Buddhist, one (0.6%) Sikh, one (0.6%) other, and six (3.8%) undeclared. Religious observance was much more important to this group than to the Canadian sample (M = 5.4, SD = 1.35 on a 7-point scale from 1 = “not at all important” to 7 = “extremely important”).

Measures

Participants completed the same questions about offense, measures of forgiveness, and measures of reactions to the injurer as were used in Study 1.

Dispositional measures

As in Study 1, participants completed Singelis’s (1994) Self-Construal Scale to assess two dimensions of collectivism.

Unlike Study 1, because the third author had particular interest in the study of trait anger, participants completed five further subscales of the STAXI-2: Trait Anger (10 items), Anger Expression Out (eight items), Anger Expression In (eight items), Anger Control Out (eight items), and Anger Control In (eight items). As with the State Anger subscale, all items are rated on a 4-point scale from 1 = “not at all” to 4 = “very much so.” Because the trait anger scales increased the survey length, participants did not complete the measure of attachment security.

The trait anger scale taps anger proneness as a disposition (e.g., “I am quick tempered.”). Spielberger (1988) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .86. Anger Expression Out taps the tendency to express anger overtly (e.g., “I express my anger.”); Spielberger et al. (1995) reported associated alphas of .75 to .78. In contrast, Anger Expression In assesses the tendency to experience anger, but not express it directly (“I boil inside, but I don’t show it.”) and has associated Cronbach’s alphas of .74 to .76 (Spielberger et al., 1995). Anger Control Out measures the tendency to control the expression of anger (“I control my urge to express my angry feelings.”); Spielberger et al. reported Cronbach’s alphas of .84 to .88. Finally Anger Control In assesses the attempt to reduce anger (e.g., “I take a deep breath and relax.”). Internal consistency of this scale is very high (Cronbach’s αs of .91 to .92; Spielberger et al., 1995).

Procedure

Karnatak University does not have a Research Ethics Board; instead, the Registrar reviewed the ethics application that was submitted to Brock University and granted approval. As noted above, Brock University’s Research Ethics Board also reviewed and approved this study.

Participants completed measures in small groups of 6 to 14. They received no compensation for participation, which is the standard practice at this university.

The order of questionnaires was as follows: demographic questions; questions about the event; questions about forgiveness (R4FQ and TRIM); PANAS-X; STAXI State Anger; Self-Construal Scale; STAXI Trait Anger, Anger Expression Out, Anger Expression In, Anger Control Out, and Anger Control In. There were two different orders of measures, with half the participants given the TRIM first, followed by the R4FQ, and half given the R4FQ first.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Characteristics of the hurtful event

For the Canadian study, in terms of the hurtful event, 112 (40.9%) indicated that the injurer was a romantic partner, 94 (34.3%) a friend, 45 (16.4%) a family member, and 11 (4.0%) other, whereas 12 (4.4%) did not respond. Most (n = 234, 85.4%) rated themselves as having been very or extremely hurt at the time (M = 6.4 on a 7-point scale, SD = 0.88). However, most (n = 192, 70.1%) rated themselves now as being “not at all” to only “a little hurt” (M = 2.7, SD = 1.42). Paired samples t test confirmed that this reduction was significant, t(273) = 35.94, p = .000. (This and all probabilities are two-tailed.) Despite the reduction in hurt, participants generally rated themselves as less close to the injurer (closeness at time of injury M = 5.9 on a 7-point scale, SD = 1.32 vs. closeness now M = 4.0, SD = 2.14), corresponding t(273) = 12.67, p = .000.

For the Indian study, friends were the most frequent injurers, reported by 98 participants (61.6%), whereas 32 (20.1%) cited a family member, nine (5.6%) a romantic partner, 13 (8.2%) other, and seven (4.4%) did not respond. Most (n = 139, 87.4%) rated themselves as having been very or extremely hurt at the time (M = 6.2 on a 7-point scale, SD = 1.21). However, most (n = 91, 57.2%) rated themselves now as being “not at all” to only “a little hurt” (M = 3.3, SD = 1.81). Paired samples t test confirmed that this reduction was significant, t(155) = 18.6, p = .000. Despite the reduction in hurt, as in the Canadian study, participants generally rated themselves as less close to the injurer (closeness at time of injury M = 5.0 on a 7-point scale, SD = 1.78 vs. closeness now M = 3.4, SD = 1.90), corresponding t(155) = 8.81, p = .000.

Psychometric analyses

First, we considered whether some of variables could be collapsed into composite scores. The two religiosity items were highly correlated in the Canadian study, r(269) = .82, p = .000, and moderately correlated in the Indian study, r(157) = .48, p = .000; therefore, we combined them into a single religiosity score by calculating a mean score.

Similarly, we examined the intercorrelations of the STAXI subscales completed by the Indian study participants. Anger Control Out and Anger Control In were highly correlated, r(147) = .72, p = .000, and therefore the mean of the two was calculated to form an Anger Control composite score.

Finally, we found that TRIM total was highly correlated with TRIM avoidance in both samples, r(271) = –.94 for Canadian sample and r(156) = –.90 for Indian sample, and therefore, we retained the Avoidance subscale and did not use the Total score because the latter also contained the Revenge items.

The psychometric properties of both the dispositional variables and the variables assessing reaction to the injurer are presented in Table 1, for both studies at Time 1 and also for Time 2 in the case of TRIM. As can be seen in Table 1, three of the PANAS emotion scales for which we had no hypotheses had weak Cronbach’s alphas in both samples: Attentiveness, Shyness, and Surprise. Therefore, these were dropped from further analyses. Several of the variables were skewed, but given the applied nature of this research and the reality that variable scores would not be transformed in application, we decided to use the raw scores instead of transformed scores (see Wilcox, 2012, for a discussion of the problems with transforming data).

For those variables that were used in both studies, independent sample t tests were calculated to examine differences between the samples. As can be seen in Table 1, the India sample scores were higher on religiosity, interdependence, revenge, avoidance, all measures of negative emotion, and two measures of positive emotion (positive affect and self-assurance).

Development of R4FQ Subscales

The goal of these analyses was to develop internally consistent subscales whose items reflected previously identified reasons for forgiving. To that end, we used exploratory factor analysis and followed the recommendations of Costello and Osborne (2005) who compared multiple approaches with exploratory factor analysis and found that maximum likelihood extraction, with oblimin rotation, and multiple test runs after inspection of scree plots produced the most replicable results. Adopting that approach, we conducted factor analyses separately on the samples. In our initial analyses, we looked to identify items that were not performing well: either they cross-loaded on factors or did not load at least .40 on one factor. These were deleted and factor analyses rerun. An 8-factor solution was best for the Canadian data and a 9-factor solution for the Indian sample. The best performing items for both samples were retained and final factor analyses conducted on these 44 items. A 9-factor solution now was the best for both, and the factors for both samples were largely comparable, but not identical. The factor solution for the Canadian sample was “cleaner,” which is to be expected given the items were derived from North American samples and given that English was not the first language for the Indian sample.

Therefore, nine subscales were formed based on the final Canadian sample factor analysis. Listed in order from most highly endorsed to least (in the Canadian sample), these are as follows: For the Relationship (four items, for example, “I did not want this to come between us because we have such a close relationship, so I forgave ____”), To Feel Better (five items, for example, “I forgave ____ so I could let go of the hurt.”), Based on Principle (seven items, for example, “I forgave ____ because every good act helps make the world a better place.”), Because Injurer Reformed (three items, for example, “I forgave because ____ apologized to me.”), To Demonstrate Moral Superiority (four items, for example, “By forgiving ____ I could show that I was morally superior to him or her.”), Because Understood Injurer (seven items, for example, “The circumstances that ____ was in at the time contributed to his or her actions, making the hurt more forgivable.”), For God (five items, for example, “I felt I should make myself forgive ____ because God expects me to.”), Because of Social Pressure (six items, for example, “Others expected me to forgive, so I felt I had to forgive ____.”), and For Pragmatic Reasons (three items, for example, “I forgave ____ because if I didn’t, she or her could turn other people against me.”).

In Table 2, the psychometric data for the subscales for both samples, as well as the t values for the mean comparisons between samples, are presented. The final 44-item questionnaire is given in the Online Appendix.

Table 2.

Psychometric Properties of R4FQ Subscales.

	Canadian study				Indian study				Comparison of sample means
Subscale	M	SD	α	Skew	M	SD	α	Skew	t test (p)	Test–retest
For Relationship	4.97	1.71	.89	−.77	4.56	1.74	.84	−.33	2.40 (.017)
To Feel Better	4.91	1.16	.78	−.66	5.22	1.00	.66	−.97	−2.87 (.004)
Based on Principle	4.40	1.25	.86	−.33	5.08	1.19	.84	−.87	−5.52 (.000)
Because Injurer Reformed	3.81	1.71	.82	−.15	3.46	1.52	.72	.07	2.14 (.033)
Moral Superiority	3.26	1.56	.85	.27	3.82	1.33	.64	−.28	−3.79 (.000)
Because Understood Injurer	3.22	1.42	.83	.31	3.83	1.31	.80	−.18	−4.41 (.000)
For God	2.55	1.71	.94	.71	4.43	1.51	.84	−.45	−11.46 (.000)
Because of Social Pressure	2.51	1.25	.89	.93	3.03	1.27	.81	.53	−4.18 (.000)
For Pragmatic Reasons	2.39	1.31	.68	.88	3.05	1.42	.64	.21	−4.85 (.000)
Time 2
For Relationship	4.76	1.77	.92	−.57						.89
To Feel Better	4.72	1.23	.85	−.81						.67
Based on Principle	4.45	1.30	.89	−.42						.82
Because Injurer Reformed	3.60	1.67	.87	.03						.83
Moral Superiority	3.00	1.53	.88	.51						.82
Because Understood Injurer	3.23	1.37	.84	.47						.81
For God	2.48	1.75	.96	.85						.91
Because of Social Pressure	2.75	1.36	.92	.72						.79
For Pragmatic Reasons	2.35	1.26	.69	.98						.7

Note. R4FQ = Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire.

Relations of R4FQ Subscales to Other Variables

The correlations among the subscales, and between the subscales and measures of forgiveness, ratings of the event, dispositional variables, and reactions to the injurer are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3.

Correlations With Reasons for Forgiving Subscales in Canadian Sample.

	R4FQ subscales
Variable	1.r (p)	2.r (p)	3.r (p)	4.r (p)	5.r (p)	6.r (p)	7.r (p)	8.r (p)	9.r (p)
R4FQ subscales
1. For the Relationship		−.10 (.110)	.20 (.001)	.41 (.000)	−.24 (.000)	.41 (.000)	−.05 (.390)	.10 (.100)	−.02 (.788)
2. To Feel Better	−.10 (.110)		.36 (.000)	−.03 (.649)	.19 (.001)	.04 (.544)	.17 (.004)	.13 (.032)	.07 (.282)
3. Based on Principle	.20 (.001)	.36 (.000)		.29 (.000)	.06 (.299)	.43 (.000)	.35 (.000)	.12 (.056)	.05 (.431)
4. Because Injurer Reformed	.41 (.000)	−.03 (.649)	.29 (.000)		−.03 (.681)	.39 (.000)	−.08 (.186)	.09 (.159)	.03 (.577)
5. To Demonstrate Moral Superiority	−.24 (.000)	.19 (.001)	.06 (.299)	−.03 (.681)		−.09 (.138)	.09 (.136)	.42 (.000)	.49 (.000)
6. Because Understood Injurer	.41 (.000)	.04 (.544)	.43 (.000)	.39 (.000)	−.09 (.138)		.04 (.538)	.08 (.201)	.14 (.017)
7. For God	−.05 (.390)	.17 (.004)	.35 (.000)	−.08 (.186)	.09 (.136)	.04 (.538)		.09 (.126)	.07 (.236)
8. Because of Social Pressure	.10 (.100)	.13 (.032)	.12 (.056)	.09 (.159)	.42 (.000)	.08 (.201)	.09 (.126)		.48 (.000)
9. For Pragmatic Reasons	−.02 (.788)	.07 (.282)	.05 (.431)	.03 (.577)	.49 (.000)	.14 (.017)	.07 (.236)	.48 (.000)
Measures of forgiveness
Forgiveness Rating	.24 (.000)	−.06 (.348)	.17 (.004)	.20 (.001)	−.34 (.000)	.13 (.028)	.09 (.134)	−.12 (.042)	−.23 (.000)
TRIM Revenge	−.15 (.012)	.00 (.966)	−.10 (.100)	−.03 (.588)	.45 (.000)	−.04 (.514)	.08 (.186)	.27 (.000)	.43 (.000)
TRIM Avoidance	−.57 (.000)	.16 (.007)	−.16 (.007)	−.35 (.000)	.43 (.000)	−.26 (.000)	.10 (.088)	.16 (.007)	.26 (.000)
Ratings of event
Months Since Happened	−.22 (.001)	−.07 (.252)	−.02 (.734)	−.12 (.058)	−.12 (.062)	−.08 (.220)	.09 (.143)	−.07 (.269)	−.10 (.127)
How Hurt at Injury	.04 (.540)	.20 (.001)	.05 (.401)	.08 (.193)	.04 (.524)	−.13 (.027)	.00 (.959)	.02 (.793)	−.05 (.420)
How Hurt Now	.08 (.173)	.04 (.516)	−.14 (.020)	−.01 (.875)	.16 (.008)	−.08 (.167)	−.01 (.907)	.25 (.000)	.12 (.041)
Relationship Closeness at Injury	.31 (.000)	.05 (.394)	−.01 (.879)	.05 (.394)	−.02 (.769)	−.02 (.780)	−.05 (.375)	−.02 (.738)	−.07 (.230)
Relationship Closeness Now	.65 (.000)	−.12 (.048)	.16 (.008)	.35 (.000)	−.28 (.000)	.33 (.000)	−.09 (.132)	−.04 (.538)	−.12 (.044)
Dispositional variables
Religiosity	−.12 (.041)	.12 (.043)	.23 (.000)	−.13 (.036)	−.01 (.881)	.01 (.938)	.82 (.000)	−.06 (.339)	−.05 (.442)
Interdependent	.07 (.279)	.24 (.000)	.35 (.000)	.04 (.478)	.09 (.141)	.14 (.024)	.34 (.000)	.19 (.002)	.07 (.227)
Independent	−.10 (.087)	.19 (.002)	.15 (.013)	.03 (.649)	.06 (.355)	−.01 (.884)	−.02 (.765)	−.04 (.513)	−.01 (.913)
ECR Avoidant Attachment	−.08 (.179)	−.07 (.263)	−.18 (.002)	−.20 (.001)	.10 (.101)	−.11 (.078)	−.04 (.535)	.07 (.247)	.14 (.019)
ECR Anxious Attachment	.05 (.404)	−.05 (.397)	−.13 (.034)	−.04 (.508)	.13 (.030)	.03 (.661)	−.03 (.607)	.12 (.040)	.20 (.001)
Reactions to offender
STAXI State Anger	−.05 (.415)	−.05 (.407)	−.15 (.015)	−.12 (.047)	.30 (.000)	−.12 (.045)	−.04 (.145)	.31 (.000)	.28 (.000)
PANAS Positive Affect	.27 (.000)	.06 (.354)	.35 (.000)	.31 (.000)	−.03 (.587)	.30 (.000)	.15 (.013)	−.00 (.970)	−.01 (.877)
PANAS Negative Affect	−.12 (.040)	.05 (.386)	−.04 (.526)	−.12 (.052)	.25 (.000)	−.02 (.754)	.04 (.536)	.18 (.003)	.31 (.000)
PANAS Fear	−.12 (.055)	.09 (.134)	.05 (.412)	−.05 (.420)	.17 (.006)	−.01 (.816)	.08 (.181)	.17 (.006)	.25 (.000)
PANAS Hostility	−.16 (.009)	.03 (.597)	−.14 (.022)	−.15 (.011)	.33 (.000)	−.09 (.142)	.00 (.980)	.20 (.001)	.33 (.000)
PANAS Guilt	.03 (.574)	−.03 (.589)	.01 (.937)	−.08 (.171)	.18 (.004)	.12 (.047)	.06 (.335)	.16 (.009)	.33 (.000)
PANAS Sadness	−.11 (.085)	.10 (.086)	−.03 (.600)	−.19 (.001)	.24 (.000)	−.01 (.926)	.06 (.301)	.23 (.000)	.30 (.000)
PANAS Joviality	.43 (.000)	−.03 (.595)	.31 (.000)	.36 (.000)	−.23 (.000)	.32 (.000)	.09 (.155)	−.08 (.169)	−.17 (.006)
PANAS Self-Assurance	.05 (.448)	.04 (.508)	.20 (.001	.19 (.002)	.11 (.069)	.11 (.077)	.14 (.019)	.02 (.799)	.06 (.321)
PANAS Fatigue	−.02 (.776)	−.08 (.194)	.012 (.841)	.01 (.879)	.15 (.014)	.06 (.348)	−.02 (.729)	.20 (.001)	.30 (.000)
PANAS Serenity	.25 (.000)	−.03 (.598)	.28 (.000)	.29 (.000)	−.19 (.002)	.19 (.002)	.08 (.203)	−.13 (.028)	−.19 (.001)

Note. R4FQ = Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire; TRIM = Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory; ECR = Experiences in Close Relationships; STAXI = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.

Table 4.

Correlations With Reasons for Forgiving Subscales in Indian Sample.

	R4FQ subscales
Variable	1.r (p)	2.r (p)	3.r (p)	4.r (p)	5.r (p)	6.r (p)	7.r (p)	8.r (p)	9.r (p)
R4FQ subscales
1. For the Relationship		−.01 (.888)	.34 (.000)	.39 (.000)	−.10 (.219)	.46 (.000)	.18 (.026)	.20 (.012)	−.04 (.589)
2. To Feel Better	−.01 (.888)		.39 (.000)	.03 (.739)	.19 (.015)	.16 (.047)	.30 (.000)	.06 (.444)	.12 (.121)
3. Based on Principle	.34 (.000)	.39 (.000)		.32 (.000)	.29 (.000)	.47 (.000)	.31 (.000)	.18 (.026)	.07 (.405)
4. Because Injurer Reformed	.39 (.000)	.03 (.739)	.32 (.000)		.10 (.226)	.50 (.000)	.18 (.024)	.38 (continued) (.000)	.31 (.000)
5. To Demonstrate Moral Superiority	−.10 (.219)	.19 (.015)	.29 (.000)	.10 (.226)		.20 (.013)	.32 (.000)	.55 (.000)	.50 (.000)
6. Because Understood Injurer	.46 (.000)	.16 (.047)	.47 (.000)	.50 (.000)	.20 (.013)		.16 (.043)	.36 (.000)	.23 (.004)
7. For God	.18 (.026)	.30 (.000)	.31 (.000)	.18 (.024)	.32 (.000)	.16 (.043)		.45 (.000)	.31 (.000)
8. Because of Social Pressure	.20 (.012)	.06 (.444)	.18 (.026)	.38 (.000)	.55 (.000)	.36 (.000)	.45 (.000)		.64 (.000)
9. For Pragmatic Reasons	−.04 (.589)	.12 (.121)	.07 (.405)	.31 (.000)	.50 (.000)	.23 (.004)	.31 (.000)	.64 (.000)
Measures of forgiveness
Forgiveness Rating	.20 (.010)	−.01 (.884)	.02 (.846)	−.12 (.131)	−.15 (.054)	.21 (.008)	−.02 (.851)	−.15 (.064)	−.21 (.007)
TRIM Revenge	.05 (.570)	−.08 (.298)	−.09 (.291)	.28 (.000)	.34 (.000)	.07 (.388)	.24 (.002)	.43 (.000)	.36 (.000)
TRIM Avoidance	−.57 (.000)	−.05 (.570)	−.26 (.001)	−.19 (.015)	.20 (.012)	−.37 (.000)	.10 (.210)	.07 (.367)	.19 (.020)
Ratings of event
Months Since Happened	.16 (.111)	.03 (.759)	.14 (.141)	.13 (.172)	−.14 (.154)	.12 (.239)	−.00 (.980)	−.09 (.360)	−.06 (.530)
How Hurt at Injury	.07 (.375)	.28 (.000)	.04 (.635)	−.03 (.681)	−.05 (.500)	−.12 (.150)	.18 (.023)	−.05 (.550)	−.08 (.346)
How Hurt Now	.14 (.082)	−.07 (.418)	−.00 (.980)	.04 (.666)	.22 (.006)	−.07 (.411)	.11 (.179)	.30 (.000)	.11 (.166)
Relationship Closeness at Injury	.31 (.000)	.11 (.170)	.07 (.393)	.06 (.489)	−.13 (.114)	.06 (.443)	.043 (.588)	−.04 (.616)	−.19 (.020)
Relationship Closeness Now	.47 (.000)	.00 (.987)	.18 (.024)	.26 (.001)	−.03 (.746)	.41 (.000)	.10 (.205)	.17 (.032)	.07 (.378)
Dispositional variables
Religiosity	.06 (.476)	.03 (.684)	−.02 (.793)	−.08 (.338)	.07 (.413)	−.06 (.471)	.34 (.000)	.10 (.233)	.02 (.805)
Interdependent	.12 (.126)	.21 (.010)	.25 (.001)	.02 (.850)	−.09 (.286)	.04 (.646)	.21 (.008)	−.05 (.572)	−.17 (.038)
Independent	.05 (.568)	.17 (.036)	.28 (.000)	.17 (.039)	.05 (.506)	.10 (.215)	.10 (.209)	.09 (.282)	.08 (.349)
STAXI Trait Anger	.03 (.739)	−.03 (.755)	−.10 (.221)	.12 (.155)	.19 (.018)	−.03 (.725)	.15 (.066)	.26 (.001)	.26 (.001)
STAXI Anger Control	−.04 (.598)	.10 (.225)	.11 (.202)	−.10 (.212)	.07 (.411)	−.01 (.895)	−.01 (.904)	−.01 (.919)	−.03 (.712)
STAXI Anger Expression Out	−.00 (.990)	−.03 (.695)	−.14 (.079)	−.01 (.898)	.15 (.062)	−.03 (.705)	.17 (.041)	.25 (.002)	.20 (.014)
STAXI Anger Expression In	.08 (.351)	−.04 (.651)	−.17 (.043)	.12 (.139)	.04 (.655)	−.05 (.572)	.02 (.828)	.25 (.002)	.24 (.004)
Reactions to offender
STAXI State Anger	−.01 (.869)	−.21 (.008)	−.04 (.660)	.16 (.050)	.20 (.012)	−.08 (.303)	.20 (.014)	.31 (.000)	.24 (.002)
PANAS Positive Affect	.28 (.000)	−.03 (.747)	.17 (.040)	−.00 (.989)	.09 (.291)	.31 (.000)	.22 (.006)	.11 (.185)	−.05 (.545)
PANAS Negative Affect	.07 (.419)	−.12 (.152)	−.12 (.147)	.14 (.079)	.20 (.012)	.04 (.638)	.27 (.001)	.44 (.000)	.39 (.000)
PANAS Fear	.15 .056	−.06 (.487)	−.02 (.773)	.25 (.001)	.19 (.018)	.13 (.122)	.32 (.000)	.45 (.000)	.41 (.000)
PANAS Hostility	−.20 (.015)	−.03 (.754)	−.12) (.153)	.08 (.339)	.25 (.002)	−.12 (.127)	.25 (.002)	.39 (.000)	.38 (.000)
PANAS Guilt	.20 (.012)	−.14 (.087)	−.07 (.361)	.10 (.216)	.19 (.020)	.13 (.114)	.24 (.002)	.34 (.000)	.25 (.002)
PANAS Sadness	.08 (.317)	−.07 (.370)	−.14 (.081)	.00 (.967)	.08 (.336)	−.05 (.504)	.16 (.043)	.33 (.000)	.24 (.003)
PANAS Joviality	.34 (.000)	.05 (.545)	.16 (.042)	.04 (.642)	−.02 (.811)	.40 (.000)	.17 (.037)	.02 (.790)	−.07 (.401)
PANAS Self-Assurance	.05 (.515)	−.02 (.798)	.17 (.032)	−.02 (.843)	.12 (.127)	.17 (.035)	.11 (.177)	.15 (.063)	−.03 (.676)
PANAS Fatigue	.08 (.350)	−.09 (.272)	.03 (.698)	.22 (.006)	.22 (.006)	.13 (.111)	.11 (.169)	.39 (.000)	.31 (.000)
PANAS Serenity	.14 (.092)	.06 (.488)	.22 (.006)	−.08 (.310)	−.12 (.154)	.14 (.080)	.14 (.078)	−.11 (.173)	−.14 (.076)

Note. R4FQ = Reasons for Forgiving Questionnaire; TRIM = Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory; STAXI = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.

As evident in these tables, all subscales are correlated with at least one index of forgiveness in at least one sample (in most cases, with multiple measures in both samples). The strongest correlations were between less forgiveness and forgiving To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, Because of Social Pressure, and For Pragmatic Reasons.

There are several modest correlations with dispositional variables. However, the strongest correlations are with reactions to the injurer. Several reasons were associated with positive affect and emotion in both samples: For the Relationship, Based on Principle, and Because Understood the Injurer. In addition, in both samples, three reasons for forgiving were associated with greater negative emotions: To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, Because of Social Pressure, and For Pragmatic Reasons. One subscale, Because the Injurer Reformed, performed differently in the two samples. In the Canadian study, it was positively correlated with Positive Affect, Joviality, and Serenity, but in the Indian sample it was positively correlated with Fear and Fatigue. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that forgiving to feel better showed almost no relation to affect or emotion in both samples.

Finally, in each sample, two sets of partial correlations were calculated to examine which reasons for forgiving predicted perceived changes in amount of hurt felt and in relationship closeness. When partial correlations were calculated between R4FQ subscales and the rating of how hurt participants felt at the time of data collection, controlling for how hurt they rated themselves as feeling at the time of the injury, four variables were associated with increased hurt in the Canadian study: Because of Social Pressure (pr = .31, p = .000), To Demonstrate Moral Superiority (pr = .22, p = .000), For Pragmatic Reasons (pr = .18, p = .000), and For God (pr = .12, p = .013). In the Indian sample, two of these were also significantly and positively associated with increased hurt: Because of Social Pressure (pr = .32, p = .000) and To Demonstrate Moral Superiority (pr = .25, p = .002).

In terms of change in relationship closeness, in the Canadian sample there was a negative partial correlation with To Demonstrate Moral Superiority (pr = –.21, p = .000), whereas four R4FQ subscales were positively related to increased closeness: For the Relationship (pr = .58, p = .000), Because Understood Offender (pr = .33, p = .000), Because Offender Reformed (pr = .33, p = .000), and Based on Principle (pr = .14, p = .005). In the Indian sample, the same four subscales showed a positive relation to increased closeness (For the Relationship, pr = .44, p = .000; Because Understood Offender, pr = .25, p = .002; Because Offender Reformed, pr = .25, p = .002; and Based on Principle, pr = .18, p = .028), but, in addition, Because of Social Pressure was also positively related (pr = .19, p = .016).

Discussion

Our studies are part of a research program to describe and measure different forms of forgiveness, based on differing reasons for forgiving, and study the emotional outcomes of these. Given the large number of potential reasons for forgiving—we identified 27 in one prior study (Stewart et al., 2010)—it was not feasible to measure all of these in a single questionnaire. However, in this third version of the R4FQ, with 44 items we were able to measure nine reasons, which is more than other existing measures, including the earlier versions of the R4FQ. The nine subscales all had adequate to excellent internal consistency in samples from both Canada and India. They also had excellent test–retest reliability.

The Cronbach’s alphas were slightly lower in the Indian study, but this was true of almost all measures. At least in part, these findings likely reflected that English was a second language for this sample, which was readily apparent in open-ended questions. The resultant increase in measurement error reduces statistical power and would account in part for the fewer significant findings in the Indian sample compared with the Canadian sample. However, an inspection of the factor analysis findings showed that the factor structure was slightly different in the two samples and points to the real possibility that there will be cultural differences both in the reasons people have for forgiving and in the factor structures underlying those reasons.

Research into reasons for forgiving is still at an early stage of research. For example, as noted below, more work needs to be done to improve measurement of religious motivations for forgiving. Given this and the preliminary evidence for cultural differences (with more such differences discussed below), it was not our goal to establish and test a specific factor structure. Therefore, we did not follow up with a confirmatory factor analysis in a new sample. Nonetheless, we were successful in measuring nine reasons—more reasons than captured by any prior measure. Each of these nine reasons has been described in other research, suggesting that they are observable outside our samples: For the Relationship (Ballester et al., 2011; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993, who based the reasons they studied on a review of the forgiveness literature; Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004; Younger et al., 2004), To Feel Better (Gorsuch & Hao, 1993; Jo & An, 2013; Stewart et al., 2010; Younger et al., 2004), Based on Principle (Ballester et al., 2011; Cox et al., 2012; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993; Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004; Younger et al., 2004), Because the Injurer Reformed (Younger et al., 2004), To Demonstrate Moral Superiority (Ballester et al., 2011), Because Understood the Injurer (Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004), For God (Cox et al., 2012; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993; Younger et al., 2004), Because of Social Pressure (Trainer, 1981; cf. Younger et al.’s (2004) “do not like conflict”), and For Pragmatic Reasons (Bright et al., 2006; Cox et al., 2012; Trainer, 1981).

While these reasons have all been documented in North American samples, it may well be the case that different reasons predominate in other cultures. For example, Takada and Ohbuchi (2004) in their study of Japanese participants measured such motives as “reduction of guilt” and “maintenance of social harmony.” We have not encountered these reasons in any of our research with Canadian samples. Similarly, no participant in any of our studies articulated the motive Ballester et al. (2011) called “Challenge.” Although the Canadian subscales worked well in the Indian sample, the Indian participants were well educated and relatively fluent in English. Therefore, they may have been a “Westernized” group, a conclusion supported by the fact they did not differ from the Canadian sample on Independent Self-Construal (although they did score more highly on Interdependent Self-Construal).

Although it will be appropriate to develop culture-specific measures of forgiveness types, the R4FQ subscales represent a cross section of important dimensions of arguably universal human desire and need. For example, the R4FQ subscales tap the dimensions that Takada and Ohbuchi (2004) identified in their Japanese sample: Altruistic (e.g., Based on Principle), Egocentric (e.g., To Feel Better), and Normative (e.g., Because of Social Pressure). The subscales also cover important areas of discussion within forgiveness research, such as the relation of forgiveness to reconciliation and the role of offender apology in forgiveness. Although psychologists may argue, for sound reasons, that reconciliation is different from forgiveness and that the decision to forgive is independent of the offender’s behavior (Enright et al., 1998; Freedman, 2008), forgiving to preserve a relationship and forgiving because an offender apologized or made amends emerged as two forms of forgiveness in our samples. Moreover, both of these were associated with less avoidance of the injurer, higher ratings of forgiveness, and, in the case of forgiving for the relationship, less vengefulness.

Relation of R4FQ Subscales to Dispositional Variables

Because the R4FQ is an offense-specific questionnaire, we did not expect strong relations with dispositional variables. However, as expected, all of the dispositional variables were related to a subset of reasons for forgiving.

As hypothesized, religiosity was positively correlated with forgiving for God (in both studies) and with forgiving for a principle (in the Canadian sample).

In the Canadian study, we had hypothesized that anxious attachment would be positively correlated with forgiving to preserve the relationship, but this was not found. However, both anxious and avoidant attachment were associated with being less likely to forgive for a principle and more likely to forgive for pragmatic reasons. In addition, anxious attachment was positively correlated with forgiving in response to social pressure and forgiving to demonstrate moral superiority. Avoidant attachment was related to being less likely to forgive because the offender reformed, consistent with the tendency for those high on avoidant attachment to be more interpersonally detached (Fraley & Shaver, 2000). Thus, for people with insecure attachment, forgiveness tends not be about offering an altruistic gift to an offender, but about achieving egocentric goals. In future research, it would be worthwhile to examine the nature of the attachment between the injured and injurer, not just dispositional attachment.

In the Indian study, we investigated the hypothesis that trait anger would be an impediment to the kinds of forgiveness described by Trainer’s (1981) concept of Intrinsic forgiveness, that is, forgiveness that arises from compassion or altruism. As it turns out, the four measures of trait anger were largely unrelated to the more altruistic forms of forgiveness such as forgiving for a principle or because one could cognitively take the perspective of the offender. Only Anger Expression In, the tendency to feel very angry but hide it (Spielberger et al., 1995), was negatively related to forgiving for a principle. Instead, the trait anger measures tended to correlate positively with forgiving for pragmatic reasons or in response to social pressure. It is difficult to know the direction of causality here. Perhaps individuals higher on trait anger are so because their life circumstances include inordinate social demands and pressures.

Finally, in both studies, we examined interdependent and independent self-construals on the assumption that individuals’ beliefs concerning the degree of interconnection between themselves and others would affect their orientation to forgiveness; however, the findings with these variables were more ambiguous. Forgiving to feel better and forgiving for a principle were each correlated with both independent and interdependent self-construal in both studies. Interdependent, and not independent, self-construal was correlated with being more likely to forgive for God, in both studies, and with forgiving because one understood the offender’s actions, in the Canadian sample. Perhaps what was most surprising was that interdependent self-construal was not correlated with forgiving to preserve the relationship. However, none of the dispositional variables correlated with forgiving for the relationship. This was one of the most highly endorsed reasons in both samples. Given humans are fundamentally social beings, perhaps preserving relationships is an important priority and hence relatively unaffected by dispositions.

Another approach to the question of collectivism was to compare the two samples. We would expect the Indian sample to be more collectivistic in orientation, and in fact, they scored more highly on interdependent self-construal (although there was no difference on independent self-construal). However, there were other differences that must be weighed in considering the findings. The Indian sample on average was older, better educated, and more religious. In addition, English was not their first language.

The two samples differed on every subscale of the R4FQ. Consistent with greater interdependence in the Indian sample, they were more likely to forgive because of social pressure, for pragmatic reasons, and out of empathy (forgiving because they understood the offender); however, the Canadian sample was more likely to forgive for the relationship, which was unexpected. This may well reflect that a greater portion of the offenders in the Canadian sample were romantic partners (40.9%) versus in the Indian sample (5.6%).

In summary, all of the dispositional variables showed differential relations to the various reasons for forgiving. Most correlations were readily interpretable, and this provides initial evidence for the validity of the R4FQ subscales and provides direction for future research examining the predictors of different forms of forgiveness.

Reasons for Forgiving and Emotional Outcome

Based on our own research (DeCourville et al., 2008; Stewart et al., 2010) and that of others (e.g., Cox et al., 2012; Huang & Enright, 2000; Trainer, 1981), we expected that forms of forgiving would be associated with different emotional outcomes. This general hypothesis was amply supported in both studies.

Although all participants had self-identified as having forgiven their offender, nonetheless there was considerable variability in how strongly they had forgiven as assessed by a simple forgiveness rating, as well as scores on the Avoidance and Revenge subscales of TRIM. In general, forgiving for egocentric reasons—to demonstrate moral superiority, to avoid social pressure (with its implication of avoiding social conflict), and for pragmatic reasons—was associated in both samples with less forgiveness. Even forgiving to feel better showed a small correlation with greater avoidance of the offender in the Canadian sample and was otherwise unrelated to forgiveness measures.

In contrast, forms of forgiveness that were focused on reasons outside of the individual—forgiving for the relationship, or because they understood the offender, or (in the Canada sample only) because of a principle—were associated with greater forgiveness. The offender’s behavior also had an impact for some participants. In the Canadian sample, forgiving because the offender reformed was associated with greater forgiveness. However, in India the situation was more complex, with forgiving because the offender reformed being associated with less avoidance, but greater vengefulness.

Similar patterns were observed with participants’ ratings of their emotions when imagining that they were seated beside the offender. In both studies, forgiving to feel better paradoxically showed almost no relation to emotional well-being. This is consistent with the findings of Stewart et al. (2010) that people who forgave to feel better also reported experiencing lingering anger toward the offender. In the Canadian study, forgiving to feel better was the only subscale unrelated to affect and emotion, and in the Indian sample it was only correlated with less anger. It is not uncommon in self-help books on forgiveness for the argument to be made that forgiveness is a fast track to feeling better. These findings would suggest that such an argument provides insufficient motivation to forgive in ways that actually lead to feeling better.

Instead, in both studies, forgiving for the relationship, or for a principle, or because one understood the offender was associated with positive emotional outcomes. In contrast, the more egocentric reasons—To Demonstrate Moral Superiority, Because of Social Pressure, and For Pragmatic Reasons—were generally associated in both samples with more anger, negative affect and emotion, and less positive affect and emotion.

The findings with emotional outcome differed across the two samples for Because Offender Reformed and For God. In the Canadian sample, forgiving because the offender reformed was related to more positive affect and mood (joviality, self-assurance, and serenity) and to less anger, hostility, and sadness, but in the Indian sample it was related to greater fear and fatigue. Forgiving for God in the Canadian sample was only slightly correlated with positive affect and self-assurance; however, in the Indian sample it was correlated with both positive and negative mood. These mixed findings in the Indian sample and the weak findings in the Canadian sample may be due to a shortcoming in the current version of For God subscale: It does not differentiate between more joyous reasons for forgiving and forgiving for fear of God. Future research should attempt to separate these two quite different motivations by adding more items and testing them not only in a general, community sample, but in samples that more highly value religious belief and practice than was the case with the Canadian sample.

A reviewer of this article made the helpful observation that religious motivation would reflect in more than just forgiving “for God.” It would arguably affect the value one places on forgiveness in general and, potentially, on specific reasons for forgiving. Presumably certain forms of forgiveness would be more valued over others, and this may well vary across religious traditions. Moreover, people who identify with a religious tradition, even if they do not place great importance on adherence to religious beliefs and practices, may still be affected by the value structure of their tradition. In short, religious motivation cannot be simplified to forgiving for God, even once that is better measured. Given that forgiveness looms large in the teachings of many faith traditions, it is important for future research to study how religious belief, practice, and identification with differing traditions affect the valuing and practice of different forms of forgiveness.

Finally, in both samples, four reasons for forgiving were associated with a perceived increase in relationship closeness between the occurrence of the offense and the time of data collection: For the Relationship, Because Understood Offender, Because Offender Reformed, and Based on Principle. In addition, in the Canadian sample, To Demonstrate Moral Superiority was negatively related to increased closeness.

Conclusion

Despite the effort of scholars to establish a single definition of forgiveness for the purposes of research and communication, consensus has not been achieved (Kearns & Fincham, 2004). This failure likely reflects that in reality there are different forms of forgiveness. Our research is predicated on the assumption that rather than continuing to argue on philosophical grounds for a definition of “true” forgiveness, a better approach is to empirically document and measure common forms of forgiveness and then study the predictors of these and the impact of these on individual, relational, and societal functioning. To that end, we studied nine types of forgiveness characterized by different goals being pursued by the forgiver. These different forms of forgiveness were differentially predicted by individual dispositions and had a differential impact on emotional outcome.

Supplemental Material

Appendix – Supplemental material for Reasons for Forgiving: Individual Differences and Emotional Outcomes

Supplemental material, Appendix for Reasons for Forgiving: Individual Differences and Emotional Outcomes by Kathryn Belicki, Nancy DeCourville, Shanmukh Kamble, Tammy Stewart and Alicia Rubel in SAGE Open

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,authorship,and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by a Brock SSHRC Institutional Grant and the cost of publishing by the Brock Library Open Access Publishing Fund.

ORCID iD

Kathryn Belicki

Supplementary Materials

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Author Biographies

Kathryn Belicki is a professor of Psychology at Brock University. She began her career studying nightmares,which led her to the study of psychlogical trauma,and ultimately to the study of forgiveness and forgiveness-seeking.

Nancy DeCourville,now retired,is a professor Emerita at Brock University. Her prior interests include statistical methods and studying the nuances of subjective experience.

Shanmukh Vasant Kamble is a professor in the Department of Psychology at Karnatak University,Dharwad,India. He primarily works in the field of positive psychology. His main areas of research are forgiveness,justice,emotions,coping,and religion.

Tammy Stewart has an MA in psychology and is the department coordinator for the Department of Psychology at Brock University. She has a long-standing research interest in forgiveness,particularly the study of differences in people’s experience of forgiving.

Alicia Rubel holds a doctorate in psychology from Brock University. Their work explores the psychology of social justice,interpersonal relationships,and wellbeing. Alicia is currently completing a master of Social Work at Wilfrid Laurier University.

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