Abstract
Keywords
Introduction
Families constitute the fundamental societal unit, primarily responsible for economic support, protection, social relationships, reproduction, and well-being—physical and mental (Solheim & Wachwithan, 2018). Families are changing globally, including the Arabian region because of transitions in marriage, childbearing, fertility, lifestyle, increased participation of women in the labor force, educational achievements, cultural changes such as travel and tourism reflecting modernization, and a rapid pace of urbanization (Al-Khraif et al., 2015; Crabtree, 2007; El-Haddad, 2003; Hamadeh et al., 2008; Olmsted, 2011). Such changes in families are widespread around the world depending on specific socioeconomic and demographic conditions leading to societal issues: economic, educational, work–family, parenting, sexuality, and gender creating specific problems of substance abuse, domestic violence, unemployment, debt, child abuse, and so on, addressed effectively under the “healthy family functioning” and “happy families in a peaceful society” (Robila & Taylor, 2018; Tiliouine & Achoui, 2018). Kabaria-Muriithi et al. (2018) and Abuya et al. (2019) also explain how a cohesive family builds characters, commitments, and self-worth leading to building “good citizens.”
Globalization has led to an increase in the movement of people and accompanying this has been a decrease in the size of family units. Other factors that have led to the decrease in extended families include personal preferences about childbearing, income levels, government incentives, and global cultural influences (DeSilva, 2003). However, such changes have removed the safety net offered by families, especially for children and the aged (Kronfol et al., 2016). Extended families have served as pillars of care, values, and culture in the Arab society acting as reservoirs of culture, tradition, and values, thus playing a role in social and cultural stability. New family structures can take time to develop along with its effects on the division of labor and distribution of power (Willikens, 2010) as against the widely held family value, that is, “men are providers and women are home makers” (Hwang, 2018; Tiliouine & Achoui, 2018).
Family changes may threaten social cohesiveness and this, along with a heightened risk of loneliness posed by single-member families, is of concern in Saudi Arabia and the region. Many researchers are apprehensive about the possible disappearance of extended families altogether from the Arabian Gulf, where education and careers are receiving more attention than marriage and family (Al-Khateeb, 1998; Almalki & Ganong, 2018; El-Haddad, 2003). Empirically, the phenomenon has been measured over time by demographers through indicators reflecting changes in size, structure, and composition of families. In addition, ratios pave the way for comparisons as well as changes over time and serve as the basis for promoting health and security within the intergenerational social order (El-Haddad, 2003; Kronfol et al., 2016).
Changes in Arab families are evident due to rising age at first marriage and cultural or economic pressures (Olmsted, 2011), exerting a possible impact on educational outcomes with gender differentials (Odimegwu et al., 2017). Combined with this is a rapid economic transition in the Gulf fostering changes in fertility and marriage patterns and thus reductions in the number of children. Moreover, improving education of women and men influences the duration of marriage, the ideal number of children, age of women at delivery of their last child, the interval between consecutive pregnancies, and the history of abortions (Hamadeh et al., 2008). Rapid social and lifestyle changes across generations influence the roles and responsibilities of childbearing and child-rearing (Crabtree, 2007). El-Haddad (2003) compares the transition of Arab Gulf families to nuclear families consisting only of parents and their children following the Western model. Movement from traditional or rural lifestyle to cities affects not only interpersonal and secondary social relationships but also the social status and decision-making power of women. Such changes in lifestyle open doors for newer methods of socialization based at modern commercial malls, travel and tourism trips, and so on, leading to cultural integration and intercultural marriages.
As a social unit, the family has been undergoing radical transformations in its formation and structure toward a nuclear family unit (DeSilva, 2003). The developing countries, including Islamic ones, exhibit a rapid process of modernization. A very clear indication is that the mean age at first marriage has been significantly raised, particularly in Saudi Arabia due to a notable increase in female education (Al-Khraif et al., 2019), which ultimately led to a delay in the formation of families and further declines in fertility. At the outset, these changes impacted upon household size, structure, composition, and thereby attitudes, sentiments, responses, and personality (Laslett, 1970). Lindblom et al. (2016) argue that the development of efficient emotional regulation is fostered by functional early relationships; otherwise, children develop neurotic defense mechanisms.
Furthermore, fertility continues to decline. As explained by Lesthaeghe (1995), this scenario leads to societies undergoing a second demographic transition with characteristics including a further reduction in household size, delayed marriage and parenthood, an increasing rate of cohabitation, a rise in divorce and single parenthood, shifts in individual values, orientation toward higher order needs, and an increasing symmetry in gender roles and female autonomy.
A characteristic that is opposite to the first demographic transition, particularly in marriage, fertility, and societal background, is the powerful, inevitable, and irreversible shift in attitudes and norms in the direction of greater individual freedom, needs, and self-actualization (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Zaidi & Morgan, 2017). This situation has been observed in Indonesia and in other countries in East Asia and parts of Southeast Asia such as Thailand and Singapore (Riatu & Ariane, 2016). It has been molded by government policies prompted by changing demographics. Such scenarios have directly contributed to a decline in household size, structure, and composition and thus affected attitudes, sentiments, and responses (Laslett, 1970; Riatu & Ariane, 2016). Studies on family demography help explain the complexities of demographic transitions and strengthen government policy, especially in expanding social development and welfare.
At this point, the core of family transition is the decline in fertility and changing family needs linked with demographic transition. Preindustrial societies with high levels of mortality and fertility resemble developed countries with higher life expectancies and replacement level fertility. Globally, during the period of the second demographic transition (manifested in marriages, fertility, higher order needs, revolutions, and role and lifestyle changes—a term coined in 1986), changing patterns of marriage, fertility, and the family have emerged with women’s education and occupational opportunities, directly impacting upon the distribution of individuals and households (Lesthaeghe, 1995, 2010, 2014). In Asian countries such as Indonesia, for example, the majority—more than 60% of households—are two-generation families. The so-called nuclear family has an average of 3.9 members per household. This takes into account the presence of nonfamily members including domestic workers (Riatu & Ariane, 2016).
Research Problem
Vision 2030 stresses families at various sections: first, in its theme of “a vibrant society” referring to life according to Islamic principles of moderation, national identity, and cultural heritage to lead a good life in a beautiful environment, caring families in a social and health care system (Saudi Arabia, 2013); second, in creating cities’ open landscaped areas developed for recreational needs of families; and third in strengthening families through social developments, caring, developing children’s character, education, boosting business and productive families, and being responsible for our own lives.
Family demography is the study of primary social groups or units, in particular of group membership and the relationship between the members (Willikens, 2010). It explores changes in the size, structure, composition, and growth in addition to various social, economic, and cultural linkages. Although a family is a household composed of members related by marriage, blood, or adoption, a household may be a single family or several families or unrelated persons (DeSilva, 2003). Thus, the structure of a family and transition processes are the core of family demography, especially the distribution of members by type and position. For instance, Eustace et al. (2018) referred key indicators such as socioeconomic status, marriage and marital status, fertility and sexuality, contraception, and contemporary vulnerabilities of family in the Tanzanian context of family life education. A similar study of family demography by Ritblatt and Rosental (2018) incorporated economy, health, education, and women status. Another study emphasized unemployment and marital issues as important determinants of family lifestyle and thus well-being (Choudhury & Broman, 2016). However, studies during 1970s and 1980s reveal women’s traditional employment and economic contributions to families (Al-Suwaigh, 1989; Altorki, 1977).
Le Play’s three family types (joint family, stem family, and nuclear family) are widely discussed (Ruggles, 2012). Joint families and stem families are multigenerational but have their own strengths in building and preserving values, culture, attitudes, and relationships, whereas the nuclear family can be weaker in this regard resulting from the growth of social differentiation and individualism and loss of specialized family functions and weak kinship ties (Lamanna, 2002; Laslett, 1970; Ruggles, 2012). Still, family development is considered as important as economic development (Xia & Creaser, 2018).
Saudi Arabia is a collective society having an intertwined Arab culture and Islamic values and an acceptance of hierarchical order in the society (Almalki & Ganong, 2018), where the households have increased in number, but the number of persons per household has fallen noticeably (Al-Khraif et al., 2016). As per the censuses, the number of households has increased from 1,877,099 in 1992 to 2,957,661 in 2010 but depicts a decline in the number of persons per household from 6.6 to 6.3. These figures show an increase in the number of smaller independent families.
Families are not only smaller in size but also closely knit with fewer members—usually the adult couple and their unmarried children. Although the topic has widespread importance in the context of demographic transition, a very little work has been conducted, especially in the Saudi Arabian context. Apparently, family demographics with national-level data aids in understanding other demographic processes; those light into sustainable development, especially related to Vision 2030. As these efforts have an indirect impact on values and traditions, they are part of building up disciplined dynamic societies. Such studies incorporating national demographics are very rare in the Arabian context, though there are region-specific small-sample studies on families. This article investigates family demographic changes since 1992. The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
To trace the changes in family size and structure from trends of fertility and marriage;
To explain the change in structure and composition of family;
To describe the changing family roles and functions.
Method
This study is organized into the following sections: fertility trends and emerging issues of family size transition, changes in family composition, and transition in median age. For this purpose, this study makes use of two sets of data, namely, the censuses of 1992, 2004, and 2010 (the last three censuses) and the demographic surveys of 2000, 2007, and 2016. Fertility rates are calculated from the data referring to 1 year preceding the census/survey (excluding births to women of age 50 years and above). Other classified data were analyzed by keeping the number of households (as the proxy of family) as the denominator to reflect dynamics and changes at the family level. Although a household consists of people who coreside and share resources, a family consists of related individuals (Willikens, 2010); thus, households serve as the proxy to the family.
Analyses were carried out to calculate the following indices:
Section 1
a. Fertility indicators—total fertility rate (TFR), crude birth rate (CBR), general fertility rate (GFR), general marital fertility rate (GMFR), and gross reproduction rate (GRR);
b. Percentage of unmarried women aged 30 years and above to the total women of the same age;
c. Number of unmarried women aged 30 years and above per 100 households;
d. Number of unmarried men aged 35 years and above per 100 households;
e. Number of currently married women aged less than 20 years per 100 households;
f. Number of currently married men aged less than 25 years per 100 households;
g. Percentage of female-headed households.
Section 2
a. Number of persons, males, and females per household;
b. Number of persons, males, and females in each broad age group per household;
c. Number of persons, males, and females with a blood relationship to the head of the household;
d. Number of persons, males, and females aged 12 years and above (1992) and 15 years and above (other years) in each marital status per household;
e. Number of persons, males, and females aged 12 years and above (1992) and 15 years and above (other years) in each employment (activity) status per household;
f. Median age of population for each category of relationship (family composition), marital status, and employment.
Results and Discussion
Saudi Arabia’s population is increasing, slowly and steadily, but the number of households is increasing more rapidly, creating social and economic concerns. Still, it holds the importance of family and religious affiliation with appreciated hospitality and interdependency, as stated by Almalki and Ganong (2018). The salient concerns in this context of family demography are fertility, family structure, family composition, and functional distributions, which are discussed separately. Family transformations are parallel to the modernization process—political, economic, and social spheres (Copur & Taylor, 2018).
Fertility Trends and Nuptiality
As demonstrated in Table 1, fertility rates in Saudi Arabia declined quickly to a level of 2.7 children (2016) from 4.9 children (2000). This is of remarkable economic significance, especially in values of children in line with education and health care, in addition to family budgets determining consumer behavior. However, the current fertility trends show a near replacement level—a GRR of 1.3 in 2016. Saudi Arabian families are conjugal in nature: almost all have children except in cases of health complications demanding contraception (Almalki & Ganong, 2018; Al-Khraif et al., 2017). This directly reflects the family demographic transition process, which might lead to more people living independently, more single-parent families, greater cohabitation, and marital dissolutions (El-Haddad, 2003; Riatu & Ariane, 2016; Willikens, 2010).
Fertility Indicators Depicting a Rapid Declining Trend.
TFR = total fertility rate; CBR = crude birth rate; GFR = general fertility rate; GMFR = general marital fertility rate; GRR = gross reproduction rate.
Greater numbers of women in Saudi Arabia have been educated and this is linked to their higher age at first marriage. There has also been an increase in the number of persons educated in American and European universities, who have gained both advanced technology–based education as well as Western values. This Western outlook, especially toward marriage and childbearing, was observed in the percentage of unmarried women aged 30 years and above to the total women of the same age. Their percentages increased from 1.9 (1992) to 8.8 (2016), an unexpected sharp and steady increase.
No doubt, such fertility trends influence family living and dynamics in Saudi Arabia, especially in the absence of the myth of “not marrying educated/working women” (El-Haddad, 2003). These figures are comparable to those of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries where fertility rates are persistently low (OECD, 2011).
Such a rapid decline in fertility can be attributed to many reasons, such as new lifestyles, raising standards of living, changing perceptions of children, family size preference, and increase in contraception combined with changes in traditional values and functions and structure of families (Axinn et al., 1994; El-Haddad, 2003; Riatu & Ariane, 2016; Roudi-Fahimi, 2004). Whenever childbearing is postponed because of women’s participation in labor force, there are declines in fertility often facilitated by access to contraceptives (OECD, 2011). These changes in family size can in turn contribute to new values (DeSilva, 2003) and push the government toward new infrastructure development and welfare services. Moreover, Arab women are no more regarded as highly fertile, especially due to change in values—cost of children, social conservation, education of girls, age at marriage, labor force participation, and so on (Fargues, 2005).
Table 2 shows the indicators developed to reflect on the fertility behavior of households/families, with percentages taking the number of households as the denominator (instead of total population). Such calculations receive significance in the context of family demography as they reflect the percentage of persons per 100 households. Five indicators were developed out of the marital status distribution of population. First, the number of never married women aged 30 years and above, which increased from 1.45 per 100 households (1992) to 6.53 per 100 households (2010). It means that there were almost seven women in 100 families of this status. The increase in this category of women raises challenges because of its implications for reproductive behavior, childbirth, and related demographic and health dimensions.
Indicators Influencing the Fertility Behavior at Household Level (Number of Persons/Number of Households × 100).
As of 2016 (survey data), the number of never married women of age 30 years and above (those crossing the prime reproductive age) reached 10.48 per 100 households, an increase due to various demographic and socioeconomic transformations—educational, industrial, urban, and Western values—the so-called second demographic transition. Such transitions have their roots in societal factors such as women’s attitudes toward marriage as nonessential for societal membership, romantic love, women in work mixing with men, improvements in women’s education, a growing role of women in public life, and the phenomenon of increased breakups of marital relationships, as explained by El-Haddad (2003). This “spinsterhood crisis” is found among the well-educated middle class and those holding high-ranking jobs.
Similarly, the number of never married men aged 35 years and above (those crossing the prime reproductive age) was 6.8 per 100 households (2010) that fell slightly in 2016. Such marital status distributions or celibacies beyond an absolute high age can harm family formation variables and the social living index. Men and women remaining unmarried beyond their crucial reproductive ages could threaten society and the country, both socially and culturally, in terms of sexuality, reproduction, and roles and responsibilities giving space of aberrations and alternatives. This substantiates the arguments of El-Haddad (2003) that a new phenomenon of remaining unmarried in Gulf societies is not restricted to females but includes males as well.
But the decrease in early marriage, especially of girls below 20 years (before crossing adolescent age) from a high of 7.73 (1992) to a low of 0.70 (2016) per 100 households, is promising in terms of educational and health prospects. These rates show the reduced incidence of early marriages (postponement of marriage) influencing birth rates and other demographic changes determining family demography (El-Haddad, 2003; United Nations, 2015). A similar decline in the early marriage of men below 25 years (before completing the youth age) per 100 households is also noted. This relates to increased delays in the “marriage project” by both males and females until they have realized their personal aspirations (El-Haddad, 2003), such as obtaining a higher degree or certain occupational status or attaining financial capability. Marital relations within the family context influence educational attainment on one hand and the resulting family planning usage influences familial poverty, hunger, and mortality on the other (Abuya et al., 2019; Cleland et al., 2006). Although adoption of family planning contributes to women’s empowerment, achievement of universal primary schooling, and long-term environmental sustainability (Cleland et al., 2006), the ills include a rise in young adults living independently, exclusive premarital cohabitation, marriage at older ages, high level of marital dissolution, and low fertility.
The headships of the household/family are usually not an issue in patriarchal societies such as Saudi Arabia as all families with a male member are headed by males. This is particularly true in situations where males act as the main breadwinners and females as homemakers. But the data show that 6.98 (2010) per 100 households are headed by females, a fall from 9.67 per 100 households in 1992. The absence of a male in the family can be due to death, separation, divorce or widowhood, emigration, or infirmity/disability. The data reveal that nearly 10% of Saudi Arabian households are headed by a woman, an issue of family demography. All these situations have long-term effects that influence family size, traditional values, norms of child care, and filial responsibilities in the Kingdom (Al-Khraif et al., 2019). As the country experiences frequent migrations, family connections and intergenerational relationship influence fertility and other demographic dimensions (Ayika et al., 2018).
Family Size and Structure
As an indicator, the number of persons in a household has importance as it reflects the family size as well as the family system. As shown in Figure 1, there is a decline in the average family size from 6.6 (1992) to 5.9 persons (2016). Such a steady decline in household size reflects transition in families caused due to a decline in birth rate, as stated by Almalki and Ganong (2018). The number of both males and females declined equally. However, family size remains large in Gulf countries (El-Haddad, 2003), in comparison with some Asian countries.
Number of persons per household.
The average family size has not declined in Saudi Arabia, noticeably, similar to other Gulf countries, except in some urban sectors, despite the improvements in household economy, living standards, household technologies, housing patterns, consumption patterns, and expenditure (El-Haddad, 2003). This is quite different from the Japanese experience of households shrinking to a single member as a result of modernization (Kumagai, 2015; Riatu & Ariane, 2016). If a similar situation were to develop in Saudi Arabia, it could threaten norms of filial piety and care of a rapidly aging population. Fortunately, there are strong bonds of relationships in the society in line with traditional housings, shared accommodations, extended family groups, and family compounds, despite the impact of urbanization and nucleation of families (Almalki & Ganong, 2018).
Another analysis looks at the number of persons per household in terms of age structure. The broad age groups, considered, include children (less than 5 years), school-age children (5–14 years), adolescents and youths (15–24 years), adults (25–59 years), and old aged (60 years and above). Such a classification divides the population by their developmental stages (Table 3).
Number of Persons per Household by Age Distribution.
The number of persons in a household remained more or less unchanged during the study periods from 1992 (6.6) to 2010 (6.3) although there is a slight decline in both males and females (the number in 2004 was contradictory as it does not tally with the trend). The above figures comprise various age groups, of which there is a decline in children < 5 years and those aged 5 to 14 years, but there were a slight increase in the adolescents and youths, a sharp increase in the adults, and almost the same number of older aged. As of 2010, a household is composed of two children aged 0 to 14 years, four persons aged 15 to 59 years, and one or none older aged. In 1992, the corresponding figures were three, three, and one or none, respectively.
A steady transformation in the number of children and of adults leads to the emergence of the current age structural composition of families in the Kingdom. There were no marked differences in the number of males and females in a household. Although children aged 0 to 14 fell from three (1992) to two (2010), the number of adolescents and adults increased. Although structural changes are visible within the family/household, family size and relations are connected with the traditional frameworks without altering family functions such as breadwinning, homemaking, childbearing, and child-rearing (El-Haddad, 2003). Moreover, Arabs share common values of religion and traditions, which increases the group bonding attaching religious manners, social class, and family background as an important personal identity (Almalki & Ganong, 2018). Such a strict religious practice is part of their social activity, which is an important preoccupation to reconfigure the diversity of families, as stated by Salguero-Velazquez et al. (2018).
Household structure continues to change as of 2016 with a decline in the number of children (<5 and 5–14 years) and adolescents/youths but an increase in adults and also the elderly. Nearly three-fifths of the families live in own houses, whereas the rest live in rental houses or official quarters—villa, traditional houses, or apartments (Almalki & Ganong, 2018; Salam et al., 2014). The survey data also show changes similar to those from the censuses in the age groups of both males and females. These changes reveal gains in the working-age adult population. The overall structure shows six persons (composed of two children aged 0–14 years; one adolescent/youth; three adults; one or none elderly at a household). Such a trend has been linked to economic abundance and an accompanying rise in consumerism and the purchase of status symbols, such as cars, employing domestic servants, and extravagance in housing and clothing—all visible lifestyle changes in the Kingdom accompanied by a remarkable increase in the family income (Almalki & Ganong, 2018; El-Haddad, 2003). However, in Gulf societies, particularly in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, older persons have maintained their economic role and status along with their authority and influence in the family and clan. But these arrangements can erode as a result of urbanization, technology transfer, educational progress, emigration patterns, globalization, status of women, higher order needs and changing values concerning social equality, social justice, and human rights (El-Haddad, 2003; Riatu & Ariane, 2016). Moreover, families keep their children, adults, and elderly under stability of their overall health and wellness for the benefit of society (Baran & Jones, 2018). The rise in life expectancy and new work arrangements involving a pensionable age pushes the older aged away from production with continued income. Another concern is the senility and diseases that affect the aged, which needs specialized care systems. An increase in the elderly accompanied by a decline in childbearing women reduces the number of children (OECD, 2011) and increases the family demographic transition, as observed in the Kingdom.
Family Composition
Saudi Arabian families are united, sympathetic, and supportive, thereby maintaining high levels of happiness and peace (Almalki & Ganong, 2018). Apparently, Arab families are harmonious giving due importance and care to women in recognition to their greater role in upbringing children (Tiliouine & Achoui, 2018). Members of a household analyzed by their relationship with the household head excluding those in the public housings showed six people in a household (2010) including a head, a spouse, and four sons/daughters (Table 4). Some households have other relatives such as a son- or a daughter-in-law, grandchildren, or grandparents. As compared with previous census years, the constitution of households remains largely unchanged except for the presence of a spouse and sons- or daughters-in-law, which clearly indicates a slow change in family composition in the Kingdom. It also indicates the unchanged or preserved extended family structure that reflects traditional family values for future generations to come in terms of education, socialization, collaboration, more support for children, control over expenses, and so on. Households are usually headed by men. Those headed by women often reflect their status as educated working women (El-Haddad, 2003; United Nations, 2015) rather than the absence of men as stated by DeSilva (2003) in the context of Sri Lanka where there are a higher proportion of female-headed households, particularly in rural areas due to the absence of men (the traditional heads of households who left for work or other reasons).
Changes in the Number of Persons per Household by Family Composition, Marital Status, and Employment.
Refers to the household population only, that is, excluding population residing at public housings. b Only for those aged 12 years and above for 1992 but 15+ years for 2004 and 2010.
Of the three males in a typical Saudi household, one is the head and two are sons. That is, males in a household live mostly as the head or as sons, which shows their prominent status in a household. Females take the role of household head (having no spouse), or usually as a spouse (one per household), or as daughters (two per household), with a negligible number as other relatives. Almalki and Ganong (2018) mentioned that approximately 28% of households are female headed (employed women with nonworking husbands, divorced women, widows, or never married). There are no changes in the numbers except in sons and daughters in a household. The surveys also show a similar trend—decreasing number of sons and daughters. This indicates the declining number of children per household/family. These are reflections of changing Gulf family structures and fluctuations by the forces of globalization and modernization, as explained by El-Haddad (2003).
Consequent to economic development, education, and higher living standards, nuclear families received popularity in the Kingdom but as the most influential social unit with values of loyalty, respect, commitments to personal needs, individual identities, familial associations, sacrifice for the family, in-group contributions, and bonds to the community (Almalki & Ganong, 2018). In addition, families are raised up to their comfort levels to access and employ support mechanisms and services, as pointed out by Taylor and Robila (2018). The family’s influence on work is highly recognized that women with preschool children have low work participation (Lebert & Antal, 2016).
Roles and Responsibilities of Family Members
Analysis of marital status and employment within a household sheds some light on the roles and responsibilities within the family (Table 4). There are clear indications of the increasing number of never married people. As of 2010, of the five people (4.5 exactly) aged 15 years or more in an average family, nearly three are unmarried and nearly two are married. A negligible number were with a failed marriage (0.28 per household meaning 28 persons in 100 households), under the conjugal system of family life, prevalent in the Gulf countries, as stated by El-Haddad (2003). Although the number of youth aged 15 and above per household increased gradually, the share of never married and other persons increased faster, which reduced the rate of fertility. Both the delay in marriages and marital dissolutions are more pronounced among the females, probably due to abuse, carelessness, education, parental intervention, jealousy, and suspicion. More precisely, as Al-Khateeb (1998) stated, differing expectations during role conflict in the family lead to marital dissolutions. Such changes in marital distribution reflect upon the current trend of families as well as the values attached. Thus, it is important for the parents to facilitate relationship with their younger children to influence their achievements (Odimegwu et al., 2017). Apparently, these trends are linked to females’ improved status, roles, responsibilities, and values noted in the Kingdom as impacting from a second demographic transition. Moreover, women often have a more progressive attitude toward equality between sexes (Al-Khateeb, 1998). A similar trend visible across the survey years confirms this change. Still, families are knit with traditional norms, relationships, generations, elderly, women’s roles, men’s obligations, authority, and so on, as seen in Georgia (Dourglishvili, 1997).
Finally, as expected, there is an increase in women’s participation in financial roles and responsibilities within families. Households are composed of two earners, one student, and one homemaker (12/15 years and above); retirees and others form a negligible portion (0.33 per household meaning 33 persons in 100 households), as of 2010. Along with an increase in the number of youth aged 15 and above over the census years, there is an increase in the number of earners (those in the labor force) from one (1992) to two (2010) per household. This increase includes both males and females. Still, earners and retirees are mostly men (Al-Khraif et al., 2018a, 2018b). This could be attributed to the change followed by oil boom that enabled families to employ domestic help, which restricted women from paid employment (Almalki & Ganong, 2018). This enables families to build transportation, child care, residential stability, home maintenance, and other support mechanisms for difficult times, as explained by Kabaria-Muriithi et al. (2018).
But the contribution made by women to household income is increasingly being seen as a valuable support to the household economy in the Arab region (El-Haddad, 2003). The previous low level of female participation in the labor force was attributed to their probable gender limitations while reconciling work and family aspirations, as pointed out by the OECD (2011). However, with increasing female educational attainment, especially at the university level, their participation in the labor force also increases as a realization of their aspirations in accordance with government policies, particularly of Vision 2030, specifically higher in education, social sciences, and health care, but lower in engineering, manufacturing, and construction (Almalki & Ganong, 2018; Hwang, 2018). As a matter of fact, men’s social and religious authority in the family reduced, but not their economic and general authority, in the male-dominated Saudi family (Al-Khateeb, 1998). But, with the hike in education with a readiness for employment, their economic dependence on men has reduced and thus gained more negotiation power in marriage, child birth, and thus the decision-making power (Al-Khraif et al., 2017; Hwang, 2018). Thus, families are to be empowered to build skills among children and youth to deal with contemporary challenges in a preventive rather than a curative manner (Bhangaokar & Pandya, 2018).
Transition in Median Age
Five-year age distribution of the population analyzed and illustrated into median age, an expression of central tendency, at the national level assuming that a similar median age applies to the families too. Median ages are calculated with the data for each relationship, each marital status, and each occupational status, for different census years and surveys. Such an attempt has its importance in explaining family demography.
As of 2010, the household heads have a median age of 42.4 years, which shows an increasing trend (Table 5). A similar rapid increase was observed in the median age of sons/daughters and grandchildren. Their overall median age also increased rapidly, which might be due to the abovementioned categories of household members. Only the median age of the parent (mother and father) declined from 62.4 (1992) to 56.1 (2010). There is a similar trend among men and women, indicating a steady transition at the household (family) level. By 2016, the head of the household reached an age of 44.2 years, with the spouse aged 40.0 years, which indicates a reduced age difference. This is also of significance as the declining age gap between spouses is part of social transformations in line with modernization. At this point, the parental age reduces from 63.5 (2000) to 61.6 (2016). It is the rapid hike in the median age of children (son/daughter) and that of the grandchildren, which requires explanation based on the fertility pattern and age at marriage/family formation. However, the sons/daughters are still at a younger age, which would extend the process of the extended family transition.
Transition in Median Age of the Population by Family Composition, Marital Status, and Employment.
There is a sharp increase in the median age of never married persons to 21.1 years (2010) from 17.1 (1992). It may be inferred that although the age of those never married, currently married, and divorced increases, that of widowed decreases in the family, probably reflecting early years of death of husbands due to accidents, injuries, or diseases. There is concern about the causes of increased mortality of men at an earlier age. It might be linked to gains in female life expectancy. The median age (15 years and above) of population is 31.0 (2010), which is more or less equal for both males and females. The increase in this age since 1992 refers to increasing aging and decreasing childhood population. A close look at the survey data shows further increases in these categories until 2016, including the widowed.
Also, population by activity status highlights their median age as 33.0 for earning members indicating an establishment period for the carrier development. It then will longer be the time for the extended family transition in the Kingdom as well expected to be happened to preserve the invaluable traditional family values for future generations’ solidarity. To this end, a positive and healthy family life supported through well-developed, well-implemented, and well-monitored family life education programs is necessary with priority to preventive, educational, and collaborative approaches to empower families and individuals by addressing and resolving family issues, as stated by Tiliouine and Achoui (2018).
Conclusion
This analysis used published classified national-level data of various censuses and demographic surveys conducted by the General Authority of Statistics, Saudi Arabia. Certain indicators developed to reflect family demography were derived by keeping the number of households as the denominator, thus giving rise to various dimensions of marital behavior, population by broad age groups, family composition, marital status, and employment per household. Analyses and interpretations in this article need to be endorsed. Although these indicators give insights into family change in Saudi Arabia, more research is needed. Moreover, indicators to explain family-level fertility and median age and other demographic dimensions would facilitate a clearer understanding of family demography.
Families in Saudi Arabia have changed rapidly in terms of fertility indicators like TFR; marital behavior indicators such as not marrying beyond a certain age or delayed first marriage, thus influencing the number of persons per household; structure, composition, and functions of household; and median age of population classified according to age structure, composition, roles, and functions. These are indications of the rapidly changing demographic scenario and socioeconomic life in the Kingdom. Subsequently, the fertility becomes central to the family demography research.
These rapid changes to family life in Saudi Arabia have socioeconomic implications. No doubt, the society is moving toward a modern Western lifestyle as characterized by a second demographic transition where the values and traditions change. It will have long-term implications for family roles and responsibilities, family cohesion, socioeconomic and demographic consequences as well as funding for welfare services. The urge for having greater freedom with less accountability to other family members could nourish a culture and tradition devoid of empathy toward children, elderly, and disabled. It could create a society which is more individualized, personalized, and self-centered (Gesellschaft). This is a critical stage for policymakers to design intervention strategies to safeguard priorities without compromising the desired values of the family of future generations.
In this context, all the proposed policies, strategies, and actions should be considered in line with Saudi Vision 2030 as well as other national plans to promote families’ social well-being and to adhere to the national interest to build a society based on passion, compassion, and Islamic values so as to ensure responsible and productive future generations who care for the elderly, disabled, and abandoned.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
Funding
ORCID iD
