Abstract
Introduction
A recent line of research in corporate finance investigates the phenomenon that has become known as “mysterious zero leverage,” after the contemporary studies of Strebulaev and Yang (2013), which found that an important and increasing proportion of firms had been presenting no debt over the years, and Devos et al. (2012), which showed that zero leverage is a persistent phenomenon. 1 Also intriguing is the fact that the existence of debt-free firms seems to be a global phenomenon, being present all over the world (Bessler et al., 2013) and including both large, listed firms (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013) and small, unlisted firms (Ramalho & Silva, 2009). Moreover, the zero-leverage phenomenon is not confined to the lack of long-term debt, but also refers to zero short-term debt (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013). Firms such as Apple, Amazon, and Yahoo are examples of organizations that in a given period have adopted extremely conservative levels of debt, even reaching an unexpected zero-leverage level. 2
The complexity of the zero-leverage phenomenon increases inasmuch as the classical theories of capital structure, namely, the trade-off, pecking-order, and agency theories, are not able to explain such conservative levels of debt. The lack of theoretical support has led academics to present alternative approaches to explain zero leverage, such as the financial constraints theory, where zero leverage emerges as an imposition of creditors, and the financial flexibility hypothesis, which states that firms avoid using debt in order to retain financial flexibility. Nevertheless, despite the considerable advances made during the last decade, it is still not clear which are the theoretical approaches that best explain the zero-leverage phenomenon, as recently stressed by Saona et al. (2020).
A drawback of existing studies on zero-leverage firms is their focus on countries with market-based financial systems, especially the United States, which favors financing through the capital market rather than through bank debt (La Porta et al., 1997). Although studies considering other countries and financial systems do exist (Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2018; Saona et al., 2020), their results are likely to have been strongly influenced by the considerable number of debt-free US firms present in their samples. A more balanced context to study zero leverage is provided by European countries. Indeed, Europe is the home of the largest banking system of the world, with non-financial firms being very dependent on bank loans as the primary source of external finance (European Investment Bank, 2015), but at the same time includes a relevant proportion of firms operating in countries with market-based financial systems. Therefore, the European context seems to be the ideal for studying not only the general effect of the financial system on the zero-leverage phenomenon, as Ghoul et al. (2018) did using a sample that included some European countries, but also to test whether the relative importance of the financial constraints and financial flexibility hypotheses to explain zero-leverage decisions varies across countries with different financial systems.
Another issue that has not been fully analyzed is the impact of the financial crisis initiated in 2008 on zero leverage. In various countries, this crisis has been related to the sovereign debt crises that until very recently prevented the normal economic growth, the availability of finance and the recovery of investment levels, particularly in Western European countries (Dolz et al., 2019; European Investment Bank, 2015). Although the reduction in credit demand and supply is expected to have favored the zero-leverage phenomenon, the economic crisis, by reducing the internal resources generated by firms, may have forced former zero-leverage firms to resort to debt after 2008 (Ramalho et al., 2018). To the best of our knowledge, only Morais et al. (2020) analyzed the effect of the 2008 global crisis on the existence of zero-debt firms. However, several questions remain to be answered, such as whether that effect was similar across countries with different financial systems or whether the financial constraints hypothesis gained relevance during the crisis.
In an attempt to fill the previously identified gaps, this study focuses on the following research questions: (1)
This article contributes in several ways to the literature. Confirming previous evidence (Bessler et al., 2013; Morais et al., 2020), our results show that also at the European level there are two types of zero-leverage firms: financially constrained firms that are unable to get any funding; and financially unconstrained firms, which maintain zero leverage by choice. Also, similarly to Ghoul et al. (2018), we confirm that the financial system prevailing in the country, as well as the level of stock market development, are important determinants of zero leverage, with firms in countries with market-based systems being more prone to be unlevered. In addition, we show that the recent finding by Morais et al. (2020) that the European financial and sovereign debt crises increased the propensity for zero leverage, actually is only valid for market-based countries, since no significant changes occurred in bank-based countries. Another novel result uncovered by our study is the fact that the relevance of the financial flexibility hypothesis is higher in market-based systems and that, contrary to what could be expected, the financial constraints approach did not gain importance with the 2008 crisis. Finally, we show that our conclusions are robust to the use of alternative measures of debt conservatism, explanatory variables and econometric methods, including instrumental variable models that allow for endogeneity in firm size and dividend payments. A preliminary propensity score matching analysis also provides similar results. Overall, our results show that (at least some of) the conflicting results found in previous studies may be due to the incorrect assumption they made of a unique, homogeneous effect of each determinant of zero leverage across different realities.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section “Literature review and research hypotheses” briefly reviews theoretical explanations of the zero-leverage phenomenon and formulates some empirical hypotheses. Section “Data and methodology” describes the data and the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section “Empirical results” presents and discusses the results obtained by both univariate and multivariate data analyses. Finally, section “Conclusion” contains some final considerations.
Literature review and research hypotheses
Studies on the “zero-leverage phenomenon” need to resort to explanatory approaches alternative to the main financial theories. This article focuses on two firm-level arguments (financial constraints and financial flexibility) and on two macroeconomic factors (financial system and the global financial crisis), and on their interaction, as possible explanations for zero leverage. Next, we review the main theoretical arguments underlying each class of zero-leverage determinants and formulate a set of empirical hypotheses that will be tested in section “Empirical results.”
Internal determinants of the zero-leverage phenomenon: the financial constraints and the financial flexibility approaches
The financial constraints approach is the hypothesis most widely accepted by researchers as an explanation of the zero-leverage phenomenon. According to this theory, in the presence of capital market imperfections, capital structure is not only determined by the need for capital (i.e., the demand side), but mainly by the possibility of obtaining external finance (i.e., the supply side). Therefore, decisions about debt are not taken only by firms, but also by creditors that may be willing to grant or not debt to them. In this context, the zero-leverage phenomenon is more an imposition of creditors due to financial market imperfections than the firm’s own financing decision.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) developed a theoretical model which shows that, in the presence of market frictions such as information asymmetries, debt can become too expensive. This prevents firms from funding projects with a positive net present value (NPV) through external finance, which may force firms to forego good investment opportunities (Almeida & Campello, 2007). Indeed, financially constrained firms face restrictions in accessing credit, because lenders are not able to assess the quality of their future investments due to information asymmetries (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Furthermore, Diamond (1991) states that in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems external finance becomes more difficult for firms with little reputation, that is, firms without a favorable past in the credit market.
In terms of empirical research, Bessler et al. (2013) and Devos et al. (2012) find strong evidence that zero-leverage firms are financially constrained. The authors also conclude that such firms are smaller, present a lower asset tangibility and have not yet acquired a favorable reputation in the debt market. More recently, Huang et al. (2017) show that firms that face financial constraints more frequently are more likely to present zero leverage.
Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence described, we test the following hypothesis:
Regarding the financial flexibility hypothesis, this approach suggests that firms avoid debt because of their financing decisions and not of their inability to obtain external finance. The literature relates financial flexibility to the firm’s capacity to fund future investments, even in the presence of information asymmetries (Ferrando et al., 2017; Gamba & Triantis, 2008). It is considered that the capacity to timely react to unexpected changes in the firm’s activity is improved by its financial flexibility (Denis, 2011). Recognizing the interdependence over time between the firm’s financing and investment decisions is the starting point for enhancing the importance of financial flexibility.
Survey evidence points out that financial managers consider financial flexibility as a determinant factor of firm’s capital structure decisions, indicating that they voluntarily limit credit lines to maintain firm’s debt capacity to turn to credit in the future (Brounen et al., 2006; Campello et al., 2010). Recognizing that financial flexibility allows firms to mitigate both financial distress costs and the underinvestment problem in situations of restricted access to external finance (Rapp et al., 2014), firms have an incentive to present high levels of cash holdings as well as to preserve their borrowing capacity (de Jong et al., 2012). Internal liquidity is then a determinant factor of financial flexibility (Ferrando et al., 2017). However, Marchica and Mura (2010) conclude that firms with low levels of debt try to maintain their financial flexibility through a low level of investment and turning to debt only when good investment opportunities arise.
Empirically, Bessler et al. (2013) present evidence that some debt-free firms deliberately adopt a debt conservatism policy. They conclude that such firms are typically more profitable and have a greater level of cash holdings than leveraged firms. Dang (2013) states that firms with greater levels of growth opportunities and liquidity are more likely to avoid debt, this being explained by the search for financial flexibility. He concludes also that the strategic decision to hold zero leverage prevails essentially in firms without financial constraints. Finally, Huang et al. (2017) show that firms with a greater level of financial flexibility are, in fact, more likely to have zero leverage.
Considering these arguments, we formulate the following hypothesis:
External determinants of the zero-leverage phenomenon: the financial system and the 2008 global financial crisis
Previous research suggests that decisions regarding capital structure are affected not only by firms’ specific factors but also by their country’s specific characteristics. For example, Ghoul et al. (2018) report that zero leverage is more prominent in developed and high-income countries. In the case of Europe, analyzing the phenomenon of extreme financial conservatism implies to highlight the importance of the banking sector. In recent decades, the European banking sector has shown strong development, presenting much stronger growth than that registered in other banking systems across the world (Langfield & Pagano, 2016). In the recent study by Takami (2016), it is argued that the reduced level of debt-free firms in Japan may be explained by the bank-based financial system that prevails in the country. Actually, although Japan is a country known for its highly developed banking system, such system has even a greater weight in Europe (Langfield & Pagano, 2016). Such a high preponderance of the bank-based financial system is reflected in the European firms’ great dependence on funding from banks (Fernández-Méndez and González, 2019; Langfield & Pagano, 2016). Indeed, European non-financial firms are more dependent on bank loans as the first source of external finance than firms in the US and Japan (European Investment Bank, 2015).
However, market-based financial systems are characterized by a generally well-functioning stock market, with greater size and liquidity (Drobetz et al., 2015), which is more attractive to external investors than bank-based financial systems. Therefore, in countries with market-based financial systems firms tend to have a wider range of available sources of financing. Taking into account the characteristics of both bank- and market-based financial systems, countries with market-oriented system are expected to have a greater proportion of debt-free firms than those with bank-oriented systems (Ghoul et al., 2018). Hence, the following research hypothesis is postulated:
Firm’s financing decisions are also determined by macroeconomic conditions. However, the effect of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure is somewhat ambiguous. Choe et al. (1993) show that in periods of economic growth, the costs of adverse selection are lower, which motivates a greater volume of share issuances. Therefore, given that firms’ preference for financing through equity is higher in periods of economic growth, equity issues are considered to be pro-cyclical and debt to be counter-cyclical. Another theoretical perspective points out that asset values fall in periods of uncertainty and macroeconomic shocks, which is reflected in a lower firm’s net worth and collateral (Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013). Therefore, in periods of economic recession, firms turn less to credit because the value of their collateral falls. In this view, both collateral and debt are pro-cyclical (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997).
There are some studies relating macroeconomic conditions with zero leverage. Dang (2013) shows that in adverse macroeconomic conditions, represented by a low, or negative, GDP growth rate, a firm’s likelihood of adopting zero leverage increases. A similar result is obtained by Ghose and Kabra (2016), and so the authors conclude that zero leverage is counter-cyclical as regards macroeconomic conditions. More recently, Morais et al. (2020) showed that the 2008 financial crisis reduced the firms’ propensity to resort to debt.
In this article, we are particularly interested in estimating the effects of the recent global financial crisis on zero leverage. Considering that the 2008 US subprime crisis was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis in 2010 in several European countries (Laeven & Valencia, 2018), preventing the availability and access to external sources of finance (European Investment Bank, 2015), it is expected that the recent crisis experienced in Europe had an important effect on zero leverage. Indeed, during periods of macroeconomic shocks, the access to external finance generally becomes more expensive and difficult due to increasing information asymmetries and default risk. On one hand, the uncertainty about the real value of the firm and the quality of their investments reduce the creditor willingness to grant debt (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, the substantial losses faced by financial institutions during the recent financial crisis may also have decreased their loan activities (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010).
Based on these arguments, we expect that one consequence of the 2008 global crisis was an increment in the proportion of zero-debt firms. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated:
The great dependence of firms on debt in bank-based countries results in closer ties and less information asymmetries between firms and banks, which can arguably mitigate the negative effects of the crisis on access to debt financing (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Therefore, firms from bank-based systems may benefit from their closer relationships with banks to keep access to debt at a fair condition during crisis periods, while firms from market-based systems may be forced to renounce the use of debt in such periods to avoid the aggravated costs. Hence, while it is expected that the 2008 crisis increased zero leverage in both bank- and market-based financial systems, one could also expect that firms located in bank-based financial systems were less impacted than their peers located in market-based countries. Thus, we argue that the crisis may have had a different effect on zero leverage depending on the financial system being considered and formulate the following hypothesis:
Interactions between zero-leverage internal and external determinants
So far, the literature on zero leverage has considered independently the effects of internal and external determinants on zero leverage, assuming they are homogeneous across different contexts. For example, while Bessler et al. (2013) and Ghoul et al. (2018) present evidence of a direct impact of country legal and/or financial system on zero leverage, they assume that the effects of internal determinants are identical across countries. Similarly, the direct impact of the 2008 crisis on firm’s and creditor’s debt decisions was estimated by Morais et al. (2020) assuming that the effects of internal determinants were the same during the crisis and non-crisis years. However, there are some connections between internal and external factors that may boost or attenuate their influence on zero leverage. Therefore, we formulate two additional hypotheses that consider their joint influence in cases that we think are particularly important.
The stronger protection to minority shareholders and the higher flow of information existent in countries with well-functioning and developed capital markets increase investors’ willingness to invest (La Porta et al., 2002), providing firms with a wider range of alternative and attractive sources of financing than in bank-based systems, where the relationships are mainly established with banks (Leland & Pyle, 1977). In particular, the greater number of investors and the higher liquidity of capital markets in market-oriented systems give firms a better chance to replace debt by equity and remain debt-free. Therefore, it is easier for firms located in those countries to keep their financial flexibility and, hence, their borrowing capacity to finance future investment opportunities that may arise (de Jong et al., 2012). For example, more profitable firms, with higher levels of internal liquidity and holding future good prospects, have more chances to be debt-free in market systems than in bank systems, where, instead of building up financial flexibility, firms often have to use their operational profits and liquidity to comply with debt repayment plans. Thus, the financial flexibility approach may apply, particularly, to firms in countries with market-based systems, that is, there is a higher propensity for those firms to adopt zero-leverage policies due to their own decision. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested:
However, the overall increase in information asymmetries and default risk during crisis periods are expected to hamper the access to external finance. In particular, the arguments put forward in section “External determinants of the zero-leverage phenomenon: the financial system and the 2008 global financial crisis” suggest that the recent financial and sovereign debt crises aggravated firms’ financial constraints and, hence, firms’ access to debt got worse due to creditors’ imposition. From the debt supply side, there are some reasons that may lead creditors to aggravate the conditions to grant debt to firms during periods of crisis. As argued by the balance sheet channel perspective, asset values fall during crisis, which, together with the uncertainty about the real value of the firm, increases considerably the risk taken by creditors and consequently reduces their willingness to grant debt (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Moreover, creditors may react to the substantial losses faced by financial institutions during the crisis by promoting a contraction in credit availability to firms or requiring higher interest rates (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010; Santos, 2011). Although this situation affects all firms, firms with little reputation are expected to be even more affected and to have even more difficulties to raise debt (Diamond, 1991). Therefore, smaller firms with low percentage of asset tangibility and low-dividend payments are expected to be more prone to have zero leverage during the crisis period due to creditors imposition. Thus, financial constraints arguments for zero leverage may acquire more relevance during the crisis period.
Hence, we hypothesize that:
Data and methodology
The accounting, financial and market data about the listed European firms included in our sample were obtained from the DataStream database provided by Thomson Reuters. Data were collected for the period between 1995 and 2016 for 14 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). These countries were selected to ensure the availability of information for listed firms during the period of analysis.
As in previous studies about capital structure, utilities and financial firms were excluded from the sample due to the different regulations that these firms are subject to. Following the recent study by Sardo and Serrasqueiro (2018), we used the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), and so firms with an industry code of 7000-7999 (Utilities) or 8000-8999 (Financials), as well as firms without industry code, were excluded from the sample. Then, we removed from the sample firm-year observations with missing information for total assets, sales or total debt. Finally, we excluded firm-year observations with invalid information or obvious errors for assets, sales and short and long-term debt. To mitigate potential survivorship bias, we allowed firms’ entry and exit from the sample. After applying those cleaning and filtering criteria, the final sample contains 8,676 listed firms corresponding to an unbalanced panel data of 88,348 firm-year observations.
Table 1 provides a definition of the variables considered in the main econometric models and also of the additional variables that were used to test the robustness of our main results. The dependent variable (
Definition of the model variables.
GDP: gross domestic product.
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are considered to have bank-based financial systems, while Denmark, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK have market-based financial systems. b The group of common law countries is composed by Ireland and UK, while Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden are identified as civil law countries. c The longest crisis period is considered only for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. For UK, the crisis period is 2008–2011 and for the remaining countries only the 2008–2009 period is considered as a crisis period. See Laeven and Valencia (2018).
As determinants of
Similarly, in the literature there is no well-defined measure of financial flexibility, this being a non-observable factor that depends greatly on managers’ assessment of future growth opportunities (Ferrando et al., 2017). Nevertheless, previous studies have assessed financial flexibility by resorting mostly to measures related to debt and/or internal liquidity (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014; Ferrando et al., 2017; Gamba & Triantis, 2008; Marchica & Mura, 2010). In this article, we consider three of those measures as proxies for financial flexibility: cash holdings, profitability and growth opportunities. Firms with a higher level of any of these measures are expected to have a greater ability or desire to build up financial flexibility. In addition, as in the previous case, we use dummy variables distinguishing between the most and least financially flexible firms.
To analyze the effect of the financial system, three alternative proxies are used. First, we construct a dummy variable based on an indicator developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) that allows the partition of the sample into countries with a market-based financial system and countries with a bank-based financial system. Second, we use the
For the crisis, we use a dummy variable based on the recent classification developed by Laeven and Valencia (2018) about banking, currency and sovereign debt crises, which recognizes that the 2008 global financial crisis affected European countries in different ways and assigns distinct final years for the crisis in each country.
Finally, the econometric models also include control variables shown in previous studies as having power in explaining capital structure decisions. These control variables are:
We perform both univariate and multivariate analyses to investigate which firms’ characteristics stimulate zero-leverage policies. In the multivariate analysis, as a consequence of the binary nature of the dependent variable, it is required the use of an econometric method appropriate for such response variable, since, for example, standard estimators such as ordinary least squares assume that the dependent variable can take on any real negative or positive value (Wooldridge, 2012). In particular, pooled logit regression models are used to estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the likelihood of a firm having zero leverage. The logit model has the following form:
where x represents the vector containing some of the explanatory variables defined in Table 1 (including also a constant term) and β represents the vector of the variable coefficients. In the robustness section other models will be considered, including probit models, random and fixed effects models and an instrumental variable approach. Propensity score matching will also be considered in a preliminary analysis.
Empirical results
Univariate analysis
Sample
We begin the empirical part of the paper by presenting a brief description of the research sample. Table 2 shows the distribution of observations and firms by country and financial system for both the full sample and the sub-sample of debt-free firms. Between 1995 and 2016 around 10.84% of firm-year observations are classified as having zero leverage, with debt-free firms being significantly present in all countries. The dimension of this result is even more noteworthy if we consider that almost 29% of firms present zero-leverage levels in at least one year. Nevertheless, these values are lower than those reported in most studies developed for the Unites States (Strebulaev & Yang, 2013) and the United Kingdom (Dang, 2013). Comparing with papers including other countries, the values reported here are also lower than those found by Bessler et al. (2013) and Ghoul et al. (2018), where about 18% and 13% of observations correspond to debt-free firms, respectively.
Sample characterisation by country.
Firms that present zero-leverage levels in at least 1 year.
A more detailed analysis reveals great heterogeneity in the distribution of zero-leverage firms between countries, with Sweden (20.36%) and UK (16.61%) presenting the greatest proportions of zero-leverage observations and France, Italy, Portugal and Spain the lowest (between 2% and 3%). Since the first two countries are characterized by market-based financial systems and the last four by bank-based systems, it seems that, as hypothesized, there may be a relationship between the level of development of the financial system and the zero-leverage phenomenon. The same conclusion is achieved when we compare the average percentage of observations of debt-free firms in countries with market and bank-based systems (16.12% and 6.26%, respectively).
Trends of zero leverage
There is consensus in the literature about an increasing trend toward zero leverage over the years (e.g., Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2018). In order to confirm a similar trend in Europe, Figure 1 shows the evolution of zero leverage over the period 1995–2016, both in global terms and by financial system. It is clear an upward trend of zero leverage for the full sample. The proportion of firms with zero leverage was 5.15% in 1995, increased fairly steady until 2006 (12.81%), stagnated during the global financial crisis (12.11%–12.87% between 2008 and 2010), peaked in 2014 (13.92%) and reached 11.94% in 2016, more than doubling during the period of analysis.

Evolution over time of zero-leverage levels in different financial systems and in the whole sample.
Figure 1 also shows marked differences in the distribution and evolution of zero leverage between the two financial systems considered. In countries with a market-based financial system, zero leverage increased considerably over the years, with the proportion of debt-free firms almost tripling between the beginning (6.79%) and the end of the period of analysis (20.40% in 2015 and 17.93% in 2016). However, for countries with a bank-based financial system, the increase of zero leverage was much less noticeable. In fact, considering the evolution from 1996 (5.54%) to 2016 (6.42%), we find that the increase of zero leverage is residual, not even reaching 1 percentage point (pp). It increased slightly until 2004 and then fell until 2008, with the figures remaining similar until 2016.
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the continuous variables defined in Table 1. In particular, Panel A reports several descriptive statistics for the full sample, while Panel B presents the mean values for both zero-leverage and leveraged firms and the results of t-tests for the mean differences across groups.
Descriptive statistics and mean characteristics of zero-leverage versus leveraged firms.
GDP: gross domestic product.
Significance at the 1% level.
Table 3 shows that debt-free firms are smaller and have lower levels of tangible assets than leveraged firms, which is in line with the hypothesis of zero leverage arising from financial constraints (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010). However, on average, debt-free firms pay out more dividends as a percentage of assets than leveraged firms. This result is against the financial constraints approach according to which firms paying more dividends suffer less from information asymmetries and have a better reputation and, hence, are less likely to be financially constrained (Cleary, 2006; Fazzari et al., 1988). The composite measures of financial constraints are also not completely in accordance, since two of them show that on average debt-free firms are more financially constrained while the other (
Propensity score matching analysis
Because the previous analysis mixes zero-leverage firms with different characteristics, we use the propensity score matching approach suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to further examine the effect of firm-specific variables proxying for financial constraints and financial flexibility on zero leverage. Propensity score matching analysis allows us to get a more balanced distribution of the values of the covariates across the groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms, on one hand, and the groups of highly and little financially flexible firms, on the other hand. To implement this method, we first use the procedure described in Table 1 to divide firms into terciles and create the “treatment” variables
Table 4 reports the results obtained. In the first row we present the “treatment effect,” which in this case may be interpreted as the average difference in the predicted probability of being debt-free between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (columns (1)–(3)) and between highly and little financially flexible firms (columns (4)–(6)). In the other rows we present, both for the original and matched sample, descriptive statistics and Rubin (2001) diagnostic criteria for the balance of the distribution of the covariate values for each group of firms. A perfect matching would imply a standardized mean difference of zero across groups and a variance ratio of one. As can be seen, the level of balance between the groups improves substantially in the matched sample in all cases. Nevertheless, the matching is never perfect and Rubin (2001) measures suggest that in some cases the samples are not sufficiently balanced. Therefore, the following conclusions should be seen as preliminary and must be confirmed by the multivariate regression analysis that we undertake in section “Multivariate analysis.”
Propensity score matching estimates.
Robust standard errors, based on the correction by Abadie and Imbens (2016), are reported in parenthesis. Standardized mean differences are the means of the absolute values of the standardized differences of the sample means in the control and treatment sub-samples calculated separately for each independent variable considered in the estimation of the propensity scores. Rubin (2001) B statistic is an indicator of whether those differences are relevant (
B > 25 or R outside [0.5, 2].
Significance at the 1% level.
Overall, the results of Table 4 lead to conclusions similar to those of Table 3. The probability of being debt-free is higher by 12.3pp for small firms and 3.9pp for the firms with the lowest proportion of tangible assets, and lower by 5.6pp for firms with the lowest dividend payouts. Thus, as before, the two first effects conform with the financial constraints theory, while the third is in contradiction. However, firms with the highest cash holdings and growth opportunities have a higher probability of having zero leverage, while the most profitable ones are less likely to be debt-free, the average difference in probability being 13.8pp, 3.2pp, and −2.1pp, respectively. Again, the two first results are in accordance with the financial flexibility theory, while the third is in conflict.
Correlation analysis
Table 5 presents the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the continuous independent variables.
5
The results show that the correlations between the explanatory and control variables are not particularly high, being higher than 0.5 only for the pair (
Pearson correlation matrix and VIF.
VIF: variance inflation factor; GDP: gross domestic product.
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables of the study, and the coefficients associated with the VIF.
Significance at 5%.
Significance at 1%.
Multivariate analysis
Results for the internal determinants of zero leverage
Table 6 presents the results of the models that allow us to test the hypotheses concerning the internal determinants of zero leverage. The eight estimated logit regression models differ only on the set of independent variables considered. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coefficient and the result of a Wald test for its individual significance in brackets. The Wald test uses robust standard errors that are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm to mitigate concerns about within-firm correlation. Given that the value of the regression coefficients is not directly interpretable in nonlinear models, below we also comment on the estimated (average) partial effect for the main independent variables, but these results are not presented in the table to save space. 6
Internal determinants of zero leverage.
The table presents the results of eight logit regression models for the dependent variable
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
We focus on columns (1)–(5) to test hypothesis H1 about the role played by financial constraints on zero leverage and on columns (1) and (6)–(8) to test hypothesis H2 about the role played by financial flexibility. The specification in column (1) is used as our baseline model and incorporates the firm’s specific explanatory variables representing the financial constraints and financial flexibility approaches, the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 1, as well as industry, year and country dummies to mitigate concerns about omitted variables. The model in column (2) adds the composite measures of financial constraints, namely, the SA-index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the WW-index of Whited and Wu (2006) and the KZ-index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Columns (3)–(5) report the results for the models that use the dummy variables
The applied econometric tests and criteria confirm the suitability of the estimated logit regression models. The Wald tests for the individual and joint significance of the explanatory variables confirm their ability to explain
Analyzing first the variables proxying the financial constraints approach, column (1) shows that both
When we add to the model the composite indexes of financial constraints, see column (2), the previous conclusions are reinforced.
8
On one hand, the sign and significance of the
Overall, in spite of the contradictory results found, we conclude that there is some support for hypothesis H1. Indeed, given that the univariate analysis in section “Univariate analysis” had already shown that zero-leverage firms display on average smaller values for the
Concerning the variables representing the financial flexibility approach, that is,
Columns (6)–(8) show that results are quite similar when we use only the extreme terciles of the financial flexibility measures. The positive coefficients of the variables
Results for the external determinants of zero leverage
The results for the models including external determinants of zero leverage are reported in Table 7. Using the first model in Table 6 as baseline, the model in column (1) incorporates the
External determinants of zero leverage.
The table presents the results of four logit regression models for the dependent variable
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
Focusing on column (1), we confirm the importance of the financial system’s development on zero leverage. The
The results on the
Regarding the joint effects of financial system and financial crisis, see column (2), we find that the coefficient of
Columns (3) and (4) show that using alternative proxies for the country’s specificities do not change our main findings. Column (3) shows that more developed stock markets potentiate the zero-leverage phenomenon and column (4) reveals that firms located in common law countries are more likely to have zero leverage. Because common law countries favor the development of market-based financial systems (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1999) and having a more developed stock market is a characteristic of such financial systems, these results confirm that European firms located in countries with market-based financial systems are more likely to have zero leverage.
The models in columns (3) and (4) also confirm that the crisis period increased the propensity for zero leverage in countries with market-based systems. In column (3) that effect depends on the sign and significance of the sum of the coefficient of
Interactions between external and internal zero-leverage determinants
In this section we allow the effect of internal and external determinants of zero leverage to be interrelated. For this purpose, we use as baseline the second model of Table 7, which incorporates all variables relevant for the hypotheses H1 H5 already tested, and add interaction terms between firm’s internal and external determinants of zero leverage. Table 8 displays the results obtained. The model in column (1) includes the interaction variables
Interactions between firm’s internal and external determinants of zero leverage.
The table presents the results of two logit regression models for the dependent variable
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
According to column (1), we find some evidence supporting hypothesis H6, since only the effect of
In contrast, in column (2) we find that none of the coefficients relative to the interaction variables where
Robustness tests
This section considers several departures from the model reported in the second column of Table 7 to evaluate the robustness of our results. 9 First, alternative dependent variables are used. Second, alternative econometric models (probit, random effects, fixed effects) are estimated. Third, models appropriate to deal with potential omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues are considered.
Table 9 presents the results for the models that use alternative dependent variables to
Robustness tests using alternative dependent variables.
This table presents the results of four logit regression models. Using as baseline model the second column of Table 7, each model uses an alternative dependent variable to
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
Table 10 presents results from four alternative econometric methods. columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are estimated using, respectively, Random-effects Logit, Fixed-effects Logit, Pooled Probit, and Random-effects Probit methods.
10
Again, our main findings are robust to the estimation method applied, since the only explanatory variable that lost significance (in two out of the four models) was
Robustness tests using alternative econometric methods.
This table re-estimates the baseline model presented on the second column of Table 7, using alternative econometric methods: column (1) uses Random-effects Logit; column (2) Fixed-effects Logit; column (3) Pooled Probit; and column (4) Random-effects Probit methods. All models include industry dummies as well as the control variables defined in Panel A of Table 1. For each independent variable we report the regression coefficients and the
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
Finally, recognizing that endogeneity is a real problem in corporate empirical finance due to omitted variables and reverse causality, we consider, in Table 11, five further models that try to mitigate the effects of potential endogeneity issues. First, in Panel A we consider models with additional control variables, which have not been considered in our main models because they have been rarely used in zero-leverage studies (
Robustness tests controlling for endogeneity problems.
Using the second column of Table 7 as baseline model, Panel A considers several additional control variables: column (1) adds
Indicates statistical significance at 10%.
Indicates statistical significance at 5%.
Indicates statistical significance at 1%.
In panel B, column (4), similarly to previous empirical studies on debt conservatism that deal with endogeneity concerns, we lag all independent variables by one year (e.g., Bessler et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2018). Alternatively, in column (5) we consider an instrumental variables approach to deal with possible reverse causality between debt and firm size and dividend payments.
11
Indeed, debt-free firms may be foregoing the opportunity to finance their investment opportunities at a lower cost and hence may invest less and present lower size; and firms with debt contracts may face covenants requiring low or no dividend payments and hence zero-leverage firms may be more prone to pay higher dividends. Considering the binary nature of the dependent variable, the model in column (5) is based on the probit model with continuous endogenous covariates proposed by Newey (1987). It assumes
Again, the only explanatory variable that loses significance, and only in one case, is
Conclusion
This article analyses the zero-leverage phenomenon in Europe, a continent greatly dominated by bank-based financial systems. During the 1995–2016 period, 10.84% of the observations in our sample of listed firms corresponded to debt-free firms. This figure is slightly lower than that reported in most previous studies, but it hides a great heterogeneity among countries. Indeed, we find that the financial system has a great relevance for the distribution of debt-free firms: while, on average, around 16% of the observations recorded in market-based financial systems correspond to debt-free firms, the corresponding figure recorded in bank-based financial systems is only about 6%. Moreover, while in market-based financial systems zero leverage presents a clear upward trend, in bank-based financial systems the percentage of debt-free firms increased less than 1pp between 1996 and 2016.
The importance of the financial system for the explanation of the zero-leverage phenomenon is reinforced by the results of our econometric analysis. After controlling for many other factors, we find that firms located in countries with market-based systems have a significant higher probability of being debt-free. We also find that the recent European financial and sovereign crises promoted firm’s zero leverage by significantly increasing the probability of a firm being debt-free, both in terms of short- and long-term debt, but this effect seems to have been limited to countries with a market-based system. Finally, we found some support that the financial flexibility hypothesis, which argues that firms may be debt-free by their own choice, seems to be a more relevant explanation for zero leverage in market-based systems, probably due to the wider range of funding options that are available in countries with that system.
An active research topic in the zero-leverage literature is whether it results mainly from frictions and impositions created by the financial market or from firms’ own financing decisions. We found that debt-free firms in Europe tend to be smaller and less profitable and to have fewer tangible assets. However, they display higher levels of cash holdings and growth opportunities and pay more dividends than leveraged firms. This shows that neither the financial flexibility nor the financial constraints approaches can explain entirely the zero-leverage phenomenon, with both of them being useful to explain the zero-leverage policies of particular groups of firms. We also found that the financial constraints approach did not gain importance during the crisis period.
In addition to contributing to the scientific literature on zero leverage, our article also has some interesting implications for practitioners, managers and government entities. For example, given that for some firms zero leverage is an imposition of the financial market, it would be important for firms located in countries with market-based systems to develop closer ties with banks and/or to focus on the creation of a financial slack that could prepare them better for periods of uncertainty. Both measures would result in a greater willingness of creditors to make credit available, in better conditions, to those firms, allowing them to keep their investment plans through periods of deteriorated credit conditions. Interesting topics for future research are,
