Abstract
Notwithstanding an existential crisis, which has wracked its operations following the announcement of the death of its supreme leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban-led insurgency remains a potent force drawing their sustenance from a wide range of sources both within Afghanistan as well as outside. Not only has it been able to withstand the military prowess of a vast coalition of international forces for a decade and half but also it has grown in strength by coalescing with large number of anti-government elements and criminal networks in the Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af-Pak) region. The advent of the Islamic State (IS) has added an interesting competitive dimension for area domination between these groups resulting in a surge in violence levels. As the attempts to co-opt elements within the Taliban insurgency through peace deals and negotiations intensifies, the anti-talk constituency within the insurgency has demonstrated its capacity to scuttle such peace processes. Regional power politics, local political opportunism and criminal aspirations of individual groups will continue to inject life into the insurgency.
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