Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Researchers have explored the relationship between religiosity and people’s gendered perspectives within the private sphere. However, there is limited research on how religiosity relates to people’s gendered perspectives in the public sphere. The authors examine the association between religiosity and the view that men make better leaders than women in two public spheres, politics and business, and explore variations by national context. Drawing on data collected in 44 national contexts, the analysis reveals that individuals with higher religious attendance are more inclined to support men’s leadership over women’s leadership in both political and business domains. Notably, this relationship is nuanced by a country’s level of economic development. Greater religiosity is associated with greater support for men’s leadership in more economically developed countries, whereas the reverse occurs in countries with lower economic development. The findings urge a more critical examination of religion’s role in shaping global perspectives on gender equity.

Keywords

gender religion cross-national comparison

In 2021, Forbes published an opinion titled “Could Religion Be Fueling the Gender Pay Gap?” (Webster 2021). Two years later, Le Monde, a French newspaper, published a similar opinion questioning whether religions “legitimize inequality between men and women” (Larousse 2023). These publications, among others, reflect a broader public discourse linking religion to the perpetuation of gender inequalities, a discourse substantiated by some social scientific studies on gender and religion (Woodhead 2007).

Religion has been identified as a source of traditionalist gender ideologies for the faithful (Woodhead 2007). Some religious gender norms discourage women from assuming leadership roles, associating traits such as independence, control, and authority with masculinity (Chan 2015; Ferguson 2018). Illustratively, discrimination against Christian women leaders in certain evangelical congregations because of marital status is also documented (Perry 2013), and within Catholic parishes, views on the ordination of women vary on the basis of different available cultural schemas (Harvey 2018).

Still, the scholarly understanding of the intersection between gender and religion is acknowledged to be far more nuanced than what is often portrayed in public discourses (Schnabel et al. 2022). Existing research emphasizes that the acceptance of traditionalist gender ideologies by the faithful is contingent on various factors. These include how individuals interpret their religious gender ideologies (Avishai 2008; Davidman 1991) and how they compare these ideologies with those articulated by the broader society (Di 2020b). Additionally, the faithful may actively respond to religious gender norms through compliance, negotiation, or resistance (Prickett 2015; Rao 2015). This nuanced perspective highlights the complexity of the relationship between gender and religion, showcasing the diverse ways in which individuals engage with and navigate their religious beliefs in the context of gender ideologies (Schnabel et al. 2022).

Even after considerable research on gender and religion, two limitations persist. First, when examining the intersection between religion and gender ideologies, scholars have tended to focus on people’s perceptions of men and women in the family (Irby 2014; Rao 2015) or in a faith community (Chan 2015; Ferguson 2018). What we do not know is how religion relates to other facets of people’s gender ideologies. Davis and Greenstein (2009), for example, suggested that gender ideology is a composite social construct that includes people’s attitudes toward the positions of men and women both within the household and in public spheres. Thus, we ask, Is religion related to people’s privileging of men in leadership positions in the public sphere, and if so, how?

The second limitation in current research concerns the geographical focus of existing research on gender and religion where there is a predominant emphasis on Christian religions in Western societies (Schnabel et al. 2022). In alignment with an emerging body of studies (Di 2020a; Schnabel 2016; Seguino 2011), we aim to address this gap by investigating how the intersection of religion and gender is influenced by the national contexts in which individuals live and practice their faith. Through this cross-national comparative research, we seek to determine the applicability of current knowledge about gender and religion across different national contexts, thereby contextualizing our understanding of gender and religion on a global scale.

Acknowledging these limitations, we formulate two research questions: (1) How is religious attendance associated with perceptions of men’s and women’s leadership in the public sphere? and (2) How does the relationship between religious attendance and these perceptions vary on the basis of national context? Leveraging data from the World Values Survey (WVS; wave 7), we gauge people’s perspectives on the positions of men and women in the public sphere by assessing whether they believe men make better political and business leaders than women. The results reveal that, at an individual level, religiosity is associated with a greater likelihood of viewing men as better leaders than women in politics and business. However, this relationship is contingent on the country’s economic development. Specifically, the positive association between religiosity and perception of men’s leadership is more pronounced in economically developed societies, whereas in economically developing societies, this relationship weakens and may even reverse.

The findings from this research contribute to scholarly insights on gender and religion by examining the role of religion and national context in shaping gender stratification on a global scale. The findings of this study offer insights into the implications of economic development on the interplay between gender and religion, the conceptualization and measurement of gender ideologies in the social scientific study of gender and religion, and the importance of diversifying social scientific research on religion (Ecklund 2020).

Gender and Religion

Gender ideology can be defined as “an individual’s level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres” (Davis and Greenstein 2009:89). Many studies find that religious people tend to support a traditionalist gender ideology that associates men with paid work and women with homemaking and caretaking (Burn and Busso 2005; Perales and Bouma 2019; Whitehead and Perry 2019).

Specifically, some religious traditions endorse an authoritative religious gender discourse that highlights the contrasting and complementary positions of women and men in the family (Heath 2019). For example, studies show that religious discourse often supports the belief that men are the family’s protectors, breadwinners, and leaders, and women are caretakers and homemakers (Irby 2014; Rao 2015; Whitehead and Perry 2019). Religious gender norms that emphasize these contrasting and complementary positions emerge not only in the so-called gender-conservative faith communities (Burke 2012) but also in faith communities that do not necessarily situate gender at the core of their religious teachings, such as in Buddhism and Confucianism (Di 2020b; Jeon 2023).

Another branch of research has examined women’s positions within faith communities. These studies reveal that religious schisms often occur because of debates over women’s access to leadership positions within nondenominational congregations (Chan 2015) and large institutions such as the Church of England (Bagilhole 2003). This research suggests that religious gender norms shape not only opinions about the position of women in the family but also their participation in religious institutions in which leadership roles are assigned according to gender. Although in some cases, women may participate as leaders under the authority of men, they still experience discrimination over “masculine” leadership styles (Ferguson 2018; Harvey 2018) and may be assigned as leaders in “feminine” domains, such as children’s ministries (Robert 2004).

Religious norms that purport contrasting and complementary positions of men and women reinforce gender inequalities (Woodhead 2007). This may occur in the household through the description of men as breadwinners and women as caretakers, thus reinforcing their unequal power dynamics, in which men lead and women follow (Woodhead 2007). These norms also reinforce gender inequality in religious organizations in which women are denied leadership positions because they are women, a norm accepted by some evangelical Christians (Chan 2015) and in some Catholic congregations (Ecklund 2006; Harvey 2018). Views of gender therefore powerfully shape and inform gender within religious congregations and the family, but this view may also shape opinions about the extent to which women can be leaders outside religious institutions, such as in politics and business. We endeavor to examine how religion may shape views of gender outside the home and religious organizations.

Measurements of religiosity vary (Hackett 2014). Because faith communities are important spaces that translate religious gender norms to individuals (Chan 2015; Rao 2015), we focus on religious attendance, as those who frequently attend religious services are more likely to be exposed to religious gender discourse and practice. On the basis of extensive studies of religion and gender (Schnabel et al. 2022), we expect that there is a positive relationship between religious attendance and gender traditionalism. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: Those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women.

Hypothesis 1b: Those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to believe that men make better business executives than women.

Gender and Religion in International Contexts

In the international context, a growing body of scholarship (Di 2020a; Jeon 2023; Kurzman et al. 2019; Rinaldo 2014; Seguino 2011) emphasizes that the interplay between religion and gender ideologies is intricately linked to the national context in which individuals practice their faith. National context plays a pivotal role in shaping gender ideologies by imparting cultural beliefs about gender (e.g., Di 2020a) and influencing economic conditions that contribute to the formation and reinforcement of specific gender ideologies (e.g., Charles and Bradley 2009; Seguino 2011).

Diverse national contexts contribute various cultural beliefs about gender, with individuals in less gender-egalitarian societies more likely to uphold traditionalist beliefs about gender (Fuwa 2004). In this study, we use the gender inequality index (GII)—a composite statistic encompassing women’s educational attainment, economic power, health, and other factors (United Nations Development Programme 2022)—to gauge a country’s gender-egalitarian status. Consequently, we hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 2a: Individuals in countries with higher national-level GIIs are more likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women.

Hypothesis 2b: Individuals in countries with higher national-level GIIs are more likely to believe that men make better business executives than women.

National-level gender norms not only influence individual gender ideologies but also contextualize the relationship between gender ideologies and the person’s religiosity (Di 2020a; Norris and Inglehart 2011). The conditioning of this relationship on national-level gender inequalities is complex. On one hand, research suggests that social institutions, including religious institutions, often reinforce prevailing cultural beliefs in their respective national context (Major and Schmader 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2011). This research suggests that the positive relationship between religiosity and support for men’s leadership in business and politics among the faithful is more pronounced in national contexts with greater gender inequality (Norris and Inglehart 2011).

On the other hand, however, qualitative analyses of the intersection between gender and religion in faith communities indicate that many faith communities articulate gender norms that are different from broader societal norms (Avishai 2008; Rao 2015). The differences between religious and secular gender norms empower faith communities to offer practitioners cultural resources that distinguish the “sacred us” from the “secular other” (Avishai 2008; Rao 2015). From this theoretical framework, we would anticipate that the positive relationship between religiosity and the view that men make better leaders than women in business and politics becomes more pronounced in societies in which gender equality is more prevalent.

As these studies suggest different ways national context can shape religion and gender ideologies, we follow hypotheses raised in other similar cross-national quantitative research (Fuwa 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Thus, we hypothesize as follows:

Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between religious attendance and the belief that men make better political leaders is stronger in countries where national-level gender inequality is higher.

Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between religious attendance and the belief that men make better business executives is stronger in countries where national-level gender inequality is higher.

In addition to cultural influences, the national context may also influence people’s gender ideologies through economic development (Charles and Bradley 2009; Fuwa 2004). Researchers have long pointed out how economic development, typically measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, is related to the level of religiosity broadly and the intersection between gender and religion specifically in different societies (e.g., Cha and Thébaud 2009; Eastin and Prakash 2013; Kasselstrand, Zuckerman, and Cragun 2023; Seguino 2011). Although the positive impact of economic development on gender equality is not linear, economic development enables women to have access to labor participation and subsequently gain greater political power and social recognition (Eastin and Prakash 2013). The positive role that economic development plays in the promotion of gender equality and gender equity is also manifested in how individual gender ideologies may change as the economy develops (Cha and Thébaud 2009; Fuwa 2004). In a cross-national comparative study, Fuwa (2004) found that people living in economically developed societies are more likely to have egalitarian gender ideologies, a pattern that also emerged in research by Eastin and Prakash (2013). Hence, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a: Those who live in more economically developed countries are less likely to believe that men make better political leaders than women.

Hypothesis 4b: Those who live in more economically developed countries are less likely to believe that men make better business executives than women.

Norris and Inglehart (2011) proposed that the interplay between religion and gender is influenced by the economic development levels in various national contexts. Specifically, in more economically developed societies, the association between religion and traditionalist gender ideologies tends to be weaker, as these societies often exhibit higher levels of secularism (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Conversely, in less economically developed societies, the relationship between religion and traditionalist gender ideologies may be stronger, given that religion holds a more influential and authoritative role as a social institution in these contexts (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Building upon and echoing Norris and Inglehart’s theorization, we formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5a: The positive relationship between religious attendance and the belief that men make better political leaders than women is weaker in more economically developed countries.

Hypothesis 5b: The positive relationship between religious attendance and the belief that men make better business executives than women is weaker in more economically developed countries.

Data and Methods

To assess our hypotheses regarding religious attendance and national contexts, we use data from the WVS wave 7. The seventh wave was fielded to more than 50 countries from 2017 to 2020 and garnered more than 70,000 survey respondents. The WVS has been fielded in numerous countries since 1981 and continues to expand to include more countries and regions. Because countries do not need to field all the questions and because of unavailable data for some of our country-level measures, we retained 44 countries in our study and more than 62,000 respondents.¹ Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our study.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics.

	Percentage	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	SD	n
Individual-level variables
Men better political leaders	41.15	—	—	—	—	65,139
Men better business executives	35.61	—	—	—	—	65,505
Religious attendance	—	3.916	1	7	2.156	66,864
Woman	52.31	—	—	—	—	66,864
Married	65.55	—	—	—	—	66,576
Children	72.13	—	—	—	—	66,098
Bachelor’s degree or higher	23.23	—	—	—	—	66,357
Employed	77.49	—	—	—	—	66,114
Age (years)						66,114
<19	4.14	—	—	—	—
20–29	21.10	—	—	—	—
30–39	21.44	—	—	—	—
40–49	18.68	—	—	—	—
50–59	16.15	—	—	—	—
60–69	11.96	—	—	—	—
70–79	5.01	—	—	—	—
≥80	1.51	—	—	—	—
Religious affiliation						65,930
No religion	21.89	—	—	—	—
Roman Catholic	19.64	—	—	—	—
Protestant	6.66	—	—	—	—
Orthodox	9.76	—	—	—	—
Other Christian	3.95	—	—	—	—
Muslim	28.79	—	—	—	—
Buddhist	6.66	—	—	—	—
Other religions	2.65	—	—	—	—
Country-level variables (n = 44)
Mean country attendance	—	3.916	1.457	6.249	1.084	66,864
Log GDP per capita	—	9.746	7.705	11.486	0.883	66,864
Gender inequality index	—	0.304	0.058	0.547	0.153	66,864
Dominant religion^a						66,864
No religion	7.86	—	—	—	—
Roman Catholicism	32.88	—	—	—	—
Protestantism	8.35	—	—	—	—
Orthodox Christianity	12.85	—	—	—	—
Islam	29.05	—	—	—	—
Buddhism	6.99	—	—	—	—
Other	2.01	—	—	—	—

Source: World Values Survey (wave 7).

Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.

Dependent Variables

Our central research question explores how religiosity is related to people’s perceptions of men’s and women’s leadership in the public sphere. In that realm, the WVS asked two questions to understand respondents’ perceptions of women’s and men’s roles in politics and business. Specifically, the dependent variables for our study come from the following questions: “For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?”

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.

On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.

We are interested in understanding the factors that shape who are more likely to agree with the above statement instead of what are the factors contributing to the nuanced differences between strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree. We therefore coded the dependent variable as a binary variable combining those who disagreed and strongly disagreed with one another (disagree = 0) and combining those with agreement statements with one another (agree = 1).

Individual-Level Independent Variables

Our primary first-level variable of interest is religious attendance. We focus on religious attendance because previous studies show that religious people’s formation of gender ideologies occur within faith communities and that people are exposed to religious gender norms and construct their gender ideologies in faith communities (Rao 2015). We expect that greater religious attendance may reflect more exposure to religiously institutionalized narratives about gender and women’s leadership (Ecklund 2003). Therefore, we perceive religious attendance as a more theoretically robust variable than prayer and belief in God, which do not necessarily translate into exposure to religious gender discourse in the same way religious attendance may. On the WVS, respondents were asked, “Apart from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” Respondents could select one of seven categories, which ranged from “Never, practically never” to “More than once a week.” For the purposes of our analyses, we treat this variable as a continuous variable.

Because religious affiliation is related to both religiosity and people’s gender ideologies (Höllinger and Makula 2021; Schnabel et al. 2022), we included religious affiliation as a control variable. We measure religious affiliation as those with “no affiliation,” “Catholic,” “Protestant,” “other Christian,” “Orthodox Christian,” “Muslim,” “Buddhist,” and “other religion.” Those who have no religious affiliation act as the reference group.

We also control for various demographic factors that may shape people’s views of women and men in different leadership positions. Specifically, we control for gender, which we measure as a binary of men and women, with men acting as the reference group. We also control for marital status given that marriage and families are highly gendered social institutions that may shape people’s gender ideologies (Fan and Marini 2000). We combined those who report being married and living together as married and compare them with those who report being divorced, separated, widowed, or single. Relatedly, we also control for whether a person has children with those who do not have children acting as the reference group.

Education and employment are also influential to people’s gender ideologies because people who are more educated and employed tend to have more egalitarian gender ideologies (Chatillon, Charles, and Bradley 2018; Ciabattari 2001). In our modeling, we control for employment status as a binary variable such that the unemployed are the reference group. We also created a binary variable to measure education, comparing those with a bachelor’s degree and higher with those who have not obtained a bachelor’s degree. Finally, cohort effect may also compound the relationship between religiosity and gender ideologies (Davis and Greenstein 2009). We controlled for age, measuring this in 10 categories, ranging from those who were 10 to 19 years, 20 to 29 years, and so on to those who identified as 80 years or older.

Country-Level Independent Variables

A central component of our research questions explores whether and how the relationship between religious attendance and the views of men’s and women’s leadership is conditioned by gender inequalities and economic development in distinctive national contexts. To answer this research question, we include national-level measurements in our models. To measure gender inequality, we use the 2018 GII produced by the United Nations Development Programme. This composite measure is based on measures of reproductive health, empowerment in education and government, and women’s labor market participation (United Nations Development Programme 2022). This index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing no inequality and 1 representing complete gender inequality.

We measure the economic development of a country through the GDP per capita. GDP per capita was recorded on the basis of 2019 World Bank figures. Because of the skewed nature of GDP, we created a natural log of this measure. As we are particularly interested in understanding whether the relationship between religiosity and gender ideologies is conditioned upon economic development in different societies, we chose GDP per capita over other more composite measurements, such as the Human Development Index (HDI).²

In addition, we control for other country-level factors that may shape the association between religion and perspectives of women’s leadership in business and politics. Primarily, we controlled for each country’s dominant religion drawing on information from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook. Country’s religion was measured as “none,” “Protestant,” “Catholic,” “Orthodox Christian,” “Islamic,” “Buddhist,” and “other religion.” Countries whose dominant religions are “none” act as the reference group. We also controlled for country’s religiosity by creating a mean score of religious attendance for each country.

Analytical Strategy

The present study is guided by two primary research questions: (1) How is religiosity associated with the belief that men make better political and business leaders than women? and (2) How does the relationship between religiosity and the view that men make better political and business leaders than women vary across national contexts? Given that our dependent variable is binary and we are interested in cross-national variations, we used multilevel binary logistic regression for the analysis.

We fit four models to each of our dependent variables. In each case, the first model incorporates all individual-level independent variables while accounting for the clustering effect of individuals embedded in different countries. This model allows us to address the first research question by discerning the individual-level association between religious attendance and people’s perspectives on men’s and women’s roles in politics and business.

The individual-level model is as follows, where subscript i refers to individual-level factors and subscript j refers to national-level factors. Logit[π(x_ij)] represents the logit link for the probability of success for the ith respondent in the jth national context (Liu 2015):

$\begin{matrix} logit [π (x_{i j})] = β_{0 j} + β_{1} {(religious attendance)}_{i j} \\ + β_{2} {(women)}_{i j} + β_{3} {(marital status)}_{i j} \\ + β_{4} {(have children)}_{i j} \\ + β_{5} {(educational attainment)}_{i j} \\ + β_{6} {(employment status)}_{i j} + β_{7 - 14} {(age)}_{i j} \\ + β_{15 - 21} {(religious affiliation)}_{i j} . \end{matrix}$

In the second model, we included all national-level factors with random slopes for religious attendance. This second model allows us to understand whether national-level factors have stand-alone relationships with people’s views on women’s leadership in the public sphere. We use random-slope models because these allow us to examine whether the effect of religious attendance varies by country. The equation for the country-level model is illustrated as follows:

$β_{0 j} = γ_{00} + γ_{01} {(GII)}_{j} + γ_{02} {(GDP)}_{j} + γ_{03 - 08} {(country - level dominant religion)}_{j} + u_{0 j} .$

Here, γ_01–08 refers to the coefficients for country-level variables. In addition, u_0j refers to the variations in people’s attitudes to women taking up leadership positions that are not explained by the model.³

The third and fourth models involve cross-level interactions between national-level factors and our primary individual-level variables. These models are designed to address our second research question about whether and how the relationship between religiosity and views of men’s and women’s leadership is influenced by different national contexts. Our theoretical framework suggests that national-level gender inequality and economic development are key factors that may condition this relationship. To explore this, we incorporated cross-level interactions between religiosity and measures of national-level gender inequality (GII) and national-level economic development (GDP per capita), respectively. The equation for the third model is as follows:

$β_{1 j} = γ_{10} + γ_{11} (GII) + u_{i j} .$

Because we used a random-slope model, the slope for religious attendance is specified to be random with level 2 residual u_ij. Finally, the equation of the fourth model, which involves the cross-level interaction between religious attendance and GDP per capita, is as follows:

$β_{1 j} = γ_{10} + γ_{12} (GDP per capita) + u_{i j} .$

We present these four models for each of our outcome variables.

Findings

Tables 2 and 3 show our results for views of women and men as political leaders and as business leaders respectively. As reflected in model 1 in Tables 2 and 3, some demographic characteristics are related to people’s perceptions of men’s and women’s leadership. For instance, women, people with a bachelor’s degree or higher, and individuals who are employed are less likely to support the statements that men make better political and business leaders than women. In addition, compared with their counterparts who are not religious, Muslims and Buddhists have higher odds of supporting the statement that men make better political and business leaders.

Table 2.

Multilevel Logistic Regression for Viewing Men as Better Political Leaders than Women.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4
Level 1
Women	−.56***	(.052)	−.56***	(.052)	−.56***	(.052)	−.56***	(.052)
Single/separate/divorced	−.065⁺	(.036)	−.064⁺	(.036)	−.064⁺	(.036)	−.064⁺	(.037)
Have children	.028	(.044)	.029	(.044)	.028	(.044)	.028	(.044)
Bachelor’s degree or higher	−.29***	(.037)	−.29***	(.037)	−.29***	(.037)	−.29***	(.037)
Employed	−.13***	(.032)	−.12***	(.032)	−.12***	(.032)	−.12***	(.032)
Age (reference: 10–19 years)
20s	.0092	(.058)	.0094	(.058)	.0099	(.058)	.010	(.058)
30s	.052	(.072)	.053	(.072)	.053	(.072)	.054	(.072)
40s	.044	(.092)	.044	(.092)	.046	(.091)	.046	(.092)
50s	.12	(.097)	.12	(.097)	.12	(.097)	.12	(.097)
60s	.13	(.11)	.13	(.11)	.13	(.11)	.13	(.11)
70s	.30*	(.14)	.30*	(.14)	.30*	(.14)	.30*	(.14)
80s and older	.46**	(.16)	.46**	(.16)	.46**	(.16)	.46**	(.16)
Religious affiliation (reference: none)
Catholic	.027	(.046)	.024	(.047)	.019	(.047)	.015	(.047)
Protestant	.0093	(.076)	−.00064	(.077)	−.0073	(.078)	−.014	(.076)
Other Christian	−.023	(.11)	−.036	(.11)	−.041	(.11)	−.043	(.11)
Orthodox	.020	(.11)	.0014	(.11)	−.0051	(.11)	−.011	(.11)
Muslim	.76***	(.14)	.74***	(.14)	.73***	(.14)	.73***	(.14)
Buddhism	.14*	(.058)	.13*	(.058)	.13*	(.058)	.13*	(.057)
Other	.048	(.092)	.036	(.091)	.030	(.091)	.024	(.090)
Religious attendance	.056***	(.013)	.056***	(.013)	.098**	(.037)	−.36**	(.11)
Level 2
Dominant religion (reference: none)
Buddhism			.63	(.95)	.62	(.95)	.61	(.94)
Islam			.44	(.92)	.43	(.92)	.41	(.91)
Orthodox Christianity			.26	(.94)	.25	(.94)	.24	(.93)
Other			.17	(.90)	.14	(.89)	.12	(.89)
Protestantism			−.83	(.91)	−.83	(.92)	−.82	(.91)
Roman Catholicism			−.77	(.93)	−.78	(.93)	−.79	(.92)
Mean country attendance			−.21	(.16)	−.20	(.16)	−.19	(.16)
GII			.76	(1.35)	.88	(1.38)	.77	(1.35)
Log GDP			−.55**	(.20)	−.55**	(.20)	−.59**	(.20)
Religious attendance × GII					−.13	(.091)
Religious attendance × GDP							.043***	(.012)
Variance attendance	.0042**	(.0014)	.0043**	(.0014)	.0040**	(.0013)	.0031**	(.0010)
Variance constant	.87***	(.17)	.30**	(.11)	.30**	(.11)	.30**	(.10)
Constant	−.51**	(.18)	5.50**	(1.99)	5.46**	(2.01)	5.83**	(1.97)
Observations	62,495		62,495		62,495		62,495

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. GDP = gross domestic product; GII = gender inequality index.

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.***p < .001.

Table 3.

Multilevel Logistic Regression for Viewing Men as Better Business Executives Than Women.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4
Level 1
Women	−.67***	(.060)	−.67***	(.060)	−.67***	(.060)	−.67***	(.060)
Single/separate/divorced	−.055	(.035)	−.055	(.035)	−.055	(.035)	−.054	(.035)
Have children	.077	(.048)	.078	(.048)	.077	(.048)	.077	(.048)
Bachelor’s degree or higher	−.31***	(.053)	−.31***	(.053)	−.31***	(.053)	−.31***	(.053)
Employed	−.19***	(.041)	−.19***	(.041)	−.19***	(.041)	−.19***	(.041)
Age (reference: 10–19 years)
20s	.028	(.066)	.028	(.066)	.029	(.066)	.029	(.066)
30s	.025	(.076)	.025	(.075)	.026	(.075)	.026	(.075)
40s	.055	(.090)	.055	(.090)	.056	(.089)	.057	(.090)
50s	.14	(.095)	.14	(.095)	.14	(.094)	.14	(.095)
60s	.17	(.11)	.17	(.11)	.18	(.11)	.17	(.11)
70s	.41**	(.14)	.41**	(.14)	.41**	(.14)	.40**	(.14)
80s and older	.62***	(.16)	.62***	(.16)	.62***	(.16)	.62***	(.16)
Religious affiliation (reference: none)
Catholic	.047	(.043)	.042	(.043)	.037	(.043)	.033	(.043)
Protestant	.083	(.10)	.071	(.10)	.064	(.10)	.057	(.10)
Other Christian	−.066	(.096)	−.082	(.097)	−.087	(.097)	−.089	(.098)
Orthodox	−.041	(.12)	−.064	(.12)	−.071	(.12)	−.076	(.12)
Muslim	.63***	(.11)	.60***	(.11)	.60***	(.11)	.59***	(.11)
Buddhism	.21*	(.092)	.20*	(.093)	.19*	(.093)	.19*	(.094)
Other	.059	(.10)	.046	(.10)	.040	(.10)	.035	(.100)
Religious attendance	.047***	(.014)	.046***	(.014)	.097*	(.040)	−.41**	(.13)
Level 2
Dominant religion (reference: none)
Buddhism			.61	(.88)	.61	(.88)	.60	(.87)
Islam			.45	(.84)	.44	(.84)	.42	(.83)
Orthodox Christianity			.38	(.86)	.37	(.86)	.37	(.86)
Other			.13	(.83)	.097	(.83)	.066	(.82)
Protestantism			−.89	(.83)	−.90	(.83)	−.90	(.82)
Roman Catholicism			−.76	(.83)	−.77	(.83)	−.78	(.82)
Mean country attendance			−.16	(.15)	−.16	(.15)	−.15	(.15)
GII			.80	(1.33)	.94	(1.36)	.85	(1.33)
Log GDP			−.53**	(.19)	−.53**	(.19)	−.57**	(.18)
Religious attendance × GII					−.16	(.10)
Religious attendance × GDP							.047***	(.014)
Variance attendance	.0048**	(.0016)	.0049**	(.0017)	.0044**	(.0014)	.0033**	(.0011)
Variance constant	.85***	(.15)	.27**	(.086)	.27**	(.087)	.26**	(.085)
Constant	−.65***	(.18)	4.95**	(1.85)	4.89**	(1.85)	5.26**	(1.83)
Observations	62,827		62,827		62,827		62,827

Note: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. GDP = gross domestic product; GII = gender inequality index.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

More important, we hypothesized that (hypothesis 1a) people who attend religious services regularly are more likely to believe men make better political leaders than women, and (hypothesis 1b) people who attend religious services regularly are more likely to believe men make better business executives than women. We find support for this in models 1 and 2. Model 1 for both outcomes shows that when we examine the individual or first-level factors alone, greater religious attendance is associated with a higher likelihood of agreeing with the statement that men make better political leaders and business executives than woman. How religious attendance shapes the likelihood of agreeing with these statements also varies by country. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the variation around religious attendance by country for each outcome variable.

Figure 1.

Random effects of religiosity by country for men as better political leaders than women.

Figure 2.

Random effects of religiosity by country for men as better business leaders than women.

In model 2, we include second-level or country-level controls. Even after we add these controls, we see that these positive associations between religious attendance and the view that men make better political and business leaders than women remain. Therefore, we find support for our hypotheses reported in hypotheses 1a and 1b. At the same time, it should be noted that the relationships between religious attendance and our two outcome variables varies significantly by country. This means that although the overall relationship between religious attendance and our outcomes is positive, the relationship between attendance and the outcomes is different for each country.

We also found no significant relationship between dominant religions in different countries and the outcomes in our analysis. This means after controlling individual-level and country-level factors, dominant religions in different countries do not have stand-alone relationships with the likelihood that individuals perceive men as better political leaders or business executives than women.

Our major independent variables on the national level are national-level gender inequality, as measured by GII, and national-level economic development, as measured by GDP per capita. Regarding the stand-alone relationship between GII and people’s support of men’s leadership, we hypothesized that people who live in the countries with higher national-level gender inequality would be more likely to believe men make better political leaders (hypothesis 2a) and business executives (hypothesis 2b) than women do. We do not find support for this. The association between the GII and our outcomes is not significant in model 2 for both of our outcomes.

To understand whether this relationship between religiosity and people’s view of men as better leaders than women varies according to national-level gender inequalities, we included a cross-level interaction between religious attendance and GII. We expected that the relationship between people’s view of men as better political leaders (hypothesis 3a) and business leaders (hypothesis 3b) than women would be stronger in the countries where gender inequality is salient on the national level. Model 3 for our outcomes shows the cross-level interaction between individual-level religious attendance and the country’s GII. The cross-level interaction between religious attendance and GII is not significant.⁴ Therefore, we do not find support for these hypotheses.

Concerning the relationship between GDP per capital and our two outcome variables, we hypothesized that (hypothesis 4a) people who live in economically developed societies are less likely to believe men make better political leaders and (hypothesis 4b) business executives than women. We find support for this in Model 2. In both outcomes, greater GDP is associated with decreases in agreeing with men’s superiority in political and business leadership. In other words, people in countries with higher GDP (those that are more economically developed) are less likely to think men are better leaders than women in business and politics.

We also examine whether the relationship between religiosity and people’s view of men’s and women’s leadership in politics and business is contextualized by the economic development in different countries. Specifically, we hypothesized that the positive relationship between religiosity and people’s view of men as (hypothesis 5a) better politicians and (hypothesis 5b) business executives is weaker in economically developed societies. We test this by creating an interaction between log GDP and religious attendance in model 4 in Tables 2 and 3. Model 4 for both of our outcomes shows that the results are significant but that there are positive cross-level interactions between GDP per capita and religious attendance. To gain a more concrete and precise understanding of how the relationship between religious attendance and the perception of men as better political leaders and business executives vary on the basis of GDP, we generated predicted probability figures.

Figures 3 and 4 show the predicted probabilities for holding men as better political and business leaders than women at the lowest GDP (Ethiopia) and the highest GDP (Singapore) in our sample. The overall predicted probability of viewing men as better leaders than women is higher in Ethiopia, and the predicted probability is lower in Singapore. However, individuals who attend religious services more frequently in more economically developed countries are more likely to agree with the statement that men make better political leaders and business executives than women. Meanwhile, the positive relationship between religious attendance and our two outcome variables can be reversed for those living in less economically developed countries. In other words, in less economically developed countries, as individuals attend religious services more frequently, they are less likely to agree with the view that men make better political leaders and business executives than women. This is in contrast with our hypotheses that the relationship between religious attendance and people’s support for men’s leadership in business and politics will weaken in economically developed countries.⁵

Figure 3.

Predicted probability for men as better political leaders than women.

Figure 4.

Predicted probability for men as better business leaders than women.

Discussions and Conclusions

Religion, as an important social institution, holds considerable sway over people’s gender ideologies, particularly among the faithful (Woodhead 2007). Previous studies indicated a general trend: religious individuals are more likely to espouse traditionalist gender ideologies (Jeon 2023; Perry and Whitehead 2016), which scholars attribute to the articulation of certain traditionalist gender norms by religious institutions (Chan 2015; Rao 2015; Sumerau and Cragun 2015) and the active compliance of religious practitioners with these norms (Rao 2015).

Past research often measured gender norms by analyzing attitudes toward men’s and women’s positions in families (Edgell 2006; Rao 2015) or within faith communities (Chan 2015; Harvey 2018). We expect that the impact of religion on a person’s gender ideology extends beyond their perceptions of men’s and women’s positions within households or faith communities. However, there is limited information about how religiosity is associated with individual attitudes toward men’s and women’s positions in public spheres. In the present study we seek to address this gap by investigating the relationship between religious service attendance and perceptions of men’s and women’s leadership in two public spheres: politics and business. Moreover, we explore how this relationship varies across different national contexts.

The analysis of survey data from participants in 44 countries reveals notable findings. At the individual level, religious attendance demonstrates a positive and significant association with the view that men make better leaders than women in both politics and business. In simple terms, individuals who attend religious services more often are also more likely to believe that men make better leaders than women. However, the role that national context plays is evident. Specifically, individuals in economically developed societies are less likely to hold the belief that men are better political or business leaders. Interestingly, national-level gender inequality does not show a stand-alone relationship with the outcome variables.

Further exploration of the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward men’s and women’s leadership in politics and business reveals patterns that deviate from initial hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, there is no evidence indicating that the relationships between religiosity and the view of men as better leaders than women are conditioned by national-level gender inequalities. However, an intriguing finding emerges when we contextualize these relationships by economic development. Unexpectedly, for both outcome variables, the relationship between religiosity and the perception that men make better leaders than women is stronger, not weaker, in more economically developed societies. Conversely, in economically developing societies, these relationships weaken and may even reverse, challenging the initially hypothesized direction.

Our finding on the significant interaction between economic development (measured by GDP per capita) and religious attendance contributes to our understanding of religion’s role in society and provides insights into scholarly approaches to analyzing gender and religion globally. Our findings complicate the perspective put forth by Norris and Inglehart (2011) that the cultural influence of religion on individuals’ gender ideologies may be weaker in economically developed and often more secular societies. Although our findings show that people in more economically developed (higher GDP) contexts are on average more likely to disagree with the view that men make better leaders than women, we find that there is a positive relationship between religiosity and support for men’s leadership in these societies.

Building upon findings from previous qualitative research (Avishai 2008; Rao 2015), we attribute these differences between our hypotheses and findings to the unique nature of religion as a social institution articulating cultural beliefs about gender. Even though more economically developed countries tend to be more secular, the process of secularization is not a simple linear decline of religion’s authority (Casanova 1994). In more secular societies, some religious practitioners and institutions may actively seek to restore religion’s cultural and moral authority (Casanova 1994).

As a result, in more economically developed contexts, religious individuals are often more socially conservative than the average population (Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013). This creates an environment in which religious individuals may come in conflict with their less religious counterparts over social policies, including those around gender and sexuality (Gaskins et al. 2013; Rozell and Wilcox 1996). Religious attendance acts a mechanism for how this division occurs. In the more economically developed societies, people who attend religious services may be exposed to traditionalist gender discourse as religious institutions attempt to maintain forms of cultural authority through gender. This attempt to restore religious authority may play out in understandings of gender that translate beyond the private spheres of family and church to the relative power dynamics between men and women in the public sphere. Being in an economically developed nation, which may also be more secular, therefore provides conditions for these gender views regarding men’s and women’s leadership in the public sphere to foment.

Meanwhile, in economically developing societies, religion may provide material and cultural resources for women to empower themselves and expand into the public sphere. Selinger (2004) argued that religion cannot be understood through western understandings of religious privatization when examining economic development. Instead, religion provides cultural and institutional resources that contribute to economic development. Our findings support Selinger’s assertion and other recent research showing that religion may act as an important institutional and cultural force that contributes to women’s autonomy in economically developing countries and postcolonial contexts (Baring 2022).

For example, women who participated in religious organizations more frequently in Mozambique displayed greater autonomy (Agadjanian and Yabiku 2015). Meanwhile, women who were not affiliated with a religion displayed lower autonomy levels (Agadjanian and Yabiku 2015). Religious organizations can also play a role in providing educational resources that promote women’s education, such as their literacy (Njoh and Akiwumi 2012), which may translate into a weakening of gender ideologies that favor men in the public sphere. Governments working toward economic development may also work with religious organizations to promote women’s empowerment, albeit to sometimes mixed results, that expand women’s experiences in the public sphere (Adams 2015). Therefore, although overall economically developing countries had higher predicted probabilities of viewing men as better leaders, religion may mitigate this by expanding women’s access to the public sphere in some ways. The role that religion plays in women’s empowerment in economically developing societies explains why the relationship between religious attendance and people’s endorsement of men’s leadership in both politics and business is surprisingly weakened in economically developing societies in our analyses.

Interestingly we found no evidence for a relationship between people’s perceptions of men as better political and business leaders and national-level gender inequalities. This finding diverges from the previous scholarly discussion emphasizing the importance of national-level gender inequalities in shaping general gender ideologies (Fuwa 2004) and religious individuals’ gender ideologies (Di 2020a). Previous research focused in this area examined how religion and the gender ideologies oriented around the “private” sphere may be conditioned upon national-level gender inequalities. In contrast, our study examines the intersection between religion and gender ideologies regarding the “public” sphere. Gender ideologies dealing with the “private” sphere may be conditioned upon national-level gender inequalities, while gender ideologies concerning the “public” sphere may be conditioned upon economic development in different societies.

Scholars argue that national-level gender inequalities matter because they condition the articulation of religious norms and individuals’ interpretations of those norms (Di 2020a; Irby 2014; Rao 2015). In societies with more severe gender inequalities, religious gender norms tend to be more egalitarian than the dominant secular gender norms (Di 2020b), and people also tend to be more critical of traditional gender norms articulated by their religions (Rinaldo 2014). This may explain why GII serves as an important moderator between religious attendance and the “private” facets of gender ideologies in previous research (Di 2020a).

Conversely, economic development may condition gender differently because in economically developing and postcolonial societies, religion may provide women with more political, economic, and educational resources (Baring 2022; Njoh and Akiwumi 2012). These resources can empower women to enter public, paid, and male-dominated spheres, such as politics and business, and may further encourage the faithful to view women as competent leaders in these domains. Hence, when considering the “public” aspects of gender ideologies, it is economic development rather than the national-level gender inequalities moderating the relationship between religiosity and gender ideologies. As social scientific research on gender and religion becomes more diverse and global (Ecklund 2020), it is increasingly important to understand how gender ideologies may operate differently for the private and public spheres and how these are conditioned by various religious and national-level factors.

This research, although contributing insights to social scientific studies of gender and religion, carries certain limitations. First, the use of a cross-sectional survey dataset inherently lacks detailed information about specific mechanisms explaining cross-national differences in the intersection between gender and religion. Despite providing provisional theorizations, this study encourages scholars to use qualitative methodologies to identify the mechanisms underlying the observed cross-national variations. For example, qualitative researchers can examine how religious organizations and which religions in countries of different economic development can strengthen or weaken gender traditionalist ideas about leadership in the public sphere. This is important, as studies show that different religions can promote or attenuate women’s empowerment in developing countries (e.g., Njoh and Akiwumi 2012).

Second, quantitative analysis may overlook nuanced patterns, especially those in individuals’ relationships with and interpretations of religious teachings, even within the same national context and faith tradition. Additionally, the diversity in articulation of gender norms by different religions or faith communities is not fully captured in large-scale survey data. Third, the focus on religious attendance as the primary independent variable and the simplicity of the dependent variables may limit our depth of understanding. Finally, measures such as GDP are often “broad stroke” measures of broader processes of modernization that may look different in different country contexts. Future research should incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data with more nuanced measurements that can better isolate economic development in different societies.

Despite these limitations, the study makes key contributions to social scientific studies of gender and religion. First, it underscores the significance of national context in the analysis of gender and religion, providing insights into the intersection between religion and gender. The research suggests that national context matters as it provides religious practitioners the conditions to adopt a religious lens in making sense of society. Second, this study contributes to debates on how religion shapes gender ideologies in countries with different levels of economic development. Our research suggests that religion operates in different ways in societies with different levels of economic development that can encourage or mitigate gender traditionalist views about women’s and men’s positions in the public sphere. Third, this research suggests that religion may relate differently to people’s gender ideologies in private and public domains as we situate the intersection between gender and religion in a global scale. A careful distinction between gender ideology in the private and public spheres will enable us to have more nuanced and accurate understanding of how religiosity is related to people’s gender ideologies in different national contexts and different spheres of life.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-srd-10.1177_23780231241286377 – Supplemental material for Faithfully Gendered? How Religious Attendance Shapes Views of Women’s Leadership in Politics and Business Cross-Nationally

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-srd-10.1177_23780231241286377 for Faithfully Gendered? How Religious Attendance Shapes Views of Women’s Leadership in Politics and Business Cross-Nationally by Esther Chan and Di Di in Socius

Footnotes

An earlier version of this article was presented at the American Academy of Religion 2022 annual meeting and the American Sociological Association 2022 annual meeting. We are thankful for the helpful comments provided by conference participants.

Authors’ Note

The authors share equal authorship and are listed alphabetically.

ORCID iD

Di Di

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

1

In addition,we tested our results using multiple imputation,and our results did not substantively change.

2

presents findings in which GDP is replaced with the HDI,showing that the results remain substantially the same. The differences in the coefficients for the HDI in comparison with logged GDP are likely to be attributed to the differing scales of these two measurements.

3

Although we did not include regional differences (e.g.,the Americas,Asia,Eurasia,Europe,the Middle East and North Africa,and sub-Saharan Africa) in our main analysis,we ran models with regional difference as a control variable as a robustness check. Our results remain substantially the same,showing significant interactions between GDP and religious attendance,while the cross-level interactions between GII and religious attendance are insignificant.

4

To have a more precise understanding of this interaction,we conducted predicted probability analyses to explore the relationship between religious attendance and the perception of men as superior political leaders in national contexts characterized by the highest and lowest GII values in our sample. The margins plots for both dependent variables (not shown in this article) indicate overlapping confidence intervals across levels of religious attendance.

5

Because of the page limitation,we present the models that are the most relevant to our central research questions. As robustness checks,we ran models with interactions between religious affiliation and religious attendance. The results in these models remain substantially same. In addition,when building models,we added our control variables stepwise in our model building to check potential issues for multicollinearity.

Author Biographies

Esther Chan is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Her research examines diversity in various institutions,including religious institutions,higher education,and digital platforms. Her current research examines diversity in religious and secular higher education and the experiences of social media influencers who create content on religion. Her work has been published in Ethnic and Racial Studies,Sociological Forum,and Public Understandings of Science .

Di Di is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. Her research examines how people’s understanding of religion,gender,science,and technology is conditioned by the national contexts where they live and work. In her most recent research,she examines how tech workers in China and the United States understand the intersections between religion,ethics,and the application of science. She has published in academic journals,such as Sociology of Religion,Social Currents,and the Journal of Contemporary China .

References

Adams

Nathaniel

. 2015. “Religion and Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Retrieved August 23, 2024. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/religion-and-women-s-empowerment-in-bangladesh.

Agadjanian

Victor

Yabiku

Scott T.

2015. “Religious Belonging, Religious Agency, and Women’s Autonomy in Mozambique.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 54(3):461–76.

Avishai

Orit

. 2008. “‘Doing Religion’ in a Secular World: Women in Conservative Religions and the Question of Agency.” Gender and Society 22(4):409–33.

Bagilhole

Barbara

. 2003. “Prospects for Change? Structural, Cultural and Action Dimensions of the Careers of Pioneer Women Priests in the Church of England.” Gender, Work & Organization 10(3):361–77.

Baring

Rito

. 2022. “Experiencing Religion: Post-colonial Views for Religious Education.” Religions 13(1):14.

Burke

Kelsy C.

2012. “Women’s Agency in Gender-Traditional Religions: A Review of Four Approaches.” Sociology Compass 6(2):122–33.

Burn

Shawn Meghan

Busso

Julia

. 2005. “Ambivalent Sexism, Scriptural Literalism, and Religiosity.” Psychology of Women Quarterly 29(4):412–18.

Casanova

José

. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cha

Youngjoo

Thébaud

Sarah

. 2009. “Labor Markets, Breadwinning, and Beliefs: How Economic Context Shapes Men’s Gender Ideology.” Gender & Society 23(2):215–43.

10.

Chan

Esther

. 2015. “Complementarianism as Doctrine and Governance: Narratives on Women’s Leadership Among Second-Generation Asian Americans.” Review of Religious Research 57(3):435–52.

11.

Charles

Maria

Bradley

Karen

. 2009. “Indulging Our Gendered Selves? Sex Segregation by Field of Study in 44 Countries.” American Journal of Sociology 114(4):924–76.

12.

Chatillon

Anna

Charles

Maria

Bradley

Karen

. 2018. “Gender Ideologies.” Pp. 217–26 in Handbook of the Sociology of Gender, edited by Risman

B. J.

Froyum

C. M.

Cham

W. J. Scarborough.

, Switzerland: Springer International.

13.

Ciabattari

Teresa

. 2001. “Changes in Men’s Conservative Gender Ideologies: Cohort and Period Influences.” Gender & Society 15(4):574–91.

14.

Davidman

Lynn

. 1991. Tradition in a Rootless World: Women Turn to Orthodox Judaism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

15.

Davis

Shannon N.

Greenstein

Theodore N.

2009. “Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and Consequences.” Annual Review of Sociology 35:87–105.

16.

. 2020a. “Are Religious Women More Traditionalist? A Cross-National Examination of Gender and Religion.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 59(4):606–28.

17.

. 2020b. “Gendered Paths to Enlightenment: The Intersection of Gender and Religion in Buddhist Temples in Mainland China and the United States.” Social Currents 8(4):341–57.

18.

Eastin

Joshua

Prakash

Aseem

. 2013. “Economic Development and Gender Equality: Is There a Gender Kuznets Curve?” World Politics 65(1):156–86.

19.

Ecklund

Elaine Howard

. 2003. “Catholic Women Negotiate Feminism: A Research Note.” Sociology of Religion 64(4):515–24.

20.

Ecklund

Elaine Howard

. 2006. “Organizational Culture and Women’s Leadership: A Study of Six Catholic Parishes.” Sociology of Religion 67(1):81–98.

21.

Ecklund

Elaine Howard

. 2020. “Diversifying the Social Scientific Study of Religion: The Next 70 Years.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 59(1):5–17.

22.

Edgell

Penny

. 2006. Religion and Family in a Changing Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

23.

Fan

Pi-Ling

Mooney Marini

Margaret

. 2000. “Influences on Gender-Role Attitudes during the Transition to Adulthood.” Social Science Research 29(2):258–83.

24.

Ferguson

Todd W.

2018. “Female Leadership and Role Congruity within the Clergy: Communal Leaders Experience No Gender Differences Yet Agentic Women Continue to Suffer Backlash.” Sex Roles 78(5):409–22.

25.

Fuwa

Makiko

. 2004. “Macro-level Gender Inequality and the Division of Household Labor in 22 Countries.” American Sociological Review 69(6):751–67.

26.

Gaskins

Ben

Golder

Matt

Siegel

David A.

2013. “Religious Participation, Social Conservatism, and Human Development.” Journal of Politics 75(4):1125–41.

27.

Hackett

Conrad

. 2014. “Seven Things to Consider When Measuring Religious Identity.” Religion 44(3):396–413.

28.

Harvey

Peter Francis

. 2018. “It’s a Total Way of Life? Catholic Priests, Women’s Ordination, and Identity Work.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 57(3):547–66.

29.

Heath

Melanie

. 2019. “Espousing Patriarchy: Conciliatory Masculinity and Homosocial Femininity in Religiously Conservative Families.” Gender & Society 33(6):888–910.

30.

Höllinger

Franz

Makula

Lorenz

. 2021. “Religiosity in the Major Religious Cultures of the World.” International Journal of Sociology 51(5):345–59.

31.

Irby

Courtney Ann.

2014. “Dating in Light of Christ: Young Evangelicals Negotiating Gender in the Context of Religious and Secular American Culture.” Sociology of Religion 75(2):260–83.

32.

Jeon

Nanum

. 2023. “Swapping Gender Traditionalism: Christianity, Buddhism, and Gender Ideology in South Korea.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 62(2):336–58.

33.

Kasselstrand

Isabella

Zuckerman

Phil

Cragun

Ryan T.

2023. Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society. New York: New York University Press.

34.

Kurzman

Charles

Dong

Willa

Gorman

Brandon

Hwang

Karam

Ryberg

Renee

Zaidi

Batool

. 2019. “Women’s Assessments of Gender Equality.” Socius. doi:10.1177/2378023119872387.

35.

Larousse

Virginie

. 2023. “Do Religions Legitimize Inequality between Men and Women?” Le Monde. Retrieved August 23, 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/religions/article/2023/03/12/do-religions-legitimize-inequality-between-men-and-women_6019003_63.html.

36.

Liu

Xing

. 2015. Applied Ordinal Logistic Regression Using Stata: From Single-Level to Multilevel Modeling. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

37.

Major

Brenda

Schmader

Toni

. 2001. “Legitimacy and the Construal of Social Disadvantage.” Pp. 176–204 in The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations, edited by Jost

J. T.

Major

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

38.

Njoh

Ambe J.

Akiwumi

Fenda A.

2012. “The Impact of Religion on Women Empowerment as a Millennium Development Goal in Africa.” Social Indicators Research 107(1):1–18.

39.

Norris

Pippa

Inglehart

Ronald

. 2011. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press.

40.

Perales

Francisco

Bouma

Gary

. 2019. “Religion, Religiosity and Patriarchal Gender Beliefs: Understanding the Australian Experience.” Journal of Sociology 55(2):323–41.

41.

Perry

Samuel L.

2013. “She Works Hard(er) for the Money: Gender, Fundraising, and Employment in Evangelical Parachurch Organizations.” Sociology of Religion 74(3):392–415.

42.

Perry

Samuel L.

Whitehead

Andrew L.

2016. “For Better or for Worse? Gender Ideology, Religious Commitment, and Relationship Quality.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 55(4):737–55.

43.

Prickett

Pamela J.

2015. “Negotiating Gendered Religious Space: The Particularities of Patriarchy in an African American Mosque.” Gender & Society 29(1):51–72.

44.

Rao

Aliya Hamid

. 2015. “Gender and Cultivating the Moral Self in Islam: Muslim Converts in an American Mosque.” Sociology of Religion 76(4):413–35.

45.

Rinaldo

Rachel

. 2014. “Pious and Critical: Muslim Women Activists and the Question of Agency.” Gender & Society 28(6):824–46.

46.

Robert

Dana L.

2004. “Women in World Mission: Controversies and Challenges from a North American Perspective.” International Review of Mission 93(368):50–61.

47.

Rozell

Mark J.

Wilcox

Clyde

. 1996. “Second Coming: The Strategies of the New Christian Right.” Political Science Quarterly 111(2):271–94.

48.

Schnabel

Landon

. 2016. “Religion and Gender Equality Worldwide: A Country-Level Analysis.” Social Indicators Research 129(2):893–907.

49.

Schnabel

Landon

Abdelhadi

Eman

Ally Zaslavsky

Katherine

Jacqueline S.

Torres-Beltran

Angie

. 2022. “Gender, Sexuality, and Religion: A Critical Integrative Review and Agenda for Future Research.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 61(2):271–92.

50.

Seguino

Stephanie

. 2011. “Help or Hindrance? Religion’s Impact on Gender Inequality in Attitudes and Outcomes.” World Development 39(8):1308–21.

51.

Selinger

Leah

. 2004. “The Forgotten Factor: The Uneasy Relationship between Religion and Development.” Social Compass 51(4):523–43.

52.

Sumerau

J. Edward

Cragun

Ryan T.

2015. “The Hallmarks of Righteous Women: Gendered Background Expectations in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.” Sociology of Religion 76(1):49–71.

53.

United Nations Development Programme. 2022. “Gender Inequality Index.” Retrieved August 23, 2024. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII.

54.

Webster

Jennica

. 2021. “Could Religion Be Fueling the Gender Pay Gap?” Forbes, August 5.

55.

Whitehead

Andrew L.

Perry

Samuel L.

2019. “Is a ‘Christian America’ a More Patriarchal America? Religion, Politics, and Traditionalist Gender Ideology.” Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne de Sociologie 56(2):151–77.

56.

Woodhead

Linda

. 2007. “Gender Differences in Religious Practice and Significance.” Pp. 566–86 in The Sage Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, edited by Beckford

Demerath

N.J.I.

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.04 MB

0.00 MB