Extensive research highlights how local developer obligations (DOs) are increasingly used by local governments as value capture tools to generate new funds for spatial investment. This article examines why DOs have become a central focus and how their use affects urban planning and development. Using the case of Antwerp, Flanders, and its Urban Development Cost (UDC) policy introduced in 2016, it argues that the motivations for using DOs extend beyond financial considerations. In Antwerp, the UDC serves as a political instrument of statecraft, allowing the executive branch of the city’s democratic structure to create discretionary revenues and consolidate control over them. This centralization of power is obscured by a technocratic approach that standardizes UDC negotiations through calculative practices. Stakeholder interviews further reveal concerns over the mechanism of the UDC, citing diminished democratic oversight, power imbalances, and uneven geographic and economic impacts. The findings highlight the need to further examine how (sub-)local political dynamics shape the financialization of value capture and influence its legitimacy.
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