Abstract
The development of technology brings progress, transformation, material abundance, and a dream life. However, its cultural significance and combined effects are both exciting and frightening. In modern thoughts of cultural studies, there are two relatively clear and opposing attitudes towards “technology,” namely “utopia” and “dystopia.” The former believes that technological progress has increasingly met human needs and promoted cultural innovation, while the latter believes that technological progress has caused spiritual retardation and value collapse. After the “digital revolution” fundamentally changed our lives and world, the question of whether technology is a blessing or a misfortune for humanity is not only an urgent issue for human and social science scholars to answer, but also unavoidable anxieties of daily practice in our time.
Professor Françoise Paquienseguy's article “Digital: The Promise of the Unlimited?” has discussed this issue. Her article analyzes how digital technology has changed the relationships between humans and the world. She argues that the technological environment has been prioritized in all environments of human life (i.e. external environment, internal environment, technological environment, and natural environment). She points out that the far-reaching social relationships created by digital technology break the limits of single existence and lead to the emergence of “plural man.” In addition, she further identifies two major types of human adaptation in the digital environment—to increase the natural potential of humans and to discuss the possibility of mastering time and space (i.e. multi-belongings, acceleration and the quest for immediacy). She points out that the desire for “more” and “faster” unavoidably requires speed and unlimitedness regardless of extending human lifespans or social acceleration. She concludes that we need to establish and accept a new society and value system to preserve freedom and communal life in the digital world. The establishment of morality demands a reflexive look at the boundary and knowing its limits, including examining the boundary of social actions, the boundary of our relations to technology, and the boundary of the permitted/created space in our everyday life. From the content and perspective of her article, the title reveals a negative connotation, indicating that the digital cannot provide unlimited promises.
Paquienseguy's article revolves around the threads of “limits” and “unlimited,” first exploring technologies and later moving on to discussing morality in the end. The author proposes the arguments around five themes by referring to many recent studies and provides heuristic functions to readers. However, it's a pity that the author's voice is not manifested in the article due to the overwhelming quotes. At the same time, the relations between “limits” and morals are not sufficiently elaborated in the article. Centering on the above issues, I will extend the discussions from a cultural aspect and state my arguments below.
Unstoppable technological-digital “surpassing”
Humans have many limitations, from body-physical to knowledge-thinking. However, technologies have largely surpassed these limitations in many ways—converging human and boy, human and nature, and human and society—opening a whole new world and social life. This point has been mentioned by Paquienseguy at the very beginning of her article entitled “Digital: The Promise of the Unlimited?” which emphasizes that while “boundaries” can be surpassed, “limits” prevail. “Technology can push our boundaries, generating new ‘modes of life,’ but it cannot alter our ‘life’ or our limits” (Paquienséguy, 2024, p. 1).
Western thinkers on human nature and humanity
Since Socrates, “What are humans?” has become one of the fundamental questions in Western philosophy. Chinese philosophers from the pre-Qin time (i.e. before 221 BC when the First Emperor of Qin united China) have also contemplated answers to this question. Ever since modernization, every scientific revolution has brought up this difficult question again and urged for an answer. And yet research on humans is still in “a complete anarchy of thought” (Cassirer, 1944), with burgeoning discussions and no agreements. Although we cannot reach a consensus on “What is the nature of humans?”, the question itself contains a belief that there exists a common and universal “human nature” and “human value,” which makes humans a unique species in the universe.
Some scholars believe that Alexander the Great, a student of Aristotle and king of ancient Macedonia, proposed the theory that all humans are essentially similar, regardless of their race and cultural background (McNeill, 1949/2010). From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, there is a long list of discussions around this topic. The British philosopher David Hume (1748/2008) even believes that the main function of history is to discover the universal principles that are constant in human nature. Mainstream Chinese and Western thoughts have always believed that caring for oneself is the purpose of human survival and all its activities. Moreover, the self-realization of human nature is the ultimate goal of conscious human behavior. The history of Chinese and other civilizations has shown that humanity has always engaged in political, economic, and cultural activities, under the belief of a universal human nature and several common values. Therefore, when we talk about digital technology surpassing boundaries, the most important thing is the surpassing of common humanity and common values.
This kind of surpassing certainly does not require a digital revolution to achieve. The social changes and economic competitions brought by the Industrial Revolution, the power competitions and violent actions activated by various political revolutions, and the different historical interpretations and future plans conceived by different ideologies seem to negate the presence of a universal human nature. As late as the nineteenth century, one of the anxieties of Western culture was that humans could no longer be human, and the relationship between humans and the world could no longer be humanistic. From realism novels by Honoré de Balzac and others to modern novels inspired by Franz Kafka, literature and art have excellently demonstrated this issue.
Correspondingly, Karl Marx warned us of the “alienation” of labor; Emile Durkheim studied the “anomie” in society; Sigmund Freud discovered “sexual repression”; Max Weber presented the “Kampf der Götter” of value systems; Jacques Derrida used to deconstruct the “supplement” of texts … In the real world, Imperialism has brought about long-term hostility between the East and the West; Nazism has aggravated racial differences; socialism has implemented class struggle; capitalism has widened the income gap; and globalization has confronted different cultures and caused friction between them … An even more extreme experiment is the large-scale social and technological engineering project that emerged in both the East and the West in the twentieth century to transform human nature and to forge new people. In 1947, Italian writer Primo Levi, who survived torture from Nazis, recalled his life in the Auschwitz concentration camp: Imagine now a man who is deprived of everyone he loves, and at the same time of his house, his habits, his clothes, in short, of everything he possesses: he will be a hollow man, reduced to suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity and restraint, for he who loses all often easily loses himself. He will be a man whose life or death can be lightly decided with no sense of human affinity, in the most fortunate of cases, on the basis of a pure judgment of utility. It is in this way that one can understand the double sense of the term “extermination camp,” and it is now clear what we seek to express with the phrase: “to lie on the bottom.” (1947/1959, pp.21–22)
Therefore, whether to recognize and continue to pursue universal human nature and common cultural values has become a major issue in modernity/postmodernity theories. Some people are sensitive to the huge differences between different cultures and focus on the more malleable aspects of human nature. But others have found that these differences are only superficial and are subjected to the commonality of all humanity, so they are committed to finding universal traits of all humanity. These two standing points project an opposing cultural trajectory. On the one hand, we urgently need to establish new shared values to cope with the new lifeworld and the great transformation of culture. In recent decades, various forms of dialogue between civilization and religions have long sought for a set of universal, global ethics. On the other hand, postmodern theories centered around cultural conflicts. They are dedicated to revealing differences and conflicts between ethnic groups, countries, classes, races, genders, and generations from various cultural texts. They believe that various discourses advocating the existence of universal human values are exclusive and oppressive. The mainstream view of contemporary theories is that cultural study is a political endeavor, and politics is a field of conflict, which cannot acknowledge the existence of shared values (Zhang, 2023, pp. 238–239). In this sense, cultural theory per se not only fails to take responsibility but on the contrary, nihilism.
From Mary’s “Monster,” Huxley’s “World State” to “Gods’ Creation”
In the twentieth century, the development of technology has more effectively destroyed the belief in universal human nature and common values, and at the same time, make it a perceived reality. At least in part, new technologies negate the existence of unique “human nature.” As early as 1932, British writer Aldous Huxley, in his magnum opus
As a product of technology, the residents of Huxley's World State lacked family, personality, passion, freedom, responsibility, and morality. They did not understand poetry, freedom, adventure, good, or even evil. They were just a “humanoid replica,” a species, a machine. Unlike Mary Shelley's nineteenth-century fictional humanoid in
Mary Shelley tells the story of humans being unable to take responsibility for their own creations and thus expresses the troubles and disasters that technological products may bring to humanity, while Aldous Huxley imagines that human technology can only create a completely objectified race, in which all “humans” unconditionally obey the creator's design and command. Thus, humans cannot create true “humans.” From Mary's “monster” to Huxley's “World State” residents, and now to the biotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) that have been advanced and perfected to an unprecedented degree, it is indeed a triumphant journey for the human design, transformation, beautification, simulation, and production.
Cloning technology can not only create new structures at the gene level but also conduct simulations of human beings themselves that are unthinkable for many; AlphaGo has defeated professional board game Go players; AI algorithms have surpassed the “understanding” that humans are capable of … For the first time in history, humans possess a technology that is powerful enough to reshape what we are, hence humanity appears to be something that is easily accessible. When humans and human nature become objects and products, and whereas “artificial humans” can be mass-produced, Huxley's fiction becomes true.
Moreover, the production of “artificial humans” endeavored by a higher level of technology has become increasingly like “natural humans”: they are gentler and more obedient than Mary's “monsters,” while more humane than Huxley's “World State” residents, who can even write poetry. So, “artificial humans” are no longer terrifying or mechanical.
We cannot choose between Mary's “monsters” or Huxley's “World State” residents because strictly speaking, they are only “non-human.” However, we are also unwilling to accept the future where contemporary biotechnology products may bring an end to “natural humans.” The whole challenge lies in the fact that the success of artificial technology may completely change our relationship and beliefs about humans and instrumental technology. The traditional view of technology generally holds that instrument/technology is neutral, and its social effects depend on how humans use these technologies are bounded by ethical culture, social mechanisms, and the norms of political power.
Since the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century and the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century, science, technology, and machines have been widely adopted in the West and then globally. The development of technology has not only enhanced human power and brought benefits, but also caused huge disasters. Although its negative consequences have been warned by literature and art since Romanticism, the utopia of technology has always maintained its tempting gesture. This is certainly because until the digital revolution, the role of technology was generally beneficial to humanity, and its evaluation was generally positive. And more importantly, technology has always been regarded as a tool for humans and an instrument that humans can control. Taking computers as an example, although we can turn them off at any time, nowadays almost everyone relies on them and all work cannot be done without them.
In Christian tradition, humans are created by God. When humans are able to create humans, they become God. However, once created, humans can no longer use their creations as tools. Therefore, this new God is actually creating trouble for themselves. Sigmund Freud (1930) had long discovered that: Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. To-day he has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a god himself. (p.91) Not completely; in some respects not at all, in others only half way … When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times … Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in this field of civilization and will increase man's likeness to God still more. But in the interests of our investigations, we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy in his Godlike character. (p.92)
Everything is still evolving and changing, and of course, humans are not completely helpless. But where is the hope? In Mary's writing, Frankenstein, who created the “monster,” ultimately suffered because of the monster, indicating that artificial humans were betraying the creator. When “World State” residents completely obey their creators, they are not real people. The two novels predict the conflict between human survival and technological development but still maintain a commitment to universal humanity and common values. In Mary's writing, the “monster” was originally kind in nature and tried to take part in human society many times. Its cruel retaliatory behavior stemmed from discrimination, exclusion, and rejection of him by human society, as well as Frankenstein's destruction of the female monster created for him. The hatred, revenge, and serial killings by monsters were merely imitations of human behavior. In Brave New World, there is a dialogue between John the Savage, who grows up in the squalor of the Savage Reservation, and the civilized man from the “World State”: “But I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin.” “In fact,” said Mustapha Mond, “you’re claiming the right to be unhappy.” “All right then,” said the Savage defiantly, “I’m claiming the right to be unhappy.” “Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; the right to have syphilis and cancer; the right to have too little to eat; the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant apprehension of what may happen tomorrow; the right to catch typhoid; the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind.” There was a long silence. “I claim them all,” said the Savage at last. (p. 288)
This brings us back to the issues of “limits” and “unlimited” that are mentioned by Professor Françoise Paquienseguy. The digital revolution has intensified the previous orientation of technological development—it seems not that humans have mastered techniques, rather, technological achievements such as “artificial humans” are gradually replacing humans. It is not cultural values that constrain technology, rather, technology has been changing cultural values. It is becoming increasingly clear that among the various challenges faced by culture, technology may be the most difficult to deal with. So, do humans have the power to overcome technological alienation and rebuild a more reasonable relationship between humans and technology?
“Humanity-Selfness” in Resisting Digitalization
The reason why “artificial humans” can partially replace “natural humans” is that technology has the power to surpass people. For instance, AI makes it possible for machines to learn and work, whose ability can surpass individual humans in these tasks. However, to start with, the development of AI relies on the accumulation of extensive recognition and memory of existing information. AI has not yet demonstrated the ability to generate new knowledge, particularly in the realm of human society. Secondly, human existence does not solely rely on knowledge, but on human attributes that are based on common knowledge—empathy, imagination, judgment, and creativity, all of which may hold greater significance. Human labor and work have increasingly been replaced by “artificial humans.” In this sense, the question of how to make reasonable choices and prudent judgments about human life becomes increasingly important. Thirdly, since the emergence of “artificial humans,” humans must contemplate how to manage the evolving relationships with them, who increasingly resemble humans, and how to formulate a new ethical framework for interpersonal interactions between artificial humans and natural humans. For these issues, AI could not provide a solution to it.
In the 2004 film “I, Robot,” directed by Alex Proyas, the robot who killed his human creator was not an issue and was free from legal punishment because the police believed that murder was confined to a human-to-human act. Other robots even admired this killing robot. Although this is science fiction, it is not far away from becoming a reality in human life. The massive production and proliferated appearance of “artificial humans” in society presents a significant challenge to our established social structures, norms, ethics, and legal frameworks. If human beings are not merely smarter animals, nor are less efficient computers, then an older philosophical puzzle appears once again: what are humans?
Culture creates human essence: Derrida's deconstructive method
The emergence of new technologies, including the digital revolution, has fundamentally altered the core of humanity and cultural landscape. Instead of contemplating the possibility of individuals maintaining independence from technology, the problem is that technology has already become an autonomous entity itself. In this context, is it possible for us to meaningfully explore the persistent presence of culture and values that are intrinsically interwoven with the essence of humanity? In contemporary philosophy and cultural theory, the concepts such as “humanity” or “the essence of human,” are defined not by “what they are, but by “what they are not.” This approach echoes Jacques Derrida's deconstructive method, which asserts that the concept of humanity is essentially crafted through its distinction from non-humanity, allowing us to grasp its essence by understanding what it is not. Therefore, the definition of humanity is extremely dependent upon the category of non-humanity in seeking explanations from the differences between humanity and non-humanity. Therefore, humanity has always been forecasted by what it is not. Where there are humanities, there exists the object of humanities. As McGowan (2007) stated: Torture as inhuman, indifference to suffering as inhuman, the will of the powerful over the weak as inhuman … The result of course, is that torture, indifference and power, do not properly belong on the scene of the human but also implicitly that real humans do not engage in these things. The Nazi death camps, then, were the work of monsters who were not properly human and so the human is absolved of responsibility in that direction. (p.120)
By using language and/or lexicon to reject evil human behavior, Derrida contends that these “non-human” modes of thinking are also the confirmation of humanity. “As an effect of the operation of difference, the category of the human radically depends for its constitution, as such, on the category of which is not human that it may be defined by its difference to it” (McGowan, 2007, p.124). Therefore, humanity emerges distinctly once separated from inhumanity, which itself is defined by specific value systems. Given it, humanity is a fluid concept that can be negotiated rather than an absolute property of anything, eternally influenced by the limits of inhuman behavior. This illustrates that humanity is not inherent or a priori, but rather an outcome fashioned by cultural forces. What we regard as undeniable humanity is merely common sense—a uniform standard that grows out of specific cultural values. “The human, then, is ideology” (McGowan, 2007, p.123). From this perspective, it is neither power nor politics that alienates humanity nor technology that leads to the “dehumanization” of individuals. Instead, there was never an inherent “human” or “humanity,” what is conventionally understood as “human” or pertaining to “humanity” is, in essence, a cultural artfact, rooted in distinct values or ideologies. This theory, which rejects the notion of a fixed humanity, does not lend credence to the idea that digitalization represents an unlimited frontier. In conclusion, humanity is an artfact forged by culture rather than by technology. This school of thought can be referred to as “Culture creates human essence.”
Lyotard's stance on humanity
Given the profound transformations in human life throughout history and the infinite diversity of human nature, the above-mentioned “Culture creates human essence” ethos gains reasonable support from psychology, ethnology, anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies. Research efforts from these disciplines collectively argue against essentializing the concept of “human nature” or attempting to define it in isolation, suggesting instead a deeply interwoven relationship between culture and the very fabric of human identity. However, Derrida overlooks a critical aspect: the values, ideologies, and cultures that demarcate the human from the inhuman are themselves fabricated artifacts. This oversight echoes are based upon an old idea: it is through the prism of culture and ideology—elements not shared with other species—that we define our humanity. This observation prompts a critical inquiry into the mechanisms by which humans generate culture and ideological frameworks. Inquiries posed by French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, a distinguished contemporary in the realm of postmodern theory, open up a novel perspective for the exploration of human nature. Lyotard (1991) asked: What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a “second” nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness and reason? That the second depends on and presupposes the first is agreed by everyone. The question is only that of knowing whether this dialectic, whatever name we grace it with, leaves no remainder. Here, what is “proper” to the human inheres neither in its consciousness nor its materiality. It is neither the capacity to think, nor the mechanics of its organic being. It is, in other words, not simply reducible either to its soft- or its hardware in technology's terms. The misery of childhood, the alienation of being in meaning produce the human, but the very condition of its production in these terms renders the human ambivalent. Whatever name we grace the process with, the point of contest is the remainder. If there is none, then machines can replicate the being of being human. If there is, then they cannot. For Lyotard, the remainder, not the alienation, is the key. Here the second form of the inhuman, as he began by defining it, comes to the fore. (p.128) Freud already listed three famous ones: man is not the centre of the cosmos (Copernicus), is not the first living creature (Darwin), is not the master of meaning (Freud himself). Through contemporary techno-science, s/he learns that s/he does not have the monopoly of mind, that is of complexification, but that complexification is not inscribed as a destiny in matter, but as possible, and that it takes place, at random, but intelligibly, well before him/herself. S/he learns in particular that his/her own science is in its tum a complexification of matter, in which, so to speak, energy itself comes to be reflected, without humans necessarily getting any benefit from this. And that thus s/he must not consider him/herself as an origin or as a result, but as a transformer ensuring, through techno-science, arts, economic development, cultures and the new memorization they involve, a supplement of complexity in the universe. (p.45)
Hypermodern human: in search of ethics and morality of the digital world
From this analytical standpoint, the advent of technologies cannot usurp the unique position of humanity, nor can the broad spectrums of culture and ideology encapsulate the entirety of the human essence. Occupying roles as both transformer ensuring and mediators of the material, the societal, and the technological realms, humans embody man's real meaning of initiative and particularity. Technological progress, therefore, is relegated to the status of instruments and resources, subservient to the dictates of human nature. The prerogative of what to transform, the methodologies of these transformations, and related considerations invariably require human engagement for discernment, assessment, and implementation. Therefore, Gilles Lipovetsky (2004) and colleagues introduce the concept of the “hypermodern human,” positing that future humans will require, and indeed should possess, the capacity to transform and mediate digital technology in ways that surpass the abilities of their modern predecessors. This capability, they assert, extends well beyond mere technical skill and productive capacity. Just as medical technology possesses the capacity to cure diseases yet fails to address the existential query of “why we live,” technological advancements have augmented human power without a commensurate enhancement in the wisdom required for utilizing such technology.
Confronted with the “non-human” prospects heralded by the digital revolution, the true paradox lies not within the potential of human beings, but rather in the crisis of human capability. Hence, it becomes imperative to establish what Professor Francoise Paquienseguy has termed the ethics and morality of the digital world. Such a framework is essential for fostering a sense of universal humanity and shared values. This approach is vital in effectively confronting and navigating the crisis that impacts us all, ensuring that in our increasingly digital existence, we remain guided by principles that honor and extend our collective humanity and ethical foundations.
A notable outcome of the evolution of social culture is the broadening of ethical horizons. This expansion of ethical limits signifies not merely an augmentation of human freedom but also an escalation in human responsibilities, demanding a deeper commitment to humanization. Technology continues to uncover and devise methods to augment, amplify, and alter human capabilities. The current state is by no means final; we stand on the brink of even more dramatic transformations in the future. Repeatedly, these advancements will propel us toward new ethical frontiers, challenging us to reassess and expand our moral considerations in step with technological progress.
Do the significant advancements within the field of biology serve merely for healing and curing, or do they also act as catalysts for enhancing human capabilities? AI also faces complex ethical issues. For example, the thinking of robots may be more advanced or even thoughtful than that of humans. Digital platforms have harnessed computer algorithms to anticipate our preferences in movies, music, and literature with remarkable precision. This proficiency symbolizes a broader trend wherein digital technology and algorithmic reasoning have been extensively leveraged by governments and authorities to exert influence over the daily behaviors of citizens.
The blurring of traditional boundaries: choice and self
Amidst this technological evolution, the conventional boundary demarcating the public from the private realm has diminished, leading to a scenario where the lines between what is considered legal and illegal are increasingly obscured. The distinctions separating the workplace from personal time have eroded, while even aspects of matchmaking and intimacy now intersect with computational systems. In an era where technology pervades every aspect of our lives, rendering our behaviors predictable in any given situation, and where our ostensibly free choices are in fact guided and limited by algorithms, the question arises: How much genuine personal freedom do we retain? All of these indicate that we are entering a vast unknown territory, which is the starting point of an unprecedented human transformation. If our behavior is predictable in any situation, and our self-proclaimed choices are actually recommended and restricted by digital culture or social media, how much personal freedom can we still have or feel like we have? This plight seems like a contemporary manifestation of Max Weber's enduring question (1904/2013): Capitalist economy replaces traditional economy and forms corresponding social organizations and systems, thereby enhancing human computing power in controlling the external environment (Weber and Kalberg, 2013). When evaluated on the metrics of efficiency and productivity, modern rational capitalism unequivocally emerges as the preeminent economic system. However, the process of rationalization, integral to the social fabric that underpins rational capitalism, finds itself at odds with some of the paramount values of Western civilization—namely, individual creativity, autonomy, or freedom. The ability to tame and convert capital still needs to be improved and the issue of managing and converting digits has just been raised.
Paramount among these concerns is how modern technology is incrementally eroding the very bedrock of humanity. This reality urgently summons us to engage in a profound exploration of the ethics and morality pertinent to the digital age. It is of critical importance to recognize that, irrespective of the non-human elements that technological advancements may introduce, the society invariably necessitates the principles and artistry that underlie communal coexistence. In his analysis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Klaus Schwab (2016) underscores the challenges brought forth by emerging technologies but affirms an enduring belief in human agency to shape the future: Despite these complexities, he maintains a steadfast belief in our capacity to master the future. It is up to us. Today we find ourselves at the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution, looking forward and, more importantly, possessing the ability to influence its path. Knowing what is required to thrive is one thing; acting upon it is another. Where is all this leading and how can we best prepare?…Voltaire once said: “Doubt is an uncomfortable condition, but certainty is a ridiculous one.” Indeed, it would be naive to claim that we know exactly where the fourth industrial revolution will lead. But it would be equally naive to be paralysed by fear and uncertainty about what that direction might be. (p.103)
Echoing Lyotard—the human self is a “transformer ensuring” which transcends mere physicality or sensation. It is variously termed across epochs, such as “soul,” “self,” “subject,” or “human nature.” The intricate workings of this transducer remain elusive to neuroscience, yet its essence as a “converter”—transmuting energy, data, and objects—suggests a binary of “self” (humanity) and “non-self” (non-human), with the demarcation between them being nebulous. Nonetheless, a limit undoubtedly exists. In anticipation of an uncertain future, there is a pressing need to craft new ethics—rules of engagement for the digital age—that delineate what is admissible and what is proscribed, thereby navigating the intricate balance between technological innovation and the preservation of our intrinsic human essence.
“The Devouring of Nature” and Powerlessness of Technology
The ethics of civilized humanity originate from recognizing limits and boundaries. The core of civilization agendas such as humans and nature, humans and animals, and humans and others are the boundaries that need to be differentiated. The pre-Qin philosopher Xunzi (453–221 BCE/2014) once stated (see Xunzi, 2014): Humans are born having desires. When they have desires but do not get the objects of their desire, then they cannot but seek some means of satisfaction. If there is no measure or limit to their seeking, then they cannot help but struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other then there will be chaos, and if there is chaos then they will be impoverished. The former kings hated such chaos, and so they established rituals and to divide things among people, to nurture their desires … (pp. 201–217).
When the digital revolution stands in opposition to the ethical and moral foundation of “differentiation” and “setting boundaries” due to its enormous surpassing function, the new rules of social games in the digital age should recognize limits in transgression and respect differences during integration. As mentioned earlier, human nature and the self serve as “transformer ensuring[s]” to differentiate humans and nature, humans and animals, and humans and others in a new sense. This is a complex issue, which I will briefly explain in the following part, starting with the boundary between humans and the external world.
Humans’ own creation of the omnipotent artificial world
New technologies such as the digital revolution, AI, and gene editing have changed all previous social rules due to their effectiveness in transforming natural species. They not only seek to surpass nature but also reshape it and create it anew. The omnipresence of virtualization, immaterialization, and artificial, digital technology in a broader sense, indicates that technology has permeated and increasingly taken a dominant position in our natural, social, and cultural environments, along with their almost omnipotent dominance. Technology has replaced existence, and digits have replaced everything. The ancient Pythagorean aphorism “All is number” has been modernized into “digital survival” and “all is the cloud.” Now, we primarily live in an “artificial world” created by humans themselves, a world that tends to eliminate boundaries between people, things, and objects, and turn the world into a permutation of digits. As a result, humans have gained an unprecedented sense of “liberation” and “freedom” defined by technology—they are no longer one of the species in the world but rather the only one.
Nature and its elements are inherently diverse, while societal uniformity largely results from rational abstraction and human manipulation. People conquer the nature and the world, continually categorizing them into known and unknown realms, and expanding empirical understanding. Digitalization introduces new paradigms rooted in formal, mathematical, and power-driven ideologies, aiming at transforming and conquering the external and internal nature. As nature increasingly becomes objectified, individuals risk losing their essence and becoming mere tools. Digitalization erodes object diversity and negates the human “self,” disrupting nature's balance and impeding its natural growth and freedom. Consequently, nature resists through disorder and disasters. Moreover, suppressing human internal nature leads to resentment and rebellion against civilization, manifesting in antisocial behavior, social unrest, crime, and psychological disorders.
Ultimately, rationalization coexists with irrationality, and the attempts to control nature lead to retaliation. Besides, digitalization's erasure of the natural world's diversity may result in the loss of profound worldly meaning and the erosion of natural beauty. Not stop at providing resources for human life, the natural realm serves as a wellspring of existential significance. In contrast to the artificial, the organic, dynamic, and evolving aspects of nature, alongside its inherent dignity and awe-inspiring qualities, form essential foundations for human ethical values and esthetic perceptions. The diminishing of worldly significance echoes with Max Weber's (1922/2004) notion of the “disenchantment of the world”; the fading esthetic sensibility is configured by the digitalization's dismissal of nature's rich imagery, diversity, and vitality. Classical Chinese culture about the ever-changing marvels of the natural world offers an unending wellspring of esthetic delight. As Chinese great poet Su Shi (1079/1996) wrote: Between Heaven and Earth each thing has its own master. If something is not mine, then I cannot take it as mine, even if it is only a hair. There is only the cool breeze along with the bright moon among the mountains. The ears catch one of these, and it is sound; the eyes encounter the other, and it forms colors. Nothing prevents us from taking these as our own. We can do whatever we want with them and they will never be used up. This is the inexhaustible treasure trove of the Fashioner-of-Things (pp. 293–294).
Surrounded by countless images, symbols, and images, individuals, devoid of reflection or resistance, can only passively accept and conform to them. False satisfaction, pseudo-entertainment, obedience, and resignation become the ailments of the digital age. The more vibrant and beautiful the world created by digital culture, the more isolated and powerless the individual becomes. Political and politicized resistance dies with the collapse of society. The most significant aspect here is the dissolution of the concept of “reality.” Endless digital products increasingly cover and replace the real world. It is not a matter of distinguishing between truth and falsehood but the absence of any “truth” whatsoever.
In the Western tradition, all cultural beliefs are based on “representation,” which in turn relies on “reality” as a premise. A symbol can point to an object, and a symbol can be used to exchange meaning. This exchange is guaranteed by the highest existence of God. But God is dead—digitalization allows even “God” to be imitated, reducing God to a symbol, that constitutes belief. Consequently, the entire representational system of Western tradition collapses; it is nothing but a vast illusion, engaging only in self-exchange rather than with reality. Thus, the mechanism of “representation” ceases to exist, replaced by a program of “simulacra.” Symbols point to entities, represent entities, and equate to entities, hence “representation”; “simulacra” transcends the utopian representation of “representation” and “equivalence,” reducing everything to death.
Language not only describes reality but also creates it, while reality becomes the creation of language. Previously, symbols and media were believed to represent, reflect, and signify reality, but now they are constituting the “hyperreal,” a new media reality—“more real than reality.” “Post-nature” becomes “post-truth,” likewise, all these become “post-God.” Shan (2017, pp. 508–545) compared the above views of French scholars Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard in his work. Although these viewpoints have yet to be confirmed by contemporary experience and common sense, it is a helpful framework for analysis in digital culture. At least until now, humanity is still unwilling to live in the “hyperreal” world; we still need nature, materiality, and a belief in truth to identify, and reject rumors, lies, and falsehoods. In conclusion, humanity cannot solely live in the digital and virtual realms, and nature will not be entirely “digitalized.”
Return to nature and true essence
The digital revolution, similar to a formidable tide, appears to surge relentlessly forward. If modernization is epitomized by the ascent of industrial capitalism and bourgeois dominance, then the digital era emerges as a domain governed by symbols, codes, and simulations. If modernization focuses on the production of goods (commodities and products), the digital age is characterized by radical cultural production and a proliferation of symbols. If modernization is characterized by growing differentiation in various aspects of life, then the digital age can be viewed as a period marked by “transgression” and “integration,” representing a movement away from differentiation. However, there is little reason to simplify this process as progress in the conventional sense—progress that enhances human survival, enriches life's meaning, and broadens horizons.
Inadequacy of scientific methods
In a commemorative address in 1974, Friedrich Von Hayek, speaking as an economist, scrutinized the inherent limitations of quantitative methods and criticized the prevalent belief in “quantitative data” in economics (Von Hayek, 1989). Von Hayek points out the fallacy of blind faith in science and scientific methodologies: What I mainly wanted to bring out by the topical illustration is that certainly in my field, but I believe also generally in the sciences of man, what looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the most unscientific, and, beyond this, that in these fields there are definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve. This means that to entrust to science or to deliberate control according to scientific principles-more than scientific method can achieve may have deplorable effects.” (p.6)
Human behavior harbors elements eluding scientific observation, and seemingly precise outcomes may harbor erroneous conclusions. The crux lies not in refuting scientific methods like quantification but in delineating the bounds of science and its methodologies. While these limits may not be as sharply as what Hayek suggested, they do exist. Digitalization cannot promise to annul all constraints: human nature, multifaceted and ever-changing, has its limitations; nature undergoes constant metamorphosis, yet the transformed remains inherently natural. This foundation, grounded not in science and technology but in the belief in human life, forms the bedrock of civilization. Without this belief, our future seems bleak: everything is digitalized and the realms of human and machine merge, time-honored orders and balances are surpassed, and the ethical underpinnings of civilization face dissolution. The inevitable consequence is that the rules governing social interactions are increasingly dictated and enforced by the wielders of digits and algorithms. Technologies, seemingly surpass boundaries, and metamorphose into scientific instruments which regulate human behavior.
Maintaining boundaries among human, non-human and nature
The digital revolution, biotechnology, and other advancements should not and cannot surpass all boundaries. Culture and art must play a role because humanity, as this “transformer ensuring”, requires the energy provided by culture and art. Going beyond digital technology, we need digital ethics and digital culture. We must realize that technology should only serve as a tool for humans, rather than a challenger or a terminator. We must refuse to become slaves for advancing technology. There is an imperative to maintain boundaries between humanity and non-human entities, between humans and nature, regardless of how broad or distant these boundaries may be. Looking back on cultural history, what unsettles us is the melancholy of civilization. In the emerging industrial society from the 18th to 19th centuries, Romanticism, represented by the “Jena Group” in Germany, exposed the degradation of nature and life. They said, “Lonely and lifeless, Nature stood. The scanty number and the rigid measure bound her with fetters of iron. As into dust and air melted the inconceivable blossoms of life into mysterious words” (p.27). They opposed civilization with nature and pursued esthetics over utilitarianism, endeavoring to make art a guiding principle of life. They opposed civilization with nature and pursued esthetics over utilitarianism, aiming to make art a principle of life.
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, popular concepts in cultural life, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche's “The Will to Power,” Vilfredo Pareto's “Residues,” Henri Bergson's “Elan Vital,” Sigmund Freud's “Desire,” and in sociology, the “Instinct School,” as well as in literature, the New Romanticism, supported nature and protested against civilization. However, at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, semiotics, structuralism, deconstructionism, narratology, discourse analysis, and ideological critique penetrated the cultural and artistic realms. Across various fields of social sciences, there are shifts toward linguistics, discourse, culture, and digitalization. These trends collectively signify the end of “nature” and the comprehensive triumph of “culture.” Nature has already receded, and humanity has become the victorious party. If this isn’t the madness of reason, it's at least a dereliction of culture. Yet, these three simple points of analysis tell us that the progress of technology and the achievements of civilization do not bring only good news. Perhaps, what we may anticipate is that a minority of individuals, like Faust in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's narrative (Goethe, 2014), will eventually grow tired of knowledge, step out of the confined technology and digitalization, and immerse themselves in nature to rediscover their true essence once again:
Footnotes
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