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Abstract

This study empirically examines the effects of full-time employees’ stock options and their share ownership on innovation. Based on data gleaned from 284 firms among China’s innovative industries, we test four hypotheses via fixed-effect regression, applied to unbalanced panel data over the time period of 2009–2014. The results show that both full-time employees’ stock options and their share ownership positively effects innovation. And said positive effects persist across business-enterprise ownership, as opposed to state- owned organizations. The study provides insightful knowledge of the roles that full-time employees’ stock options and their share ownership play in innovative industries. While ownership could be a crucial innovation determinant, besides its qualifications, the study also offers policymaking guidelines for practice as well as implications for future research.

Keywords

Full-time employees stock options stock ownership patent ownership types

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Employee stock-option and share-ownership effects on innovation

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